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MHI-102
MODERN WORLD

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COURSE INTRODUCTION

This course explains the major processes by which the modern world has been created and has subsisted. Major areas covered in this course are the theories of the modern world, the modern state and politics, capitalism and industrialization, the expansion of Europe, revolutions and international relations, modern warfare and the dilemmas of development. None of these is a history of any single part of the world so much as a history of processes the world over. The focus of this course is to make you familiar with these processes of development in order to have better understanding of the modern world. It necessarily involves much of European history, and more of Europe than many other regions of the world; but this is not a history of Europe, nor is the history of modernity equated with the history of Europe.

The structures of nationalism and socialism are not uniquely European; colonialism and decolonization complement capitalism, imperialism, and the expansion of Europe; units on international relations and revolutions are mainly focused on Europe, but its dynamism influenced the rest of the world. Issues on demography, ecology, consumerism, and globalization are not confined to Europe only, these had implications on the entire world. Thus it is not a history of Europe only, but in true sense its emphasis on the processes and common attributes help in understanding the major trends in the development of modern world.

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This course has 26 Units and **Unit 1** discusses the Renaissance which is considered as the first step towards developing an understanding of the modern world. It highlights precisely those aspects of the Renaissance that were to exercise a profound influence on the shaping of the new world. It talks about the arrival of new groups (lawyers and notaries), unfolding of new ideologies (humanism, secularism, e.g.), new processes and discoveries (print and education) and also new debates (realism vs. moralism) that were to give a new dimension to the history of the times. **Unit 2** deals with the Enlightenment that laid the foundation of the modern world. Around the turn of the 18th and the 19th centuries, it became obvious that the western European societies were undergoing a radical structural change. They had begun experiencing an unprecedented growth in the realm both of production and of science and technology. A combination of economic and cognitive growth created the space for a radical transformation of the western European society. This transformation was radical in the sense that the fundamental principles of organization were changing and it appeared that the very spirit of men was being transformed. The idea of progress was born. Enlightenment was a sustained intellectual endeavour to understand this phenomenon. This Unit will familiarize you with the ideas of enlightenment and also its relevance for the rest of the world. **Unit 3** makes an attempt to introduce the French Revolution which inaugurated the world of modern politics, of ideological parties, of totally mobilized citizen bodies, of total war, and of nationalism. The French Revolution was universal in its vision; it was not merely French even if it is known by that name; it assumed, and acted on the assumption, that its principles could be universally applied. It provided the inspiration and models for radicals throughout the 19th century in a manner that no other revolution did.

Unit 4 initiates you into an understanding of the State, particularly in its new modern interaction. Modern State has been seen to perform a whole range of new functions, the enormity of which has baffled scholars and motivated them to undertake a comprehensive study of the nature of modern State. The Unit offers a discussion of the various theories that have been propounded on the character of modern State. Modern States are all democratic, in the sense that they all seek a democratic legitimacy. They claim that their authority and power are derived from the will of the people and attempt to demonstrate it. The visible feature of modern States is bureaucracy combined with professionalism. As a system of governance through hierarchy, expertise, impersonal rules, and calculability, it has become indispensable and pervasive to modern states and non-state structures. Bureaucratization is a process that began in the early 19th century in the wake of industrialization in the drive to harness human resources through the most efficient possible means, and it has become both permanent and universal, although in varying degree. As the state and the citizen both mobilize and self mobilize through democracy and rule and function through bureaucracy, all leading to greater inclusiveness and effectiveness, the state assumes and citizens assert the right to welfare to a degree unheard of before and meaningless without the universal reach of both bureaucracy and democracy. Welfare, defined as a citizen's entitlement over and beyond his current contribution to national income, increasingly displaced charity from the early 19th century and began to be undertaken by the state in comprehensive fashion. Along with this, one of the most important features of modern politics is nationalism. This consists in a single culture claiming a single territory and the right to political domination within it. The consequence is that the world is carved up into, or is sought to be carved up into, a series of such parcels called nations. This is so profound an assumption and commitment that it would be impossible to find a state of the twentieth century which did not purport to represent a unique culture and mobilize its population through a nationalist ideology. **Units 5, 6, 7** and **8** dealing with Bureaucratization, Democratic Politics, Modern State and Welfare, and Nationalism focus on four different attributes of modern polity but emphasize the interconnected nature of all of them. **Unit 9** explains capitalist Industrialization focusing on the processes associated with capitalist development. This also discusses new categories of analysis like capital, capitalism in the classic sense and new classes such as bourgeoisie as the hallmark of the modern day economic systems. **Unit 10** on Socialist Industrialization is mainly a feature of the 20th century economic system which came into being through a comprehensive critique of the reigning capitalist industrialization by Socialist and Marxist thinkers. It came into practice for the first time on a nationwide scale in Soviet Russia after October Revolution and was later followed in varying forms in the countries of the Eastern Block and later other non-European countries like China.

Units 11, 12, 13 and **14** make you familiar with the story of expansion, imperialism, colonialism, de-colonization, migrations, settlements and challenges to it. In the 16th century Portuguese established monopolies over the lines of sea-trade and levied tribute on Asian ships. They were soon followed by the Dutch who also exercised control over the Indian Ocean. The wealth acquired from these tributes greatly facilitated European trade with Asia. Then in the 18th century, the English created the greatest tribute system by earning the right to tax the territories conquered in India and using these revenues as investments for purchases of Asian commodities. This meant that now they did not have to spend the silver procured from Americas in order to purchase Asian goods. Indian commodities could now be bought with the money raised from India as revenue. This had huge implications for the accumulation of wealth in Europe which is said to have facilitated the industrial development of Europe. **Unit 11** deals with imperialism and how this imperialism affected, and related to, the rest of the world is the focus of **Unit 12**. **Unit 13** on de-colonization is the story of the pattern and range of the liberation struggles that resisted and ultimately overthrew the imperial domination. **Unit 14** discusses the processes of conquests, migrations, and settlements that brought parts of the world closer to one another. **Units 15** and **16** explain the political configuration of the new world. **Unit 15** provides the story of rise of nation-state system in the western world and how the power of the nation-state became crucial in international relations throughout the 19th century. In the course of the 19th century, the world effectively passed under the domination of the six imperial powers, what were known as the great powers, USA, Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and Japan. **Unit 16** explains that how these states formed themselves into international blocks following the Cold War based on ideological proximity and competed with one another for supremacy over the world. **Unit 17** is on the Russian Revolution which provided the inspiration and models for radicals. Just as the French revolution dominated the 19th century, the Russian revolution loomed over the 20th century. The Russian revolution brought dramatic political transformation. Beyond politics there was revolutionary transformation in the domain of science and technology. We live so much in the world of what is known as "knowledge explosion" that we don't appreciate how much of a continuous revolution it is and has been since the 16th century. **Unit 18** introduces to the context in which new scientific ideas developed and how modern science brought significant changes in outlook and production of new scientific knowledge. Modern science helped in bringing long lasting and irreversible changes in society. **Units 19** and **20** familiarize with the developments in various spheres of knowledge and technology that revolutionized printing, medical science and communication. Technological advancement brought about enormous changes in the socio-economic life of mankind in a variety of ways. **Unit 21** looks into the changing notions of war which differentiated itself from the earlier idea of limited war. It was for the first time during the early 19th century that Napoleon dragged entire populations into recruiting for the army. He also involved the entire populations in war in inflicting damages with the intention of crippling the enemy state. It was from this notion that the idea of the modern warfare emerged. **Unit 22** gives you the idea of the process which led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. The collapse of the Soviet Union brought an end to the rivalry between the two power blocs following the days of the Cold War and marked the creation of a unipolar world. **Units 23, 24** and **25** introduce you to tremendous social cost that has had to be paid for modern development. These social costs have been captured through the digits of demography, ecology and consumerism. Last **Unit 26** of this course is on globalization. Globalization has transcended geographical boundaries impacting not only political and economic life but has influenced social, cultural life of all nations. The risk and cost brought out by globalization have significant implications for various nations, particularly for the developing countries.

Hope after studying this course you should be able to comprehend the processes through which the modern world has emerged. This course will help you to learn:

- Basic features of the modern world,
- Theories of the modern world,
- Capitalism, imperialism, colonialism and de-colonization,
- Nationalism and nation-state system,
- Developments in modern science and consequent revolution in knowledge and technology impacting every sphere of human life,
- Developments in world politics,
- Dilemmas of development referring to demography, ecology and consumerism; and
- Globalization and its implications.

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UNIT 1 RENAISSANCE AND THE IDEA OF THE INDIVIDUAL

Structure

1.1 Introduction
1.2 The Invention of the Idea
1.3 Developments in Italy
1.4 New Groups: Lawyers and Notaries
1.5 Humanism
1.6 New Education
1.7 Print
1.8 Secular Openings
1.9 Realism vs. Moralism
1.10 Summary
1.11 Exercises

1.1 INTRODUCTION

This is the first Unit of the course and is being treated as the entry point to an understanding of the modern world. 'Renaissance' is an Italian word meaning re-birth. But over the last two centuries the word has come to acquire a new meaning. Renaissance as we understand it today is associated with major social and cultural developments in Europe between the 13th and the 15th centuries. The contribution of the Renaissance to the emergence of modernity in early modern Europe has been for many years an appropriate entry point to the history of the modern world. However most intellectuals of the third world dislike such an euro-centric vision, there is no escape from the fact that it was in renaissance Italy and subsequently in certain parts of the sixteenth century Europe that a new view of man as a creative individual possessing the power to shape his destiny without depending on god became a major inspiration for social thinking and political action. In a loose sense this is what is conveyed by what we know as renaissance humanism. Michelangelo's painting of the creation of Adam in the Sistine Chapel, in an artistic sense was a celebration of the newly discovered greatness of man. The idea of a free and creative man was not however a consequence of renaissance social thought alone. Reformation, which came quickly on the heels of the Renaissance also, made its distinct contribution to a spirit of self-consciousness by privatizing religious practice and Protestantism fundamentally fostered an individualistic psyche.



MICHELANGELO, *The Creation of Adam* (About 1511)

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1.2 THE INVENTION OF THE IDEA

It is interesting to know that, prior to the 19th century, the major socio-cultural developments in Europe during the 13th-15th centuries were not understood and codified *as* renaissance. In this section, you will become familiar with the process in which renaissance became a part of our knowledge.

In 1860, Jakob Burckhardt formulated the influential concepts of 'Renaissance' and 'humanism', in his pioneering masterpiece of cultural history, *The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy.* Burckhardt's book was a "subtle synthesis of opinions about the Renaissance that had grown powerful during the Age of the Enlightenment". He seemed to be confirming a story told by secular, liberal intellectuals of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries who were searching for the origins of their own beliefs and values, that after the collapse of classical civilization a period of darkness and barbarism had set in, dominated by the church and the humdrum of rural life. Eventually, however, a revival of commerce and urban life laid the foundations for a secular and even anti-religious vision of life. The new vision, which glorified the individual and the attractions of earthly life were strongly reinforced by the rediscovery of the pagan literature of the Antiquity. The new secular and individualistic values, which were somewhat incompatible with Christian beliefs, constituted a new worldly philosophy of life known as 'humanism', drawing its main ideas and inspiration from ancient times. Humanism subsequently became the inspiration for questioning the moral basis of the feudal and Christian inheritances in Europe.

Burkhardt's work, which dominated the 19th century perception about the Renaissance, came to be subjected to criticisms later. For a time in the late 1940s and the 1950s, the very idea of a Renaissance came under attack, when the rich growth of scholarship on medieval history made the inherited view of a dark and uncivilized Middle Ages look untenable, "as medievalists discovered squarely in the Middle Ages all the essential traits supposedly typical of the later period, and also discovered within the Renaissance many traditional elements which seemed to prove that the Middle Ages lived on into the Renaissance". Medievalists found renaissances in the sense of periods of classical revival in Carolingian France, Anglo-Saxon England and Ottonian Germany. One of these medieval revivals, the 'twelfth-century Renaissance', became a subject of major historical enquiries, since the coinage of the term by Charles Homer Haskins in his *The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century* (1927). Haskins maintained that the term 'renaissance', in the sense of an enthusiasm for classical literature, was an important feature of the twelfth century and that this cultural renewal was the ancestor of subsequent civilizational progress in early modern Europe.

Yet historians have not discarded fully the concept and the term 'Renaissance' in the sense Burckhardt had used it. For historical realities, which Burckhardt had described, cannot be dismissed with quibbles about terminology. Burckhardt rightly saw the emergence of a new culture and also located one of its main sources in Italian humanism by linking it to a unique set of social, political, and economic conditions. This new culture might seem to be the product of the growth of commerce and cities in northern Italy from the late eleventh century. But urban growth and commercial expansion since the 11th century, does not explain why the new culture flowered almost at the end of the 14th century even as it is true that Italy during the 12th and 13th centuries had become the most highly developed, the wealthiest and the most urbanized region of Europe. The urban and commercial growth of Italy stands in contrast to other parts of Europe in the north of the Alps, where the scholastic philosophy, Gothic art, and vernacular literature of these centuries were clearly associated with the clergy and the feudal aristocracy of the medieval age.

1.3 DEVELOPMENTS IN ITALY

Italy too was not totally free of this older aristocratic and clerical culture. Yet the dynamic part of Italy, the north, was dominated not by clerics and feudal nobles but by wealthy urban merchants, 'and during the 12th and 13th centuries, the cities of northern Italy in alliance with the popes broke the military and political power of the German kings, who called themselves Roman emperors and attempted to assert control over northern Italy'. Strong, centralizing monarchy of the kinds that developed in France and England did not emerge in Italy. Northern Italy was dotted with virtually independent urban republics. Although the people of these urban communities were deeply religious people, the position of the clergy in Italian city life was marginal. The cities were governed by wealthy merchants and the dependent petty traders and artisans, though from the 13th century, more and more of them came under the control of military despots who offered protection from internal disorder and external invasion.

Most of these Italian towns existed as markets for local communities, as links between the surrounding country and the distant markets, generally purchasing its cereals from the vicinity. A few large urban formations, like Genoa or Florence, were centres of international trade, which had expanded so enormously during the 12th and 13th centuries that the urban communities in such sprawling towns became larger than the usual small communities in the city republics. The administration of these towns came to depend increasingly on a professional civil service with legal training. As the activity of the towns became more complex, they came to gradually acquire permanent civic institutions including a class of magistrates. This was the time when the communities came to display features of a city-state.

The city-states in practice were republican oligarchies where crucial decisions were taken by a small minority of office-holding wealthy merchants, even though a considerable part of the male population was recruited in the citizen's militia. Over time however, the existence of the city republic in many instances became precarious. The townsmen were fighting each other, a feature that Machiavelli, the great Florentine thinker of renaissance Italy explained as a result of enmity between the wealthy and the poor. The situation was further complicated by factional rivalries within the ruling groups. The city councils became so divided along factional lines that in most cities before the end of the 14th century the regime of a single individual began to be increasingly preferred. To escape the problem of civic strife, most cities turned from republicanism to *signoria* (the rule of one man), who could either be a member of the urban aristocracy or a military captain who had been hired by the city councils for organizing the city's defence from external enemies. Republican survivals were exceptions, the rule of the *signor* became universal. With the exception of Venice, most Italian cities experienced this transformation. The *signori* in most cases chose to rule through existing republican institutions combining the hitherto antagonistic principles of municipalism and feudalism.

The advent of *signori* resulted from the fragility of republican institutions, yet the triumph of the *signori* did not eliminate the need for scholar administrators. The city — states with enlarged functions including diplomacy, warfare, taxation and governance in an expanding and complex urban environment was an ideal breeding ground for a certain consciousness of citizenship. Whether it fostered individualism, as claimed by Burckhardt, still remains a problem. The kind of control that the municipal authorities imposed on traders and artisans fell far short of free private enterprise, yet it is possible to argue that the development of private wealth against the backdrop of an expanding commerce and a measure of involvement of the cities' elites in the actual governance of the city were capable of reinforcing the individualist self-consciousness in some of the city's leading men.

1.4 NEW GROUPS : LAWYERS AND NOTARIES

In a society where commerce dominated the scene the most important educated groups were the lawyers and the notaries (a combination of solicitor and record keeper) who drew up and interpreted the rules and written agreements without which trade on a large scale was not possible. With the growing scale of commerce there was an acute need for men skilled in drafting, recording, and authenticating contracts and letters. These were the notaries, specialists who did not need the long and costly education provided by law schools but who did receive training in Latin grammar and rhetoric. Such training in letter-writing and drafting legal documents was often given by apprenticeship, but at major centres of legal study such as Padua and Bologna, there were full-time professional teachers who taught not only the conventional legal forms of drafting various kinds of business documents and the correct type of handwriting for documents of public record but also provided some instruction in Roman law. Unlike in the middle ages when virtually all intellectual activities were carried on by churchmen, in the Italian cities this was pursued by members of the new professions. In more than one sense they were the real precursors to renaissance humanism.

Padua, a university town especially noted for the study of law and medicine, produced enthusiasts for the language and literature of ancient Rome. An important figure in this movement was Lovato Lovati (c. 1240-1309) a judge who showed many characteristics of humanism. His younger contemporary Albertino Mussato (1261-1325), who was a notary by profession, became widely known throughout Italy. During this early phase of the growth of humanism, Florence, the city associated with the later flowering of humanistic culture, played a marginal role. The great Florentine literary and intellectual figure of this age, Dante Alighieri (1265-1321), is linked more with medieval rather than Renaissance culture whose generation in Florence, despite the persistence of old cultural beliefs, still thought about a certain conception of cultural renewal through reinterpretation of classical literature and a conscious repudiation of the values of medieval civilization. The arrival of Petrarch, a century later, brought about this change in Florentine culture, more decisively. Petrarch realized that antiquity was a distinctive civilization which could be understood better through the words and the languages of the ancients. Petrarch's stress, therefore, was on grammar, which included the close reading of ancient authors from a linguistic point of view. With language, eloquence and the study of rhetoric, the ultimate purpose of this educational programme was to project a certain idea of good life that was suffused with secular meanings.

1.5 HUMANISM

Since the nineteenth century, historians have labeled this new culture as 'humanism', though it appears nowhere in the writings of the Renaissance period itself. The term that did exist was 'humanistic studies' (*studia humanitatis),* implying academic subjects favoured by humanists. By the first half of the fifteenth century, the term 'humanist'designated masters who taught academic subjects like grammar, rhetoric, poetry, history, and moral philosophy. They were members of a particular professional group who taught humanities and liberal arts – humanitas, a classical word earlier used by Cicero as a substitute for the Greek Paideia, or culture. Cicero was trying to make the point that it was only human beings who were capable of this knowledge about their own selves.

Renaissance humanism, conceived as 'a new philosophy of life' or a glorification of human nature in secular terms, eludes precise definition. Indeed there is no definable set of common beliefs. More than a heightened sense of individualism, the primary characteristic, was the new pattern of historical consciousness that emerged first in the thought of leading 14th century poet, Petrarch. The sense of being deeply engaged in the restoration of true civilization after many centuries of barbarian darkness – an unfair position at that — finds its first clear statement in the works of Petrarch, and some such claim is common to virtually all of those writers — like Salutati, Poggio, Valla and Ficino to name a few — whom historians identify as the leading personalities in the history of Italian humanism. The humanist self-image as free agents of civilization was sharpened by such historical consciousness which enabled them to distinguish their time as an age of light from the preceding one of darkness. They believed that a dark age had set in after the decline of the Roman Empire as a result of the invasion of the barbarians. The humanists belonging to different generations returned to this theme of belonging to a new time, inventing the concept of the middle ages between the collapse of Rome and the cultural renewal in the age of renaissance. Leonardo Bruni, for sometime the chancellor of Florence, in his history of Florence or *Flavio Biondo* in a work covering the period from the sack of Rome by Alaric in 410 A.D. to the writer's own time betrayed this new sense of modernity.

The sense of the novelty of their age was entwined with a conscious imitation of the works of the ancient Greek and Roman writers. A certain consciousness of the newness of their time turned the great figures of renaissance into believers in progress. Without doubt, the poet Petrarch (Francesco Petrarca, 1304-74) was its first great figure, the real founder of the new culture, who tried to bring back to life the inner spirit of ancient Roman civilization. His love for ancient Latin literature was dovetailed with a repudiation of the inherited medieval culture. He transformed classicism into a weapon in a struggle to regenerate the world and to create a distinctive new culture built on the solid foundation of a lost but retrievable antiquity.

1.6 NEW EDUCATION

Petrarch's dream of a cultural and moral regeneration of Christian society, based on the union of eloquence and philosophy, had important implications for education. In late medieval and renaissance Italy, there were three types of schools other than the universities and schools conducted by religious orders exclusively for their own members. Most of the teaching at all three levels was done by self-employed schoolmasters who took tuition-paying pupils and, working either alone or with one assistant, taught them whatever subjects their parents paid for. But many towns in northern Italy also organized community schools, in which the local government selected and hired a schoolmaster, who was bound by a very specific contract to teach certain subjects up to a certain level. Communal schools began to appear in the 13th century. Communal schools in small towns ensured that competent preparation for university study would be available for the sons of the ruling elites.

Despite the growth of humanism, in the 14th century the curriculum of these schools did not change much. The textbooks used were predominantly medieval and Christian in origin, and many of them had been deliberately compiled for classroom use in teaching correct Latin and sound moral principles. This medieval curriculum aroused the contempt of Petrarch and virtually all later humanists, who attacked this curriculum on the ground that most of its intellectual content, was inadequate and that its moral indoctrination had no relevance in the lives of the citizens of Italian cities. Leonardo Bruni acknowledged that it was Petrarch who had outlined a programme of study by which the classical ideas would be achieved. It included grammar, rhetoric, poetry, moral philosophy and history. The humanists also insisted upon the mastery of classical Latin and Greek, so that the ancient authors could be studied directly to the exclusion of medieval commentaries.

The humanists taught in a variety of ways. Some founded their own schools where students could study the new curriculum at both elementary and advance levels; some humanists managed to find their way into universities where teaching continued to be dominated by law, medicine and theology and the humanist curriculum had a peripheral presence. The majority achieved their mission by teaching in numerous grammar schools. But formal education was not the only way through which they shaped the minds of their age; literature, art and drama were the other vehicles of transmission of humanist ideas.

1.7 PRINT

The growing influence of humanist schoolmasters in the Latin grammar schools in the Italian towns did much to establish humanism as the major force in Italian culture. Yet another source of humanism's growing dominance was the new art of printing. By 1500, many classical texts had been printed in Italy, mostly in Latin. Printing, apart from standardizing the new editions of the classics also helped in their dissemination. Before printing, most books existed only in a few copies; printing increased their numbers. As a result, the cost of books also fell exposing the students to a new kind of learning instead of depending solely on lectures. A printed book promoting new ideas, could quickly reach hundreds of readers. Ideas, opinions, and information moved more widely and more rapidly than ever before. Surely one reason why the humanistic culture of Italy spread more rapidly across the Alps towards the end of the 15th century is that books were circulating in print.

1.8 SECULAR OPENINGS

One of the most important features of the renaissance is a beginning of a loosening control of religion over human life. In this sense it may be said that renaissance created conditions for the emergence of a secular ideology. A new focus on humanism also fed into this secular opening. But it is important to understand exactly how, and to what extent, this secular opening was created. Although humanism may have challenged the conventional authorities of the academic world, including scholastic theologians, it was not necessarily meant to be a challenge to Christian faith or to Catholic orthodoxy. Petrarch, for example, expressed doubts about his own spiritual beliefs, but he never doubted the truth of Christianity. He also objected to the Italian scholasticism of his time not on the ground that it was too religious but that it was materialistic and at times subversive of the teachings of the church. Salutati did endorse the active secular life for most people and followed that course in his own life, but he still respected the monastic ideals. In the 1390s he and his family were attached to a revivalist movement that was based on traditional forms of devotion. The inherent and general irreligiosity of Renaissance humanism is to a large extent a creation of 19th century historiography.

This is not to imply that men were not interested in worldly things, even when the educated classes as well as plain folk were deeply moved by religious revivalism and devotionalism. Certainly renaissance Italians were strongly attracted to material wealth, to power, and to glory. Yet those who preferred to live a happy and successful life were not necessarily irreligious, even though humanism as a culture of the talented urban people in the wealthy Italian town was giving rise to a secular morality.

Fransceco Barbaro, a Venetian humanist of the first generation, wrote a tract concerning marriage which repudiated the traditional ideas of poverty and defended acquisition of wealth as a virtue. Bracciolini Poggio (1380-1459), who was the most celebrated excavator of lost manuscript in Florence, in a tract *On Avarice* defended acquisition of wealth, going to the extent of justifying usury which had always been condemned by orthodox Christianity as an unchristian act, as a legitimate form of business. In addition numerous humanist treatises like for example *On Civil Life* written by Matteo Palmiry upheld the superiority of an active life over one of contemplation. Such opinions did express values of the prosperous classes. This set of values was secular; it regarded marriage, wealth and politics as natural and worthy of pursuit. Yet they were not fundamentally anti-Christian. Their authors were practical moralists who presented a moral code appropriate for the ambitious people, rather than monks, while accepting that there could be a spiritual life beyond one's worldly existence.

The glorification of secular life, however, was more a literary reflection of changing social attitudes than an aspect of classical studies. The classical studies nonetheless contributed to the glorification of human nature, even though humanists were also conscious of its frailties. Lorenzo Valla (1406-1457), who believed that study of history led man to live a life of perfection, in his work, *On Pleasure*, condemned within a profoundly Christian mentality the conventional Christian injunction against pleasure. In some other writings, there was a rejection of the view that wise men should suppress passion, on the ground that such suppression was thoroughly unnatural. The theme of human dignity occupies a central place in such works to the degree that in a number of places, as the one written by Marsilio Ficino, a neo-Platonist thinker of Florence, human nature was endowed with super natural power. Human beings occupying a crucial middle position in the great chain of being were the point of contact between the material world and the world of god. Such sentiments had already informed the writing of the 13th century humanists like Leonardo Da Vinci. Ficino's glorification of human nature takes the pursuit of the human glory beyond the everyday life of the middle class Florentines. Ficino, despite his knowledge in platonic philosophy on which he regularly lectured before students in his platonic academy, was a believer in magic and astrology. Ficino belonged to a circle of some prominent intellectual figures, which included a young prince of Medici family whose name was Giovanni Pico Della Mirandola. Mirandola's most famous work, *'Oration on the Dignity of Man'*, published in 1496 deals with the theme of human dignity by suggesting that of all God's creation man received complete freedom to choose his own place in the Great chain of being. By his own free choice man creates himself either in a spiritual fashion or in the manner of a beast. His view of human nature did not look towards divine grace but celebrated worldly achievement.

The secular morality of the humanists, therefore was grounded in a belief in man's intellectual and moral capacity, a new sense of history, and a highly sophisticated mode of learning. Faith in human capacity came from the realization that the educated could attain wisdom without the help of priests or intellectuals. The conception was strengthened by a renewed acceptance of the ancient proposition that virtue was knowledge. Behind this lay a belief that knowledge could elevate human beings. These attitudes constituted an idea not just of individualism but also a different ideal of public man, setting out not just a few new assumptions about humanity but also a normative procedure for assessing human actions.

In the 15th and 16th centuries, the scholars, the artists, the architects, the musicians and the writers, all those who shaped the culture of Humanism, began to experience a more general sense that their society had entered upon a new age, an age which has removed the 'darkness' of the preceding centuries: the 'Renaissance'. While this interpretation of history was an exaggeration of what they were professing, it was yet undeniable that a new vision of man was being created. The 'new man' was considered sovereign in the world and, with his reason and creative powers, was able to refashion the world in accordance with his will.

Increasingly, the *studium humanitatis* and the general cultural climate of the Renaissance produced texts which showed this deepening interest in the essence of what made man more civilized, humane and which were therefore called *humanist literature.* Texts written on a variety of subjects sought to expose what man was and could do both as an individual and as a member of society. The autobiography, in which a person tells his own, unique story of his life, was born in humanist circles. A fine example of this kind of writing was the one written by the famous goldsmith and sculptor, Benvenuto Cellini (1500-71), it was a secular and realistic work which told the story of his life. His readers were persuaded to see the world around him through his eyes, not according to all sorts of idealizations which the Church had earlier imposed on Christian communities.

Thus, Cellini writes of the necessity to record one's deeds, and in the process informs the posterity about his experience and engagement with reality. He writes about the ancient monuments that inspired him, giving an idea of the sense of life and movement in Michelangelo's work, often graphically describing Michelangelo's quarrels with his competitors. Another instance of this genre of writings is Vasari's *Lives of the Artists*, in which the author, who was himself an artist, reflected on the achievements of some of his contemporaries in relation to their personalities, in short describing the place of the creative individual in society. His work, as those of other great names of the renaissance like Niccolo Machiavelli was informed by the sentiments that all men were capable of achieving wisdom and glory – a feeling which merged into the new humanist ideas in the intellectual circles. This enabled them to understand afresh the history of texts, in the process laying out the groundwork for classical scholarship of modern times. A consequence of such intellectual interest enabled the humanists to develop a new understanding of man in society.

The moral basis of this ideal was derived from the belief in man's capacity to understand truth on the strength of his reason and worldly sense – an idea that the intellectuals of the renaissance had inherited from classical learning. At one level this human capacity was looked upon as a divine gift; at another level human achievement depended on free choice which implicitly acknowledged a certain self definition of goals and responsibilities by an individual, who was as much capable of sound decisions as of faulty strategies. The description of man incorporated both virtue and vice. The historian Buckhardt wrote about the development of the individual as an aspect of this new consciousness, attributing this to the material life and political culture of the Italian city states. This new consciousness created the ideal of the universal man in the sense of a certain recognition of the individual personality and private achievements. To men like Machiavelli pursuit of glory was a perfectly human virtue.

1.9 REALISM VS. MORALISM

Apart from the pursuit of glory, the self-development of an individual personality through cultivation of 'arts and sciences' emerged as another social ideal allowing a great flowering of creative activity. The cult of artistic personality was the other side of the same coin – an ideal which figures prominently in Vasari's *Lives* who linked artistic excellence to a psychology of achievement. To some extent Vasari had followed the procedure which had been adopted by the celebrated Roman biographer Plutarch. Plutarch had presented before the humanists a vision of man in society whose achievements were results of their pursuit of glory and entwined with a certain conception of virtue.

The idea was attractive and powerful because of its intense realism. Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527), a Florentine scholar, who, in his famous 1513 tract *The Prince*, describes the role of man in that segment of society which is called politics. Machiavelli, too, was secular and a realist; he showed that the will to power was a dominant motive in human action though often coated with nice words of religious and ethical nature. Upon a closer look it revealed itself as pure self-interest; and more importantly there was nothing wrong about it. Machiavelli's political thought is often interpreted as "the activation, in one sense or another, of a pagan morality, without being contaminated by Christian asceticism". It is also argued that being a realist he suggested a dual morality. What was moral in the public sphere might have been immoral in one's private life. Machiavelli's condonation of cunning on the part of a ruler in the larger interest of the realm, is the well-known example of the dual morality. Machiavelli apparently was interested more in what men did in the public sphere than what they preached. Scholars like Quentin Skinner have painstakingly argued that this was essentially a pre-Christian pagan morality where success was worshiped as virtue. Even though Machiavelli had a gloomy opinion about the way life was governed by fortune, he placed a large premium on the appropriate initiatives by men to overpower fortune. In a sense this was a celebration of man as a self- determining being.

Such a dynamic concept of man which appears with the renaissance, like humanism, cannot be precisely defined. It certainly implied an individualistic outlook and has often been described as 'renaissance individualism'. In a way it fell far short of the individualism of a mature bourgeois society, yet it was bourgeois individualism in its embryo. Probably the ideal of the self-made man which renaissance humanism proclaimed was suggestive of the way the individuals were capable of shaping their own lives rather than the more mundane pursuit of power and money. This ideal was closely tied with certain versatility or many-sidedness of human nature going against the ordered existence that was imposed on man by Christianity and feudalism. The Christian concept of man was founded on the idea that man necessarily had a depraved existence and could be delivered only by the grace of god. At another level he was a member of a feudal order or an estate. The status of an individual either as a member of a feudal order or as a member of the Christian community allowed him an extremely narrow range of freedom. One could of course rebel against the church and could be condemned as a heretic. But even that rebellion was staged in the name of the Christ, always weighed down by the belief in man’s essential sinfulness derived from the Biblical notion of the original sin. The renaissance view of man replaced this with the dynamic view in which “the two extreme poles were the greatness of man and also his littleness”.

Whether great or small, man began to be looked upon as a relatively autonomous being, ‘creating his own destiny, struggling with fate, making himself’. This was no more than an idealized image of actual man, backed up adequately by a pluralism of moral values reversing a value system based on the seven cardinal sins and seven cardinal virtues of medieval Christianity. The pluralism of moral values appears boldly in the way the renaissance intellectuals began to respond very differently to different human propensities. If the striving for power was perfectly acceptable to Machiavelli, to some others, like Thomas More, it was a source of much mischief. To put it simply the renaissance experienced the development of what may be labeled as realistic ethics, suggesting a situation where values became relative and contradictory calling upon man to look for the appropriate measure to distinguish between good and bad against the background of a significant transformation of social life.

The new ideal of man presumes a larger amount of freedom of action which the medieval Christian community did not allow. The city state was one sphere in which it became increasingly evident that man is the maker of his own world together with others instead of being determined by either Christian or feudal rules of conduct. One of the consequences was the gradual fading away of the old notion of sin. The man of the age began to measure his action by their success or the lack of it. The emergence of such practical atheism was an important aspect of renaissance thinking about man. It also existed as the basis of the rational Christianity or a tolerant religion of reason taking its position against dogmatism and allowing a certain freedom of individuality and choice. Ficino, for example, made a significant attempt to reconcile some of his platonic philosophical ideas with Christian thoughts imbued with the awareness of the creative power of man. The great renaissance figures discovered that the attributes of god in fact were the attributes of man as well. One can perhaps think of an attempt towards the deification of man as one of the wonders of the world. There are many illustrations from renaissance sculptures where human heroes appear as divine figures. Michelangelo’s David looks like a Greek god. A man like Ficino not only argued that god created man, but also stressed that once created, man created himself over and over again. Ficino also spoke of the eternal restlessness and dissatisfaction of human mind returning to the same dynamic concept of man which refused to acknowledge any limits like an early modern merchant motivated by boundless opportunities for profits.

This vision of the greatness of man dovetailed with man’s essential frailties. Machiavelli himself believed that ‘all men are bad and ever ready to display their vicious nature partly because of the fact that human desires are insatiable’. The most powerful motive Machiavelli sees as the incentive for every human action is self-interest. The vileness of human nature therefore had nothing to do with any deliberate design for evil and what Machiavelli described as human nature is synonymous with the general ethical belief of the emerging bourgeois society in which reliance was placed mainly on the unbiased observation of facts and behaviour. This precisely was the ethic of experience which occupies a central place in Machiavelli’s definition of human nature when he writes that ‘the desire to acquire possession is a very natural and ordinary thing, and when those men do it who can do it successfully they are always praised and not blamed'.

Artists presented this new vision of man as well. For the material remains of classical culture were now sought as assiduously as the surviving ancient texts: the 15th and 16th centuries saw the birth of archaeology. Numerous works of art were discovered in the ruins of ancient Rome, and the finds reinforced the new view of man that had been developing in the previous century. A multitude of paintings and sculptures of 'perfectly' proportioned men and women was the result. A new, ideal-type human being was created, which has captured our imagination through the ages. Early in the 14th century life like frescos of Giotto di Baondone, had brought about significant changes in the artistic visualization of human figure breaking away from the mechanical style of the middle ages. In 1416, the Italian sculptor Donatelo broke new ground with figures like his nude David, anticipating the more well known work on the same subject by Michelangelo in 1503. Leonardo da Vinci painted Monalisa, which has remained as one of the symbols of female beauty in modern times.



"ST. GEORGE," BRONZE COPY OF A MARBLE STATUE BY DONATELLO, 1415

Besides incorporating the secularist and individualist aspects of humanism, the reborn age or Renaissance should be called realistic as well. In painting, attempts were made to represent everything as it appeared. Though not totally absent in the previous ages, one can certainly maintain that for many centuries realism had been relatively unimportant. Already in the 14th and 15th centuries, during the first phases of humanist culture, painters increasingly attempted to reproduce reality, casting off preconceived ideas about what was morally or religiously acceptable. Increasingly, what the eye could measure or observe was painted incorporating distance, depth and colour in order to make the painting more realistic. In sculpture too people were individualized, with recognizable faces, whereas the art of the preceding centuries had been a component of an architectural background — reliefs more than free — standing figures; in the changed context sculpted images presented man according to his newly-won vision of himself as an independent and free personality, displaying a certain pride in the beauty of the body, both the male and, in view of the conventions of the preceding age, the female too.

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

"MONA LISA," OIL PAINTING BY LEONARDO DA VINCI, 1503-06

Whereas woman for a long time had been 'stereotyped due to the limits imposed upon her role by the society, she now seemed to regain some stature as an individual person, in whose body the perfection of God's creation was made as visible as in the male'. This was the case even when paintings and sculptures served religious purposes, and were composed in such a way that they aroused an appropriate devotional reaction in the viewers, like the Madonna and her child by the Italian painter Raphael or the huge frescos, mosaics and statues that adorned walls and ceilings and cupolas in the Church.



"THE GRAND-DUKE'S MADONNA," OIL PAINTING BY RAPHAEL, 1505

Inevitably, trade and travel, military conquest and diplomatic contacts linked the new culture of the Italian towns and courts with the world beyond. The new culture was admired and imitated all over Europe although, of course, by the better educated and the wealthy, only. For both south and north of the Alps, Humanism and the Renaissance were elite phenomena. Only very few of the new ideas and thoughts filtered down to the ordinary man who, after all, could not read or write the polite language, lacking, as the cultivated mind of the age saw it, the ability to acquire virtue and wisdom.

Yet in the 15th and early 16th centuries, the educational institutions in northern Europe produced many humanists. Like their Italian colleagues, they too, began to focus on the classical Greek and Roman texts along with the holy books of the Christians. Desiderius Erasmus, one of the most famous of these north European humanists, in a series of treatises, tried to lay down the rules for an educational system that despite its Christian foundation, came to be animated by the critical spirit of Humanism. Indeed, one should not forget that, contrary to what often has been suggested, most people living the culture of Renaissance and humanism did not display a 'heathenish', pagan spirit but remained firmly tied to a view of man and the world as, essentially, redeemable only by a Christian God.

By the beginning of the 16th century humanist values had begun to refashion the intellectual life of northern Europe. John Colet and Sir Thomas More popularized them in England, Jacque's Lefevre'd Etaples and Guillaume Bude in France, Conrad Celtis and Hohann Reuchulin in Germany and Erasmus in Holland were the leading humanists in early 16th century Europe. But unlike Italy, where professionals dominated the humanist movement and gave it a secular character – even atheist in some cases – in European humanism the leading protagonists were mostly members of the clerical order. Their reassessment of Christian theology set the stage for the Reformation by calling upon Christians to practice religion in the way it had been stated in the ancient texts of the Christian religion, by discarding unnecessary and unpalatable rituals, condemned as later accretions to a simple religion. With the advent of the Reformation, the humanist 'Self Congratulation on living in a golden age' was eclipsed by theological battles of the time. 'The waning of the Renaissance' had begun. Yet the new view of man as a free rational agent was a principle to which the post-Renaissance philosophy returned over and over again, inspired by the belief in a distant god who created man but allowed him complete freedom to live his life freely, in pursuit of happiness 'here and now'.

1.10 SUMMARY

This Unit has tried to explain to you the different ways in which the Renaissance created the condition for the making of a new world. It starts by explaining that significant commercial, socio-cultural and literary developments in Europe during the 13th-15th centuries came to be viewed and conceptualized *as* Renaissance only in the 19th century. The Renaissance was marked by the emergence of a new culture with roots in Italian humanism. This culture was the product of a set of unique social, political and economic conditions prevalent in parts of Europe from the late 11th century onwards. These conditions were most conspicuous in the northern part of present-day Italy with the growth of commerce and cities. These developments brought about an important shift in the centres of political power from the clerics (men associated with the Christian Church) and feudal nobles to wealthy urban merchants. At the same time there was also a tendency towards a consolidation of political power. These crucial developments along with the emergence of new social groups (lawyers and notaries), new ideologies (humanism and tendencies towards secularism) and new technologies (print) cumulatively transformed the socio-cultural and political landscape of Europe. These developments also created new forces which, in the centuries to follow, worked towards a greater cohesion and integration of the world.

1.11 EXERCISES

1) Discuss the developments facilitating the birth of Renaissance in Europe.
2) How did Renaissance help the emergence of secular ideology?
3) ‘Renaissance created the new view of man as a free rational agent’. Explain

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UNIT 2 THE ENLIGHTENMENT

Structure

2.1 Introduction
2.2 The Idea of Progress
2.3 Science and Knowledge
2.4 Science Versus Religion
2.5 Of Man and Society
2.6 Summary
2.7 Exercises

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Eighteenth century Europe witnessed very wide sweeping changes in all spheres of life. Although these changes did not occur at the same time or at the same pace in all countries, they structured a distinct historical era – one that laid the foundations of the modern age. The Enlightenment or the Age of Reason, as it came to be known subsequently, marked a sharp break from the past. Even though its anti-clericalism echoed the sentiments of the Renaissance and the Reformation it neither endorsed the paganism of the former nor did it share the faith of the latter. It clearly identified two enemies: religion and hierarchy, and attempted to displace the centrality accorded to both in social and political life. The Enlightenment men were not irreligious or atheists but they were bitterly opposed to and intolerant of the institutions of Christianity and they sought to challenge them by articulating a conception of man, history and nature that relied heavily upon the world-view expressed by the new discoveries in the natural sciences. At the most general level, the Enlightenment used the scientific method of enquiry to launch a systematic attack on tradition *per se.* They questioned blind obedience to authority, whether that of the priest or the ruler. Nothing was any longer sacred and beyond critical scrutiny. The new social and political order that the Enlightenment thinkers aspired for expressed the optimism that came with the advancement of material and scientific knowledge. They strongly believed that human beings were in a position to create a world in which freedom, liberty and happiness will prevail over all else. Even though this vision was very widely shared it was most clearly evident in the writings of Voltaire, Diderot, d'Alembert and Condorcet in France, Adam Ferguson, Adam Smith and David Hume in Scotland, Christian Wolff and Immanuel Kant in Germany and marchese di Baccaria in Italy. The writings of these theorists best express the spirit of the Enlightenment and its influence upon the modern age. In this Unit, we are going to discuss some of the essential features of the enlightenment.

2.2 THE IDEA OF PROGRESS

The idea that is constitutive of the Enlightenment and central to this historical epoch is the idea of progress. Through it the Enlightenment expressed the twin belief that – a) the present was better and more advanced than the past, and b) this advancement has resulted in the happiness of man. Both these claims about progress in history were based on the assessment of the changes that were taking place around them. The scientific discoveries of Copernicus, Kepler and Newton and their applications by Galileo led them to believe that human beings could fully understand the functioning of the universe and gain an unprecedented degree of control over their natural and physical environment. This sentiment was further reinforced by the changes that were taking place in the traditional organization of life. The incorporation of new technologies in the field of agriculture and in the manufacturing of goods had meant significant increase in the sphere of production. Coupled with improved communications, development of roads, canals, and the growth in internal and foreign trade, they believed they were standing on the threshold of a new era: an era that would be marked by abundance, perfectibility of man and the institutions of society. At the most general level there was a feeling that we are now moving towards a condition in which, to quote Gibbons, 'all inhabitants of the planet would enjoy a perfectly happy existence'.

Theorists of the Enlightenment were convinced of the achievements and superiority of their age. They saw in history a movement from the dark ages to the civilized present. This did not mean that human history was slowly but steadily moving in one direction or that every stage marked an improvement over the previous one. While pointing to progress in history they were primarily saying that there was a marked improvement in the quality of life in the present era. More specifically, the *Philosophes* (philosophers who espoused this vision in France) were claiming that there has been a tangible and undeniable advancement in every sphere of life since the Reformation. For Chastellux, flourishing agriculture, trade and industry, the rise in population and the growth in knowledge were all indicators of the increase in felicity. The latter meant that their age was a much happier one. It was marked by peace, liberty and abundance. It was, to use Kant's words, the best of all possible worlds.

Unlike many of his contemporaries Kant was however of the view that happiness was not the main issue. It was not simply a question of increase or decrease in the levels of happiness because civilization, even in its most perfect form, could not bring about the happiness of men. Hence it was not to be judged in those terms. Civilization, according to Kant, provided a setting in which men can test and prove their freedom. The present merited a special place in so far as it had created conditions in which men can encounter the most important category of reason, namely, freedom.

The belief that man had advanced from the 'barbarous rusticity' to the 'politeness of our age' was characteristic of the Enlightenment. Indeed, this reading of the past and the present marked a sharp break from the earlier conceptions of history. The Greeks, for instance, saw history as a cyclical process comprising of periods of glory followed by periods of decline and degeneration. The Middle Ages, under the influence of Christianity, had little place for mundane history. Nothing in real history mattered because hope and happiness lay in the other-world. Man's fall from grace had meant the loss of idyllic existence. Consequently, for them, it was only through redemption that men could hope to improve their present condition. The Renaissance broke away from this Christian reading of history but it had a pessimistic view of human nature. The Renaissance men believed that the achievements of antiquity, in particular, of Greek and Roman civilization, were unreachable. They embodied the highest achievements of humankind that could not be surpassed. The Enlightenment, in sharp contrast to all this, focused on the 'here' and 'now' and saw in it unprecedented growth, accompanied by moral and intellectual liberation of man. Johnson is reported to have said, "I am always angry when I hear ancient times being praised at the expense of modern times. There is now a great deal more learning in the world than there was formerly; for it is universally diffused". The

Scottish philosopher Dugald Stewart was even more unequivocal in affirming the progress in the present world. He argued that the increase in commerce had "led to the diffusion of wealth and 'a more equal diffusion of freedom and happiness', than had ever existed before". Technological innovations that accompanied capitalism meant that men were "released from the bondage of mechanical labour and…free to cultivate the mind". The present was thus seen as the age of progress where there was unprecedented advance in every sphere of life.

While the present was seen as 'spreading the light' of reason, the Enlightenment designated the past as 'primitive' and 'barbaric'. It was, in its view, riddled with superstition and dogma, and guided by religion and blind obedience to authority. Above all, it was marked by the absence of individual freedom. The present, by comparison, was designated as 'civilized' and 'enlightened': an era in which reason was expected to prevail. The theorists of Enlightenment believed that there were primarily two obstacles to progress – wars and religion. Both these could be, indeed they needed to be, destroyed by reason. Once that was done then the world would be a better place. It would, in the words of Condorcet, move from bondage to ultimate perfection of freedom and reason.

Reason was, in a sense, the key to the earthly utopia. It was an instrument that individuals could use not only to interrogate all received forms of knowledge but also to lead a virtuous, rational and happy life. For the *Philosophes*, reason was an ally of experience. It embodied a non-authoritarian source of knowledge that can be tested and proved. In the Preface to The System of Nature, Holbach wrote: "[R]eason with its faithful guide experience must attack in their entrenchments those prejudices of which the human race has been too long the victim…. Let us try to inspire man with courage, with respect for his reason, with an indistinguishable love for truth, to the end that he may learn to consult his experience, and no longer be the dupe of an imagination led astray by authority…". Theorists, such as Holbach, believed that reason could liberate men from the oppressive power exercised by religion and, at the same time, provide them knowledge of the truth. Men had therefore to be taught to use reason and to act in accordance with its potentialities. This was the main Enlightenment project.

2.3 SCIENCE AND KNOWLEDGE

The growth in scientific knowledge had given the Enlightenment grounds for being optimistic about the present and the future. Its spokesmen asserted with conviction that civilization was moving in the right direction and that it must continue to move in that direction. The apparent progress in material and social life also gave them a sense of grandeur. They felt that there were no limits on what human beings could know and accomplish. The development of human faculties and the advance that had been made by the sciences and by civilization as a whole, gave them enough reason to assert that nature had placed no limits on our hopes. The belief that human beings could achieve whatever they set out to do was closely linked to the Enlightenment idea of progress. Progress indicated the increasing ability of individuals to control their natural and social environment. According to the Enlightenment thinkers, the visible improvement in human life was the result of active and effective application of reason for controlling physical and social environment. *Vice-versa,* the success that their generation had in controlling their environment and harnessing the forces of nature for the betterment of humankind affirmed the belief that scientific application of reason would lead to the liberation of man. It could create an ideal world in which individuals could strive to combine the virtues of knowledge with liberty.

Three points need to be emphasized here. First, the Enlightenment thinkers linked knowledge with the natural sciences. The method of systematic observation, experimentation and critical inquiry used in the physical sciences was, in their view, the only viable basis of arriving at the truth. Knowledge must be demonstrable. It must be backed by proof that is accessible through reason and the faculties of the human mind. Based on this conception of knowledge, the Enlightenment posited a dichotomy between metaphysical speculation and knowledge. The Middle ages, under the influence of Christianity, had assumed that the world created by God could not be known by human beings. It was, by definition, inaccessible to human reason. The truth about man and the universe could only be 'revealed', and hence, known through the holy scriptures. The Enlightenment rejected this view and maintained that things that could not be known by the application of reason and systematic observation were chimerical. What could not be known must not even be sought for it constitutes the realm of the metaphysical, if not the non-sensical.

Second, the Enlightenment began with the view shared by the leading scientists of their times: namely, that the secrets of the universe could be apprehended completely by man. These theorists were convinced both of the intelligibility of the universe and of the ability of individuals to understand it completely. They believed that while discussing nature we ought to begin not with the authority of the scriptures but with sensible experiments and demonstrations. In *Les Bijoux Indiscrets,* Diderot compared the method of experimentation to a giant who could in one blow destroy the grand systems created by metaphysics and idle speculation. The latter were simply buildings without foundations so they could easily be knocked down by the power of scientific reason.

Third, science had provided a new and fairly different picture of man and the universe. Instead of positing a world of things that are ordered by their ideal nature or by some prior purpose, it presented nature as a self-regulating system of laws. The Enlightenment theorists embraced this world-view and like their counterparts in the natural sciences they aimed to discover laws that govern society and human nature. Identifying laws and establishing patterns entailed the study of cause and effect relationships. It required the search for an antecedent event that is necessary and sufficient for explaining an occurrence. The *Philosophes* abandoned the search for final causes and focussed instead on the examination of an efficient cause; that is, they tried to specify an antecedent event whose presence is necessary for the occurrence of a given phenomenon and whose absence would imply the non-occurrence of that phenomenon.

The study of cause-and-effect relationships was central to the Enlightenment conception of science. This conception of scientific enquiry marked a sharp departure from the Aristotelian world-view that had dominated the study of nature before this. In place of using observation as a tool for categorizing and classifying things, it now urged the discovery of causes in an attempt to explain 'why' certain things happen and also to predict the occurrence of such events in the future. Discovery of causes, in other words, was a means of increasing man's control over his environment – both natural and social.

While endorsing this conception of science the *Philosophes* were nonetheless aware that knowledge would have to be built from small foundations. Yet, they were firm in their belief that the little that we had learnt by method of observation and causal analysis had vastly extended our knowledge; and, that it alone could reveal to us the truth about the world.

Working with this conception of knowledge the Enlightenment thinkers attempted to observe and systematically explain the world around them and the society in which they lived. They focussed on the observable and attempted to understand the complexities of individual and national character by relating them to other physical and social elements that are given to empirical investigation. Montesquieu examined the connections between political and civil laws of a country and its physical character – the climate, temperature and other demographic configurations. Adam Ferguson and David Hume undertook a scientific analysis of the mind by examining empirically the process of socialization. The manner by which individuals internalize moral, social and intellectual ideas and come to acquire a notion of virtue and propriety was a subject that received their attention. Even as they studied the process of 'moral education' they believed that men of reason could only accept data that is given in observation. Hence, almost all of them focused on the empirical manifestations of objects and in their work they tried to build relationships between observable dimensions of different phenomena. Through systematic observation of concrete particulars, these philosophers sought to arrive at the general principles and laws by which nature and society are governed.

To the Enlightenment mind, increasing degree of control over physical and social world, and the success of technological applications indicated progress and truth. Indeed, they signified scientific knowledge and validated its claim to truth. Although technical success was favoured for the sake of improving human condition, what was desired above all was freedom and happiness. It was believed that the ability to explain and control natural and social environment would enable individuals to construct a world in which these twin goals can be realized. To quote Hume, "happiness was the end to which all human life was directed and as society provides men with these ideas which made life intelligible and happiness possible, men can find happiness in society". Hume was not alone in claiming this. Most of his contemporaries maintained that expanding knowledge of the laws of the universe would enable humankind to fashion their lives and create a perfect society. At the very least, it will give men the satisfaction of knowing that they have the correct methods of enquiry, consequently they will never 'relapse into barbarism'.

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What needs to be reiterated here is that the Enlightenment thinkers did not simply associate knowledge with science, they wanted to apply the "experimental method" used in the physical sciences to the study of society. Like the natural scientists they searched for laws of human nature and laws of social development. Montesquieu maintained that "[E]verything which exists has its laws: the Diety has its laws, the material world its laws, the spiritual beings of a higher order than man their laws, the beasts their laws, and man his own laws…. As a physical being, man is governed by invariable laws in the same way as other bodies". However, as an intelligent being he continuously violates those laws and creates new ones. With this basic understanding he analyzed two kinds of laws: those that are common to all men and all societies, and those that are peculiar to a society. While both were to be analyzed and discovered, the former was regarded to be particularly important. In fact, by identifying and enumerating the qualities that are common to all men they hoped to determine those customs and institutions which were in harmony with the universal natural order and sort those that did not have a place in that order. Discovering the constant and universal principles of human nature was thus of the utmost importance, especially for the task of reconstructing a better and more perfect world.

2.4 SCIENCE VERSUS RELIGION

Science was, for the Enlightenment, more than a method of enquiry. It was synonymous with a rationalist orientation. In the attempt to create conditions in which men would be free to explore their potentialities to the fullest, the theorists of Enlightenment launched a thorough critique of the institutions of Christianity and, with it, of existing religions and sects. Almost all of them, from Voltaire to Holbach, wrote about the harmful effects of religion over individual and social life. Voltaire pointed to the violence engendered in the name of religion. "It is asked why, out of the five hundred sects, there have scarcely been any who have not spilled blood?" And why "there is scarce any city or borough in Europe, where blood has not been spilled for religious quarrels". He noted further, "I say that the human species has been perceptibly diminished because women and girls were massacred as well as men…. In fine, I say, that so far from forgetting these abominable times, we should frequently take a view of them, to inspire an eternal horror for them; and that it is for our age to make reparation by toleration, for this long collection of crimes, which has taken place through the want of toleration, during sixteen barbarous centuries".

The Enlightenment critique of religion stemmed from the understanding that religion has been a source of oppression in history. It was the basis of intolerance and hatred among men. It promoted inequality and 'unfreedom' of man. What was perhaps equally important for the Enlightenment was the role that religion played in the Medieval Ages. Under the hegemony of the Established and Unified Roman Catholic Church men were expected to renounce reason and place their faith instead in revealed truth. Religious authorities spoke of the limits of human reason and asked individuals to listen passively to the voice of tradition as communicated by the Church. Theorists of Enlightenment were particularly critical of this world-view. The attempt to propound a doctrine that could not be questioned by men and that gave men a fixed view of the world and their role in it was, in their view, inimical to reason. "Instead of morality the Christian is taught the miraculous fables and inconceivable dogmas of a religion thoroughly hostile to right reason. From his very step in his studies he is taught to distrust the evidence of his senses, to subdue his reason…and to rely blindly on the authority of his master".

The Enlightenment thinkers attacked the Church for promoting superstition and ignorance. On the one hand, its doctrine was anchored in miracles and mysteries that were irreconcilable with reason, and, on the other, it was intolerant of true knowledge. This perception of religious institutions and religion was reinforced by the hostile attitude of the Church towards the new thinking that came with the Copernican Revolution. The persecution of the scientists and the philosophers for their beliefs led Voltaire to comment that "those who persecute a philosopher under the pretext that his opinions may be dangerous to the public are as absurd as those who are afraid that the study of algebra will raise the price of bread in the market; one must pity a thinking being who errs". It is to break free of a "frantic and horrible" persecutor that the Enlightenment thinkers derided the Church and all existing religion.

Anti-clericalism and rejection of existing religions does not however imply that the *Philosophes* were atheists. Indeed many of them provided rational grounds for accepting the presence of a supreme creator. Diderot went a step forward. He rejected atheism. To quote him: "Atheism leaves honesty unsupported; it does worse, indirectly it leads to depravity". Thus, while their critique of Christianity led them to question the belief that the world was created in seven days, they nevertheless believed that the world was a "beautifully crafted machine" and it must have been designed by a

Supreme Being according to some rational plan. Belief in a creator did not however imply an acceptance of a religious orientation or the faith that a religion embodies. Voltaire wrote, “He who recognizes only a creating God, he who views in God only a Being infinitely powerful, and who sees in His creatures only beautiful machines, is not religious towards Him any more than a European, admiring the King of China, would thereby profess allegiance to that prince. But he who thinks that God had deigned to place a relation between Himself and mankind; that He has made him free, capable of good and evil; that He has given all of them the good sense which is the instinct of man, and on which the law of nature is founded; such a one undoubtedly has a religion, and a much better religion than all those sects….”.

While pointing to the injustices perpetrated by existing religions, theorists of the Enlightenment presented a new ‘natural religion’ – Deism – that did away with rituals and supernatural elements and anchored itself in the principles of tolerance and equality of all persons. Explaining the distinctiveness of a person who affirms this new faith Voltaire writes, “ It is he who says to God: ‘I adore and serve you’; it is he who says to the Turk, to the Chinese, the Indian, and the Russian: ‘I love you’. He doubts, perhaps, that Mahomet [Mohammad] made a journey to the moon and put half of it in his pocket; he does not wish that after his death his wife should burn herself from devotion; he is sometimes tempted not to believe in the story of the eleven thousand virgins, and that of St. Amable, whose hat and gloves were carried by a ray of the sun from Auvergne as far as Rome. But for all that he is a just man. Noah would have placed him in his ark, Numa Pompilius in his councils; he would have ascended the car of Zoroaster; he would have talked philosophy with the Platos, the Aristippuses, the Ciceros….”. Philosophers like Voltaire cast the true believer of this new religion in their own image.

Deism expressed the beliefs and the vision of the *Philosophes,* and through it they articulated their belief that there is a Supreme Being, that all creatures in the world were His creations and they deserve to be treated with kindness and without cruelty.

The natural religion was thus a religion of humanity. It was expected not to be a source of derision and hatred among men, instead it was to incorporate true principles of human nature and a universal system of morality that arises from the latter. Although tolerance was central to the new religion, the *Philosophes* denounced all those creeds of Christianity that claimed a right to destroy all those that differed from them. These theorists showed no signs of tolerance towards those who perpetuated religious intolerance. Indeed their main aim was to destroy all traces of religious fanaticism that were visible in their world.

2.5 OF MAN AND SOCIETY

The Enlightenment demolished the Heavenly City of St. Augustine but they never lost faith in the ability of human beings to construct a new society in which peace, liberty and abundance would prevail. While they denied the possibility of miracles happening, they continued to believe in the perfectibility of the human species. With complete confidence in rationalist will and a humanist pride in the capacity of human beings to overcome all hurdles they hoped to construct a world in which there will be a steady increase in felicity. They were aware that this was a difficult task. “To prolong life, clear the roads of assassins, keep men from starving and give them hope of enjoying the fruits of their labour” would, they knew, require more than just political stability. It would need a moral and intellectual revolution and it was this that the *Philosophes* hoped to accomplish through their writings. Their belief in scientific rationality and the accompanying critique of the institutions of the Church and existing forms of religion, were essential components of this bigger agenda of social and cultural revolution.

The *Philosophes* saw scientific knowledge as power, consequently, those who tried to challenge it were identified as men who wished to keep everyone in ignorance. They were seen as the 'enemies' of humankind. However, the Enlightenment did not merely target religious institutions. Anti-clericalism may have been the predominant sentiment but it was blind obedience to authority *per se* that they were most critical of. Whether the authority was that of the priest or the ruler, tradition or custom, each was subject to the same critical gaze. To put it in another way, fighting the dogmatism of religion and its institutional structures was an important pillar in their struggle for freedom but it was by no means the only one. Challenge to religious authority was supplemented by a parallel attack on the absolutist monarchies that existed all over Europe in the post-reformation period. Writing in defense of the liberty of the individual, Diderot asserted that "no man has received from nature the right to command others…. Liberty is a gift from heaven, and every person of the same species has the right to enjoy as much liberty as he enjoys reason".

Theorists of Enlightenment cherished liberty and freedom. For them, these were the highest and the most cherished values, and they were critical of despotism for not sufficiently safeguarding these values. Liberty required, on the one hand, a government in which one has the freedom to depose a tyrannical ruler and, on the other, the option to elect people whom one is expected to obey and be governed by. A democratic regime based on the principle of popular sovereignty followed from their defence of liberty. Although many of them were skeptical of the possibility of establishing a popular, democratic government, they maintained that power that comes from the "consent of the people" alone is legitimate, and advantageous to society. Montesquieu added another dimension to the discussion on political liberty. He maintained that liberty entails two elements: 1) a moderate government and 2) not being compelled to do anything other than what one should do. Experience shows that individuals are easily tempted to misuse their power for personal ends.

It is therefore essential to place limitations upon the exercise of power. Montesquieu spoke of the need to curb the power of each wing of the government. "When legislative power is united with the executive power in a single person, or in a single body of the magistracy, there is no liberty, because one can fear that the same monarch or senate that makes tyrannical laws will enforce them tyrannically. Nor is there liberty if the power of judging is not separated from the legislative and from executive power. If it were joined to legislative power, the power over the life and liberty of the citizens would be arbitrary, for the judge would be legislator. If it were joined to executive power, the judge could have the force of an oppressor. All would be lost if the same man, or the same body of leading men or of the nobility or of the people, exercised all these powers, to make the laws, to carry out public decisions and to judge crimes or disputes among individuals….".

A government in which the three aspects of government – namely, formulation of laws, execution of laws and arbitration or interpretation of laws – are separated and each wing checks the powers of the other is only one dimension of a system committed to protecting the liberty of its citizens. It had to be supplemented by the privilege of being governed by one's own laws or by people of one's choice. A democratic government was regarded to be important for giving power to the individual. Most Enlightenment theorists recognized that power to the people may not translate into freedom of the people. The latter entailed “doing what one should want to, and in not being compelled to do what one should not want to”.

Liberty did not however imply the freedom to follow one’s whims or to do that which is not permitted by law. Almost all of them accepted the importance of law. For them, obeying laws was a necessary condition of protecting liberty. If individuals were to follow their own impulse by infringing the law then there would only be anarchy in society. Political liberty could exist only when individual citizens acknowledge the centrality of law and subject themselves to its command. Indeed, the presence of political and civil laws was seen as a continuous reminder to the individual of his duty to his fellow citizens. Some theorists of Enlightenment even represented law as an embodiment of reason. For them laws place the necessary restraint upon passions of individuals to violate the natural order and, at the same time, they induce men to channel their sentiments in a direction that facilitates social and civil life in the world. Individuals, in their view, can enjoy liberty only when public safety is ensured and crimes of all kinds are reduced, if not eliminated. It was regarded to be the task of the legislature to ensure this; in particular, to ensure that crime of all kinds becomes less frequent, even if that means using powerful means at its disposal to prevent disorder in society.

The point that needs to be emphasized here is that the Enlightenment men accepted that individuals tend overwhelmingly to pursue their own interest and this can be a cause of political disorder. Laws were, for this reason, considered necessary to place certain restraint upon unchecked pursuit of one’s own private interest. However, they felt that it was equally important to see that punishments for defying the law are in proportion to the evil produced by the act. Marcese di Baccaria in fact spoke of the need to devise a universal scale for measuring crime and for determining the punishment proportionate for it. If we could have a universal scale of this kind, Baccaria believed, it would be possible to measure the degree of liberty and slavery, humanity and cruelty that exists in different nations. What must also be mentioned here is that the Enlightenment was concerned not only with the excesses perpetrated by despotic regimes but also by the inhumanity of man to man, and it was the latter that they hoped to minimize. Reforming the system of government and the practices incorporated in existing laws was but a means to realize this end. In other words, civility for the Enlightenment meant something more than rule of law. Obeying laws was necessary but what was equally necessary was that laws reflect the principle of general reason. Indeed, obedience was emphasized because laws were supposed to create conditions in which individual liberty is protected and enhanced.

The discourse on crime and punishment formed a part of the Enlightenment’s larger concern for creating a free and enlightened society. Just as the natural scientists hoped to achieve greater control over the physical elements through their knowledge, the social scientists believed that their understanding of the laws of human nature and society would enable them to eliminate evil and create a better world. Theorists of Enlightenment were full of optimism in this regard. They felt that all limitations could be overcome and a free world could be created. In part this optimism was fostered by the new forms of production introduced by the capitalist economy and the technological innovations spurred by the growth of scientific knowledge.

The Enlightenment thinkers favoured freedom of enterprise. Adam Smith argued that even though individuals seek this freedom to further their own private gain, nevertheless the pursuit of self-interest is likely to promote the interest of society as a whole. Freedom of enterprise would lead to growth in production, more

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employment opportunities, and this would benefit all citizens. Although these philosophers defended capitalist enterprise and argued that a life of virtue did not entail forsaking commercial society, they created space for themselves away from the world of business, politics and fashion. In the salons, coffee-houses and taverns of the emerging modern cities they would meet, discuss and express opinions that would be among the most influential ideas of their times. More importantly, men, and sometimes even women, would meet as friends and as equals. Addison and Steele saw coffee-house conversation as a form of social interaction that "taught men tolerance, moderation and the pleasure of consensus. It also taught them to look at their own behaviour with a critical detachment which was difficult to acquire in public life". The Enlightenment theorists placed considerable stress on the spirit of critique. For them virtue lay in teaching ourselves to be critical of our beliefs and in learning how to review our opinions in the light of experience. Cultivating skeptical habits of mind would, according to Hume, help to release men from the bondage of myth and prejudice which corrupts the mind and generates enthusiasm that can stand in the way of human happiness.

Education was to play an important role in this regard. The Enlightenment had tremendous faith in the power of human beings brought up rationally from infancy to achieve unlimited progress. They also entrusted the state with the responsibility of changing the structure of laws and institutions, and undertaking the work of reform. Surrounded by a world that was full of promise for a better tomorrow, the Enlightenment thinkers wished to instill the spirit of tolerance and minimize crime and torture. They were of course aware that knowledge about human nature and society would not automatically create virtue, but they believed that it could certainly shed light upon ignorance and warn us against the misuse of power.

2.6 SUMMARY

The ideas of the Enlightenment, in particular, its faith in scientific method of investigation, its optimism that the new era of scientific-technological advancement and industrialization would lead to a world filled with happiness for all and its attempts to create a social order based on the principles of human reason, tolerance and equality, effected a profound social and intellectual revolution. Although votaries of Enlightenment had little political clout in the first half of the 18th century, theirs was perhaps the most popular voice by the end of that century. Certainly it was the most effective in determining what constitutes a 'modern' outlook. The distinction that they posited between tradition and modernity, religion and science, their reliance on reform and state initiatives for re-structuring society provided a model of development that would be endorsed not only in the advanced industrialized societies but also in the colonized world. Indeed, all over the world Enlightenment was to become synonymous with modernity.

The influence of Enlightenment is evident as much in the modernization theories that dominated the study of societies in the mid-twentieth century as it is in the social reform movements of the nineteenth century in India. The former invoked Enlightenment's understanding of the past and present, tradition and modernity to rank societies and to construct a model of a modern, democratic polity. The latter drew upon the humanist liberalism of the Enlightenment and attempted to bring religion and custom in line with the principles of human reason. They subjected traditional practices to critical scrutiny and struggled to change those that violated the fundamental principles of equality and tolerance. So strong was the impact of the Enlightenment upon these reformers that they welcomed the new ideas that came with the British rule and believed that when they ask for self-government it would be granted to them. Although the exploitative nature of the colonial rule is readily acknowledged today, the Enlightenment conception of individual and its faith in scientific knowledge and free enterprise continue to dominate the popular imagination even today.

2.7 EXERCISES

1) How did the Enlightenment thinker associate knowledge with science?
2) Discuss the impact of the Enlightenment on religious belief.
3) 'Theorists of Enlightenment cherished liberty and freedom.' Explain.

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UNIT 3 POLITICAL REVOLUTION : FRANCE

Structure

3.1 Introduction
3.2 French Revolution and the Emergence of New Political Culture
  3.2.1 The Ideas of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity
  3.2.2 The Concept of Republican State
  3.2.3 Modern Views on Representation
  3.2.4 The Theory of Revolutionary Conspiracy
3.3 Nationalism and Sovereignty
3.4 The Idea of Plebiscite and Totalitarian Regime
3.5 French Revolution and Socialist Ideology
3.6 The Cultural Legacy
3.7 Revolution and Gender
3.8 Summary
3.9 Exercises

3.1 INTRODUCTION

At the undergraduate level you may have studied the course of events of the French Revolution and what this Revolution tried to achieve. In this Unit, we shall examine what the modern world owes to this great event by analyzing its direct and indirect impact.

The French Revolution along with the American War of Independence, are given credit for movements such as liberalism, democracy and nationalism, although many of these ideas became greatly transformed in the second half of the nineteenth and in the early twentieth centuries. No other idea has had such a deep impact on the emerging nations as the ideas of equality, liberty and fraternity. These concepts found expression in many different ways because although they had different meanings for different sections of society, they nonetheless enjoyed a universal appeal. As movements, they were directly linked with political expression and social protests and the French Revolution became a source of inspiration for many of the subsequent movements. Before going into a detailed discussion of those aspects of the revolution that shaped the modern world, it would be useful to briefly study the direction the revolution took.

Like in many other parts of Europe, a conflict was emerging between the old regime and the new social forces in France. The state of France was in a deep financial crisis and the subject of taxation brought the issue of privilege to the forefront. The calling of the Estates General to tackle the taxation problem sparked off the crisis. Clergy and nobility constituted a very small minority of population but enjoyed most of the privileges and were represented in the first two estates while the rest of over 90 per cent of population remained burdened with taxation and many of them had to pay many seigniorial dues but had a much lesser representation. This political system was questioned by the newly emerging classes. They were deeply imbued with the ideals of political reform, flowing from the ideas of the Enlightenment. The elections of the Estates General activated all sections of the society. While the nobility tried to capture its losing power and safeguard its privileges, the representatives of the middle class attempted to alter the power structure. In the words of Prof. Goodwin, the revolution began as 'a merciless war between aristocracy and democracy. But just a couple of years back, in 1787, aristocracy had made a strong onslaught on despotism.' The events of 1789 rapidly outran all expectations. These were simultaneous outbreaks of the urban poor, leading to the famous capture of Bastille on July14, 1789.

The representatives of the third estate declared themselves as the National Assembly and began creating a new France through debates and experiments. The rural population on an unprecedented scale forced the National Assembly to end all forms of privileges including financial and legal. The new Constitution of 1791 and the confiscation of Church property radically transformed the stated structure of France and altered the basis of power and authority. The strong popular pressure of the lower classes pushed the revolution towards radical republicanism. The flood of revolutionary ideas and experiments could not be confined to the borders of France and the revolutionary government of France began exporting the new principles by propaganda and war. Thus, the revolutionary events rapidly outran all expectations and the break with the past became irrevocable. As a result during the nineteenth century, France became a laboratory of social and political theories. In this Unit, we shall try to explain:

- how the French Revolution was an attempt to break with the past;
- how a modern political culture emerged, based on the principle of liberty, equality and national sovereignty;
- in what ways the revolution contributed to the modern ideas of democracy based on the practice of representation, the ideas of plebiscite and the importance of public opinion;.
- how the fear of revolution led to the theory of revolutionary conspiracy for the future generations; and
- how the ideas of modern nationalism and socialism had their roots in the revolution itself.

3.2 FRENCH REVOLUTION AND THE EMERGENCE OF NEW POLITICAL CULTURE

In recent years, scholars have broadened the period of the French Revolution to almost the last three decades of the eighteenth century when revolutionary politics had begun to take shape. The creation of new political rhetoric and the development of new symbolic forms of political practice transformed contemporary notions about politics, which became an instrument for reshaping society. People of France had a strong belief that they could establish a new national community based on reason and natural law according to the spirit of enlightenment, without reference to the customs of the past. Such high ambitions demanded new political practices for their realization. As Francois Furet suggests, France through revolution invented democratic culture and revealed to the world one of the basic forms of historical consciousness of action. If the Revolution invented new structures and upset the old ones, it also set in motion new forces to transform the traditional mechanisms of politics. The

Revolution took over an empty space and then proliferated within that. For Furet, the French Revolution was essentially a political phenomenon. It led to a profound transformation of political discourse involving new but powerful forms of political symbolism and experimented in radical forms of political action which was unprecedented and unanticipated.

In the political dialogue between societies and their states, the Revolution tipped scales in favour of society against the state. The ancient regime was dominated by the king; the Revolution turned it into people's achievement. **From the 'kingdom of subjects' France became a nation of citizens.** The old society was based on privilege; the Revolution established equality. The Revolution created an ideology of a radical break with the past. Everything — the economy, society and politics yielded to the force of new ideology. The revolution, according to Keith Michael Baker, marked the transformation of the discursive practice of the community, a moment in which social relations were reconstituted and the relationship between individual, community and state radically transformed. As the Revolution progressed, it coined new vocabulary of politics and culture. It accumulated its own symbols and religious overtones and provided new definitions of patriotism and war. For Robespierre, the famous Jacobin leader, the revolution became a war of liberty against its enemies. 'Its intensity, its reforming zeal and its war against privilege made it' as Mcmanners writes, 'a fort of forcing house where in the ideals of the future, and their perversions, were brought to early maturity'.

It should also be borne in mind that the Revolution in France was not pre-planned. The overthrow of the government was followed by intense confusion and opened the gates of political discourse and contestations. In this situation kind of actions and arguments took on meanings that often went far beyond what the actors or leaders intended. The emergence of modern political culture destroyed the absolutist monarchy and brought about a political order wider which the nation existed as a collective body. Various efforts were made to reconstitute the meaning of public right and redefine the nature of social order. According to K.M. Baker, the three strands of discourse in the late eighteenth century were — justice, will and reason. The emergence, elaboration and interpretation of these three discourses defined the political culture that emerged in France and provided the ideological framework to the subsequent changes. These discourses provided grounds for the abolition of feudal structure in France. Thus, the Revolution had begun a new era but its ideologies and institutional framework gradually developed as a consequence of debates and struggles within as well as outside France.

3.2.1 The Ideas of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity

No doubt, the ideas like liberty, equality, fraternity and so on had existed sometimes in a very confused or abstract form in many societies but in France, during the revolutionary era, these became the guiding principles for the law makers. The American Revolution of 1776 had also declared all men are born 'free and equal'. The Congress of the representatives of the thirteen colonies had asserted that all men are born equal and have certain natural rights which are inalienable and cannot be taken away. But the American Constitution remained silent on the significant question of slavery and postponed the demand for extension of the franchise to them. The slavery issue had divided the American nation during the Civil War (1861-1865). In France, these ideas became the defining concepts that had impact not only upon the western civilization but also worked their way into the history of 19th and 20th century Europe, America and Asia.

By liberty, the revolutionaries meant the right to act within the world with responsibility to no one but oneself. It was an idea that remained dear to those who made the French Revolution and one which pervaded the reforms. The Revolution founded a potent new tradition of liberty. Protestants, Jews and Free Thinkers gained toleration both in France and in the French dominated regions. The first official document of the French Revolution — the Declaration of the Rights of Man — stated· the ideas of liberty and equality and efforts were made to embody them in the new regime to form the chief theme of the French politics in the nineteenth century.



The Declaration of the Rights of Men

Robespierre had argued that the French Revolution was the first revolution to be based on the theory of the rights of humanity. The truth however was that the Frenchmen found considerable difficulty in reaching a consensus regarding the definition of those rights. Closely associated with the notion of liberty is the idea of equality. The Revolutionary and the Napoleonic regimes established the principle of equal liability to taxation. They provided greater degree of economic opportunity for the third estate by various means by removing monopolistic rights, abolition of social privileges, by breaking up large land-holdings of the nobles and clergy and opened up administrative posts to merit. The Revolutionary regime promoted fraternity in the legal sense as well, by making all Frenchmen equal before law.

A few lines from a contemporary poem bring out the spirit of the time —

Oh you who are discouraging by nothing?

True lovers of Liberty Establish equality
On the debris of slavery
Republican Frenchmen, conquerors of your rights,
Strike down all these tyrants, profaners of the law.

These revolutionary slogans had become the torch-bearers for many of the countries in the age of decolonization.

The continuing chain of revolutions which spread from Spain (1820) to Naples and Sicily (1820), Piedmont (1821) and finally to France (1830) clearly show the unending appeal of the ideas of liberty, equality and fraternity.

3.2.2 The Concept of Republican State

The idea of a Republican state was not the product of the French Revolution as there existed many republican states in the ancient world — in Greece, Rome and in India. But the French Republic was based on a modern ideological platform. It was created with the support of a liberal constitution and popular base. The world 'republic' has become inseparable from the Revolution with two high points:

- The year 1789 when the sovereignty of the monarch was replaced by the sovereignty of the nation; and
- The 1792 when the monarch was deposed and the liberal republic was established.

Interestingly, in the French tradition, the word 'republic' has retained a powerful emotional importance even though its institutional structures remained weak. The principle of republic was subverted by persons of despotic traits on many occasions.

Modern politics can be said to have begun in the revolutionary decade, giving birth to terms like 'right' and 'left'. The French Revolution had divided the people between liberals and conservatives. The liberals generally moved towards republicanism with wide suffrage, individual rights, freedom of speech and expression, and election of the head of the State. The conservatives resisted change and laid stress on discipline, duties and social hierarchy. The unprecedented challenge of the Revolution crystallized the political thinking of the conservatives. Many of them opposed reforms based on the ideas of the Enlightenment. Both these ideologies played a determining role in popular movements creating a sharp and antipathic division in nineteenth century Europe. The French exported the idea of republicanism against the English preference for monarchy and conservatism. The Republic in France is now firmly established. The "Mareillaise" is no more a battle song but her national anthem and the Fourteenth of July is the national holiday, remembered as the Republic Day. So 'the currents of turbulence and ideological dissidence which flowed most strongly after 1789' according to C.A. Bayly, 'forced ruling groups to reconstitute the ideological foundations of the state and partially to modernize it'. They drew from a variety of sources, especially the Enlightenment. It was this shift in the basis and structure of traditional states that led to the popularity of new principles like republicanism and liberalism.

3.2.3 Modern Views on Representation

Robespierre believed that the sovereign people, once their institutions were established, would do for themselves all that they could do well and their delegates would carry out what the people could not do. The supporters of Rousseau, however, faced problems because the *social contract* stated that 'a people which gives itself representatives is no longer free'. Citing the English practice, Rousseau argued that the English people were free only at election time. In fact, the *social contract* of Rousseau offered an abstract antithesis of the political and social order of the ancient regime. The corporate society of orders and Estates was rejected in this work and was to be replaced by a society based on equality of individuals bound by the common status of citizenship. To achieve the freedom of the citizens, Rousseau transferred sovereignty from the monarch to the body of citizens as a whole. It is not the individual's will but the general will of the whole body of citizens that prevails. Rousseau's definition of social contract suggests that the sovereignty thus created through a collective will could neither be alienated nor represented. Sovereign authority of a monarch conferred by the people did not express the general will but only that of a particular person. Once this general will is lost in this way, it dissolves into a multiplicity of individuals who find themselves subject to the will of another. The social contract of Rousseau, therefore, offered a definite repudiation of representation as incompatible with the spirit of the general will.

The supporters of the Revolution felt that for a large state like France, Rousseau's principles had to be modified. Sieyes, one of the most important leaders of the liberal revolution, concluded that the people can neither speak nor act, except through their representatives. 'This view met objections from the Right, particularly from the nobles who subscribed to the distinction of Orders. Later on, in the period of Terror, Sieyes' view of representation met with opposition from the Left. The spread of Rousseau's ideas, the popular participation, and deteriorating economic circumstances created a demand for direct democracy, where deputies could be recalled from the Sectional Assembly of Paris and new representatives nominated, where people could intervene in state affairs by-insurrections and the administration of popular justice could be introduced.

Keith Michael Baker traces the roots of the social theory of representation to the days of Louis XIV's reign when a group of reformers gathered around the Due De Bourgogne demanding the restoration of traditional provincial estates. But it was the Physiocratic writings of Mirabeau and Quesney which transformed these ideas into a modern theory of representation of society and social interests. Mirabeau in his work *L'Ami deshommes'* (The Friend of Men) established the right of property as the fundamental law of every society. He suggested the decentralization of administration through the creation of provincial assemblies composed of property owners. Till this stage, the proponents of the social theory of representation proposed assemblies but this was not meant to give voice to political will of the nation. It was concerned with the rational representation of social interests.

The theory of representation was given a modern content through the political debates of 1788 and 1789. It was reworked and changed from some of its earlier meanings when the deputies revolted against the old order based on the traditional force of representation, and justified their action by an appeal to the principle of general will. Sieyes' *Qu'est-ce que be TierEtat?* (What is the Third Estate?) provided solutions to some of the thorny problems raised in political debates. He legitimized the Revolution of the deputies in the name of national sovereignty and this led to the effective transformation of the Estates-General into a National Assembly. There was the fusion of the idea of the general will with the concept of representation, achieved in the course of constitutional debates that took place over formation of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen.

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The French Revolution brought about a fundamental transformation in the concept of representation, thereby contributing to a vibrant form of democracy. The traditional perception of representation had located unity and identity in the person of an absolute monarch. Rousseau had suggested that it could be found only in the body of the citizens taken as a whole. For Sieyes, a complex modem society could achieve unity only in the national assembly. But it was far from a complete solution. Instead, it introduced tensions into revolutionary discourse. Yet, it provided an ideological foundation to the modem concept of representative government — an ideal that influenced so many liberals of the nineteenth century.

Although, the French theorists had provided the idea of the 'sovereignty of the people' they could not transform it into reality for a number of reasons. The effective instrument needed to translate ideas into practice was a coherent party system. During the revolutionary era, there was hardly any political party. One does talk of the Girondins and the Montagnards as the parties of those days but in reality these were more like shifting groups based on friendship or personal loyalties without party organization. They hardly represented public opinion or contested on distinct ideology. Besides, the French democratic experiments were carried out in the most adverse conditions, when French had plunged into war in 1792. The Revolution drifted away from its original ideals into another stage — the period of Terror and it is commonly described as the beginning of 'totalitarian democracy' under Robespierre. Although he was fully aware that the revolutionary dictatorship would be a temporary experiment and not the end of the democracy, his interpretation of Rousseau and general will was conveniently used by dictators of the modern period to justify their actions.

3.2.4 The Theory of Revolutionary Conspiracy

The polarization of Europe's politics into Left and Right also encouraged new ideas of the revolution which led to radical upheavals and subversion of such basic social institutions as family and property. By 19th century, the Revolution had become a universal force-an ideological form of politics that first influenced Europe and then the world. This resulted in the construction of a conspiracy theory on the origins of the Revolution. The Revolution began to be seen by many (like Edmund Burke) as a conspiracy by an active minority who were fed by the teaching of philosophers and had all veneration for ancient institutions and demanded a new deal. This minority was poisoned by the new doctrines and in the name of democracy undermined authority and damaged social stability. Many (like Austrian Chancellor Metternich) feared the outbreak of revolution in other parts of Europe and this gave birth to the theory of conspiracy which haunted many governments and conservative leaders.

The general impression persisted throughout the nineteenth century that the French Revolution was the outcome of conspiracy for which contemporary groups like freemasonry and men of revolutionary ideology were held responsible for overthrowing 'legitimate' authorities. The conspiracy theories promoted and sustained the language of civil war in politics. Many political battles were fought against imaginary foes. Abbe Barruel and the famous novelist Alexandre Dumas were among those influential writers who created the popular impression that freemasons supported revolutions in order to harm monarchy throughout Europe. They were also held responsible for undermining the power of the Catholic Church. Several versions of this myth persisted throughout the nineteenth century. No doubt, freemasonry in France was popular with the left-wing politicians but they were seldom centres of conspiracy. They only remained platforms for political discussion. Even till the beginning of the twentieth century, they attracted radicals and some socialists. Their critics saw them as the homes of threatening and subversive activities. This theory of conspiracy was revived with its old myth when the civil war erupted in Paris after the Franco-Prussianwar in 1870-71. This impression was created because some Parisian freemasons had tried to mediate between the rebels and the government. Interestingly, Nicholas Deschamps in his book *Les Societe set la Societe* (The Societies and the Society) saw freemasonry behind the German unification. The conspiracy theory was also applied throughout the nineteenth century to Protestants, Jesuits and Jews. The Jews were also accused of plotting the rise of Prussia under Bismarck, in association with Protestants and freemasons. The publication of Edouard Drumont's best seller *La France Juive* (The French Jew Woman) in 1886 saw the beginning of anti-Jewish propaganda in many parts of Europe. Anti-semitism became a major conservative theme in the late nineteenth century. An anti-semitic paranoia got a major twist in France through the Dreyfus affair (1894-99). Its aftermath could be seen even during the Second World War. The formation of International Socialism in London in 1864, consisting of labour representatives and socialist parties of some European nations, was seen by many in context of the theory of conspiracy. There were many who held it responsible for the Paris Commune of 1871. Interpreting political events in terms of conspiracies is a tendency whose origins can be easily treated to the days of French Revolution.

3.3 NATIONALISM AND SOVEREIGNTY

Among the forces that were to shape the developments in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, nationalism proved to be of tremendous importance. The French Revolution provided a new definition of nation. France became a nation when the association of free citizens declared their rights to constitute the sole source of sovereignty. Sieye's famous exposition *Qu'est-ce-que le Tiers Etat?* (What is the Third Estate?) provided a political definition of the nation 'as inalienable common will'. This conception of nation had many implications. It meant that a nation was a body of associates living under a common law, enjoying the status of citizens, having a relationship of equality by excluding all forms of privilege based on birth or social rank. The second implication inherent in the definition of the nation became problematic as it was not universally accepted. Sieye's conception of nation, possessing an inalienable and unitary common will, meant a rejection of the ancient laws and ideas that upheld claims for traditional organizations and institutions, including the theory of divine rights. He insisted on the link between a unitary representation and a unitary national will that he considered crucial in transforming the Estates General into a National Assembly. Thus, popular sovereignty lay at the heart of the Revolution and was closely linked to nationalism.

In contrast to the revolutionary notion of nationalism, the eighteenth century concept of nation was aptly defined by Diderot in his *Eneycropedie.* In this, he described it as a 'corrective word used to denote a considerable quantity of people who inhabit a certain extent of country defined with certain limits, and obeying the same government'. Giving primacy to the diplomatic needs and security concerns, states were handed over, without paying heed to popular will, to foreign rulers as compensations, peace bribes or rewards of victory. The leaders of the Concert of Europe adopted the same methods to safeguard themselves against the future threats by redrawing the map of Europe. However, such arrangements could not last long and a strong wave of nationalism swept across Europe, beginning with the Greek and Belgium movements, reaching its heights in 1848.

The French nationalism was fostered and strengthened by various methods. The Pete de Law Federation of 14 July 1790 had proclaimed and enacted the unity of the nation. By means of revolution and war, a large section of the population was made aware of belonging to the nation. The involvement of the people in national life from 1789 to 1815, in 1830, 1848 and 1870-71 made France a unique nation - revolutionary model for others and a standard bearer of political progress. National identity of France was redefined in 1889 by the nationalists by providing legal and cultural definitions. However, this debate remained inconclusive. All through these years, the French governments had organized grand festivals to instill a sense of national unity and promote a national memory. This included celebrating fetes like 14 July with military bands, parades, fireworks, exhibitions, playing national anthem and creating national symbols, and by unveiling statues of republican heroes right across the country. These festivities have now become a common practice in almost all the nations to forge the spirit of national unity.

The role of the French Revolution in giving rise to nationalist feelings in other countries of Europe, was usually not direct. The French notions of nationalism often led to inspiration, administration and on a number of occasions, resulted in fear and resistance. According to C.A. Bayly, the thing that did most to radicalize the Revolution was the invasion of France by the great powers. The presence of foreign armies on French soil released a wave of resistance in France, then across the borders of France under Napoleon and in Europe itself. It released extraordinary energy in the name of nationalism. Napolean's attempt to create a German federation after the annexation of German lands on the left bank of Rhine from 1801 to 1814, revolutionized the German political structure and swept away its medieval foundations. The French reorganized and secularized the ecclesiastical states and the German states, abolished free cities and the imperial nobility and attacked the feudal relics. The practical effect of all these measures was the reduction in the Catholic and the Habsburg character of Germany. The influence of the larger states, particularly Prussia increased manifold and the number of political units of Germany greatly reduced from about 300 states to only 38 by 1815. Thus the process of German unification was set in motion. The French had also annexed Belgium for opposing the French while the kingdom of Italy was kept in economic tutelage for financial gains. Some of the Italian principalities were given away to the French ruling houses as rewards. Napoleon's rule caused strong popular resentment in these places. The critics of Napoleon rightly point out that his regime was the 'negation of nationality'. There is no doubt that Napoleon's rule also led to the imposition of French model of administration with institutions like secular education, civil code and prefect systems. Napoleon's defeat led to the liberation of these lands but the imperial institutions of Napoleon had a lasting impact. Metternich tried to reverse all this through Vienna Congress, yet the old patterns could never be restored completely. Here too, the principle of national unity began to influence the political movements.

The process of national unification in recent times has been achieved through various means-railways, expanding bureaucracies, administrative centralization, expansion of markets and economic regulations, education, mass media, propaganda through modern means of communication and by promoting cultural identity. Quite apart from these, ideological factors too have promoted national feelings. The Franco-Prussian War of 1871 was the direct outcome of the passionate nationalism and popular sentiments that not only changed the political boundaries of Europe but also upset the traditional power equation.

Modern forms of nationalism manifested themselves in various ways between the French Revolution and the world wars. They revealed idealist, selfish and aggressive characteristics. Nationalism sometimes assumed sinister forms and has often been used as a vehicle for invasion arid domination. Under the Nazi rule, it became insane and demonic. Modern definitions of nationalism lay stress on common descent, language, territory, cultural and ethnic bonds. The experiences of nineteenth century have left a large space for illogical emotions and hatred that was fed by myths and distortions of history to stir popular feelings.

Wars greatly shaped national identity and the model for this was provided by France. The cult of Napoleon provided France with a great moment of national triumph. The wars of Louis Napoleon in 1854, 1859 and 1870 aroused strong national feelings and were made to satisfy national aspirations. The nineteenth and the twentieth centuries saw almost every Western state glorifying military ceremonies, national symbols and mass conscriptions, thereby making war an instrument of national consciousness. It was the force of nationalism that propelled European states towards the First World War. The rise of Japan in Asia was achieved through promoting nationalist spirit while its absence in China delayed her emergence as a nation-state. The French Revolution thus acted as a catalyst in the development and later the domination of modern nationalism, first in Europe and subsequently in the rest of the world. French nationalism became as much of a model as a threat for the outsiders. The resolute nationalist spirit drew a great deal from the Enlightenment philosophies and had a global appeal and global consequences.

3.4 THE IDEA OF PLEBISCITE AND TOTALITARIAN REGIME

The use of plebiscite as a device to settle disputes or to provide legitimacy to a debatable action had its origin in the French Revolution. In 1790 the citizens of Avignon declared their desire to be united with the rest of France. They were French speaking and were bound with the French culture but Avignon was a papal territory. This action of the people of Avignon brought an issue to the forefront that later became one of the most important sources of conflict and change during the nineteenth century — that was the principle of self-determination or the right of the people to choose their own allegiance. It ran contrary to the generally accepted principle that suggested that a ruler's sovereignty was derived from divine sanction. This right of self-determination, like the democratic principle, was closely related to the French Revolution and this passion for self-determination redrew the map of Europe in the nineteenth century. Many of the Italian States under Austrian rule succeeded in joining the union. The Latin American States of Spain and Portugal achieved independence between 1808 and 1826. The French Revolution had left its mark on these actions.

The establishment of the Jacobin Republic in 1793 was another decisive event that had a long term impact. Robespierre's action of setting up a republican government with a powerful executive was basically a temporary experiment and was not meant to be an end of democracy. His reinterpretation of Rousseau to legitimize his rule gave many dictators a pretext to justify their actions. Hence, the modem totalitarian states, particularly of the twentieth century, are usually seen as the legacy of the French Revolution. Strong war-time dictatorships had been established in the earlier period but the quasi-democratic device of plebiscite was the byproduct of the French Revolution. A number of arbitrary measures were adopted during the Revolution which were given legal sanction by way of plebiscite. Many fraudulent method became a common practice under the Bonapartist regime. A new Constitution was passed by an unusually large majority and in 1802, Bonaparte became Consulate for life with just 8000 votes polled against him. With another plebiscite he became the Emperor of France with over three and a half million votes in his favour against mere 2579. Similar plebiscites were held by Louis Napoleon. Under the totalitarian regimes of the twentieth century, the dictatorships have gained approval with foul means and many scholars hold the French Revolution responsible for this misuse of democracy.

3.5 FRENCH REVOLUTION AND SOCIALIST IDEOLOGY

Although, the French Revolution was a liberal and not a socialist revolution, some currents of socialism could be found in various guises on the eve of the Revolution – a few aspects of it provided later socialists with inspiration and heroes. It is true that there was a gulf between the most radical social thinkers of the eighteenth century and the modem doctrines of socialism but some of the writings and speeches of the revolution era were the driving force in the form of protest against poverty, exploitation and inequality. Montesquieu, who himself came from an aristocratic family, said that the state owed all its citizens an assured subsistence and healthy life. Similar sentiments were expressed by other thinkers and officials in France. Although there was no real socialist doctrine in France in 1789 but the passion for equality existed at every stage, even though the opposition was more against social rather than economic privilege.

The French Revolution protected property rights vehemently but it was not for total concentration of property and wealth. The egalitarian thought is reflected in Robespierre's speech of 5 February 1794 when he said that 'Commerce is the source of public wealth and not just of the monstrous opulence of a few families'. When the Church lands were auctioned, one argument in the debate was the need of making property more widespread, so that a larger number of people would become the supporters of the new order. Towards the end of 1789, a society was formed called the *Cercle Social* (Social Circle), to educate the people. In this, Abbe Fauchet highlighted the egalitarian implications of the *social contract,* and asked for a gradual division of land. However, many of these proposals were suppressed.

When the Revolution turned into war, the economic repercussions like food shortages, steep inflation, black-marketing, etc. led to the reinforcement of egalitarian ideas, with popular demand for equality and state regulation of economy. There were several small groups who were demanding or planning action. Some of them enjoy a special place in the ancestry of modern socialism. Apart from *Cercle Social,* Marx and Engels mention the names of Keclerc and Roux as precursors of socialism. Together with some others like Varlet, they formed a group demanding radical reforms and came to be called *Enrages.* They were individual enthusiasts and not bound by single ideology except their fight for the poor against the rich. Jacques Roux, a priest of the constitutional church in Paris, claimed that the produce of the land belonged to all men. His followers declared that physical need is the only basis of property. Roux also denounced the monopolists, hoarders and speculators as the enemies of society. Varlet too carried forward the egalitarian virtues and felt that so long as the majority of population remained subject to the tyranny of the rich, Rousseau's concept of direct democracy would remain an illusion. Leclerc, the revolutionary journalist compared the mercantile and bourgeois class to aristocracy and raised a slogan that 'all men have an equal right to eat.'

The Herbertists represented the voice of the urban poor. Herbert was a mythical personality and reflected the aspirations and fears of the *Sans Culottes,* a lower middle class category consisting of artisans and small shopkeepers who strongly supported the success of the Revolution Herbert divided the Third Estate between bourgeoisie and the people. They all preached a war against the rich. In 1795 - 96, Noel Babenf led a rising called the conspiracy of Equals, that was almost communist. He reflected the collective spirit and his original solutions were utopian in character — an idea of total abolition of private property.

The French socialist ideology resurfaced during the period of Restoration (1815 - 1830) and in July Monarchy. Pierre Joseph Proudhon's views, according to Karl Marx, marked an important stage in popular thought. He was one of those who helped the working class to become conscious of itself. His writings against profit making had idealized artisans, criticized industrialization and excessive division of labour and called for absolute equality of incomes. The socialist impact led to the coming of class war in 1848 and then in 1871. During the Paris Commune, the Paris workers made determined attempt to govern themselves. Words like class war, proletariat and workers solidarity came from France in the socialist vocabulary. All through the twentieth century, France remained an important centre of socialism and socialist thought.

3.6 THE CULTURAL LEGACY

The French Revolution was like an explosion and a violent upheaval. Events like this often destroy many aspects of the past culture. The destructive experience of the revolution was not expected to give birth to durable creations but the Revolution of 1789 signifies an idea of fundamental change.

The French people had to confront the collapse of the whole social order. What is termed as the *ancien regime,* and from its rubbles and chaos they had to assemble a new order. This provided limitless possibilities of innovation to the revolutionaries. Like the people of other regions, the Frenchmen did not have much of a political vocabulary before 1789 as politics centred at Vessailles, the royal court. However, the elections to the Estates General brought the common man of the street into the national politics. The lower section of the populace began participating in street marches and political insurrections. It affected not only the nature of politics but contributed to the sudden formation of a revolutionary language based on new political vocabulary. New words or phrases were coined to express popular demands. Words like citizen rights, sovereignty, representation and patriotism received new meanings. Thousands of brochures, pamphlets, caricatures and cartoons, plays, newspaper articles came out explaining the new ideology. Stage plays were enacted on political and revolutionary themes, folk songs were sung with changed meanings, popular fetes were organized and a revolutionary calendar was introduced in France. All these developments were contributing to the creation of new revolutionary culture. Traditional centres of public sphere were adapting themselves according to the revolutionary atmosphere. New concepts of time and space came into being based on the principles of rationalism and naturalism.

The revolutionaries had provided a new division of time by preparing a revolutionary calendar in which a month was to consist of three weeks of ten days each, and a year divided into twelve months. The remaining five days were declared patriotic days to include civil qualities like virtue, genius, labour, reward and opinion. Each day of the week was given a new name, which was dedicated to some aspect of rural life. The names of the rulers and queens were swiftly removed from Paris streets and new names were given. Words like *Le Roy* or *Le Roi* (the king) were replaced by *la loi* (the liberty). Even the pictures of king, queen and jack were replaced with revolutionary symbols. The new expressions and political vocabulary had eroded the sacred position of the king. The ritual use of the language like swearing and oaths provided to the revolutionaries a means of reconstituting moral basis of the community. The formation of new political culture had its stamp on the French culture. Theatre, art and music came under strong revolutionary influence.

The coming of the Revolution influenced the journalistic press. The newspapers like *Mercure,* Brissot's *Patriote Francaise* (French Patriots) and Barere's *Point du Tour* (The Turning Point) provided direct message to the people and popularized the revolutionary ideology. These papers demonstrated the role of political journalism to the future revolutionaries including intellectuals like Karl Marx. There was a sudden growth of readership and a revolutionary change in the content of newspaper. This contributed to the formation of public opinion.

In the sphere of drama, every crisis in the revolution had its commentary on civic stage. Political themes were extensively borrowed. Stage plays became a source of political propaganda. Chenier's *Charles IX* is said to have baptized the stage in the name of nation, law and constitution. It was the most popular play reflecting the spirit of revolution. Art, too, was used in public festivals and in the visual pageantry of the large-scale spectacles. The decade of the Revolution produced thousands of printed images through allegorical compositions, political caricatures, portraits of leaders, letterheads, playing cards, children's games, civil manuals and many other forms. These images are called *ephemera* and these proved to be more effective means of drawing people into political debates. Art in this period acquired a strategic and explicitly political function. The revolutionaries had great faith in the power of images and art was used to perform the role of social and moral regenerator. The imagery of the French Revolution was created through all these means.

However, it is very difficult to say as to how much of these changes survived the Revolution. Perhaps very little of it accept its imagery and memory. This was because the Revolution had completely rejected the old culture of ancient regime, while the new culture that was imposed from above was seen as a product of socio- political interests and charged up emotions of a few. Its survival became precarious. The French society had reached a stage of disorder and sharp divide with the collapse of the old moral foundations. The new ruling class was unable to provide an alternative. Yet those projects which were universal in scope, such as the metric system, secularism, legal code and democratic principles — they survived to a large extent. The other two expressions of the 18th century — Enlightenment and no- classicism struggled with romanticism in the 19th century but moulded some of the styles and ideas of modern day arts.

It can be said that the principal legacy of the French Revolution was the Revolution itself. Even after two hundred years, its memory persists. Many religions of humanity during the nineteenth century — religions which made humanity their objects of cult- were born out of this revolutionary faith. It marked the overthrow of the old regime and the establishment of a free, fraternal and egalitarian society. It forced a historical reconsideration of tradition. The revolutionary faith became a tradition that relieved itself in the events of 1830, 1848 and 1871 in France and inspired many others in Greece, Belgium, Italy and Germany. However, some people question the use of term 'revolutionary culture' for this memory, tradition and ritual enactments. Whichever way one looks at the Revolution, its most important legacy was democratic republicanism – an ideology embraced by a large section of the middle class all over the world. The ideology experienced stiff resistance from the European officials during the nineteenth century, as it was achieved either through war or terror. However, the radical republicanism in France had to adjust with more moderate forms of government, public education, secularism and the desire for individual liberty in order to find a permanent place in Europe and the outside world. The French Revolutionary culture had a deep influence over the reformulated post-colonial world that emerged after the Second World War.

3.7 REVOLUTION AND GENDER

One question which is often asked by the historians is whether the Revolution caused the disempowerment of women from politics. There is no doubt that women from different sections of French society participated in the Revolution and contributed in different ways. From the hostesses of salons representing the aristocratic and bourgeois background to women of modest means — washerwomen, fisher women, flower sellers to the labouring women, all had something to offer. Most of them demanded sufficient and regular supply of bread, some wanted better education but the radicals like those who were members of the society of Revolutionary Republic Women, asked for political representation, franchise rights and equality with men. There are, however, two views on this subject. One view suggests that the condition of French women worsened due to the Revolution and whatever was granted to them through the Constitution was taken away after 1793. Women ceased to be citizens and Napoleon's code adopted a cynical attitude towards them. The Revolution reflected bourgeois masculine power in which women were deprived of justice and the cause of women remained suspended for over one century. However, there is another view that holds that the Revolution improved the position of 'family' in which women given equal role. The new laws on inheritance of property reflected a distinct elevation in the status of women. Similarly, when the marriage was made a civil contract by the Constitution of 1791, divorce became a matter of mutual consent in which women had equal say. So while the French women were among the first in Europe to clamour for equal political rights and citizenship, their agitations died down after the Revolution and remained suspended till the second half of the century.

3.8 SUMMARY

After reading this Unit, you must have realized that the French Revolution initiated several important issues which remain relevant in today's world but the solutions found to these questions varied with the passage of time. Prolonged debates followed once the revolutionary problems were raised. It is not easy to make a precise assessment of the Revolution's legacy. It definitely provided a sudden leap into a utopian future. Most of the revolutionaries throughout the world saw the Revolution as the torchbearer of modern politics and political experimentation but there are many others who shunned it for its violence and disorder. These are two opposite views on the Revolutionary politics. The 'Whig-Republican' interpretation sees the Revolution as the inventor of modern democratic culture. According to this view, the principles of liberty and equality reached a logical conclusion and a desired end by the end of the nineteenth century. The opposite view is presented by the 'Tory-Tocquevillian' analysis. It argues that the Revolution resulted in the strengthening of state power at the expense of autonomous institutions like the church, corporations and associations by weakening the civil society and making it dependent on the state. This view regards Bonapartism as the culmination of post-revolutionary political culture by creating a powerful state.

3.9 EXERCISES

1) Analyze the contribution of the French Revolution in developing a new political culture.
2) How did the French Revolution shape nationalism and sovereignty in Europe?
3) Write a critical note on French cultural legacy.

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UNIT 4 THEORIES OF THE STATE

Structure

4.1 Introduction

4.2 Understanding the State

4.3 Liberal Conception of the State

4.4 Rousseau

4.5 The Marxist Perspective

4.6 Welfare State

4.7 Liberal – Egalitarian State

4.8 Libertarian – Minimal State

4.9 Gandhian Perspective on the State

4.10 Feminist Theory and the State

4.11 Summary

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4.1 INTRODUCTION

The State is central to our understanding of modern societies and politics. It is a truism to mention that State plays a crucial role in the functioning of modern society. What then is the State? This appears to be a simple question but when we attempt to answer this we find the answers elusive. In the course of answering this question we would realize that our understanding of politics itself is to a great extent linked with our understanding of the State. Today it is impossible to think of life without the framework of the State. The State has come to be equated with civility and identity.

Our attitude to the State is to a great extent determined by our conceptualization of it. From the point of view of an active citizenship it is important to include a critical and insightful understanding of the State as part of any meaningful political education. All this makes the study of the State significant.

Having highlighted the importance of studying the concept of the State, it needs to be mentioned that it is one of the most problematic and ambivalent concepts in politics, its ambivalence being a consequence of its certain yet elusive character. So overwhelming is the importance of the State in contemporary societies that politics is itself conflated with the State, the appropriateness of this conflation is the subject of a rather lively debate in political theory.

Differing historical experiences have led to differing perceptions and practices of the State. Yet all States do have a territory, legal system, judiciary and monopoly of force and so on. The idea of an impersonal and sovereign political order is an intrinsically modern idea and by extension also the idea of citizenship. The gradual erosion of feudal ties and controls meant a redefinition of political authority and structures as well. The idea of the modern State which we will examine in this unit emerges around this time. In fact it was only towards the end of the sixteenth century that the concept of the State became central to European political thought.

4.2 UNDERSTANDING THE STATE

It was around the time of the Enlightenment that major enquiries into the basic nature and structure of the State began to be made in a systematic manner. The new concerns focussed on the distinctions between the new, modern State that had come into being and the traditional state systems. The new concerns also focused on the relationship between the State and society. The Enlightenment thinkers were particularly concerned with the question of where the State ended and the society began. It was as a result of the intellectual efforts of the Enlightenment thinkers that we are today in a position to address some key questions regarding the nature of the State. Some of these questions are: What is the State? How long has it been with us? What are its main features? These are all important questions and need to be answered before we proceed to enquire into the theories of the State.

State can be defined as the centralized, law making, law enforcing, politically sovereign institution in the society. In other words, it is useful to understand and define the State in terms of the functions it performs. Put briefly and simply, the State

- Comprises a set of institutions with ultimate control over the means of violence and coercion within a given territory;
- Monopolizes rule-making within the territory;
- Develops the structures for the implementation of the rules;
- Regulates market activity within the territory; and
- Ensures the regulation and distribution of essential material goods and services.

However, in modern times, that is to say during the last three hundred years or so, a whole new set of functions have been added to this. It has been argued that a major task of the modern state system in Europe was to enable the development of industrialism. It was also under industrialism that the modern State came to enjoy tremendous powers. It also became so omnipotent that it became virtually impossible to think of human life outside the framework of the State. The state is all pervasive today, but was it always like this? Was there a time when people could live without a state? This leads us to the second question: how old is the State?

Living in modern times we tend to take the State for granted as if it has always been a part of human society. Moreover, we also tend to take some of the features of the modern State – national, representative, centralized, interventionist – for granted. We need to recognize that not only were these features not always a part of the State, the State itself was not *always* there. Therefore the question on the life of the State can be answered by suggesting that although there is nothing exclusively modern about the State, it nonetheless does not have a very long life in human history. It is therefore best to look upon State as a *contingency* and not a perennial feature of human life. If we were to divide the entire human history into three phases – pre-agrarian, agrarian and industrial – then the State certainly did not exist in the pre-agrarian phase of human life. In the elementary situation of the hunters and gatherers, there was no surplus and no division of labour. As a result, there was no need for any political centralization. However, once humans took to agriculture and consequently to a more settled life, a division of labour and a more complex form of human organization began to emerge. It was then that gradually a State came into being to extract surplus, regulate the division of labour, maintain exchange mechanism and settle disputes whenever required.

However not all the agrarian societies had a State. Only the large and the more complex ones did. Small, primitive, simple and elementary agrarian societies could still manage their affairs without a State. Although the State had arrived in the human world at this stage, it was still an option and not an inevitability. Some agrarian societies had a state and some did not.

It was however in the third phase of human society, i.e., under industrialism that the State ceased to be an option and became an integral and necessary part of human society. With a limitless increase in the division of labour and an increasing complexity of human life, people have found it impossible to manage without a State. So it would be fair to say that in the beginning, i.e., in the pre-agrarian stage of human life there was no State. Then, under agrarian conditions, some human societies had a State and some did not (we can even say that some *needed* a state and some did not). But under industrial condition there is no choice but to *have* a State. State under modern conditions is no longer an option but a necessity.

The range of the nature of state-systems in human history has varied a great deal. There have been small kingdoms, city-states as well as large empires. However under modern conditions, a new type of State – nation-state – has emerged and pervaded the modern world. We can say that the history of State in modern times is the history of nation-states. It is this nation-state – centralized, interventionist, representative – that has been the object of theorizing by various scholars. We can now turn to some of the theories that have propounded about the modern State.

4.3 LIBERAL CONCEPTION OF THE STATE

Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527) and Jean Bodin (1530-96) were amongst the earliest writers to articulate the new concerns, although it was Thomas Hobbes (1588-1642) nearly a century later who addresses the question sharply. The questions that arose were seeking answers to basic issues like, what is the State? The State's origins and foundations were examined, as also its relationship with society and the most desirable form of this relationship, its functions and of course whose interests should the State represent, and then at the end of it all how would the relationship between States be governed?

Thomas Hobbes offers a brilliant analysis of the State and related issues. He represents a point of transition, between a commitment to the absolute State and the struggle of liberalism against tyranny. Without going into too many details, liberalism can be explained as that worldview which gives central importance to the idea of choice, this choice is to be exercised across diverse fields like marriage, education, enterprise, work and profession and of course political affairs. This ability to choose is what characterizes a rational and free individual and politics is about the defence of these rights and any interference whatsoever is to be limited and through the State based on a constitution.

Hobbes in his book '*Leviathan*' acknowledges clearly the development of a new form of power, public power characterized by permanence and sovereignty. Hobbes is a fascinating point of departure for our discussions on the modern theories of the State, because he combines within him many profoundly liberal and at the same time many illiberal arguments. Hobbes opens his account by describing human nature that he says always seeks 'more intense delight' and hence is characterized by a restlessness and a desire to maximize power. This famously reduces human society into a 'war of all against all'. The idea that people might come to respect and trust each other and co-operate and honour their promises and contracts seems remote to Hobbes. This is what he describes as, the state of nature, here life becomes to quote him ‘nasty, short and brutish’. What then is the way out? It is the creation of the State, which in this case turns out to be an absolute State, and this is quite clearly a direct outcome of the dreadful life that Hobbes visualizes in the absence of the State.

He suggests that free and equal individuals should surrender their rights by transferring them to a powerful authority that can force them to keep their promises and covenants, then an effective and legitimate private and public sphere, society and State can be formed. This would be done through a social contract wherein consenting individuals hand over their rights of self-government to a single authority, authorized to act on their behalf. The sovereign thus created would be permanent and absolute. At this point it is interesting to note the liberal in Hobbes emphasizing that this sovereign would be so only as a consequence of consenting individuals, who in turn are bound to fulfil their obligations to the sovereign. It would be the duty of the sovereign however, to protect the people and of course their property.

Thomas Hobbes considers the State to be pre-eminent in social and political life. According to him it is the State that gives to the individuals the chance to live in a civilized society. The miserable life in the state of nature is altered by the emergence of the State. Then follows the creation of a civilized society. Thus it is the State that in Hobbes’ conception constructs society and establishes its form and codifies its forces. Moreover the self-seeking nature of individuals leads to anarchy and violence and hence State has to be powerful and strident enough to resist this and maintain order, for order is a value that Hobbes cherishes greatly. And since it is all the consenting individuals who have created the State, the State is legitimate and represents the sum total of all individuals enabling them to carry on with their businesses and lives in an uninterrupted manner. To do all this, a giant and powerful State is envisaged, and this vision is remarkably close to the image of a modern all pervasive State that we are familiar with. His conception of individuals as being nothing more than self-interested is also a depressingly modern and familiar view.

Hobbes’ political conclusions emphasizing on an all powerful State does make him profoundly illiberal, and this tension in his writings between the emphatic claims on individuality on the one hand, and the need for an all powerful State on the other hand make his arguments very exciting.

Rapid and far-reaching technological, economic, political changes apart from a good number of years separate John Locke from Hobbes. Locke is not prepared to accept the idea of an absolute sovereign, and this is a major point of departure from where he then establishes his theory of the State. For Locke the State exists as an instrument to protect the life, liberty and estate of the citizens. Locke like Hobbes saw the establishment of the political world as preceded by the existence of individuals endowed with natural rights to property, which includes life, liberty and estate.

Locke begins with a picture of free, equal and rational men (Locke like Hobbes and in fact like most other political theorists is not thinking of women when he writes about social and political issues) living quite amicably in the state of nature governed by natural laws. In the state of nature they enjoy natural rights, but Locke points out that not all individuals would be equally respectful of the natural laws. This creates some inconveniences, the most significant of these being inadequate regulation of property which for Locke is prior to both society and the State. Locke suggests that these inconveniences can be overcome only by the consenting individuals forging contracts to create first a society and then a State. The State is thus very obviously a creation for the purpose of the individuals and it would be they who would be the final judges in this matter. This is a very novel idea though today seems commonplace because it has become almost the central idea of liberalism. Locke holds categorically that the individuals do not transfer all their rights to the State, and whatever rights are transferred is only on the condition that the State adheres to its basic purpose of preserving the individual's life, liberty and estate. This is today one of the central ideas of liberalism and is central to our understanding of the State.

Thus Locke paved the way for representative government although Locke himself advocated constitutional monarchy and was clearly not articulating any of the now routinely accepted democratic ideas of popular government based on universal adult franchise. Yet there is no denying that it was his idea that the State should be for the protection of the rights of the citizens which made the transformation of liberalism into liberal democracy possible.

Taking off from Locke's ideas that there must be limits upon legally sanctioned political power, Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), and James Mill (1773-1836) developed a systematic account of the liberal democratic State. In their account the State would be expected to ensure that the conditions necessary for individuals to pursue their interests without risk of arbitrary political interference, to participate freely in economic transactions, to exchange labour and goods on the market and to appropriate resources privately. In all this the State was to be like an umpire while individuals went about their business as per the rules of the free market, and periodic elections determined who would be in power.

The idea was that such an arrangement would lead to the maximization of pleasure for the maximum numbers as per the principle of utility, to which both Bentham and Mill subscribed. This argument was clearly advocating a limited State on the grounds that the scope and power of the State should be limited in order to ensure that the collective good be realized through individuals freely competing and pursuing utility without State interference.

Yet significantly certain kinds of interference were allowed, any individual, group or class that would challenge the security of property, the working of the market or the upkeep of public good could be held by the State. Prisons became the hallmark of this age, the enactment and enforcement of law backed by the coercive powers of the State and the creation of new State institutions advocated in order to uphold the general principle of utility.

The modern liberal democratic State which we are familiar can be traced to the writings of Bentham and Mill. However they stopped short of advocating universal suffrage (for instance workers and women were kept out of the charmed circle), finding one reason or the other to deny the vote to all individuals. For the utilitarians, democracy was not an end in itself only a means to an end. Democracy was seen as the logical requirement for the governance of a society freed from absolute power and tradition, inhabited by individuals who seek to maximize their private gains, constituted as they are by endless desires.

John Stuart Mill (1806-73) is perhaps one of the first and strongest advocates of democracy as an end in itself who saw its primary purpose as the highest and harmonious development of the individual. John Stuart Mill was deeply committed

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to the idea of individual liberty, moral development and the rights of minorities. He was concerned with the nature and limits of the power that could be legitimately exercised by society over the individual. Liberal democratic government was necessary not only to ensure the pursuit of individual satisfaction, but also for free development of individuality.

While he conceded the need for some regulation and interference in individual's lives, but he sought obstacles to arbitrary and self-interested intervention. To ensure all of this, Mill proposed a representative democracy. However despite the firm commitment to liberty and democracy that Mill makes, he too believed that those with the most knowledge and skills should have more votes than the rest, inevitably this would imply that those with most property and privilege would have more votes than the rest. Of course it needs to be mentioned that deep inequalities of wealth, and power bothered Mill who believed that these would prevent the full development of those thus marginalized.

4.4 ROUSSEAU

Standing apart from the liberal and democratic tradition is Rousseau (1712-1778) who might be described a champion of the 'direct' or 'participatory' model of democracy. Rousseau is uncomfortable with the idea that sovereignty can be transferred either by consent or through the ballot, actually he did not think it possible even. Rousseau justifies the need for the State by beginning his arguments in the '*Social Contract*' with the description of the state of nature in which human beings were rather happy but were ultimately driven out of it because of various obstacles to their preservation (some of these obstacles that he identifies are natural disasters, individual weakness and common miseries). Thus human beings come to realize that for the fullest realization of their potential and for greatest liberty it is essential for them to come together and co-operate through a law making and enforcing body. This State would be thus a result of a contract that human beings create to establish possibilities of *self*-regulation and *self*-government. In his scheme of affairs individuals were to be directly involved in law making and obeying these laws would not be akin to obeying a sovereign authority outside on oneself but it would amount to obeying oneself and this to Rousseau constitutes freedom.

Individuals are thus to vote in disregard of their private interest, to each individual who is an indivisible part of the sovereign what matters is only the interest of the body politic itself. Rousseau calls this general will. For Rousseau the sovereign is the people themselves in a new form of association and the sovereign's will is the will of each person. The government is thus the result of an agreement among the citizens and is legitimate only to the extent to which it fulfils the instructions of the general will and obviously should it fail to do so it can be revoked or changed.

4.5 THE MARXIST PERSPECTIVE

The take off point for Karl Marx (1818-83) and Engels (1820-95) in their analysis of the State is unlike the preceding accounts not the individual and his or her relation to the State. As Marx put it very eloquently 'man is not an abstract being squatting outside the world…'

Marx argued that individuals by themselves do not tell us much, it is the interaction between individuals and institutions and the society that makes the account worthwhile.

He contends that the State has to be seen as a dynamic institution circumscribed by social forces and always changing. Thus the key to understanding the relations between people is the class structure. Classes they argued are created at a specific conjecture in history, the implication is that historically there was a period characterized by the absence of classes and the future could hold a classless society. With the creation of surplus produce a class of non- producers that can live off the productive activity of others emerges and this is the foundation of classes in society. Those who succeed in gaining control over the means of production form the ruling class both economically and politically. This leads to intense, perpetual and irreconcilable conflicts in society. Such struggles while becoming the motor force for historical development also become the basis for the emergence of the State.

Marx and Engels challenged the idea that the State can be neutral and represent the community or the public interests as though classes did not exist. When the liberals claim that the State acts neutrally it is according to Marx protecting a system of individual rights and defending the regime of private property, thus its actions produce results that are far from neutral. Marx is of the opinion that the dichotomy between the private and the public which characterizes the modern State is itself dubious for it depoliticizes the most important source of power in modern societies i.e. private property. That which creates a fundamental and crucial divide in society is presented as an outcome of free private contracts and not a matter for the State. However he argues, all the institutions and structures of the State defend the interests of private property and thus the claims of neutrality that the State makes are untenable.

Marxist politics would therefore require an action plan to overthrow the State and by implication the classes that uphold the State. Marx characterized the history of State broadly as having set out from a slave State, to feudal State and then to the modern State (with capitalism as its basis). The last mentioned carries within it as a consequence of heightened class struggle the possibility of revolutionary transformation and the creation of a socialist State. This would be for the first time in history a State representative of the majority. It would be controlled by the proletariat, and unlike the earlier dictatorships controlled by the property owning classes, this State would be the dictatorship of the proletariat, the toiling classes.

Eventually Marx argues that the logic of historical development would lead this State to a communist stage. Material abundance and prosperity would distinguish this State from the earlier stage of statelessness described as primitive communism by Marx. In the communist stage of society's evolution due to the absence of classes and class struggle, the State would become redundant and wither away. The State according to Marx exists to defend the interests of the ruling classes and is deeply embedded in socio-economic relations and linked to particular class interests. We can discern at least two distinct strands in Marx explaining the nature of this relationship between classes and the State.

Of the two, the more subtle position is the one that we will examine first. This position holds that the State and its bureaucratic institutions may take a variety of forms and constitute a source of power which need not be directly linked to the interests or be under the unambiguous control of the dominant class in the short term. Thus, according to this view, the State appears to have a certain degree of power independent of class forces, thus it is described as being relatively autonomous. The other view that we find often represented in Marx's writings is that the State's role is to coordinate a divided society in the interests of the ruling class, thus it sees the State as merely a 'superstructure' serving the interests of the dominant class.

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Later Marxists have differed considerably with each other on the interpretations of the Marxist concept of the State. One of the most celebrated of such differences is the now famous ‘Miliband vs. Poulantzas’ debate.

Ralph Miliband begins by stressing the need to separate the governing classes from the ruling classes. The latter exercises ultimate control whereas the former makes day-to-day decisions. Miliband is suggesting that the ruling class does not get embroiled in the everyday business of governance, for the State is an instrument that is for the domination of society on behalf of this very class. His contention is that in order to be politically effective the State has to separate itself from the ruling class. And in doing this, it might even have to take actions that might not be in the interests of the ruling class, of course in the long run.

For Poulantzas the class affiliations of those in State positions and offices is not of any significance. He draws attention to the structural components of the capitalist State which enable it to protect the long-term framework of capitalist production even if it means severe conflict with some segments of the capitalist class. A fundamental point in Poulantza’s argument is that the State is what holds together capitalism by ensuring political organization of the dominant classes that are constantly engaged in conflict due to competitive pressures and short term differences.

Further the State ensures ‘political disorganization’ of the working classes which because of many reasons can threaten the hegemony of the dominant classes, the State also undertakes the task of political ‘regrouping’ by a complex ‘ideological process’ of classes from the non-dominant modes of production who could act against the State. Thus in this perspective the centralized modern State is both a necessary result of the ‘anarchic competition of civil society’ and a force in the reproduction of such competition and division. The State does not simply record socio-economic reality, it enters into its very construction by reinforcing its form and codifying its elements.

4.6 WELFARE STATE

Marxist theory of the State as we have seen challenged the hegemony of individualism that was intrinsic to liberal and liberal-democratic theories. However from within liberalism attempts at revisiting the basic assumptions came with the reversal of the explanation of the process of social causation, and the consequent effect this had on the idea of personal responsibility that had been a feature of nineteenth century thought. The emergence of the case for the welfare State began with the argument that instead of public welfare being the cause of dependence, loss of autonomy and capacity for individual responsibility for action and the market the source of independence and freedom, the opposite was the case.

A considerable amount of re-interpretation of certain basic concepts like liberty, community and equality were undertaken, and the nature of society was no longer visualized as a loosely coordinating set of individuals bound together by common rules but lacking a common purpose rather as a more intimate form of order. People were seen as being held together by social bonds that were not merely contractual and hence they could make claims on one another as citizens engaged in a common enterprise. This made the welfare State appear less like a charity and more like a form of entitlement. T. H. Green (1836-82) was one of the first and strongest advocates of the kind of the welfare State that Europe became familiar with. It began with a redefinition of liberty and its recasting of the notions of citizenship and community, moving as it did from the earlier foundation of the State based on the subjective preferences of atomized individuals.

The theory of modern welfare State stems out of an enquiry into the alleged inadequacies of the individualistic market order rather than from a socialist or Marxist theory. The latter theories would not argue for a welfare State without the backdrop of socialism. In fact Marxists are deeply critical of the welfare State institutions since they are merely set upon existing capitalist structures. On close scrutiny of the intellectual foundations of the welfare State we would notice that it does not sanction the abolition of the market but only a correction of its defects. Hence the successful welfare State is something that would in the long run help the capitalist State.

4.7 LIBERAL — EGALITARIAN STATE

The primary concern of welfare State theories has been equality, and to realize this goal an interventionist state was advanced as an option. John Rawls on the other hand has been concerned with the justification in rational terms of socially and economically necessary inequalities. Rawls's notion of State is similar to that of Locke: the State is a voluntary society constituted for mutual protection. This civil association regulates the general conditions so that individuals can pursue their individual interests. In Rawls' conception individuals are viewed as rational agents with interests and right claims, and a State can provide a general framework of rules and conditions which enable the fulfilment of these rights and claims. Rawls bestows upon the State an active role in the integration and promotion of the lives of the individual.

Rawls believes that 'public reason' would be the basis of the liberal legitimacy of the State. This is described by him as intellectual and moral power of citizens. In Rawls' most well known work, 'A Theory of Justice' as well as in his later works there is no conscious attempt made to develop a theory of State. However a close reading of his works suggests that he has in mind a constitutional democracy based on the principle of 'public reason' where each departure from the principle of equality should be justified on the basis of the famous Rawlsian principles of justice. The State would in this framework be expected to intervene in favour of establishing the principle of justice as fairness, and establish the principle of equality of individuals.

4.8 LIBERTARIAN — MINIMAL STATE

Robert Nozick has in his work 'Anarchy, State and Utopia' (1974) expressed his deep reservations regarding a State that is allowed to intervene and in fact to the whole quest for equality. Nozick is of the view that it is only the minimal State that can be morally justified, being limited by rights bearing individuals. Nozick challenged both anarchic visions of statelessness as well as welfare oriented interventionism.

Nozick repudiated the claims of any State to 'forbid capitalist acts between consenting adults'. He argues that a State that does anything more than provide services will necessarily violate people's rights and so cannot be morally legitimate. He argues primarily against the view that a major function of the State is to achieve distributive justice on the basis of some conception of the right pattern of distribution. Nozick therefore argues that a State which is more extensive than the minimal State is bound to be non-neutral by increasing the scope for manipulations. The position that Nozick took led him to become one of most invoked philosophers of the New Right, who were arguing through the 1980s for the rolling out of the State from the society.

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Nozick's prescription for a minimal State seemed to fulfil these requirements and thus gave an intellectual basis for the rapid withdrawal of the State from many key areas in England, Europe and America.

4.9 GANDHIAN PERSPECTIVE ON THE STATE

We have till now looked at theories of the State that are circumscribed by the western experience. Anti-imperialist movements and the subsequent de-colonization was the context of new theories of State that questioned, re-examined and in some cases moved away completely from the western vantage point. Of these Mahatma Gandhi's is a profound challenge to both the liberal and the Marxist views of the State.

Gandhi's views on the State begin from a position of deep distrust and discomfort vis-à-vis the State. He differed from the core commitment that liberals make to the idea of unbridled individualism. Hence he obviously does not subscribe to the notion of the State that has as its fundamental principle competing individuals pursuing an end defined by the interests of the isolated, atomized self.

Gandhi was equally uncomfortable with the interventionist role of the State advocated by some other theories albeit in the interest of equality. Gandhi argued that increasing State interference is immoral and opens up ever increasing possibilities of violence and corruption.

Gandhi described swarajya as the ideal State. This would imply not only self-rule as is commonly understood but it implied governance of one's self, self-control and self regulation. A situation where each individual is able to govern and control himself or herself thus making the State redundant.

Gandhi advocated an active citizenry that would be involved in decision making and control of its destiny, rather than a huge and centralized, monolithic State structure. For Gandhi such a structure would be an embodiment of violence and would lead to alienation. This was an extension of his opinion that large scale industrialization would lead to violence and alienation.

Gandhi denounced the modern State as a soulless machine, which even while engaging in ostensibly egalitarian acts unwittingly leads to violence, and in the last instance a destruction of the individual. Gandhi expected the State to ensure internal peace and external security. He was however extremely sceptical of the modern State's claims to act on behalf of something described as autonomous 'national interest'. This discussion is only a fleeting glimpse of the very interesting arguments Gandhi puts forth in his dialogue with the tradition of western political theory that we have looked at so far. Needless to add that in order to present the total picture we need to place this discussion in the larger context of Gandhi's political philosophy.

4.10 FEMINIST THEORY AND THE STATE

Feminists of the liberal persuasion do not see any harm in engaging with the State and using the State as an ally to fight for their rights. They see the State as a neutral institution from which women had so long been excluded and into which they should make an entry.

However there are many that see the above approach as being rather short sighted. Malestream (which is also mainstream) political theory and politics has all along had a way of structuring politics and political institutions that does not permit the entry, articulation and much less the realization of feminist goals. The State from this point of view is presented as male in the feminist sense. The laws thus see and treat women the way men treat women. Radical feminists would go on from here to urge abandonment of such a State. This is however not a very widely shared view, most feminists would argue they need to engage with this State as *women*, challenging the State's spurious claims to gender neutrality, and insisting on the validity of female voices.

Marxist-feminist attitude of scepticism towards the welfare State is premised on the belief that the benign use of the State to provide welfare for its citizens simply represents the most cost-effective way of reproducing labour power. It also assumes and reinforces women's domestic responsibilities and their economic dependency on a male breadwinner within the patriarchal family. The contention is that far from freeing women, welfare provision has helped to maintain oppressive gender roles, and has led to increased surveillance of sexual and reproductive behaviour and of child rearing practices. In the 1960s at the height of political radicalism, feminists argued that collaborating with the State amounted to a sell out. Today however there is a much more open-ended and less consistently hostile attitude to the State and to conventional political activity.

Post-Modernism and the Understanding of the State

Post-modernism sees the sovereign State as a metanarrative that is part of the totalizing discourse of modernity. Michel Foucault has argued that power is exercised not only at the level of the State but at the micro levels where it is constantly being redefined and experienced. Resistance too therefore to power has to happen not just at the spectacular levels but at these micro levels. Since such an approach is questioning the existence of a centralized system of power, there is no basis within this approach for either the use or the undermining of State power.

4.11 SUMMARY

We have in this Unit surveyed the liberal, the Marxist, the welfare, Gandhian, feminist and the post-modernist conceptions of the State. Each of these short discussions is a pointer to a much larger debate and analysis that can be developed with the help of further readings. The modern nation-State emerged at a particular historical juncture, and the changes in the contemporary world seem to suggest a difficult future ahead for the nation-State. Technological, economic, financial, cultural and political changes seem to suggest a disjunction between the structure of the modern nation-State and the world around it. The future would hold answers as to the form and longevity of the institution of the nation-State as we know it.

4.12 EXERCISES

1) Define the concept of the State?

2) Write a note on the liberal conception of the State.

3) Analyze the Marxist and the Gandhian perspectives on the State.

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UNIT 5 BUREAUCRATIZATION

Structure

5.1 Introduction
5.2 Bureaucratization and the State
5.3 Bureaucracy in Political Parties
5.4 Bureaucratization in Trade Unions
5.5 Summary
5.6 Exercises

5.1 INTRODUCTION

This Unit will explain the coming of bureaucratization as an institution in the modern era. It will also attempt to show the way in which our life has been fully encompassed by different forms of bureaucracy, even those, which we think are engaged in fighting against it.

Bureaucratization could be said to encompass the processes both of the centralization and expansion and of the professionalization of all institutions; and this happens as much in government as in the other principal structures of power like political parties, trade unions, corporations, the armed forces, and the educational, religious, legal, and medical and other technical establishments, as also what has come to be known as the non-governmental organizations.

Its principles are well-known. It consists in centralizing decision-making through a tight chain of command, appointing professional "experts" through uniform criteria of examination and certification, demanding impersonal adherence to rules and laws, and attempting a nearly full calculability of action. An official in any one of these hierarchies acts impersonally, on the basis of expertise, and obeys and issues instructions which are "legitimate", that is, framed in accordance with the law and the rules and regulations that derive from the law. The individual official may be replaced effortlessly, and the system functions like a machine with moveable replaceable parts. It is immensely attractive to all modern rulers, who are always looking for instruments of rule that are effective, politically reliable, impersonal, and professional.

But bureaucracies are only instruments of modern rulers: they are not the rulers themselves. How rulers are chosen is varied; but in most of the world it occurs through some form of election rather than rising to the top of a bureaucracy. The electoral processes are not bureaucratic even if they must submit to rules most often; but the electoral machines like political parties and their supporters are or attempt to be thoroughly bureaucratic organizations. **Thus, those at the top who ultimately rule, reach that position through processes that are not bureaucratic; but they rule through instruments that are bureaucratic.**

These occur alongside what is known as democratization. This appears as a paradox, since it is always assumed that bureaucracy and democracy are opposed in principle. Indeed they are, but they can and do coexist and even reinforce each other. But more, if we understand democracy, not as rule by the people so much as legitimation of rulers by the people through elections, then bureaucracy is fully compatible with it. Further, democracy also implies the active citizen asserting rights in numerous spheres, claiming new rights, forming organizations to promote them, and participating in the political process. Every one of these actions by the active citizen requires powerful organization and funding; and even the active citizen furthering democracy acts through a bureaucracy. He advocates, promotes, and consolidates democracy through, among other things, more bureaucracy. For example, a non-governmental organization is set up to empower a citizen's group in some sphere of activity. It is set up first of all according to procedures laid down by the law; it must raise funds and function according to the charter permitted by law; its functioning is open to scrutiny; its officials are appointed in a hierarchy for fixed terms for their recognized expertise; and they are answerable to a general body. Not all of this might occur with the rigour that is implied by this bald statement, but this does apply to all large bodies, and it is the orientation of lesser ones. Innumerable small and often ephemeral bodies are formed to fight for the rights of citizens; but they must become bureaucracies, small or big, to do so effectively; and the largest and most famous of all of them are of course the political parties themselves.

The phases and processes through which the expansion of bureaucracy and professionalization has occurred have been necessarily uneven, both across countries and within countries. Usually, the armed forces, police, and civil services have been the first to do so thoroughly, followed by the business corporation and the political parties, and what are known as the "free" professions, those of education, the law, and medicine, with the non-governmental sector coming last. Significantly, in Europe and the Christian world in general, the Churches have been among the earliest to have become regular bureaucracies, perhaps earlier than the state itself. Between countries, Britain and Germany exhibit higher levels of bureaucracy in the first half of the nineteenth century, with France following and Russia coming far down the list; but in the course of the twentieth century, especially after World War I, all of them did so with a vigour and energy that yielded extraordinary results in World War II. It would suffice here to deal with just the bureaucracies of the state, of the party systems, and of trade unions, to suggest the manner in which all structures, including the ones that were most opposed to bureaucracy and professional career, have submitted to that very logic.

5.2 BUREAUCRATIZATION AND THE STATE

It is customary to note the process of formation of bureaucracy from about the fifteenth until the eighteenth century in Europe as royal absolutisms imposed themselves against feudal nobilities. However, this was more a process of centralization of power in the hands of the king, not of its professionalization in the manner of a modern bureaucracy. The king gradually monopolized power and appointed his own officials to collect taxes, administer justice, and run the armed forces, denying such powers to the feudal nobility and other estates. The nobilities and estates could now merely act as employees or agents of the king, no longer in their own right. In terms of professional capacity, the persons employed by the king were no different from those of the great feudal magnates. They were chosen for their loyalty (combined with competence of course, but often that was a limited consideration), and appointments were acts of personal whim and patronage. The king merely commanded a larger area of patronage with greater resources and higher stakes to play for. By this means the modern state, as the monopolist of the exercise of legitimate coercion, or the absolute centre of power in any single territory, was established by the eighteenth century; but its institutions were not the modern professional ones we know today.

That transformation occurred in the nineteenth century in Europe by when the challenge from feudal nobilities and local estates had been overcome, and the modern state accumulated apparently unlimited resources through industrialization. The challenge before the state was to harness and exploit these vast new resources and ever newer sources, both material and human. Generating and exploiting material resources took the form of industrialization; doing the same with human resources took the form of social mobilization. Entirely new institutions and professions were required for these activities; and the emergence of professional bureaucracies takes place against this background. The first of these were the direct servants of the state, the civil servants and the armed forces.

The direct activities of the state vastly expanded, starting with Britain from the 1830s, and with it, the number of employees of the state. This occurred with interventions by the state in the fields of factory inspection, public health, municipal administration, school education, poor relief, all in a wave of "reform" in the 1830s, topped by the parliamentary reform of 1832 when the franchise was extended. But all these were accompanied by a comparable campaign against "corruption" and in the cause of "efficiency." By corruption the reformers meant the system of patronage in place since the sixteenth century, by which officials were appointed as personal favours, salaries were distributed for doing little or nothing (sinecures), and worse still, persons could buy their jobs, as happened especially with army officers (purchase of commissions). The sweeping reforms of the thirties and forties did away with many but not all of these practices, and appointments now began to take place against proven professional qualification, especially through the competitive examination. Thus officialdom both vastly expanded and became immensely more professional.

This was when schools became modern centres of high quality education, mutating from the Dootheboy's Hall caricatured in Charles Dickens' *Nicholas Nickleby* to Thomas Arnold's public schools, celebrated in *Tom Brown's Schooldays*. Similarly, universities became centres of modern professional education, and academic scholarship itself became a new profession. In the eighteenth century, the education of an aristocrat did not require a university, but it did need the "grand tour" of the courts of Europe, to learn manners and acquire social contacts. In the nineteenth century, the grand tour was discarded, university education became indispensable, and Oxford and Cambridge assumed their formidable reputations and positions of eminence. All these systems were dominated by competitive examinations.

The process was completed in the next wave of reforms in the 1860s and 1870s, during the first government of W. E. Gladstone (1867-1874). In stages from 1870, entry into the civil service was to take place through competitive examination; purchase of commissions in the army was abolished; in 1873 seven courts of law dating from medieval times were merged into one Court of Judicature, and the obviously unprofessional judicial functions of the House of Lords were terminated; and in 1871 the Anglican Church's monopoly of teaching posts at Oxford and Cambridge was ended. Disraeli's government in 1874-1880 followed up with welfare measures which furthered the first series of the 1830s: a maximum of 56.5 working hours per week; further restrictions on the legal age for employment; the effective introduction of what has become almost a religious observance in developed countries, the weekend; regulation of working class housing; laying down standards for sewage disposal;

controls on the adulteration of food and drugs; restricting the pollution of rivers; establishing safety limits for the loading of ships (the Plimsoll Line), and much else.

As may be gauged from this extraordinary series, each sphere of expansion of government activity demanded the recruitment of a fresh body of professionals, whether to inspect factories, to work out sewage disposal systems, or to control pollution. In each case problems had to be diagnosed, solutions proposed, and standards established, all of which required advanced academic competence gained from the modern university system; they then had to be enforced which required bureaucratic "efficiency"; and more had to be prepared for as newer areas appeared for intervention with each technological advance or with "progress.". The process was never-ending; government became gargantuan and ever more "bureaucratic"; but the demand for more and more of it was insatiable. The professional took charge everywhere; and education itself became a form of investment for the accumulation of a new kind of capital that yielded the richest dividends.

This process was slower in France, despite the French reputation for absolutist states, royal bureaucracies, and Napoleonic efficiency. These high levels of professionalism and bureaucracy were attained in Paris, but the province remained in the hands of local interests to a degree greater than in Germany or Britain, although less than in the Mediterranean. Napoleon certainly conceived of bureaucracy as a perfect chain of command in which the central authority issued instructions that passed "swift as an electric current" to subordinates, that is the prefects (like the district magistrates in India) governing the 83 departments (districts), sub-prefects in the *arrondissements*, and mayors in the 36,000 communes. The model was of perfect bureaucracy, and the prefect enjoyed ample power of every kind that a government in a modernizing state can possess and hence dispensed patronage as a local potentate. For that very reason local interest groups consisting of landlords, businessmen, the Church, unions when they arose, and peasant lobbies, all competed furiously to gain control of these appointments; in effect these offices became agents of local factions and clans rather than of the state itself. Already, by 1866, 37 per cent of the mayors were farmers; after they began to be elected from 1882, that trend was accentuated. By 1913, 46 per cent were farmers, and in the smallest communes as many as 78 per cent. Thus appointments became arbitrary; transfers were frequent according to local factional struggles, officials were overtly political rather than neutral, they were expected to ensure the election of local politicians, and they were punished or rewarded according to their performance in such matters. It was in everybody's interest to resist rationalization, and the competitive examination system was introduced only in the 1880s. But thereafter the process gathered momentum, and especially after World War I France became another typically advanced industrial society in these respects. As the above account indicates, there could be considerable differences between different states and images and ideals may be only distantly related to reality.

Russia occupied an extreme position in these respects, both before 1917 and after. In the nineteenth century, this was an undergoverned country despite the extraordinary concentration of power at the top. The towns and the provinces were left to various forms of local self-regulation (but not self-government) by local notables and factions, all in a manner that did not challenge the power of the state. Until the forties officials were astonishingly untrained, with high rates of actual illiteracy. But a new educational system was set in place from the forties, with new universities like Moscow and Kazan, and a new generation of qualified officials took up positions during that decade. In forbidding conditions they relentlessly pursued their goals of professional excellence and “progress”, none of which meant democracy but certainly did mean efficiency; they were especially concerned to eliminate arbitrariness and to establish the rule of law and rational administration. It was thanks to the efforts of this generation that the “great reforms” of the sixties were carried out, that is, the abolition of serfdom, the introduction of elected local government bodies known as the zemstvo, the creation of professional advocacy and courts of law that acquired a European reputation for high standards, and increasingly higher standards in the civil services and armed forces. However, a uniform competitive examination system was never introduced and appointments remained acts of patronage. But this patronage was exercised among a widening pool of expert manpower thanks to the education system expanding and improving in quality at so rapid a rate. The greatest extension of government was perhaps in the zemstvo and the municipalities, in the domains of public health, elementary education, agronomy, collecting statistics, maintaining communications and other aspects of local modernization. These were all jobs carried out by armies of graduates of universities and sundry higher educational institutes, especially medical, technological, or engineering institutes. They were known as the “Third Element”, so called because the first was the nobility and the second was the bureaucracy in local society; but this Third Element was the backbone of the effort because they were the “experts.”

In Soviet times, these processes were carried far, with high levels of professionalism and specialization, as in advanced industrial societies. Owing to the immensely rapid rate of industrialization, collectivization of agriculture, and other processes of modernization, the administrative structure was professionalized at a similar rate, not the half century and more that Britain took in the nineteenth century. The greatest stress was placed on technical education to optimize industrialization, and a vast body of competent managers and technical staff poured out of these institutes to run the economy. Just as Western bureaucracies present a public image of training in the humanities, law, and the social sciences, the Soviet image of the administrator was of technocracy; but all were uniformly professionals selected for their expertise, combined with loyalty to the regime in question. However, there were notable variations. All activity was bureaucratized and professionalized, not only the direct activity of the state and of the Party, but even of professions which are in principle utterly inimical to these forms of organization or regimentation, namely writers and artists. Even these were required to form their own organizations to carry out their creative work, like officials, within such structures. The Union of Writers is merely the most well known. This did not in fact prevent works of great significance and originality being produced, but authors were answerable to the state in this fashion. The state provided patronage and support through these institutions, and demanded from them that standards of excellence and expertise be established and enforced. It thus elaborated hierarchies of achievement and patterns of recognition, which, in the West, was substantially the work of the market.

5.3 BUREAUCRACY IN POLITICAL PARTIES

Political Parties, like all else, tended to become bureaucratic structures as they transformed themselves into large mass organizations from the 1860s and 1870s especially. In the UK, the party used to be a loose association of groups engaged in local politics, with great variations on issues of concern and forms of functioning. But then the following changes occurred: 1) From about 1867, the local party club network expanded enormously, with each party, Liberal and Conservative (or Tory), organizing its own brass band, football clubs, benefit societies, and even building societies in a great wave of mobilization that was apparently non-political, but was designed to foster political loyalties to the party that was promoting this range of action. 2) Each of them organized their own "Constituency Associations" consisting of local voluntary activists, who came to be known as the "caucus." These associations were centralized in a national party body: for the Liberal Party it was the National Liberal Federation from 1877, and for the Conservatives it was the National Union of Conservative and Constitutional Associations (NUCCA) from as early as 1867 but acquiring momentum in the 1880s. 3) This structure allowed the central party leadership to impose strict discipline on the local party units, especially to decide electoral strategy, candidates for election, electoral alliances, and so on. The typical party bureaucrat, known as the party agent, appointed by the central command, now supervised these associations. His main job was to ensure that party supporters were entered on the voters' lists, to provide intelligence to the centre on the public mood, and to impose discipline locally. The results were evident in the nineties for the Conservative Party which was better organized than the Liberals: in the 1850s, governments suffered 10 to 15 defeats in parliamentary votes in a year; from 1900, the average was just one per session. By 1914 the party had become a centralized bureaucratic machine that overrode local, individual variations and preferences and headed toward becoming a mass party with a larger and larger electorate. The local enthusiast, activist, or notable was overtaken by the party official from the centre, in the manner that royal bureaucracies subordinated the remnants of feudal aristocracies all over Europe between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries; and independent members of parliament were increasingly a thing of the past.

This process continued throughout the twentieth century, with the Labour Party following suit when it replaced the Liberals as the alternative to the Conservatives from the twenties. In the Labour Party also, the candidate is formally selected by the constituency body, but this is subject to central control. The sovereign body is the Annual Conference of delegates and members, but its resolutions are never binding on the party whether in government or in opposition despite the many pious and ideological statements to the contrary. The conduct of members in parliament is decided solely by the central party bureaucracy. This party makes loud claims to its being more democratic than others; but it is like any other, a mass organization run by an oligarchy through its paid bureaucracy.

The German party system developed in comparable manner. The Social Democratic Party or the SPD by its German acronym, formed in 1875, and from the 1890s rapidly became a mass party with a large trade union base like the Labour Party. Indeed, the German civil service became something of a model across the ideological spectrum, from the right wing pressure group, the Agrarian League, for corporates like Siemens and Krupp, and even for its bitter antagonist, the SPD. As with the Labour Party, the Party Congress is the sovereign body; but not only does it meet only once in two years after 1914, but the party leadership and the parliamentary party (the group of members of parliament) known as the "fraktion" in the Bundestag (parliament) has the decisive say. The conservative opposition, the Christian Democratic Union or the CDU, differs only by being a trifle looser. It has tended to be more dominated by personalities, especially Konrad Adenauer, the Chancellor (prime minister in Germany) from 1949 to 963 and party chairman until 1966. However, in fundamentals of organization, it differs little from its principal opponent, the SPD.

The contrast, to some extent, is France and the Mediterranean states. France, despite its fearsome reputation for Napoleonic bureaucracies, in fact possessed parties with weaker organizational structures than the German or British counterparts. The reason is perhaps more to do with the size of parties: the German SPD had 1.7 million members in 1914, the British Conservative Primrose League could boast more than 2 million members, while the French Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière (SFIO) had only 35-75,000 members and the Action Libérale Populaire only 250,000. In France, local influences and personalities counted for more than national organization. Local bodies of the village and canton decided on candidates, provided the election machine, organized the campaign, and grabbed the benefits in case their candidate won the election. The benefits were the usual patronage of the state, jobs, subsidies, relief, contracts and the like. The national party organization had great difficulty exercising control over deputies (members of parliaments), for, if these deputies kept their local supporters happy, there was little the national body could do. In these senses, French parties reflected the localism and patronage politics of the French bureaucracy also.

These features changed after World War II, especially with the Communist Party (PCF) being such an excellent bureaucracy in typically Stalinist fashion, with its professional training and strict enforcement of the Party line from above, to the extent of its not allowing even direct communication between party cells at the base. These cells were required to communicate only with their superior levels, that is vertically. This, it should be noted is one of the typical features of the bureaucracy of state, where communications between departments must take place only with the permission of the head of the department and not between lower officials in the hierarchy.

The most obvious cases of party bureaucracies are those of the fascist and socialist states. The fascist bureaucracies formally submitted to the "leader-principle", that is, a single charismatic leader controlled the entire movement, the party, and where appropriate, the state itself. But in modern times a single leader cannot control personally such vast machines as those of industrial societies; and however charismatic, energetic, or able the leader or dictator, he could not be any more personal in his choice of officials than the American president is: he had to submit to the logic of bureaucratic structure to get things done. These forms of leadership were chosen differently from those of the electoral systems of the democracies, they provided a different ideological direction, and they adopted a distinct style of their own; for the rest they ruled modern industrial or industrializing societies through familiar structures of bureaucracy.

The professionalization and bureaucratization of political parties is arresting for the party having been originally conceived as an agent of democracy against the bureaucracy of the state. A considerable amount of democratic rhetoric is employed by these bodies to mobilize mass support and to further their campaigns to influence the state. But the process of representing mass electorates and securing their support imposes its inexorable logic on these organizations; and they must summon the professional to use all the techniques of management and administration to ensure the required results. In addition, parties aspire to install their own governments or actually do so, in anticipation or furtherance of which they replicate the structures and functioning of the government itself. As a result, multiple bureaucracies of professionals emerge, those of the civil service itself, and those of the respective political parties.

In the case of single party states, there are ostensibly just two such bureaucracies, those of the party and of the state. But in fact there could be many of them, all hierarchies competing for the attention of the Leader and bases for manoeuvring into the top position. Thus, even in Hitler's Third Reich, the following structures competed with each other, and each one of them could have provided the avenue to the top: the Nazi Party itself or the NSDAP; the SS, headed by Himmler, who thought of himself as the successor; the armed forces, which periodically conspired to overthrow Hitler and eventually provided the actual successor in 1945, Grand Admiral Doenitz; and the security services. This feature was more pronounced in the fascist and conservative dictatorships that spread across Europe in the inter-war years. Such competition however does not and did not take the form of elections, for which reason they are not called democratic. The most extreme and lucid case is that of the Soviet Union in which a single bureaucracy ran the country, that of the Party itself; it provided the sole arena to aspire for power; and all competition to reach the top took place strictly within it. All the other bureaucracies were strictly subordinate to it and never did challenge its monopoly, whether they were the planners, the managers, general administration, the armed forces, or the security services. As such, this single Party was, in itself, like the multiple party system of the liberal democracies, for in each case either the single Party or the multiple parties was the sole avenue to power, not the military, the paramilitaries, the civil services, the religious hierarchies, the corporate structure, the legal establishment, or the academic system. As has been noted earlier, the manner in which leaders and rulers are chosen in modern bureaucratic societies is not bureaucratic, but the instruments with which they rule are uniformly bureaucratic across the ideological divides.

5.4 BUREAUCRATIZATION IN TRADE UNIONS

Unions are the other typically democratic institutions of modern times, embodying the hopes of the "exploited" to secure a just distribution of power and wealth. They are arguably also the first and most significant of the non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Their origins and formal procedures are quintessentially democratic: they were and are voluntary associations mostly of persons asserting their rights. Through most of the nineteenth century they were just such bodies, sprouting in factories and workplaces as and when occasion demanded, usually to protect their wages or to demand higher wages and shorter working hours. Factories were small in size, unions were also small, and the negotiations were highly personal, between a few workers and an employer.

But dramatic changes occurred from the eighteen seventies, with a new wave of industrialization, new technologies, and new structures of management. Plant size became larger, technologies diversified and grew in sophistication, and management was separated from ownership, leading to the emergence of professional management. Workers' protest actions likewise became all the more complex, larger in scope, covering many factories simultaneously, or a full industry or region, and negotiations between unions and management became more professional and less personal. Along with the professional manager there emerged the professional union official. Two new bureaucracies began to face each other, those of corporate management, and those of the unions. Just as managers required academic qualifications, examination procedures for selection, and training programmes, union officials were now selected for their qualifications, subjected to competitive selection examinations, and were thereafter trained on the job. They were no longer just workers representing other workers; they could be anybody chosen for their skills at organizing research, framing plans for action, committee work, and negotiation. Negotiating skills were especially decisive, and among them high competence in mathematics and economics, since union officials were expected to negotiate ceaselessly on costs of production, productivity, profits, wage rates, standards of living, insurances, welfare and the like. But the demand went beyond negotiation. Unions had to prepare their plans on the basis of the state of the economy, not merely of a single factory or industry; their understanding of the economy and their capacity to convince a wider public about the impact of their actions on the economy and on the rest of the population became vital.

This became ever more demanding as union action began to play a role in national elections. Political parties across the ideological spectrum, from left to right, prospected for support among unions; and the social democratic or labour parties with socialist ideologies were especially energetic and commanded the largest following among the working class. As unions supported particular political parties, they needed to plan, advertise themselves, and act in tandem with the political parties and their priorities. The party bureaucrat and the union bureaucrat had to work in unison, both leaving the rank-and-file voter and rank-and-file union member far behind. As socialist ministers entered governments from the beginning of the twentieth century, and as social democratic parties became governments or led coalition governments from the twenties, union, party, and civil service officials had to work together and on an equal footing with comparable levels of competence. For the purposes of national representation, unions built up national organizations to represent them. These were federations of unions, or head organizations, samples of which are the Trades Union Congress (TUC) in Britain, the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT) in France, or the Deutsche Gewerkshaftsbund (DGB) in Germany. There could be more than one such federation in a single country, with each ideological orientation forming its own head organization also. These are merely representative listings. Thus the original union of a single factory had first become a member of a federation of unions within an industry, and these federations then formed the national federation like the TUC. As may be imagined, these enormous bodies could be run only by full-time paid officials, not by workers taking time off work to look after the interests of other workers. These national federations also routinely negotiated and signed agreements with national federations of employers, a typical specimen of which would be the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) representing British capitalists.

How deeply immersed unions are in affairs of state and responsible for governance may be gauged from the examples of Britain and Germany after World War II. British unions emerged from the War with heady plans for 1) public control of core areas of the economy, including nationalization and extensive regulation of the private sector; 2) high levels of employment through demand management; 3) extensive welfare "from cradle to grave"; and 4) planning of investment, including even an ambitious scheme of a "manpower budget" that would make annual estimates of manpower requirements and availability so that investment could be planned to ensure adequate levels of employment. But it was all conceived in the manner that any civil servant might; there was no concession to "democracy" in these plans; and the TUC took the decision-making hierarchy for granted with workers at the bottom, and assumed that professional management, under the surveillance of the government of course, would ensure that the benefits reached workers. Democratic guarantees lay in the presence of the TUC and of the Labour Party, not of workers playing a direct role. Little of all this was achieved in fact, especially since the TUC was not committed to socialism or to planning and was merely anxious that the agony of the Depression years should not be repeated. Therefore it was satisfied with the extensive welfare system established, that about 20 per cent of productive capacity was publicly owned, and that demand management kept employment levels high. Even this relatively modest achievement demanded considerable responsibility for governance and professionals to manage the role of the TUCs. They had to be good economists enough to understand that if they pressed their wage demands too far and were too successful, inflationary pressures would build up and real wages would not rise adequately, for which they would eventually have to take the blame. In like manner, they had to be nimble political managers to keep a friendly Labour government in power and to accept the constraints and responsibilities that power brought. All these were functions of professional economists, political managers, and officials, all far removed from the original ideal of a trade unionist fighting for his little union.

This is not a question of centralization of decision-making so much as of its professionalization. Thus, the British union structure is astonishingly, indeed bewilderingly decentralized, and the TUC has little control over the national federations and great industrial unions; deals are struck between unions in an industry and the corresponding employers' federation, and often lower down the hierarchy; any union could negotiate anything and any agreement could be abrogated; multiple unions flourished in an industry, the bane of British industrial relations according to some; and even on the employers' side multiple bodies flourished until the co-ordinating top body, the Confederation of British Industry was formed as late as 1965. This could pass for democracy; but it is a democracy run by officials, not workers.

German unions after the War were even more optimistic than the British because they were the only sector in Germany untainted by National Socialism. As codified at the Munich Congress of the DGB in 1949, they expected 1) co-determination (*Mitbestimmung*), that is, to run industry jointly with capitalists by having an equal number of union-appointed directors on boards of companies; 2) comprehensive welfare; 3) socialization of key industries; 4) unions to be non-partisan and organized for each industry; and 5) planning. Little was eventually achieved, chiefly because of the Cold War, the rightward political drift in Germany, and the continuous government by the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) all the way until 1963. However, what was attained was 1) advanced levels of centralization and of industrial unionism, eliminating multiple unions that had so plagued the Weimar Republic in the twenties and early thirties; 2) according to the Works Constitution Act of 1952 only one-third of the directors were to be from the unions, not half as originally hoped; 3) advanced welfare. In retrospect, this is considerable, and requires unions to play a major role in governance. In the most important two industries however, coal and steel, parity between labour and other directors had already been achieved by 1947 and was formalized in 1951. German union action is also marked by an advanced degree of "juridification", that is, any action has to be according to the law in all its detail, union membership is totally voluntary, collective bargaining may take place only between unions and managements, and strikes may be organized only by unions and not during the life of a contract. Violations of these principles attract severe penalties at law and unions must function like any corporation with full legal liability. When the DGB amended its radical Munich Programme at Düsseldorf in 1963, only nationalization was reduced in importance while co-determination retained its pride of place. Thus unions have to function, not merely as pressure groups to extract what they can for their members, but more as partners in industrial governance, and therewith as another kind of management.

However, the trends are not quite so unidirectional as implied by the above account. A constant challenge is mounted from the base, from the rank-and-file, what are known in Britain as the shop stewards and in Germany as works' councils or *Betriebsräte*. These are elected bodies at the lowest levels of organization; they represent the immediate democracy of workers; they are concerned only with the particular problems of their members; and they have been consistently more radical than the union bureaucracies. In Britain they have repeatedly erupted to challenge union leaderships' dealings with managements and governments. In Germany however, the highly regulated union system has integrated even these potentially radical and independent bodies. They have been permitted to negotiate agreements in extension of what unions themselves do, for example with respect to bonuses but not wages. Thus dualism, or the co-existence of unions and of works' councils, has been built into the system.

While the above picture may describe Western and Central Europe, the situation in the Soviet Union and East Europe (after 1945) was different in certain respects. Here also the union, party, management and state bureaucracies engaged with each other, each acting for its own constituency. However unions did not act to assert the rights of workers since they were already in a state which had abolished capitalists and capitalism, and the state itself claimed to be the promoter of the interests of workers. This matter was settled as early as 1921, at the Tenth Party Congress in Russia, when unions were denied the right to agitate on behalf of workers against management, and they had to accept the function of partnership in governance, with its necessary discipline. This was then derided as "statization" and bureaucratization. In effect in the Soviet Union, all four bureaucracies were different forms of state bureaucracies, functionally differentiated from each other like ministries, but all equally subject to the same political imperatives and leadership in a manner that was direct and constitutional. The role of the unions therefore was to ensure that the policies of the Party and of the state with respect to the welfare of workers were carried out and that productivity and discipline were maintained at appropriate levels. While labour policy was determined at the top, unions at the base engaged with management on deciding the worker's wage category, work quotas, bonuses and the like, which typically the German works' councils also dealt with. Unions participated in framing plans at the enterprise level, kept a watch on welfare and wage aspects of the law, monitored disciplinary proceedings, and attended to all welfare matters like housing, recreation, education, and healthcare. Unions had distinct functions in the West and the East, but they belonged to networks of hierarchies of officialdom in symmetrical fashion.

5.5 SUMMARY

As may be seen now, four major bureaucracies dealt with each other, those of unions, employers, parties, and of the state; they wrangled, negotiated, conflicted, competed, or otherwise worked together from national to local levels in a complex and interlocking system of policy formation, decision-making, administration, and most of all government formation, collectively called governance. They were all professionals dealing with fellow professionals with comparable and compatible levels of qualification, work ethic, and self-interest, but each pursuing the case for its own constituency, somewhat like lawyers appearing on opposed sides in a structured legal system.

As the above account suggests, all spheres of public action have been professionalized and are run through bureaucracies. This is only to be expected of the armed forces, the civil services, and the security services, the principal arms of the state. But the complexity of modern industrial society, even in territorially limited states like

Switzerland or Singapore, attains a depth which imperatively demands professional expertise and its corporate organization to be effective. The process therefore penetrates other spheres also. Thus entrepreneurship, with its origins in individual creativity and risk-taking giving rise to the legend and slogan of *laissez-faire*, has been transformed from at least the 1870s into corporate activity run by professional managers, and its origins, like most stories of origin, have entered the realm of myth. The stories of political parties and of trade unions have been told, of both setting out as self-conscious bodies of persons fighting off the pretensions and prestations of bureaucracy and capitalists respectively and themselves becoming parallel bureaucracies and partners in those structures of governance. Churches have always been tight corporate bodies that have demanded high standards of professionalism from especially the eighteenth century and are possessed of a degree of discipline and ideological certainty that would be the envy of the armed forces and communist parties. Even the academic system, while maintaining an image of freewheeling individualism, has become properly professional from the early nineteenth century, with universities and research and other specialized institutes offloading products on to the market like corporate houses, and academics being subjected to the severe test of the market place, as evidenced in the harsh slogan, "publish or perish." Academic research is increasingly expected to consist of team work led by project investigators who raise funds on the market and organize vast bodies of team research by experts, which then appear on the market in a flood of articles, conference proceedings volumes, and serial monographs. The dogma and ideology of individual free choice and action retain their seductive charm; but it is possible to sustain that subjective conviction only thanks to the pluralism of the modern world which gives us a choice as to which form of bureaucracy and structured profession we may individually submit to, not whether bureaucracy itself is acceptable or not.

5.6 EXERCISES

1) What do we mean by bureaucratization in the Modern World.?
2) What are different forms of bureaucracy?
3) What are the elements that different types of bureaucracies have in common?

UNIT 6 DEMOCRATIC POLITICS

Structure

6.1 Introduction
6.2 Democracy : Ancient and Modern
6.3 Democracy in the Modern World: Ideas and Institutions
6.4 Explaining Democracy and Democratization
6.5 Democracy and its Critics
6.6 Contemporary Challenges to Democracy
    6.6.1 Development
    6.6.2 Diversity
    6.6.3 Gender
    6.6.4 Globalization
6.7 Summary
6.8 Exercises

6.1 INTRODUCTION

This Unit will make a survey of different forms of democracy historically, theoretically as well as geographically. The attempt will also be to give a range of criticisms which have been offered to the notion of democracy and democratization process. Even as it has become the most dominant principle of modern political system, democracy is still fraught with many new and contemporary challenges. A brief survey of such challenges is made towards the end of this Unit.

Most discussions of the history of democracy tend to begin with an invocation to its origins in ancient Greece. In the next section, we briefly consider the question of whether democracy in the modern world bears any similarity with democracy in ancient Greece.

Democracy has been, and continues to remain, one of the most contested concepts in the political vocabulary of the modern world. It means many different things to different people, but the fact that all manner of political regimes have sought to appropriate the label 'democracy' to legitimize themselves, clearly shows that it carries a positive normative connotation. Rather like justice and freedom, then, democracy is widely perceived to be a good thing, and a desirable attribute for a polity to possess. However, the task of determining which democracies are truly worthy of the name, or of distinguishing between polities in terms of the extent of democracy they have achieved, is a difficult if not impossible one. There are no universal standards to which we can appeal to decide such questions, so that ultimately, any person's judgement or evaluation of particular democracies is necessarily predicated on the way in which s/he understands the democratic ideal.

If judging contemporary democracies is so fraught with difficulty, the task of describing the evolution of democracy in the modern world is no less contentious. Historians disagree about the origins of modern democratic ideas, as also about the emergence of democratic institutions. Thus, for some, the French Declaration of the Rights of Man was an early statement of democratic principles, while for others it was a manifesto of the bourgeois class which, though opposed to hierarchy based on nobility, was neither egalitarian nor democratic. Similarly, while John Locke is for some the first significant theorist of liberal-democratic ideas, for others he is at best a theorist of constitutional government (and at worst an unabashed advocate of private property rights). On this interpretation, it is Jean-Jacques Rousseau, with his faith in the direct participation of the citizens in the making of laws, who is the premier philosopher of democracy.

6.2 DEMOCRACY : ANCIENT AND MODERN

In 1992, 2500 years of democracy were enthusiastically celebrated all over the world. This was an unusual celebration for two reasons. Firstly, while anniversaries of statesmen, revolutions and the founding of nations are quite commonly celebrated, no other political ideal has ever been celebrated in this way. Secondly, democracy in the modern world is quite different from democracy as it was practised in ancient Greece 2500 years ago. The democratic ideas and practices with which we are here concerned are emphatically modern, but it would be useful to briefly note the chief features of democracy in the city-state of Athens (widely considered to be the most stable, enduring and model form of democracy in Greece) in ancient times.

Appropriately, the word democracy itself is of Greek origin. The Greek word *demokratia* is a combination of the words *demos* (meaning the people) and *kratos* (meaning power or rule). Thus, the one common principle underlying democracy in both the ancient and modern worlds is the idea of rule by the people, whether directly — through personal participation — or indirectly, through elected representatives. The important difference, of course, is in the way in which 'the people' were defined. In the ancient Greek polity, the 'demos' was rather restrictively defined, and notably excluded three main categories of persons: the slaves, women, and *metics* (the foreigners who lived and worked in the city-state). This meant that barely a quarter of the total population were members of the citizen body. Nevertheless, it is notable that the direct participation of a 40,000 strong citizen body was no mean achievement. The actual career of Athenian democracy was fairly troubled, as aristocrats, generals and demagogues made periodic attempts to control power. Their contempt for the poor — described as 'the mob' or 'the rabble' — finds echoes in the modern world, where democracy was achieved through struggle, and against considerable odds. Indeed, the struggle for democracy everywhere and throughout history, has been simultaneously a struggle against political inequality based on, and justified by, inequalities of birth and wealth.

At its best, however, Athenian democracy conveys an impressive picture of direct participation by citizens in the assembly which deliberated and took decisions on all policy matters, and met on as many as 300 days in the year. Citizens also participated directly in government, as they were chosen by lot to serve in official administrative and judicial positions.

6.3 DEMOCRACY IN THE MODERN WORLD : IDEAS AND INSTITUTIONS

The story of democracy in the modern world is not merely the story of the evolution of democratic institutions in the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. An understanding of modern democracy is not possible without an account of the social and political ideas, as well as of the patterns of material development in the economic and productive spheres of the societies in which modern democracy took birth. As one of the 'characteristic institutions of modernity', democracy was the result of complex and intertwined processes of ideological, social and economic change. In Britain, this change was signalled by the Industrial Revolution that began in the middle of the eighteenth century, while in France and America it was launched by the political revolutions in the last quarter of that same century.

Britain is conventionally regarded as the first modern democracy because, in the aftermath of the Civil War (1640-1649), royal absolutism was brought to an end, and powers were transferred from the crown to the two Houses of Parliament, of which one, the House of Commons, was an elected chamber. Though the franchise continued to be highly restricted — based on ownership of property — control of the executive had effectively passed to a loose coalition of the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie, such that political conflict was henceforth peacefully conducted between competing elites. It was only in the nineteenth century that the expansion of the suffrage took place, beginning with the enfranchisement of the upper middle classes in the Reform Act of 1832. This was followed by the gradual extension of the franchise to the working classes, largely as a response to the pressure of political struggles by the working-class and radical movements like Chartism. By the last quarter of the nineteenth century, and three Reform Acts later, about two-thirds of the male population stood enfranchised. It was, however, not until 1929 that women secured the right to vote, and universal adult suffrage was only fully achieved in 1948, when plural voting was abolished in favour of the principle of one-person one-vote.

As in Britain, so also in France, the achievement of universal adult suffrage was not completed until 1946. The rather more radical tradition of democracy in France was inaugurated by the French Revolution of 1789, with its stirring call of Liberty-Equality- Fraternity. The principle of popular sovereignty was crucial to the deliberations of the National Assembly. The Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen proclaimed the following individual rights as the natural and imprescriptible entitlements not merely of French citizens, but of 'mankind' at large: among others, the rights of personal liberty, freedom of thought and religion, security of property and political equality. Though the Revolution proclaimed an end to both the feudal economy and two centuries of royal absolutist rule, republican democracy in France suffered many reverses. The revolutionary constitution of 1791 established something akin to universal male suffrage (though the philosopher Condorcet and some others advocated the extension of the franchise to women, this was seen as quite contrary to public opinion), and even the property requirement for the right to vote was low enough to exclude only domestic servants, vagrants and beggars. Thus, four million male citizens won the right to vote in 1791, but four years later, more restrictive property requirements were introduced, bringing down the number of voters to just 100,000 prosperous taxpayers. Universal male suffrage was reintroduced only after the revolution of 1848.

In the United States of America, too, the advance of democracy in the aftermath of the Civil War was restricted to white men, and the enfranchisement of women, as also of indigenous and black people was not achieved until the twentieth century. Nevertheless, the Declaration of Independence (1776) was the document that simultaneously effected the legal creation of the United States of America, and that of democracy in that country. Though slavery continued to be practised until the mid-nineteenth century, the American Revolution did give the modern world its first democratic government and society. Hereditary power - of monarchy and aristocracy alike — were overthrown as republican government, in which all citizens were at least notionally equal, was put in place. An important institutional mechanism of the separation of powers between the three branches of government — the executive, the legislature and the judiciary — was also effected, making it difficult for any one branch to exercise arbitrary or untrammelled power.

The ideological importance of these early — albeit limited — victories of democracy cannot be underestimated. It has been argued that the foundations of democratic ideas had been prepared by the implicit egalitarianism of the Reformation. Though the Reformation was often — as in Britain and Germany, for instance — carried through by absolute monarchical power, Protestantism nevertheless had the long-term effect of creating religious minorities, and therefore providing the grounds for doctrines of religious toleration to be articulated. The idea that God spoke directly to individuals, without the mediation of priests, also made possible and legitimate the questioning of political authority. The political ideas of the Levellers, John Locke and Tom Paine, and documents like the French Declaration of the Rights of Man (1789), and the American Declaration of Independence (1776), expressed the important ideas and principles that have underpinned democracy in the modern world.

> When, in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissole the political bonds which have connected them with another, and to assume, among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the laws of natur and of Nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.
>
> We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute a new Government, laying its foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established, should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shown, that mankind are more disposed to sufer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object, evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government and to provide new Guards for their future security. Such has been the patient sufferance of these Colonies, and such is now the necessity which constraints them to alter their former Systems of Government. The history of the present King of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having, in direct object, the establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States....
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> **(American Declaration of Independence, 1776)**

These writings and documents are also often seen as charters of liberalism, and liberalism was indeed an important handmaiden of democracy at this time. This is why it is not surprising that the beginnings of democratic theory are distinguished by a strong emphasis on the concept of liberty, rather than the concept of equality

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with which it later came to be identified. As their name indicates, the Levellers in seventeenth century England advanced a radical conception of popular sovereignty and civil liberties. Interrogating property ownership as the basis for political rights, they advocated a nearly universal male suffrage, though — echoing ancient Athens — servants and criminals, apart from women, were to be excluded.

John Locke's *Second Treatise on Government* (1681) is an important source — book of classical liberal ideas. In this work, Locke presents an account of a hypothetical state of nature, governed by a Law of Nature, which mandates that no individual ought to harm another in life, health, liberty or possessions. The natural equality of men - stemming not from any equality of endowment in terms of virtue or excellence, but from the fact that they are all equally creatures of God - gives them the equal right to freedom. Though this state of nature is governed by a Law of Nature that endorses these rights, there is no agency to administer and enforce this law. Therefore, to prevent others from invading their rights or to exact retribution for such invasions, men will enforce the law as *they* interpret it. In a state of nature that is largely characterized by peace and mutual assistance, the absence of such an agency contains endless possibilities for conflict, and these are the chief inconveniences of the state of nature, which is therefore transcended through a social contract. This social contract, founded in the consent of every individual, is the basis of legitimate government. Civil law must now conform to the eternal rule that is natural law, and hence the purpose of political society and of government is the preservation of the life, liberty and property of individuals (and Locke accordingly supplements this account with a defence of private property). If the government fails to discharge the purposes for which it was created, the people have the right to resist and replace it. It is this statement of the core principles of classical liberalism — individualism, popular sovereignty and limited government — that provided the foundation for liberal democracy.

These principles were also celebrated in the American Declaration of Independence (1776), which followed Locke in describing as natural and inalienable the rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness (the last widely interpreted as an euphemism for property). The continued exclusion of slaves and women from the category of those who possessed such rights is only one example of the contradiction between the universalism of liberal principles and the selectivity of liberal practices.

The French Declaration of the Rights of Man (1789) reflected the republican spirit of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, in idealizing citizenship by presenting individuals as public-spirited members of a community. For Rousseau, however, representative government simply was not good enough, and the only form of free government was direct democracy in which citizens would participate directly. Of course, Rousseau was aware that gross inequalities of wealth as well as large political communities were obstacles to popular sovereignty, while liberty, welfare and public education in the context of a small city — state provided the ideal conditions for democracy.

6.4 EXPLAINING DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATIZATION

Though liberal ideas found institutional embodiment in democracy, democracy was not simply the result of a fruitful exchange between political ideas and political institutions, confined to the domain of political action. We cannot understand the birth of democracy in Europe without some reference to the important material transformations that were taking place in these societies. Industrial capitalism created new social classes which questioned the stranglehold of the older elites, whose power was based entirely in the ownership of land, and demanded a share in political power. Gradually, the middle and working classes also became more vocal and assertive in claiming rights of political participation. States also, over prolonged period of time, engaged in military conflict with each other. These wars required higher levels of technology, the deployment of the industrial power generated in the society, and more intensive resource (in terms of extraction of taxes) and social mobilization by the state. All this gave to modern states a greater centrality in the life of their citizens than they had previously enjoyed. This centrality of the state naturally resulted in greater pressures for controlling the state and sharing in the power and the resources that it commanded. The pressures for democratization were surely facilitated by these developments, as they were by the greater literacy, and new forms of communication and transport that made political organization possible for groups that had, in the past, been ruled, without actually participating in ruling.

Some historians have suggested that these processes of democratization took place in the course of 'the long nineteenth century', the period from 1760 to 1919, beginning with the Industrial Revolution and ending with the First World War. At the inception of this period, there were no democracies, but by its end most Western states had some form of liberal democracy in operation. In Western societies, capitalist industrialization is widely believed to have been a powerful impetus to democratization. However, outside of the west, social theorists have many different explanations for the varied routes through which democratization occurs, in what sorts of historical circumstances, at what levels of material development, and so on. They have tended to search for such historical patterns to explain the nature and even durability of democracy in specific contexts, as also the past and future relationship between democracy and development.

Some scholars, like Barrington Moore, have sought to explain democratization in terms of long-term processes of historical change, especially the changing structures of power. Why, Moore asked, did England and France move towards liberal-democracy, while Japan and Germany turned to fascism, Russia and China to communism, and India proceeded in an altogether different direction. His answer was that the route to liberal democracy generally lies in a common pattern of changing relationships between peasants, lords, the urban bourgeoisie and the state. The signposts on this journey include the following: the investment of the agricultural surplus in industrial growth; a turn towards commercial agriculture and therefore greater freedom for the peasantry; a balance of power between the state and the landed aristocracy; a dynamic bourgeoisie with its own economic base leading a revolutionary break from the past; and so on.

Other scholars, also searching for a structural explanation for democratization, have argued that processes of democratization are powerfully shaped by *class power, state power* and *transnational power*. They emphasize the changing dynamics of class power in relation to the structure and form of state power, and the context of both these in transnational power, taking many diverse forms such as imperialism or economic/military dependence.

Patterns of economic development thus effect significant changes in the nature of class forces and class divisions, and both these interact with the state and political institutions to redefine society and politics. In addition, the nature of civil society, the political culture of a society, and international factors (ranging from aid to war) are also helpful in accounting for patterns of democratization. On the whole, while comparative studies can provide some illumination, it is futile beyond a point to search for a single explanation that can account for the emergence (or not) of democracy in any given country at any point in the history of the last two centuries. There is tremendous variation, across both time and space, in the forms of democracy that have evolved in different parts of the world, and no one explanation — however comprehensive — can explain them all.

This is why, though the evolution of democracy in Europe and the United States through the nineteenth century is generally treated as the exemplar of democratization, the experience of post-colonial democratization in Latin America and Asia, and of post-Communist democratization in Eastern Europe, has raised questions about the conditions under which democratic institutions take root in some countries but not in others. This is also why it is difficult to establish uniform standards for judging or comparing the nature and extent of democracy as found in the different states which claim or have historically claimed the label of democracy. The 'real world of democracy', as the political theorist C.B. MacPherson famously called it, has been populated by many variants of democracy: from bourgeois democracy to socialist and even communist versions, each of which has insisted that *its* form of democracy is the truest and most genuine. The eagerness with which the title of democracy is claimed points, in fact, to the unparalleled legitimacy that this form of government has come to enjoy in the modern world.

As a corollary, it is important to note that it has now come to be recognized that the link between liberalism and democracy is not a necessary one. Liberal-democracy may be seen as a historically specific form of democracy, based on a culturally specific theory of individuation. It combines liberalism as a theory of the state with democracy as a form of government. As such, for societies which attach greater significance to the community than to the individual, the democratic part of liberal-democracy (such as free elections and freedom of speech) is more universalizable than its liberal component. It has, thus, become possible today to speak not only of different paths to democracy, but also of different ways of being democratic, or even being 'differently democratic'.

Despite these limitations, it is true that the twentieth century saw an unparalleled extension of democracy in terms of both its *inclusiveness* as well as its *spatial expansion.* Beginning with the extension of the suffrage to women in the older western democracies, and ending with the dismantling of apartheid in South Africa, democracy in the twentieth century surely became more inclusive. The provenance of democracy also increased in spatial terms, as — following decolonization in the 1950s and 1960s — it was eagerly adopted by most of the new nations of Asia and Africa. Many of these new laboratories of democracy did not manage to sustain it, and in the 1990s the process of democratization met new challenges in post-Communist Eastern Europe.

It is clear, then, that the history of democracy has by no means been an uninterrupted, smooth or even process. It has been marked by successes and reversals within particular democratic societies, but it has also varied across countries and continents. At all times, it is important to keep in mind the interaction between ideas and institutions mentioned earlier. This is also true of the arguments of the critics of democracy.

6.5 DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS

Democracy has had its fair share of critics and even enemies in the modern world, no less than in ancient Greece. If the Athenians of the ancient world feared democracy as potential monocracy, the 19th century English political philosopher John Stuart Mill expressed his fear of the tyranny of the majority, which he equated with ignorance and a lack of education. Mill's anxiety was that democracy would mean the dominance of mediocre public opinion, elbowing out dissent and creative ideas. Nevertheless, Mill significantly improved upon his intellectual inheritance of Utilitarianism by his impassioned defence of liberty and by his insistence on various welfare measures for the working classes. This gives him a special position in the liberal tradition, as the forerunner of social-democracy and the principles of the welfare-state.

The socialist critique of democracy has its origins in the writings of Karl Marx whose attitude to democracy was somewhat ambivalent. Even as he viewed bourgeois democracy as inherently flawed, on account of its class character, Marx nevertheless endorsed the battle for democracy as an important stepping-stone on the journey of the proletariat towards revolutionary change. In the Soviet Union, however, democracy was characterized as a handmaiden of capitalism, which could not be used to realize, through peaceful means, the ascendancy of the working class.

Among the most important critics of democracy were the elite theorists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Vilfredo Pareto and Gaetano Mosca, whose ideas struck a sympathetic chord in Mussolini's fascist politics. For Mosca, all talk of democracy was ideological hogwash, because the reality was that, throughout history, society had always been divided between elites — a minority of the population which had taken the major decisions in society — and the mass of the people. The dominant minority, the ruling class, was beyond the control of the majority or the mass, which the elite theorists viewed as atomized, ignorant, politically incompetent and incapable of concerted dynamic political action. In the mid-twentieth century, this argument was taken forward in the 'realist' account of Joseph Schumpeter who said that the classical, eighteenth century definition of democracy (as an institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions by making the people decide issues through the election of legislators to carry out their will) was flawed because the people were ignorant, irrational and apathetic, and therefore the principle of popular sovereignty was meaningless. In a democracy, said Schumpeter, there must be recognition of the vital fact of leadership. The role of the people should be restricted to choosing their rulers through competitive elections, and thereafter leaving them to govern. This redefinition changed the purpose and the essence of democracy from that of vesting decision-making power in the electorate, to that of merely selecting representatives. The normative force of the democratic ideal was thus undermined.

Nevertheless, the equalizing thrust of democratic institutions appears to have persisted. At least some of the anxieties of nineteenth century observers, that democracy would have an alarming impact in terms of revising social rankings and undercutting the power of hereditary elites, proved to be true. At the same time, however, democracy proved to have a certain power of containment of social divisions, to the extent that it provided peaceful avenues of political competition and prevented social inequalities from acquiring an explosive or violent form.

6.6 CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES TO DEMOCRACY

Among the important challenges to democracy at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the following may be identified:

1) Development
2) Diversity
3) Gender
4) Globalization

6.6.1 Development

Though many scholars have tried to establish a correlation between democracy and development, by exploring the extent to which democracy furthers or inhibits development, there is no conclusive evidence regarding the relationship between these. The slow pace of development in India is sometimes attributed to its adoption of democracy, while the developmental successes of the East Asian economies are attributed to their lack of democracy. However, the comparative studies undertaken by scholars present mixed results and do not conclusively establish either that democracy inhibits development or that it facilitates it. Background historical conditions, the nature of economy and society, significantly affect developmental outcomes. Logically, to the extent that people have the right to make claims upon the state and to insist that the state be responsive to their needs, democracy is potentially a powerful weapon against poverty and deprivation. If the poor in developing democratic societies have failed to use this weapon effectively, this should be blamed not on democracy per se, but attributed to the concentration of economic and social power that predisposes the state to act in ways that are biased in favour of dominant classes and social forces.

Further, conventional notions of development (equated with economic growth) are today being fundamentally challenged and questioned, most famously in the human development perspective of noted economist Amartya Sen. Sen has drawn attention to the importance of providing people with economic entitlements and social opportunity structures, so that they may enlarge their human capabilities and enhance their ability to determine their own life-plans. So defined, development should make political participation more meaningful, even as democracy provides channels through which people can press their claims for development upon the state.

6.6.2 Diversity

Till the middle of the 20th century, classical democratic theory was ambivalent on the question of cultural diversity. The first significant challenge of pluralism in a liberal polity was the civil rights movement in the United States. More recently, immigrant populations in Europe, as well as indigenous people in Australia, Canada and the United States, have demanded cultural recognition and community rights. These claims have pointed to an important gap in democratic theory which makes a virtue of its commitment to individual equality, but remains blind to diversity, and so does not sufficiently respect cultural plurality. This can mean that minority groups, defined in terms of their distinctive cultural or racial or ethnic identity, will suffer. Individual members of such groups may be formally entitled to equal rights in the polity, but social prejudice and lack of equal opportunity may render them less than equal. In such circumstances, the neutrality of democratic theory becomes a problem, as it prevents special consideration from being given to those citizens whose formal equality is undermined by the disadvantages and prejudices that they are subject to by virtue of their cultural identity. Hence, the state must move beyond mere tolerance, which is essentially a negative value, to affirm the value of multiculturalism.

This challenge has also been difficult to accommodate because classical democratic theory has envisaged the individual, and the individual alone, as the legitimate bearer or subject of rights. Within such theory, it has been near-impossible to conceive of groups as the bearers of rights. In recent years, the communitarian critics of liberalism have argued that individuals are not the autonomous pre-social creatures that liberal theory makes them out to be. Rather, they are formed and constituted by the traditions and communities in which they are located. Hence, minorities must be given group rights in order that their cultures may be protected from assimilation by the dominant culture.

6.6.3 Gender

It is notable that, even in Europe, the home of liberal-democratic theory, the granting of the suffrage to women has been a slow process. Switzerland gave women the right to vote as recently as 1971. Even today, women in Kuwait do not possess this right. In many countries where they do possess democratic political rights, women continue to lack political and economic power. In 1993, it was estimated that women owned only 1 per cent of the world's property and earned 10 per cent of world income. Women account for barely 4 per cent of the heads of state across the world, and 5 per cent of cabinet ministers/national policy-makers. In national legislatures, they accounted for just 10 per cent.

Early feminists like Mary Wollstonecraft had invoked essentially liberal notions of equality and universal individual rights to buttress the claim of women to equal rights of citizenship. Today, almost a century after female suffrage was first granted, it is clear that franchise alone had a limited potential to transform women's lives, leading 'second-wave' feminists to question the apparent gender-neutrality of the liberal conception of the individual citizen.

There are two important aspects of the feminist challenge to democracy. Firstly, feminist arguments have pointed to the male-centred character of democratic theory and institutions. The customary division between the private and the public realm, feminists argue, tends to relegate women to the private sphere characterized by subordination to patriarchal power and lack of freedom, while democracy is restricted to the essentially male-oriented public sphere. Despite ostensibly universal and gender-neutral categories of citizenship, women have continued to suffer subordination and exclusion, both within and outside the family. The availability of rights is further severely compromised for those belonging to subordinate social groups (e.g., racial or religious or linguistic minorities or lower castes in India), and especially so for women belonging to these groups. Even in their most minimal and negative conception, rights are frequently not available to large numbers of women. Let alone the right to make meaningful choices about one's life in accordance with one's conception of self-realization, basic civil and political liberties are routinely denied or severely constrained. These include, variously, the free exercise of the right to franchise, freedom of association and movement, the right to be elected, reproductive rights, etc.

This is why feminists have sought, secondly, to 'engender' democracy, by providing for greater participation for women in political processes, if need be by quota-based reservations in political parties or legislatures. The case for quotas is often justified by an appeal to Anne Phillips' argument that a *politics of ideas* (political choice between the policies and programmes of political parties, rather than on the basis of group concerns and interests) does not ensure adequate policy concern for groups which are marginalized or excluded. This suggests the importance of a *politics of presence*, in which women, ethnic minorities and other similarly excluded groups are guaranteed fair representation. In this way, feminists have attempted to rework the theory of democratic representation.

6.6.4 Globalization

The institutions of democracy as we have known it are inextricably linked to the idea of the sovereign and territorially defined modern nation-state. So are its principles and practices, whether these pertain to the nature of citizenship or the idea of self-governance through consent and representation. Thus, a democratic political community is assumed to be one whose borders are coterminous with those of a territorial nation-state. To the extent that it entails transcending national borders, globalization is increasingly changing all this. Globalization, as we know, increases the intensity of transnational flows of trade, finance, capital, technology, information and even culture. In so doing, it makes it difficult for democratic governments — particularly in the countries of the South — to control their own affairs internally and in a self-contained way. The new institutions of global governance, such as the International Monetary Fund or the World Trade Organization, perform regulatory functions but are not themselves organized in ways that are democratic or accountable. On the contrary, they reflect and reinforce the asymmetries of global power relations.

However, even as the forces of global capital and global institutional power place limits on democracy as it is practised within nation-states, globalization and the information flows made possible by it do have a certain democratizing potential too. One of the most striking examples of this is the phenomenon called 'global civil society', a term that describes the organizations, associations and movements which cut across national boundaries, and generate new types of political solidarities around issues of environmental degradation, or women's oppression, or human rights. Of course, these movements and organizations are often criticized because they are themselves unaccountable. Another form of supranational democracy and citizenship is found in the creation of regional organizations like the European Union, which seek to advance models of 'cosmopolitan democracy' beyond the nation-state. Cosmopolitan democrats believe that the era of the sovereign state is coming to an end, and there are transformative possibilities in globalization and regionalization which can lead us towards greater and more substantive democratization. Thus, while many people believe that the nation-state is the most suitable site for the practice of democracy, there are others who argue that since the practice of power in the world is being rapidly transformed, the mechanisms of democracy have also to be revisioned and possibly redesigned.

6.7 SUMMARY

As we have seen, the evolution and the practice of democracy in the modern world have varied greatly. Each of the nation-states that today claims to be democratic has arrived at its own distinctive form of democracy by a quite distinctive route. History, society and economy are powerful influences shaping democracy, as are democratic ideas and ideals. It is a mix of the material and the ideological that must explain democracy anywhere. Both, further, are dynamic forces: material conditions change, but so do the ideas and visions of what is a democratic, egalitarian and participatory society, and how it may be brought into existence. In this sense, the struggle for democracy is never concluded; it just constantly assumes new forms.

6.8 EXERCISES

1) Write a note on the origin of democracy in the modern world.

2) Briefly discuss the historical process of democratization.

3) Explain the contemporary challenges to democracy.

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UNIT 7 MODERN STATE AND WELFARE

Structure

7.1 Introduction
7.2 Welfare State
7.3 From Charity to Welfare: The English Experience
  7.3.1 Elizabethan Poor Laws
  7.3.2 Poverty and Charity : Differing Perspectives
  7.3.3 Relief to Services: Change to Welfare
7.4 Social Legislation for Social Control: Germany under Bismarck
7.5 From Benevolence to Community Centred Welfare: The Case of Japan
  7.5.1 Taking care of the Urban Poor: Wealthy Merchants and Charity
  7.5.2 Confucian Piety and Self-Help: The Ideas of Ninomiya Sontoku
  7.5.3 Meiji Welfare Polices: Saving the Samurai or Charity begins at Home
  7.5.4 Relief and the Poor: The Dangers of Dependence
  7.5.5 Influence of Western Ideas on Japan
  7.5.6 National Objectives and Welfare: Strengthening State Control
  7.5.7 Private Charity: Emperor and Christian Groups
  7.5.8 New Ideas about Relief: Public Responsibility of the State
  7.5.9 The Ministry of Health and Welfare: Furthering the War Effort
7.6 Summary
7.7 Exercises

7.1 INTRODUCTION

In the Unit 4, we have discussed how state had emerged in the wake of industrialization. This Unit goes into a discussion of one important feature and function of the modern state: welfare and social responsibilities. The Unit will argue that in the pre-modern time charity and welfare were tasks that were generally performed by the family, community or the religious establishment. In modern times, however, the state looks upon welfare as a part of its responsibility and handles it in an institutionalized manner.

This Unit will discuss the concept of welfare state and then take up three examples of welfare states — England, Germany and Japan. In all the three models, the policy makers faced the same dilemmas on the questions of charity and welfare. For instance, who should be the real recipients of relief and help from the state? Does relief genuinely help the poor or promote indolence and idleness among them? How to ensure that the benefits of relief reach only those who need it? And, how to ensure that it does not create a group of parasites who would soon become a liability on the system? These questions came up for debate in the context of welfare in the three countries discussed. These questions are relevant even today. This Unit will give you some idea about how these unresolved questions were debated by the thinkers and philosophers and what were the type of welfare measure and institutions, evolved by the three modern state systems.

7.2 THE WELFARE STATE

One of the defining characteristics of the modern state is seen in the responsibility it takes for the welfare of its citizens. The state regulates social and economic relations to ensure the well being of all its people. This change from a time when charity and relief provided by the family, community or Church to social welfare is seen as the process by which the modern Western European State has progressed and this history is inextricably linked with the creation of a modern sensibility. In the pre-modern period, it is argued, the individual could only appeal to the Church or religious groups, family or the community when faced with poverty or illness and the causes of poverty were often seen either in fate or in individual failure. Communities or individuals in distress could then appeal to the charity or benevolence of the rulers or that of their family or community. Industrialization brought with it economic growth but also the growth of urban centres where an increasing class of people lived at subsistence levels. The modern state began to tackle the social problems that arose out of this through measures that grew in coverage both out of a strong sense of humanitarian concern as well as because of a fear of social unrest. This body of legislation developed the welfare state where not just the poor but all citizens were entitled to a variety of social benefits such as a minimum wage, access to public health systems and schemes were established for social insurance such as old age pensions, or unemployment benefits. The state moved from moral exhortation to providing assistance to help the disadvantaged and as it did so it took positive steps to reduce income disparities through taxation and special schemes to benefit those who were economically or socially disadvantaged.

How does this process take place? Is it a natural progression as societies modernize and develop? What underlies this humanitarian concern? Some historians would explain disinterested reform as serving class interests so that the ascendancy of a new class led people to think in terms of social legislation. Is there a convergence so that all societies slowly emulate the experience of the European states? The European experience has become the norm against which to measure the progress of all states but it can be argued that the history and traditions of a country can act as equally important influences on the shape and character of welfare policies and the philosophy that underlies them.

Contemporary debates about entitlements and welfare policies both in the United States and Western Europe as well as in India and other developing countries have been sharp and acrimonious criticizing state assistance for removing incentives for work as well as for placing an intolerable burden on the state exchequer. Critics have also seen help to the disadvantaged as a form of ‘reverse discrimination”. These debates highlight the different approach that countries have followed and an examination of the history of social legislation will allow us to understand that there is not one ideal system to which all countries have to aspire to emulate. An examination of English and German social legislation shows the differing approaches and objectives that the two countries had so that even when we talk of the West it is important to bear in mind the diversity that this word often hides. The history of social legislation in Japan shows how a non-Western society that developed within the period of Western dominance was able to develop a welfare system that owed as much to the new doctrines and ideas coming from the West as to its own historical traditions. By considering both Western and non-Western countries it will be possible to see the complex strands that have contributed to shaping the nature of welfare in the modern world.

7.3 FROM CHARITY TO WELFARE : THE ENGLISH EXPERIENCE

England was the first European country to come under the spell of industrialization. As a consequence, it took the lead in modern institutions like democracy and a modern representative state system: England also had a long tradition of charity. These features placed England at the centre of any debate on welfare state. In this section we will look at the English experience of charity and welfare.

7.3.1 Elizabethan Poor Laws

The European experience has been heavily influenced by the experience of Britain which has had a long history of public assistance to the poor and private charity. The poor were in earlier times wards of the Church but by Elizabethan period in the sixteenth century laws were enacted to establish a national system of relief that provided legal and compulsory help to the poor. The Poor Laws were codified in 1597-1598 and re-enacted in 1601 and under these laws the parish became the basic unit of administration to manage relief work. A compulsory tax was imposed on each household and this money was used to provide relief to the aged, the infirm but not the ‘sturdy beggar’. The able-bodied poor were punished. Social reformers and social legislation was concerned with discouraging dependence on charity that would lead to idleness. They did this through forced work or punishments such as whipping. The principle that the poor laws were based on was ‘work for those that will labour, punishment for those that will not, and bread for those who cannot.”

In economic thought the idle poor also represented an intolerable drain on the wealth of the nation and consequently many schemes were devised to put them to work. Reformers wrote about workhouses and labour camps and the condition in the workhouses was designed to be worse than outside. Part of the concern about the drain of wealth was due to the expenditure on relief works which rose to astronomical heights from £665,000 in 1685 to £900,000 in 1701 and by 1711 it was over £2 million and that for a population of 6 million!

It was this background that put England far ahead of the other European states in its concern and policies for the poor. Many travellers were impressed and wrote glowingly of these polices. Benjamin Franklin came to England in 1766 and praised the way England looked after her poor but he also raised the question that was much debated in contemporary England, and which continues to evoke a debate even today. He wrote, “There is no country in the world where so many provisions are established for them [the poor]; hospitals, almshouses, a tax for the support of the poor…In short, you offered a premium for the encouragement of idleness, and you should not now wonder that it has had its effect in the increase of poverty.”

Alexis de Tocqueville, a French scholar visited England in 1833 and wrote a *Memoir on Pauperism* (1835) where he wrote “with indescribable astonishment…[that]..one-sixth of the inhabitants of this flourishing kingdom live at the expense of public charity”. He was astonished because he saw England as a developed, prosperous country, the very “Eden of modern civilization” and noted that other European countries were poorer and the poor in England rich compared to the European poor but English poverty was of a different type. This poverty amidst plenty had nothing to do with subsistence but for the English “the lack of a multitude of things causes poverty”. This was, he wrote, also accompanied by a commitment to alleviate poverty for ‘society believes itself bound to come to the aid of those who lack them. These changes brought about a more reasoned and systematic form of social action to mitigate poverty. It transformed what was private charity oven out of a moral duty into a legal obligation. Like Franklin before him Tocqueville noted that the guarantee of the means of subsistence removes the incentive to work and will promote idleness. Tocqueville, as a result, came out openly in defence of private charity. Public charity, by marking the recipient as a pauper, he wrote, stigmatizes the recipient as well as creates incentives for idleness. The poor had to write their names in poor rolls and Tocqueville found this to be, "a notarized manifestation of misery, of weakness, of misconduct on the part of the recipient."

7.3.2 Poverty and Charity: Differing Perspectives

Economic development as well as social dislocation marked the capitalist transformation of the world between 1750-1850. In this situation ideas about relief and charity also began to change. The reform sentiment that gathered momentum during this period effected a range of social policies but perhaps the movement against slavery was the most dramatic of these. Electoral reforms allowed greater participation and in turn parliament was made more sensitive to popular opinion and became the vehicle for realizing social legislation. The reforms of 1834 set up a Central Poor Commission to supervise the administration of poor relief that had become inefficient and corrupt. The able-bodied poor were kept out of relief system through the workhouse test since conditions in the workhouse were always harsher than outside. Yet these reforms did establish a system that carried social legislation further by regulating hours and conditions of work in factories and mines.

Concern for public health had become particularly necessary because of the cholera epidemics of 1831-3 and 1847-8 but the untiring efforts of Edwin Chadwick were equally important for a better organization of urban life. An Act of 1848 established a central board of health on the lines of the Poor Law Commissioners that had the power to establish local boards. Other Acts enforced regulations governing education, prison conditions, and working conditions for children and women. The New Poor Laws gave rise to intense debates that centre around a distinction between the poor and the pauper. The laws it was argued was 'pauperizing the poor'. This was because the laws gave an allowance to the poor. The funds for this allowance were generated through extra rates levied on tax payers. It was argued that not only did this work as a disincentive to work but it drove wages down, led to a fall in productivity, and was a burden on those who paid the extra rates but did not benefit from it. Because of this burden these people were driven to swell the ranks of unemployed agricultural labour.

The question of who are the poor was central to much of the debates and proposals for social legislation. At the end of the eighteenth century Edmund Burke had objected to the phrase 'labouring poor' arguing that there were 'labouring poor' who worked for their subsistence and the 'poor' who were the sick, infirm, or those orphaned in their infancy or incapacitated by old age. The Church had given alms regardless of whether the recipient laboured or not as did the Elizabethan poor laws. It was John Malthus who introduced an idea of ambiguity. Malthus argued against the idea that an expanding industrial economy would produce sufficient wealth to provide for the 'happiness and comfort of the lower orders of society'. Industrial growth would lead to a growth in population but agricultural production would not rise leading to a worsening of conditions for those struggling for subsistence. Any relief given to these paupers would increase their population and consequently worsen the situation as there would be a decrease in food available for the entire poor population. The only way to break out of this vicious cycle was through the exercise of 'moral restraint'.

It was this type of thinking that supported and sustained programmes of social amelioration and created a division among social reformers. It was this thinking and these debates that are reflected in Disraeli's comment that in England now "Poverty is a crime" or in Thomas Carlyle's statement that these laws put a 'bounty on unthrift, idleness, bastardy and beer drinking.' The debates however, also had a positive effect as they shifted concerns from poverty narrowly defined to larger issues of the obligations of state and society, of the causes of social inequality, the basis of law and obligation. Thinkers such as Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels argued that inequities in the system could only be changed through revolutionary change that would give the full value of his labour to the worker, others sought to return to the old community based systems that had disintegrated and some others sought to bring about legal restrictions that would regulate factory work, public health and mitigate the effects of early industrialization.

As the general condition of the working class began to improve the stigma attached to poverty began to change and disappear. It was now narrowly focussed on the urban vagrant whom Henry Mayhew characterized as the 'peculiar poor' marked by a 'distinctive moral physiognomy'. This differentiation of the poor was taken further by Charles Booth who through careful household surveys, (published as Life and Labour of the People of London between 1889-1903 in 14 volumes) made a distinction between the very poor (paupers, street folk) and the comfortable working class. He drew a poverty line and laid the basis for providing social legislation to help this category of deserving poor and they benefited from subsequent legislation such as the Old Age Pensions Act of 1898 or the National Insurance Act of 1911.

7.3.3 Relief to Services: Change to Welfare

Poverty and its relief were now transformed into a social problem that required a different approach. It was no longer a matter of providing relief but services and these not just to a particular group of people but to all citizens. Moreover, these were not the bare minimum required but would soon be set at what the 1945 Labour Party manifesto called the 'optimum standard'. Comprehensive social legislation was made a reality with the Liberal party in 1905 under the leadership of the younger generations of liberals, Herbert Asquith, David Lloyd George and Winston Churchill and the pressure of trade unions. They were committed to waging a war against misery and squalor. Under their leadership an impressive array of legislation was enacted: Workers Compensation Act (1906), Old Age Pension Laws (1908), Trade Board Acts (1909) that was empowered to set up special commissions to fix a minimum wage for workers. The National Insurance Act (1911) which was a contributory scheme for all workers was modelled on Bismarck's scheme of 1883-9 and made friendly societies and trade unions 'approved societies' to administer the scheme reflecting the cooperation between state and voluntary bodies. Similarly measures for town planning were influenced by German laws and the Education Act of 1902 was an attempt to catch up with the German and French systems that were far more advanced.

The Liberals also enacted laws to clear slums and build proper houses for the poor in 1909. This aside from improving living conditions also fuelled a construction boom in the coming years. Lloyd George's proposed budget of 1909 which was defeated in the House of Lords was written reflecting this new philosophy of welfare. He provided for an increase in income tax as well as a super tax on the incomes of the rich. He proposed to confiscate 20 per cent from unearned increment of land values as well as levied a heavy tax on undeveloped land. These revenues were to be used for old age pensions as well as other forms of social insurance. They would also go towards changing the social structure by breaking the monopoly of the rich nobility. There were many big landowners among the nobility, for instance the Duke of Westminister owned over 600 acres in London at this time. Though defeated the Liberals managed to enact many of these measures when they came back to power in 1910.

The post war years influenced by the economic crisis and unemployment before the war and this sense of crisis during the war fuelled the resurgence of left wing movements all over Europe. People increasingly demanded that the state had an obligation to secure the well being of its citizens. In 1942 Sir William Beveridge's Report on Social Insurance and Allied Services (1942) laid out a practical plan for a comprehensive public protection of the individual. It was on the basis of this that the Labour government of 1945 enacted laws that ended the old poor law system and created a social security system that brought together earlier elements as well as allowed for voluntary schemes as well. Education had been reorganized through the Butler Act of 1944 and in 1945 a system of family allowances was started.

7.4 SOCIAL LEGISLATION FOR SOCIAL CONTROL : GERMANY UNDER BISMARCK

In Europe Germany presents an example where a different philosophy helped to determine the nature of the welfare system. Poor relief had traditionally been left to the communes but in Prussia systematic efforts were made to provide relief for the poor. In the Rhine provinces an unsuccessful attempt had been made in 1824 to restrict working hours of children in factories. They became more concerned when they realized that these provinces were not contributing their full quota of troops because of physical problems in the population. The powers to control industry had been taken away from the guild but after the middle of the century they were given the function of social insurance. A system of state sponsored education was also developed.

Germany under the leadership of Otto von Bismarck was the first country to adopt comprehensive social legislation. Bismarck was motivated by a political vision glorifying the nation and an economic vision that stressed national self-sufficiency and paternalism. He also sought to counter the threat posed by the demands of a socialist movement. In the Reichstag he stated clearly that the purpose of enacting legislation to provide insurance against sickness and old age to workers was so that 'these gentlemen [Social Democrats] will sound their bird call in vain. The workers health was important to the nation because the worker was also the soldier that protected the state. The duty of the State, according to Bismarck was to regulate all aspects of life in the national interest. To make the nation strong it was necessary to help the weaker citizens.

The logic of the Bismarckian view can be traced to the changes brought about during the French Revolution when the levee en masse or universal conscription was introduced in August 1793 and then continued in the Law of Conscription 1798. The state now had the right to call up all its citizens to defend it. Now wars became conflicts between nations so that in democratic societies just as the state could call up all its citizens to defend it, it became the duty of the state to look after the welfare of its people. The scope of the revolutionary government in France reflected this new relationship as it carried out policies to improve and assist its people even abolishing slavery in the colonies. As David Thompson writes, "This connection between the necessities of warfare and the development of welfare was to remain constant throughout subsequent European history."

Bismarck's motives have been debated and it has been noted that he never mentioned social legislation in his memoirs. However, that is not a reliable guide because even as Minister President of Prussia in 1862-63 he had begun to think of insurance plans for workers so that the subsequent legislation he initiated grew out of this earlier thinking. Certainly Bismarck tried hard to eradicate socialism, just as hard as he tried to control the Catholic Church, as a force in German political life. The anti-Socialist law of 1878 however failed to curb the growth of socialism and was allowed to lapse in 1890.

The German welfare system codified earlier voluntary activities by guilds, parishes and benefit societies through laws passed between 1883 and 1889, sought to provide insurance for urban workers against sickness, accident and problems of old age. These were further extended in 1911 to non-industrial workers such as agricultural workers and domestic servants so that in 1913 around fourteen and a half million people were insured. Laws regulating factories and child labour came in 1914 and unemployment insurance for workers was introduced only in 1924. In fact the German welfare system provided the most comprehensive protection to workers in all of Europe and became a model that many copied.

State Preserving Policies: Combating Socialism through Legislation

During 1883-84 Germany enacted social legislation that provided for factory inspection, limited the employment of women and children, fixed minimum hours of work, established public employment agencies and insured workers for their old age. Except for unemployment insurance Germany under Bismarck had adopted all the elements of welfare legislation. These measures were adopted because as the Emperor stated in the Reichstag in February 1879, while introducing the anti-socialist law of 21 October, 1878 that this House would not refuse its cooperation to the remedying of social ills by means of legislation. A remedy cannot alone be sought in the repression of socialist excesses; there must be simultaneously the positive advancement of the welfare of the working class. And here the care of those workpeople who are incapable of earning their livelihood is of the first importance. The statement added to the Accident Insurance Bill, March 1881 explained the motives of the legislation in clear terms that the state: should interest itself to greater degree than hitherto in those of its members who need assistance, is not only a duty of and Christianity - by which state institutions should be permeated - but a duty of state-preserving policy, whose aim should be to cultivate the conception - and that, too, amongst nonpropertied classes, which form at once the most numerous and the least instructed part of the population - that the state is not merely a necessary but a beneficent institution. These classes must, by the evident and direct advantages which are secured to them by legislative measures, be led to regard the state not as an institution contrived for the protection of the better classes of society, but as one serving their own needs and interests.

In Europe other countries also followed this path to cope with the democratization of politics. France enacted a law to regulate the employment of women and children and it fixed ten hours a day as the maximum for all workers. Working hours were further reduced in 1905. Other laws instituted free medical services, protection to labour unions and compensation for work related injuries from the employers and finally in 1910 an old age pension system. The Italian government also passed similar laws, except it did not provide free medical services though it encouraged co-operative stores and provided nationalized life insurance.

7.5 FROM BENEVOLENCE TO COMMUNITY CENTRED WELFARE: THE CASE OF JAPAN

Unlike these policies that were marked by obligatory help on a long term basis in pre-modern Japan ideas of welfare were based on an ideology of benevolent rule where the ruler helped to mitigate the suffering of his people through timely help. To demonstrate his compassion and re-assert his moral authority the ruler would provide relief. Relief usually followed bad harvests and often vast sums were used to purchase rice that was distributed to the people. By the early nineteenth century such aid was supplemented by construction projects that provided work. The nature of this relief was grounded in a hierarchical relationship between the lord and his people but this was also reinforced by the demands of political stability. Peasants hit by famine posed a threat to social and political stability so benevolence became a vital political instrument.

The rulers saw the political necessity of ameliorating the effects of disaster but their benevolence was not unlimited. The people who could be helped were limited to those who had no one to turn to such as orphans and the destitute. It was not meant for the able-bodied for whom moral exhortations to be diligent and thrifty were the favoured panacea. Relief measures were carried out mostly through the family and the community. Since taxes were paid collectively the richer families were motivated to help the weaker and poorer. However, the authorities, domain or central actively encouraged and helped to set up institutions to provide help in calamitous times. In some domains granaries were set up in villages to provide rice during emergencies and charity was encouraged by official commendation.

7.5.1 Taking care of the Urban Poor: Wealthy Merchants and Charity

Pre-modern Japan had a high proportion of its population living in urban centres. The capital Edo (now called Tokyo) had over a million people at its height and Kyoto and Osaka a population of approximately half a million each and there were over dozen large castle towns. These urban centres attracted people from the countryside and inevitably a class of vagabonds and those with no fixed work grew. The cities mostly administered directly by the Shogunate set up relief shelters in the mid-seventeenth century. These provided temporary help after which the people were sent back to their villages. These gradually became permanent facilities by the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century. In the late eighteenth century a type of workhouse was started in Edo where the aim was to help those without a criminal background to learn new skills and become gainfully employed. This was in part a reaction to famine as well as urban riots. The inmates were also given a course of practical ethics to ensure that they were provided the appropriate moral basis to develop their lives.

Along with this a fund was created for providing temporary relief during emergencies as well as on-going help for the aged, children and the ill without relatives. The scale of the help provided can be gauged from the fact that in 1805 about 4 out of 1,000 townspeople in Edo received help. This relief system was sustained by a special tax and managed by wealthy merchants. This was then compared to Shogunal benevolence a more public and sustained relief system than the measures practised in the villages that tended to deal with specific emergencies.

7.5.2 Confucian Piety and Self-Help: The Ideas of Ninomiya Sontoku

The development of such institutions was accompanied by ideas about how to tackle poverty and provide aid to the downtrodden, poor and destitute. Ninomiya Sontoku (1787-1856) was the most famous of the philosophers coming out of a prosperous farming family who advocated self-help. He and other reformers like him preached Confucian ideas of filial piety and diligence but they did not see the social order as static. They argued that even poor peasants by working hard, being thrifty and improving productivity by using new agricultural methods could improve their lot and become wealthy. However, it must be noted that while promoting self-help they did not see the self as the individual but rather as the community. This led them to be critical of charity as counterproductive and they placed their emphasis on mutual assistance as well as interest free loans. So in 1830 Ninomiya Sontoku wrote, “Grants in money, or release from taxes, will in no way help them in their distress. Indeed, one secret of their salvation lies in withdrawing all monetary help from them. Such help only induces avarice and indolence, and is a fruitful source of dissension among the people.”

These were the different strands that together with the new ideas coming from the West that shaped the intellectual and institutional forms that welfare measures would take in the modern period. What does emerge is that certain key elements had been clearly formulated and these underlie much of the contemporary writing on the subject. These elements are that the problem of poverty can only be resolved through the joint efforts of the community and the state, the fear that relief would lead to laziness and dependence on state help and that moral suasion was an important element in resolving the problem of poverty.

7.5.3 Meiji Welfare Policies: Saving the Samurai or Charity begins at Home

The creation of the modern state in Japan began after the restoration of 1868 when the Tokugawa Shogunate was overthrown and the Meiji Government established. The Meiji government instituted a series of measures to set up the institutional structure of a modern state system grounded in the belief that it was the responsibility of the state to create a strong and prosperous country. As in many other areas the idea of welfare was heavily influenced by the earlier notions of giving relief to the needy thus the government responded to disasters and helped those without support. The biggest beneficiaries of state aid by the new Meiji government were the samurai, the erstwhile ruling group that as a class had seen its incomes decline. The government alive to the potential of political disruption instituted a scheme to commute their land rents into government bonds that would enable them to make the transition.

Government practices were also influenced by the examples now available to them from Europe. Thus the Agricultural distress fund Law of 1880 which set up reserve funds to provide grants or loans to those affected by bad harvests was modelled on regulations in effect in Prussia. Under this law during 1881-1886 over three million affected people were helped and another million families received grants. The success of this was praised in German newspapers of the day but this fund was severely curtailed after 1890 when the state withdrew its contributions. Other groups of poor who did not constitute a political threat were not so generously looked after.

7.5.4 Relief and the Poor: Dangers of Dependence

The Meiji government's centralization policies found in civic institutions alternative centres of power that needed to be curtailed. Thus the fund managed by the wealthy merchants of Edo was abolished in 1872 despite the massive relief work it had done during the turmoil of the Meiji restoration. The basic law that looked after the welfare of the poor was the Relief Regulations of 1874. This law aimed to provide small assistance to the poor but because conditions for giving relief were so stringent that actually very few received it. In 1876 only 2,521 received it and by 1892 it had gone up to only 18,545 and this despite years of recession and distress. The idea that state welfare could debilitate the recipient remained very strong. Thus the Home Ministry wrote that 'if the elderly, sick, poor and decrepit grow accustomed to relief, in the end, will not good people lapse into idleness and lose their spirit of independence and, in particular, become reliant on the government."

7.5.5 Influence of Western Ideas on Japan

Ideas about poverty began to be influenced by western writings where the influence of John Malthus Essay on Population gave rise to a vast literature against public assistance programmes. In books such as Henry Fawcett's *Pauperism: Its causes and remedies* it was argued that poverty was due to individual failing and the answer was in self- improvement rather than government assistance. Similarly, Fukuzawa Yukichi, arguably one of the most influential Meiji thinkers, argued for a national relief law, on the basis of England's New Poor Law of 1834 but only if it served to take people off state assistance. This thinking was reflected, in the reduction of public relief by state bodies. In 1881 the Tokyo Prefectural assembly stopped funds for free medical treatment and the first popularly elected Imperial Diet of 1890 attacked the government's poor relief bill.

English liberalism and ideas of laissez-faire (non-interventionism) helped to buttress government desire to reduce expenditure on poor relief. The government sought to ensure that relief would be managed through the community and the family and in this the Civil Code of 1898 provided explicit support. In other words the state intervened to force family and neighbours to aid the poor. The state worked through private relief efforts in time of emergencies and this policy proved successful because Japan was still largely an agrarian society. The number of farm households declined slowly till WWII and this meant that family, community and mutual assistance networks continued to function effectively.

The mid-1880's witnessed economic recession and social problems so much so that the question of poverty and how to eliminate it became a central focus of discussion and debate. The influence of Bismarck's social policies in Germany provided an alternative route for some of the leading Japanese thinkers and bureaucracy involved in formulating policy. They argued that it was the responsibility of the State to raise productivity and maintain order and for this the health and well being of its population was an integral element. Bureaucrats influenced by these ideas wanted a European style welfare programme in which public assistance and social insurance for workers would be provided. The first attempt to modify the Relief Regulations, along European lines, where central funds would be disbursed through municipalities was defeated.

Redefining Japanese Welfare: The Difference from Europe

In Japan in 1902 when another attempt to propose a poor relief bill was made critics argued that it would encourage indolence, drain resources and increase the number of poor. A man who represented this new thinking was Inoue Tomoichi, who had made a close study of the welfare systems practised in Europe and written extensively on them. In his various official positions he was to exercise a great influence on policy formation. Now they began to define Japanese policy in terms of its difference from England, Germany and other European countries. Their concern was how to prevent the rise of poverty that seemed to accompany industrialization and for this they argued that welfare is not a right but an act of mercy by the State and will be given by the central government. The healthy poor will be excluded unlike Europe where there was an on-going relief system for the healthy and able bodied poor.

Here arguments were advanced that Japan was different from the West because in Japan the family was the important unit rather than the individual. This was the reason for a low population of poor and helped to keep relief expenditure by the state down as well. They saw England as the prime example of escalating welfare expenditure. In this they were successful as the number of welfare recipients was brought down so that in 1903 it was only 3 in 10,000 Japanese. There were subsequent cuts in the central budget and the responsibility was shifted to municipalities so that even as the population rose and inflation grew welfare expenditures fell. Government efforts were directed at preventing poverty through moral instruction.

The idea that poverty could be reduced through a proper moral curriculum and training was in part a product of the influence of the British Fabian socialists Beatrice and Sydney Webb. Beatrice Webb's Minority Report to the Royal Commission on the Poor Law (1905-1909) argued for abolishing the Poor law. Their jointly written book *The Prevention of Destitution*, (1911) suggested that while preventive measures such as minimum wages, education, medical services were important there was also an equally important need to reform the habits of the unemployed. In line with this thinking the Webbs when they visited Japan emphasized to their hosts the need to prevent the poor from developing the idea that relief was a matter of right.

7.5.6 National Objectives and Welfare: Strengthening State Control

The period after the Russo-Japanese war (1904-1905) saw government policies successfully integrating and linking the individual and the state. Policies were directed at directing individual effort to fulfil national objectives and welfare polices too were drafted within this framework. Rather than poor relief the government focussed in rebuilding the community as with urbanization and industrialisation community and village bonds had loosened if not withered away. The growth of slums in urban centres reflected the growing numbers of poor workers. In the Local Improvement Campaign (1906-1918) the government used municipalities as well as private organizations to organize community groups such as the local "repaying virtue societies (*hotokusha*) The government also encouraged local leaders to undertake social work and to that end sponsored seminars at the national and local level to teach them how to go about doing this. It also established in 1908 a central Charity Association to study issues of poverty and carry out relief work.

7.5.7 Private Charity: Emperor and Christian Groups

The government guided private work because as they said unlike the West Japan did not have a long tradition of private charity. Christian groups played a very important part both in setting up orphanages and other charitable institutions and in influencing government policy on moral reform. It was Christians such as Tomeoka Kosuke, a social reformer who were active in introducing the ideas of Ninomiya Sontoku that hard work and thrift would eliminate poverty.

The Imperial household also played a large role in contributing to welfare activities through donations. These were directed through private organizations and often motivated by a desire to curb radical political movements. Thus the largest donations were made in 1910 when twelve socialists were executed for allegedly trying to kill the Emperor. In terms of the amount of money spent private institutions continued to play a major role but the state managed many of the voluntary bodies often forcing people to donate. The thinking behind government policies continued to be that relief was not a matter of right.

7.5.8 New Ideas about Relief: Public Responsibility of the State

The years following WWI saw the emergence of Japan as a major political actor on the international scene. Internally the expansion of the economy also helped to sharpen social problems. Japanese bureaucrats as well as reformers began to now look for welfare models in Britain, Weimar Germany and the United States. Relief work had been supervised by the Bureau of Local Affairs but by 1920 a Bureau of Social Affairs was established which looked after poor relief, veteran's assistance, children's welfare and unemployment. The bureaucrats in these offices had a different viewpoint. They argued that in these new times it was no longer possible to rely on family or neighbourhood for relief. The state must spend resources on ensuring public assistance. They saw society as the unit at which poverty could be tackled and this view was grounded in social theories emanating from Europe that said the state had a public responsibility. However, even while the state's obligation to relieve poverty now became the key element in social policy earlier ideas were not jettisoned and the family system continued to be stressed. Also the idea that public assistance must not create dependency continued to be a major strain in official documents as well as in the thinking of reformers.

The Bureau managed to institute labour exchanges (1921) workers health insurance (1922) restrictions on work hours for children, women (1923) mandatory retirement age and severance pay (1936) and seaman's insurance (1938). While debates continued about what system to adopt and various commissions studied European practices the district commissioner system developed in Osaka was an innovative contribution. In each school district the government selected a local notable or person of virtue. Each of these unpaid commissioners was responsible for two hundred households. They in turn elected representatives to an Executive Council which met once a month. The commissioners surveyed the poor in their area, provided counsel and helped organise relief funds or medical care and other social services. This system spread so that by 1931 district commissioners were in 43 prefectures and by 1942 there were nearly 74,560 commissioners (4,537 of them women). Nearly all the municipalities had adopted this system by 1942.

The district commissioner system became the cornerstone of social policy because it was cost effective and allowed timely intervention to help families in a variety of ways ranging from advice on better household management to medical care or providing relief. The commissioners could also help to correct household registers as they tracked down relatives who could provide support to destitute relatives. These commissioners came from the middle classes rather than the local notables who had been the earlier focus of relief systems.

7.5.9 The Ministry of Health and Welfare: Furthering the War Effort

The district commissioners system was followed by the Relief and Protection Law (1929) which was not in any way different in its assumptions from the earlier relief regulations but with the war in China the government established the Ministry of Health and Welfare, at the suggestion of the Army Ministry. The military wanted an efficient health policy for not only its soldiers but for the people from whom it drew its soldiers. The revised Military Assistance Law of 1937 provided for assistance with minimal requirements. Moreover, the assistance was not channelled through the family and the recipient did not lose his right to vote. Unlike earlier systems this did not make it difficult for the poor to seek state relief. Through the war all systems including the district commissioners system were directed towards the war effort. This helped in providing welfare facilities for the general population rather than just the poor. For instance, day care centres were provided for all children, as was medical care allowances to fatherless families and finally in 1938 a National Health Insurance Law that covered the whole population was passed. The war years while they did see a broadening of the scope of social legislation did neglect the destitute and infirm because it concentrated on the mobilizing the nation for the war effort.

Japan's social legislation did not achieve the levels of Britain, the United States or many countries in Europe till after WWII. The history of its pre-war system shows that indigenous institutions and practices played an important role in shaping social legislation often incorporating and building on West European and United States policies. Equally Japanese policy makers changed and adapted these ideas to suit their objectives.

7.6 SUMMARY

Surveying the history of state concern for the welfare of the people shows the varying paths that countries have taken influenced by their histories and traditions. The traditional concerns whether of relief and charity or of benevolence guided the thinking of rulers and ruled in their understanding of how to better the conditions of the poor and infirm. In the eighteenth century the capitalist transformation of the world created a global economy. The expansion of the economies of the European powers not only allowed them to carve the world into colonial enclaves but also created a larger class of people who benefited from this expansion within their own countries. The British Reform Acts of 1867 and 1883, for instance, expanded the electorate from 3 per cent to 29 per cent. This expansion changed the terms of political debate forcing the state to forge new forms of legitimacy.

Humanitarian concerns became politically important. Earlier such concerns had been expressed through the family or community, particularly religious organizations, or had been seen as acts of benevolence in times of calamity. Now the state began to see the need to provide social legislation to not only provide relief during disasters but also to improve living conditions and reduce subordination and exploitation and accommodate increased political participation. This did not follow a uniform pattern. In Germany and Japan social legislation became a vital element in the policy of social control. In this welfare legislation was a way of strengthening national power. However, the general democratization of politics and greater political participation through the electoral process changed the forms of social control and placed greater reliance on internalized moral and cultural mechanisms. Relief and charity expanded and were transformed through social legislation that sought to provide for the needs of all its citizens from 'cradle to grave'. The questions that were raised when these policies were initially formulated still remain, namely, does state support lead to dependence and loss of initiative, are the financial costs placing an unacceptable burden on those who do not benefit from these policies, and do entitlements or reservations create special interest groups. These questions are still with us and are far from resolved, one way or the other. Even though we do not have the answer, we at least know that these questions *are* important even today and will continue to attract attention so long as economic disparities persist in the world.

7.7 EXERCISES

1) Explain the concept of welfare state giving example.
2) Analyze various welfare measures introduced by the state in England.
3) Write a brief note on the welfare measures taken in Japan.

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UNIT 8 NATIONALISM

Structure

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8.1 INTRODUCTION

We live in a world that is very nationalist though not in the sense of the world having become one nation. The world today is very nationalist in the sense that nationalism has clearly emerged as the most dominant political force during the course of the last two centuries. There is no individual or a piece of territory that is not a part of some nation- state or the other. It is therefore important to try and understand this phenomenon. This Unit proposes to discuss the following issues:

- What is nation and how were nations formed;
- What is nationalism and what is its relationship with nations and nation-states;
- The ways in which nationalism has altered the political map of the modern world; and
- What are the different types of nations that have dotted the modern world?

A great paradox of nationalism is that its political power is strangely accompanied by its philosophical poverty. Although the political salience of nationalism is now acknowledged by all, it did not receive much of a scholarly attention that it deserved, until the 1960s. The great nationalist experience of the world remained curiously untheorized until the 1960s. Now that the works on nationalism have poured in, in a big way, we do not as yet have anything like the final word or even a consensus position on it. According to Benedict Anderson, a pioneering scholar on nationalism, the question of nations and nationalism 'finds the authors more often with their backs to one another, staring out at different, obscure horizons, than engaged in orderly hand-to-hand combat.' (Quoted in Gopal Balakrishnan (ed.), *Mapping the Nation,* p.1.*)* It is also strange that those scholars, who fully acknowledge the historical legitimacy, reality and political validity of nationalism, refer to it as an 'invented tradition' (Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*), 'imagined community' and a 'cultural artifact' and sometimes also as a 'myth' (Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*). The variety of issues that are still hotly debated relates to the antiquity of nations. Have nations been in existence through the centuries of human history

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or are they the products only of its modern phase. The various positions on it can be broadly divided between what might be called the modernists, who believe nations to be a modern phenomenon, and the primordialists, who tend to trace the history of nations to the pre-modern period.

8.2 WHAT IS A NATION : HOW ARE NATIONS FORMED

Are nations formed or is humanity inherently blessed with nations? In other words, are nations a contingency or are they an integral part of human condition? Understandably most nationalists (nationalist ideologues, writers, poets or practitioners of nationalist politics) have tended to look upon nations as given and somewhat perennial. These nations, according to nationalist perception, only needed to be aroused from their deep slumber by the agent called nationalism. In the traditional nationalist perception the role of nationalism has been seen as that of an 'awakener' who makes nations rise from their deep slumber. In the nationalist discourse nations appear like sleeping beauties waiting for their prince charming! What is missing in this understanding is the *process* through which nations themselves arrive in this world. Nations were not always there; they emerged at some point. It is therefore important not to see nationalism in its own image.

Definitions on nations have been quite scarce. It would be true to say that nations have been *described* much more than they have been *defined.* Perhaps the earliest attempt to define a nation was made in 1882 by Ernest Renan, a French scholar. He defined nation, as a human collectively brought together by will, consciousness and collective memory (and also common forgetfulness, or a collective amnesia). He called the nation as an exercise in everyday plebiscite. The strength of Renan's definition lay in providing a **voluntaristic** (as against **naturalistic)** component to the understanding of nation. He forcefully rejected the notion that nations were created by natural boundaries like mountains, rivers and oceans. He emphasized the role of human will and memory in the making of a nation. A human collectivity or grouping can *will* itself to form a nation. The process of the creation of a nation is not dependent upon any natural or objective criteria and a nation, in order to be, is not obliged to fulfil any of the objection conditions.

Renan's understanding of nation, pioneering though it was, could be criticized on three accounts. One, it overlooked the specificity of nations as a unique form of human grouping. Whereas Renan defined a nation well, he defined many non- nations as well, or groups that could not be considered nations — actual or potential. By his definition, any articulate, self-conscious human group with some degree of living together (a club, a band of thieves, residents of a locality, students living in a hostel or a university) could be called a nation. Will and consciousness are elements which can be found in many (indeed most) human groupings. This definition helps to identify a greater number of human groupings but does not go very far in distinguishing nations (actual or potential) from non-nations. It is a definition-net which, when cast into the sea of human groupings, captures the nations but also many obvious non-nations. It successfully lists all the possible human groupings which have the potential of developing into nations, but doesn't explain precisely which ones actually do. Two, the question about the role of consciousness in the making of nation is a bit tricky and complex. Consciousness must certainly assume the object that it is conscious of. As Karl Deustch remarked, there has to be *something* to be conscious of (Quoted in Gopal Balakrishnan, *Mapping the Nation,* p.79). In other words, nations have to first exist, if people have to develop the will and consciousness of belonging to that unit. Consciousness can only follow the making of the nation, not precede it. And if the emergence of the consciousness is of a later date than the making of a nation, then certainly consciousness cannot be seen as having contributed to the making of the nation. Consciousness can at best describe a nation, not define it. This then is the great paradox about the role of will and consciousness in the making of the nation. A human collectivity called the nation cannot exist without 'human will' (As Renan rightly pointed out); yet factors pertaining to will and consciousness cannot be sufficiently invoked to define a nation. The polemical question on their relationship will be: does a national create its own consciousness or does the consciousness create the nation? Three, it was rightly pointed out that coming from France (culturally a fairly homogeneous society that already possessed some of the features of a nation) Renan may have taken the objective factors (like language, territory etc.) that went into the making of a nation, for granted. Renan considered nations to be a specifically Western European attribute. In other words, nations, according to Renan, could only emerge in societies that were already culturally homogenous. That heterogeneous groups could also evolve (or invent, or sometimes even fabricate) homogeneity in their journey towards acquiring nationhood, was something that was not very clear to Renan.

A significant corrective to Renan's understanding was provided by Joseph Stalin in 1912. Stalin offered a much sharper and comprehensive understanding of nations. Nation, according to Stalin, was a human collectivity sharing a common territory, language, economic life and a psychological make-up. His complete definition in his own words: **'A nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture.'** Stalinist definition consisted of objective yardsticks as against the subjective factors enumerated by Renan. However, the Stalinist definition was not entirely without problems and he may have over stressed the role of factors like language and territory. Stalin may not have taken into consideration the capacity of many human groups to form nations *without* already being blessed by either a single language or a common territory. Jews in the 20th century scattered through Europe and America and completely devoid of a territory they could call their own, nonetheless possessed the necessary prerequisites of a nation, without fulfilling some of Stalin's criteria (though they would fulfil Renan's).

If Renan's definition-net was too wide catching nations as well as many non-nations, Stalin's net tended to be a bit narrow, leaving out significant nations though it eliminated the risk of catching non-nations. It should then be possible to look upon Renan and Stalin as complementing rather than contradicting each other. The question then is: do Renan and Stalin, put together, cover the entire spectrum? Can an assemblage of the two definitions be considered adequate in identifying *all* the nations (actual and potential) of the world? Perhaps not.

The problem with both sets of definitions is that they are both completely rooted in Western European experience and thus leave out of their orbit a significant number of national formations which may not have shared a common territory or even language (e.g. Jews in the early 20th century, Indian Muslims in the 1940s, Poles in the late 19th century etc.). The western European experience of nation is linked directly to state and territory. Therefore drawing upon this experience, these definitions have tended to see nations in precisely these terms. But there is no reason for us to take such a restricted view of nations. The trajectories of national formations is a varied one and this variety needs to be grasped and retained: some nations inherit empires and slice pieces of nation-states for themselves; some nations inherits states and turn them into nation-states; some nations inherit nothing — no state, no empire, no territory, no single language — and fight (not always successfully) for the creation of a nation-state. It is important to acknowledge the possibility of nations exiting without a pre-existing state and fighting precisely to create a state *of their own.* These have often been referred to as ethnic nations as against territorial nations. This distinction (between ethnic nations and territorial nations) may or may not be valid, but there is no reason for us to privilege one variety of nations over the other.

The range that is covered by the two definitions mentioned about is immense but by no means complete. Stalin and Renan certainly represent two ends of the spectrum. Whereas it is true that both 'will' and 'culture' should constitute important components in any definition of nation, neither or even both can be treated as adequate. 'Will' creates too large a package of nations and non-nations; language and territory tend to leave out significant nations. The former is too inclusive, the latter too exclusive. In fact both the components put together are not able to accommodate all nations. What then is the crucial element missing? It is here that Ernest Gellner provides the answer. In the ultimate analysis, nations are best understood *in the spirit of nationalism.* Contrary to popular belief it is not nations that lead to nationalism, but that nations are created by nationalism. Nations are not the product of some antiquity or the working of some distant historical forces (not always anyway) but they are the creation of nationalism, *in alliance with certain other factors.* Human grouping may possess the characteristics enumerated by Renan and Stalin, but they acquire nationhood only when they are imbued with the spirit of nationalism. So nations are created by the objective naturalist factors like common language, territory, history economic life; along with voluntaristic factors like will, consciousness and memory; *and nationalism.* A particular nation is created by its nationalism. The relationship between the two is somewhat like the proverbial egg and the chicken. It is difficult to determine what came first but easy to predict that they constantly reproduce each other.

The three components — will (Renan), culture (Stalin) and ideology (Gellner) — thus complete our definition of nation. The writings of the three scholars mentioned above (Ernest Renan, Joseph Stalin and Ernest Gellner) are stretched over a period of 100 years. Renan wrote his piece in 1882 and Gellner provided his definition in 1983. We can thus say that a comprehensive definition of nation that is available with us today, took over a century to evolve and is the result of a combination of many intellectual contributions.

8.3 NATIONALISM

Since our definition of nations has become so crucially dependent on nationalism, we need to answer the question: what is nationalism? In this section, we would attempt to provide a definition of nationalism. We will then discuss the emergence of state and nation as constitutive elements in our understanding of nationalism and nation-state.

8.3.1 Defining Nationalism

Strangely enough, a lack of consensus on the question of nation does not quite extend to the question of nationalism. For a global definition of nationalism, it is best to again depend on Ernest Gellner: '**Nationalism is political principle that holds**

that national and political units should be congruent.' Among the scholars who have grappled with the problem of nation and nationalism, he really stands out for a variety of reasons. Most of them have begun their enquiry by first trying to define nation, and from there they have gone on to define nationalism as the articulation of the nation (the desire for **autonomy**, **unity**, **identity** of the unit called nation, already defined). Gellner is probably the only one who has begun his enquiry by first defining nationalism and then having moved on to nation. His definition of nationalism covers, at one stroke, national sentiment, thinking, consciousness, ideology and movement. The definition is simple and profound. If the two concepts employed in it — **political unit** and **national unit** — are dejargonized to mean state and nation, respectively, it becomes even simpler. We, living in modern times, tend to take nation and state for granted and moreover, tend to taken them to be more or less the same thing. We do so because they appear to us as very nearly the same things. But there is no reason for us to believe that the two may have always been the same thing, or to use Gellner's words, they may have always been congruent. After all, their congruence is not a condition given to us; it is the insistence of the agent called nationalism. For this coming together of state and nation, there are clearly three pre-conditions — there should be a state; there should be a nation; and finally, they should be nationalism to tell the other two that they are meant for each other and cannot live without each other. In other words, the present day congruence of nation and state (emergence of nation-state) is a product of three specific development in human history. When did the three happen in human history? Let us now focus on the emergence of state and nation as preconditions to the development of nation-state. As mentioned earlier we look upon nationalism as a modern phenomenon and understand it to be rooted in the transformation of the world from agrarian to industrial. We need to therefore answer two questions: Why did nationalism not emerge during the agrarian period? What was it about the industrial society that necessitated the emergence of nationalism? In this section, we will also try and answer these questions by pointing out some salient features of the agrarian society and of the industrial society.

8.3.2 Emergence of State and Nation

State, as the centralized, power wielding agency, did not arrive in this world for a very long time; it may sound improbable but is true that mankind, for most of its life — about 99 per cent, lived happily without a state. Human society, in its pre-agrarian stage, was a stateless society. Societies were small; forms of organization were simple; division of labour was elementary. The nature of exchange, wherever it existed, was such as could be managed easily by people themselves without having to resort to any central authority. People did not need a state and, as a result, did not have one. The pre-condition for the arrival of the state, and therefore nationalism, simply did not exist.

The first agrarian revolution — indeed the first revolution known to mankind-initiated the first major transformation in human life. It liberated a section of the population from having to fend for themselves; it could now be done by others. Those who were freed from the need to procure food for themselves were obliged to do other things. A division of labour came into being. With the passage of time this division became more complex. The availability of large surplus segregated people from each other. Groups of people were separated and stratified. A state came into being to maintain law and order, collect surplus, resolve disputes when the need arose, and, of course, to regulate the exchange mechanism. Of course, not all agrarian societies had a state; only those with an elaborate division of labour did. Simple agrarian societies resembling their pre-agrarian ancestors, could still manage without one. State, at this stage of human history, was an option, and as an option, was crucially dependent upon the existing division of labour. A hypothetical anti-state citizen of the medieval world could still hope that under conditions of a stable division of labour, state might be dispensed with. Our medieval anti-state protagonist would certainly have been disappointed, if he had lived long enough, by the arrival of the industrial era which increased this division of labour manifold thereby ensuring a long life for the state. State, under conditions of industrial economy, was no longer an option; it became a necessity. As of today, the state is still with us, strong as ever, and the vision of a stateless society in some distant future is there only to test human credulity.

So the state has arrived and shows no signs of disappearing. What about nation, the other pre-conditions? We certainly did not hear of a nation in the medieval times, though we did hear of cultural groups and units. It is possible that nations may have grown out of these cultural units, under conditions favourable for their growth. Cultural units that existed in the medieval world were either very small (based on tribe, caste, clan or village) or very large (based on the religious civilizations of Islam and Christianity). This range was also available to political units. They were either very small (city-states or small kingdoms) or very large (Empires — Holy Roman, Ottoman, Mughal, Russian).

So the cultural units existed in the medieval world and so did the political units. They often cut across each other. Large empires contained many cultural units within their territory. Large cultural units could easily accommodate themselves under many political units. They felt no great need for any major re-allocation of boundaries to suit nationalist imperative. Nobody told them that they were violating the nationalist principle. None — either the political or the cultural unit — was greatly attracted to one-culture-one polity formula. Indeed it was not possible to implement such a formula even if the impulse had existed (which it did not). Why was it that the passion for nationalism, so characteristic of our times, was missing both from the human mind and the human heart during the agrarian times? In order to address this question, we need to focus on some of the features of the agrarian society.

8.3.3 Agrarian Society

So far our contention in this Unit has been that whereas some preconditions (emergence of state, presence of distinct cultural communities) for the development of nation-states had materialized in the agrarian period, some others (transformation of cultural communities into national communities, the emergence of the ideology of nationalism) had not. The question is: Why didn't we see the emergence of state as representative of cultural communities during the agrarian period? Why was the ideology of nationalism absent from the world during the same period? What was it about the agrarian society which inhibited the growth of these preconditions to the development of a nation-state system? Some of these questions can be satisfactorily answered if we could draw a cultural map of the world. Ernest Gellner has actually drawn such a map.

The map consists of three major dividing lines. Line 1, the greatest social divide known to mankind, has the horizontally stratified groups of political, military and religious elite on top of the line and the numerous communities of food producers, artisans and common people below the line. Line 2 divides the three (or possibly four) types of medieval elite — political, military and religious and those who possessed knowledge through a mastery over written world. In some cases a commercial elite also joined the apex. Their method of recruitment and reproduction varied from society to society. It could be open or closed, hereditary or non-hereditary. Their relationship with each other also varied from territory to territory. The religious elite (Ulema, Clergy, Brahmin) could dominate the political elite or vice-versa. Culturally they formed different groups, but they were all united by their great distance from common people. A China-Wall stood between them and the simple peasant would dare not cross it. Indeed it was impossible for him to do so. To join the exclusive high culture, he would need at least one of the attributes like special pedigree, chosen heredity, privileged status, divine sanction and access to literacy and written word. None of it was available to him.

The third dividing line stood vertically creating laterally insulated communities of common people. They lived for centuries in stable cultural formations, not particularly informed about the presence of other groups across the vertical lines. Written word was rarely available to them. They lived their culture without ever articulating it. They could not write and to understand what was written, they relied upon the clergy or the Ulema or Brahmin. They paid their ruler what was demanded from them. In the absence of literacy they evolved their own system of communication which was context based and would be unintelligible outside the context or the community. This communication would not cut across the vertical line; indeed there was no need for it, for across the line the other cultural group would use its own evolved communication. The use of literacy for them seldom extended beyond the need to communicate. Education among these groups was like a cottage industry. People learnt their skills not in a University but in their own local environment. Only scholars, from the apex went to the Universities to learn Latin, Greek, Sanskrit or Persian. The skills acquired from the cottage industry were handed over from generation to generation. The result: the citizens of the agrarian world lived in laterally insulated cultural groupings. They did not need literacy; they used their own evolved form of communication valid only in their culture. They lived in stable cultural formations. Horizontal mobility did not exist. Vertical mobility was out of the question. They viewed (or did not view) the exclusive high-culture at the apex with an aloof distance and felt no need to relate to it. Both the ruler and the ruled felt no great need for any kind of identification with each other. Man was (and still is) a loyal animal and his loyalty was rightfully claimed by his village, kinship, caste, religious or any other form of ethnic ties. Indeed he was a product of these ties. The exclusive high-culture generally did not attempt to claim his loyalty, for to do so would be risky: it might weaken or even erode the China-Wall. In other words, it might convert the China-Wall into a German-Wall. The common peasant being so distant, felt no compulsion to express solidarity with the exclusive high-culture. There were enough loyalty evoking units available to them. No cultural bonding existed, or could possibly exist, between the ruler and the ruled. The ruler was neither chosen by the people, nor was he representative of them. The people in turn felt no need to identify with their ruler. This was the scenario in which man lived in pre-modern times.

The continuity and stability of the pre-modern world, described above, terminated with the arrival of the industrial economy and society. It is our argument that this transformation — from the agrarian to the industrial — created conditions for the rise of nations and nationalism. In the next section let us look at some of the features of the industrial society.

8.3.4 Industrial Society

The medieval man might have gone on living like this happily ever after, had an accident of tremendous consequence not occurred. The tranquility and the stability of the medieval world was shaken with a jerk by the strong tidal wave or a huge hurricane of industrialization hitting the world, though not all of it at the same time. Nothing like this had ever happened to mankind. This single event transformed the cultural map of the world profoundly and irreversibly. The industrial society, when it was finally established in *some* pockets of the world, was found to be just the opposite of the agrarian society in very fundamental ways. Five crucial features of the industrial society separated it from the agrarian world and had implications for the emergence of the nationalism.

One, it was a society based on perpetual growth — both **economic** and **cognitive**, the two being **interrelated**. Cognitive growth in the realm of technology, though not confined to it, directly fed into economic growth and the latter, in turn facilitated investments for technological updating. Changes had occurred in the agrarian world, but it was never a rule. The industrial society showed a tremendous commitment to continuous change and growth. The idea of progress was born for the first time. Technology and economy got linked to each other in a manner in which they were not in the pre-modern times. A constantly growing society would not allow any stable barriers of rank, status and caste. The two are indeed incompatible. Social structures, which had taken their permanence for granted in the agrarian world, would find it impossible to resist the hurricane of industrialism.

Two, it was literate society. Literacy in the agrarian world was confined to the exclusive high-culture, in other words to the king, priest and the scholar. The common man did not need literacy and did not have it or had it at a very elementary level which could easily be imparted by his family or the community. Industrial society, on the other hand, cannot survive without universal literacy. Why should full (or very nearly so) literacy be a precondition for the smooth functioning, indeed the very survival, of the industrial society and economy? There are in fact many reasons why it has to be so. One, industrial economy requires greater participation in the running of the economy by a much larger section of the population. These participants, drawn from very different cultural backgrounds and involved in very different tasks assigned to them, must be able to communicate with each other in order to ensure the running of the economy and the system. Drawn as they are from different cultural settings, they cannot communicate in their old idioms. They have to communicate in some standardized idiom in which all of them have to be trained. This is an enormous task and can no longer be performed by the traditional agencies (family, guild, community etc). Traditional agencies, rooted in their own cultural contexts, cannot, in any case, impart context-free education. Such training can only be imparted uniformly to all citizens by an agency as large as the State. In other words, **education which was a cottage industry in the agrarian world, must now become full-fledged, impersonal and organized modern industry to turn out neat, uniform human product out of the raw material of an uprooted anonymous mass population**. As a result, people start resembling each other culturally and share the same language in which they have all been taught. The language at school may initially be different from the language at home, but gradually, in about a generation's time, the language at school also becomes the language at home. The Hungarian peasant only initially speaks two languages — the local dialect at home and its refined and comprehensive version at school. Gradually, within a generation or so, the latter replaces the dialect at home also. This process helps in the creation of a seamless, culturally uniform, internally standardized society and thus fulfils a major precondition for nationalism. Two, the new system also demands that these trained men should be able to perform diverse tasks suited to the requirements of a constantly growing economy.

They should therefore be ready to shift occupationally. Only a generic educational training, imparted by a large centralized agency, can ensure that men are competent and qualified to undertake newer tasks. The paradox of the industrial age is that it is a system based on specialism but the specialism in the industrial age is very general. Every man is a specialist. Every man is *trained* to be a specialist. One half of this training is generic (based on language, cognition and a common conceptual currency); the other half is specific and must be different for different tasks (like doctors, managers, engineers, computer personnel etc.) Now anyone required to shift occupationally can be trained *specifically* for that task because he has already received the generic training. This enables people to move occupationally across generations and sometimes within the span of a single generation. This provides the industrial society a certain mobility, which also facilitates the nationalist project. Three, **an industrial society is one in which work is not manual but semantic**. It does not any longer (certainly in mature industrial societies) consist of ploughing, reaping, threshing, but rather of handling machines and pushing buttons. In the pre-modern world work consisted of the application of the human muscle over matter with the help of elementary technology based on wind and water. All this changed with the arrival of modern technology. A qualified worker in an industrial economy is one who must know which button to press, how to operate the machines, and if possible, to fix minor errors. In other words modern workers have to manipulate not things but meanings and messages. All these qualifications require literacy imparted in a standardized medium. The image of a worker, just uprooted from his village and pushed straight into industry is rapidly becoming archaic. A worker is not inherently suited to the tasks of the modern economy; he needs to be trained (which implies literacy) to perform his tasks suitably and satisfactorily. **Modern economy does not just need a worker; it needs a skilled worker.** A part of the skill is also the ability to perform different tasks, as and when the need arises. As stated earlier, imparting standardized context free education to such a vast number is a monumental task and cannot be performed by the agencies which had been doing it for centuries namely kin, local unit, county, guild. It can only be provided by a modern national education system, 'a pyramid at whose base are primarily schools, staffed by teachers trained at secondary schools, staffed by University trained teachers, led by the products of advanced graduate schools.' (Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism,* p.34). Only the state can maintain and look after such a huge structure or delegate it to one of its agencies. The implications of such a literate society are various; emergence of nationalism is only one of them. It creates internally standardized and homogeneous cultural communities. This is just what nationalism needs.

The third, fourth and fifth features of the industrial society are actually an extension of the first and the second (i.e. literate society, committed to perpetual growth). It is mobile society; it is an egalitarian society; and it is a society with a shared high-culture and not exclusive as it was in the agrarian world. Let us briefly look at all three.

The agrarian world was a stable order devoid of any great transformations. The conditions making for any kind of mobility simply did not exist. The industrial society by contrast, is essentially unstable and constantly changing. The changes include the strategic location of the social personnel within it. Positions are changing and people therefore cannot take their current social status for granted; they might lose it and make way for others across generation. The factors that restricted mobility (or fostered stability whichever way you look at it) are no longer operative in an industrial economy. The area and scope of a man's employability gets enlarged thanks to literacy imparted in a standardized medium. His cultural nests have been eroded and his status is threatened by the arrival of new social and economic roles. The industrial society acquires the features of systematic randomness (something like the children's game of snakes and ladders) in which men cannot take their present position for granted. The mobility (physical, spatial, occupational, social) engendered by the industrial economy is exceptionally deep and sometimes unfathomable. A mobile society has to inevitably be an egalitarian society. Roles and positions are not fixed and are certainly not determined by social status. A peasant's son need not be a peasant; what occupational position he occupies will depend, not on his heredity or community's status, but on his own competence and training. The role of social status does not completely diminish in the industrial society, but it loses the eminence that it enjoyed in the agrarian world. The description of the industrial society as egalitarian does not match with the brutally inhuman and inegalitarian conditions that prevailed in the initial years of the industrial economy. But they were soon overcome, paving way for a more mobile and egalitarian order.

All the four features put together (a society based on perpetual growth, literate society, mobile society and also egalitarian) would ensure the fifth one also. The agrarian world was characterized by deep and stable barriers — both vertical and horizontal. The biggest barrier was that of status and high culture. The high culture(s) of the king, priest and the scholar was/were sustained by access to literacy and the privileged status. Both these features disappear in the industrial society. Everybody gains access to literacy and a growing, mobile society just does not allow any barriers to settle down for long. To quote Gellner again, 'Men can tolerate terrible inequalities, if they are stable and hallowed by custom. But in a hectically mobile society, custom has no time to hollow anything. A rolling stone gathers no aura, and a mobile population does not allow any aura to attach to its stratification.' (Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism,* p.25). The implication of all this is that the high culture loses its exclusiveness and becomes shared. All this has serious implications for the emergence of nationalism.

The result of the above-mentioned developments was that mankind was shaken out of its neatly nested cultural zones and liberated from the various identities which had claimed its loyalty for centuries. Man ceased to belong to his local ties; indeed they were getting increasingly difficult to recognize. He has now, either already or aspired to be, a member of the shared high-culture. The guidelines for the membership of this shared high-culture were provided to him by the uniform educational system. Man continued to be a loyal animal even in the industrial society, but the units demanding or claiming his loyalty had either disappeared or were in a process of disappearing. Who, or what, should claim his loyalty now? The prestige of the modern man depends not upon his membership of primordial ties but upon his membership of the new shared high-culture transmitted by a uniform education system provided by the state. He is now a product of the shared high-culture and has a vested interest in its preservation and protection. And he knows his culture can be protected only by the state, *its* own state. In other words **a marriage of culture and polity is the only precondition to his dignified survival in a world of dissolving identities**. His national identity is important to him and only a state representative of his nation can ensure the preservation of this identity. *This* is nationalism. And this is why modern man is nationalist.

The large culturally homogenous national units cannot be preserved and protected by the unit itself. They need a political roof of their own. This explains the nationalist man. But it does not explain why the state should be keen on protecting this national unit? Why can't it just be happy ruling over the territory, and bothering about little else, like the medieval state did? Why must the modern state insist on the unmediated membership and loyalty of its citizens? It has to because the modern state, under conditions of modern economy, cannot function without an active participation of its citizens. Didn't it train them to be literate and occupationally mobile? **Modern state needs not only trained men but also committed and loyal men. They must follow the instructions of the state in which they live, and of no other subdivision within the territory. Only nationalism can ensure this.**

To sum up the argument, modern industrial economy has transformed the world culturally and economically. It requires everybody to be literate. This literacy has to be imparted in a uniform standardized manner to facilitate the running of the economy. This process displaces people out of their secure cultural nests and destroys their loyalty inducing local identities. Gradually it rehabilitates them as a member of a new homogenous cultural unit, held together by literacy. The China-Wall breaks down allowing people entry into the high-culture (or rather the high-culture extending to people) which ceases to be exclusive. Rules of the new membership are easy (literacy) and conditions favourable. These new national units owe a great deal to the political unit that educated them. Modern economy had displaced them; the state rehabilitated them as members of a new national community. The two tasks were of course complementary. The new national community (nation, if you like) would be keenly desirous of preserving its identity, autonomy and unity (nationalism, if you like). It has nowhere to go, no past to look back to except romantically. It looks up to the state for its protection; or rather it wants a state of its own for guaranteed preservation and protection. To return to the definition; nationalism insists that nation and state be congruent. We now know why.

One question still remains. Since the bulldozer of the modern economy flattened out all the existing cultural-ethnic differences and also the traditional units of the society, how did it create new national units and loyalties? Bulldozers are not known to create solidarities. In other words, since all the medieval cultural nests were destroyed by modern economy, why didn't the world become one cultural unit requiring one single political roof? Why was the world divided among many nations requiring many nation-states? To put it simply, why did we have many nationalisms instead of one world nationalism called internationalism? Indeed it was predicted by 19th century Marxism and liberalism alike. It simply did not happen. Why?

Part of the answer to the question must reckon with the tidal wave nature of industrialization which did not hit the entire world at the same time and in the same manner. There were clearly at least three waves (possibly more) — the early wave to hit Western Europe and North America; a slightly later wave to hit the rest of Europe and Japan and a third wave that hit the remaining part of the globe that later came to be known as the third world. The recipients of the third wave did not achieve the economic and cultural transformation with which the early industrial wave had blessed Europe and North America. They only underwent political domination by the early industrial countries. The different timing of the waves may have been an accident or may have been because some parts of the medieval world were better prepared for a development of this kind than other parts. But a different timing of the arrival of the industrial wave effectively divided the globe into different zones. Secondly, modern economy did not just expect people to be literate; it expected them to be literate in a particular language (English, French, German). It couldn't be the classical language of the high-culture like Latin (it would be difficult to train simple peasants in the classical language) or the folk language of the people (the dialect may not be suitable for a large-scale transmission). The literacy would therefore have to be imparted in new modern languages resembling both the folk and the classical. People, after receiving generic training in a particular language, were obliged to look upon themselves as members of the shared high-culture fostered by *that* particular language. Moreover, the language (and the shared high- culture) also determined the boundary of man's mobility. If he travelled beyond the boundary line of that language and the shared high-culture he was trained in, he would not be useful in the new territory (unless he was smart enough to equip himself with the new cognitive set up). It is for this reason that modern man does not simply think; he thinks as French or German. To extend the argument, modern man does not simply exist; he exists as French or German. And he can exist with dignity only under a French or German political roof.

The story so far resembles West European brand of nationalism. Would it be applicable to societies where nationalism took the form of protest? Can it, for instance, be applied to the Indian sub-continent? Indian people acquired a modern state in the form of British imperialist state for the entire territory, but refused to live under it. The essence of western European nationalism was that the Modern English or French man could live only under a state that was English or French, respectively. In other words, the essence of western European nationalism was loyalty to the state. Essence of Indian nationalism, on the other hand, was rebellion against the state. However in spite of basic differences, certain commonness can be found between the European and the Indian nationalism. The arrival of the modern economy, however tentative, indirect and incomplete, did create conditions for transformation, albeit incomplete, of herds of cultural communities into a national unit of Indian people. These people insisted on having *their* own political unit. This insistence (nationalism, if you like) gradually created and fostered an Indian nation. This Indian nation was different from its European counterpart in that it was not being sustained by a uniform educational system imparted in a single language (although English did help in uniting the intelligentsia). It was being created not by the uniform condition of economic development, but the uniform condition of economic exploitation by the alien state. This exploitation was modern in that it was systematic, orderly and efficient unlike medieval forms of loot and plunder. Indian nationalism was based on this cognition and on the desire that the national unit of Indian people should have its own political roof.

The bulldozer of industrialization was not operative in India. The pre-existing socio religious identities were therefore not flattened out: some were politically overcome by Indian nationalism; same made their peace with it; some others challenged it; and some actually became successful in obtaining their own political roof for their perceived national unit. The diversity and cultural plurality of Indian nation (The 19th century Indian nationalists rightly called it a nation-in-making) created the space for the possibility of rival or breakaway nationalisms. Thus came into being Pakistan in 1947 based on the notion of all Indian Muslims being a nation. But the territorial spread of Pakistan (with an east and a west wing on either side of India separated by well over 900 miles) created a further space of yet another breakaway nationalism on territorial grounds. Thus came into being Bangladesh as an independent nation-state in 1971.

One scholar, perhaps articulating the extent of scholarly incomprehension on nationalism, likened nationalism to a genie that had somehow been released from the bottle of history some two hundred years ago and since then had been stalking diverse lands and people without anyone being able to control it. Nationalism may not be as unexplainable as a genie but it has certainly pervaded the entire universe including its people and territories. And it shows no signs of disappearing. The neat and nearly complete division of the globe into roughly 200 more or less stable nation-states is no guaranty against a resurgence of nationalism. But nationalism cannot continue to perform old roles. For nearly 150 years between the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and the end of the Second World War in 1945, nationalism was the lone promoter of nation-states. Now that this task seems to be over nationalism must now turn into a destroyer of the existing nation-states through the resurgence of breakaway nationalisms seeking to create new nation-states. This means that societies with cultural, religious or linguistic plurality and an uncertain economic development may still go through all the violence, hatred and brutality that have come to be associated with a surcharged nationalism.

8.4 STAGES OF NATIONALISM : TYPES OF NATIONALISM

The above explanation for the emergence of nationalism must make allowance for two factors. One, nationalism could not have emerged in a day but that its emergence was spread over stages which need to be located at various points in the transformation of the world from the agrarian to the industrial. The section above constructed two ideal types of human societies, the agrarian that was largely nationalism resistant and the industrial that appeared destined to be nationalism prone. The two formations must certainly not have existed in their pure form in most cases. But most agrarian societies would have shown resemblance to the model constructed above. Likewise, the advanced industrial societies should possess the traits listed in our description of the industrial society. The timing, pace and trajectory of the transformation from one to the other would inevitably vary from territory to territory. The basic point is that the different stages in the arrival of nationalism are related to this transformation. Since the very nature of this transformation was different for different societies (and probably nowhere was it so neat and complete), the stages of nationalism also varied. It is, therefore, not possible to construct stages uniformly applicable to all parts of the world. It is still important to keep in mind that nationalism, like other global phenomena (capitalism and colonialism) arrived in this world through stages and not in one single transition.

Two, nationalism arrived in stages, but nowhere did it duplicate itself in shape and form. Although the entire world changed dramatically in the last 200 years from being nationalism free to being completely dominated by nationalism, the nature of nationalism differed dramatically from area to area. So profound is the change that some scholars have begun doubting the very existing of the generic category called nationalism. No two nationalisms are found to be similar, yet all nationalisms do share certain basic traits in common. This indeed is the great paradox of nationalism. To put it differently, **nationalism changes its form in different societies yet retains its essence in all of them**. Nationalism led to the transformation of nations into nation-states, but the process of this transformation varied. The various nation-states of the modern world were created through multiple routes, characterized by different *kinds* of nationalisms. A common myth has been to look at the arrival of nation-states through only two routes — the market and the protest, i.e., nationalism engendered by the market forces or by national movements. In fact the range of nationalist experience is much more varied than that. Two prominent scholars on nationalism, Ernest Gellner and Anthony Smith have created their own typologies of nationalism. Let us briefly look at both of them.

8.4.1 Gellner's Typology

Gellner, writing exclusively about Europe, divided Europe into four zones travelling from west to east and formulated four different types of nationalisms applicable to each zone. These can be seen on the map of Europe given here. Gellner understood nationalism in terms of a marriage between the states and a pervasive high-culture and saw four different patterns of this marriage in the four European zones. Zone I, located on the western belt consisting of England, France, Portugal and Spain witnessed a rather smooth and easy marriage of the two, because both the ingredients (state and high-culture for the defined territory) were present prior to the arrival of nationalism. In Gellner's metaphor, the couple were already living together in a kind of customary marriage and the strong dynastic states more or less corresponded to cultural linguistic zones anyway, even before the decree of nationalism ordered them to do so. In other words, these societies fulfilled the nationalist principle before the arrival of nationalism. Only the minor cultural differences *within* these societies needed to be homogenized; peasants and workers had to be educated and transformed into Englishmen, Frenchmen etc. Needless to say this process was smooth and conflict-free and therefore did not require any violence for the fulfilment of the nationalist principle.

Zone II (present day Italy and Germany), situated on the territory of the erstwhile Holy Roman Empire, was different from zone I in the sense that, metaphorically speaking, the bride (high culture for the territory) was ready (among the Italians from the days of early Renaissance and among the Germans since the days of Luther) but there was no groom (state for the exclusive territory). Whereas strong dynastic states had crystallized in zone 1 along the Atlantic coast, this zone was marked by political fragmentation. The age of nationalism, which had found both the elements (state and high culture for the territory) present in zone I, found only one (high culture) in zone II. So, although no 'cultural engineering' or ethnic cleansing was required here, a state-protector corresponding to the area had to be found or created. It was for this reason the nationalist project here had to be concerned with 'unification'. Here also, as in zone I, nationalism was benign, soft and conflict-free. There were no claims and counter-claims for the territory. Culturally homogeneous territories did not have to be carved out; they already existed. The high-culture also existed; it only needed to reach out to peasants and workers.

It is in zone III (territories east of Germany and west of Russian Empire, areas of present day Poland, Ukrain, Yugoslavia, Greece, Albania, Balkans etc.) that nationalism ceased to be benign and liberal and had to necessarily be nasty, violent and brutal. The horrors, generally associated with nationalism, were inevitable here as neither of the two preconditions (state and high-culture) existed in a neat congruent fashion. Both a national state and a national culture had to be carved out. This process required violence, ethnic cleansing, forced transfer of population in an area marked by a complex pathwork of linguistic and cultural differences. The cultures living at the margins of the two empires (Ottoman and Russian) did not correspond either with a territory or language or state. Here, in order to meet and fulfil the nationalist imperative (passion for nationalism was quite strong in 19th century Europe), plenty of brutal earth-shifting had to be done in order to carve out areas of homogeneous cultures requiring their state Culturally uniform nation-states could only be produced by violence and ethnic cleansing. To quote Gellner, ‘In such areas, either people must be persuaded to forego the implementation of the nationalist ideal, or ethnic cleansing must take place. There is no third way.’ (*Gellner, Nationalism,* p.56).

Zone IV is the area of Russian Empire on the farthest east in Europe. This zone was unique in some ways. The First World War relegated the empires of the world (Habsburg, Ottoman, Russian) to the dustbin of history. Yet the Russian Empire survived under a new dispensation and the socialist ideology. The marriage of state and culture did not take place here, or at any rate not for a very long time. The nationalist imperative was kept ruthlessly under check by the Tsarist Empire, and was, contained creatively by the supra-nationalist ideology of socialism, by the soviet Empire. In fact many of the national cultures flourished under the USSR; some were even nurtured by the state. There is no evidence that the collapse of the Soviet Russia in 1991 was brought by nationalism, but nationalism certainly benefited by the dismantling of the empire. In other words, the marriage of state and culture *followed* the disintegration without causing it in any way. A high culture in different cultural zones had been in a way nurtured by the socialist state, and the other element (the state) simply arrived upon the collapse of the Soviet Empire.

8.4.2 Anthony Smith’s Typology

So much for Europe. Is it possibly to create a similar typology for the entire world? Though a neat zonal division of the world (along European lines) is not possible and the pattern would be much more complex, Anthony Smith has attempted some kind of a division of a world into different types of routes that nationalism takes in its journey towards creation of nation-states. It can best be understood through the table given below.



His basic division is simple. The creation of nation-states has taken two routes — **gradualist** and **nationalist.** The gradualist route is generally conflict free and contest free and is one where the initiative was taken by the state to create conditions for the spread of nationalism. Nation-states were thus formed either by direct **state sponsored patriotism** (like zone I of Gellner) or were the result of **colonization** (Australia and Canada: they did not have to fight for independence) or **provincialism** where cultures/ states just ceded from the imperial power, were granted independence and were on their way towards becoming nation-states. One feature of the gradualist route is that it was marked by the absence of conflict, violence, contesting claims over nationhood or any national movement. The other, nationalist route is characterized by rupture, conflict, violence and earth-moving. Smith divides this rupture-ridden route into two sub-routes — those of **ethnic nationalism** and

territorial nationalism. These terms are self-evident and their meanings clear. The ethnic sub-route is divided into two lanes-based on **renewal** and **secession.** Renewal is based on the renewal or the revival of a declining ethnic identity like Persia in the 1890s. The secessionist lane could be further divided into three by-lanes of **breakaway, diaspora** and **irredentist** nationalism. The breakaway group (either from empires or multi-national states) sought to sever a bond through cessation like Italians and Czecs from the Habsburg Empire; Arabs, Armenians and Serbs from the Ottoman Empire; and Poles and Ukrainians from the Tsarist Russian Empire. Bangladesh that broke away from Pakistan in 1991 could also come in the same category. The diaspora nationalism is best represented by the Jews. Completely devoid of a state, territory of their own, or even a high-culture till the mid-19th century, Jews lived for nearly two centuries like perpetual minorities on other people's lands. They were eventually constituted into a nation-state through struggle, other powers' diplomacy, ethnic cleansing (done to them by others), earth moving and also by statistical probability of being on the right side in the great world war. Had the war gone the other way, we can be sure that Israel would not have been formed into a nation-state in 1950. The irredentist nationalism normally followed a successful national movement. If the new state did not include all the members of the ethnic group (this mildly violates the nationalist principle) who lived on the adjacent land under a different polity, they would have to be redeemed and the land on which they lived, annexed. This happened in Balkan nationalism among Greeks, Serbs and Bulgarians and in Germany of Somalia today.

Territorial nationalism occurred when a heterogeneous population was coercively united by a colonial power. The boundary of the territory and the centralized administration of the colonial power formed the focus of the nation to be. On taking over power (invariably through a national movement) the nationalists try to integrate the culturally heterogeneous population (tribes, various other cultural groups and people living on the margin), who had neither shared history nor common origin except colonial subjugation. This happened for instance in Tanzania and Argentina. In certain instances (Burma, Indonesia, Malaysia, Kenya, Nigeria) there were national movements that defined their aims in terms of wider territorial units, yet were clearly spearheaded by members of one dominant ethnic group. Later their domination was challenged by other smaller groups, creating space for a breakaway nationalism.

8.5 SUMMARY

In this unit, you have seen how nations and nationalisms have evolved through a complex historical process in modern times. While there has been a large consensus among historians about their recent origins (despite objections from the primordialists), there is considerable confusion over different stages and types of nationalism. Nationalism is a phenomenon which is part of an ongoing process and which will continue to define our day to day lives for years to come.

8.6 EXERCISES

1) Define nation. How were nations formed?

2) 'Transformation from the agrarian to the industrial society created conditions for the rise of nations and nationalism.' Explain.

3) Is nationalism the ultimate product of modernization? Discuss with reference to Gellner and Smith debate.

UNIT 9 CAPITALIST INDUSTRIALIZATION

Structure

9.1 Introduction
9.2 Capital
9.3 Capitalism
9.4 Capitalist Industrialization
9.5 Industrial Revolution
9.6 Theories for the Emergence of Capitalism
  9.6.1 Adam Smith
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  9.6.3 Immanuel Wallerstein
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9.8 Agriculture and Industrialization: Britain, France and Germany
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9.1 INTRODUCTION

Definitions of capitalism are legion, contentious, and give rise to disparate and often incompatible explanations of economic history. This is because capitalism is a historical phenomenon. To say this is more than a truism. It implies that capitalism grew over a long period of time. Consequently, historians differ as to the point in time where the phenomenon may be reasonably said to exist. Some scholars take an expansive view, beginning their story in classical antiquity and encompassing all manifestations of profit-seeking trade, investment, and production. Others focus much more narrowly, whether by equating capitalism with a single quality – such as competition, markets, the predominance of money in exchange – or by identifying this form of economic structure with modern factory industrialization as originally exemplified by England during the Industrial Revolution.

A capitalist system implies, in the first place, that property is predominantly in private hands and the allocation of goods, services, and factors of production (land, labour and capital) is made mainly through market mechanisms, with capitalists responding to profit signals, workers to wage incentives, and consumers to prices. In the second place, capitalist economies are highly capitalized. Their stocks of physical capital, education and knowledge are large relative to their income flow and huge when compared with pre-capitalist societies. This is because the most striking characteristic of capitalist performance has been a sustained (although not continuous) upward thrust in productivity and real income per head, which was achieved by a combination of innovation and accumulation. In this respect, capitalism is very different from earlier modes of production or social orders whose property and other social institutions were oriented to preserve equilibrium and were less able to afford the risks of change.

Historically, the rise of this new economic system was a complex and pervasive process, eventually involving nearly every facet of economic life throughout Europe. It was also protracted, stretching across the entire early modern period. The development of capitalism entailed a revolution in economic relations, institutions, and attitudes; on occasion it involved violence on the part of proponents and opponents alike; and it gave birth to new social classes. None of this occurred quickly or abruptly, however. The novel form of production grew up within the old, gradually supplanting rather than suddenly and dramatically overthrowing it. Hence its date of birth and critical moments of maturation are difficult to specify. Nor was the advance of capitalism steady or uniform. On the contrary, it was a decidedly uneven procedure, one that suffered disruptions, crises, even reversals. The process unfolded in disparate fashion across nations, regions and sectors of the economy; even within the same industry or farming district capitalist and non-capitalist methods might be found cheek by jowl.

Despite the many difficulties of periodization and causal explanation, there is agreement among historians of capitalism about certain features of this history. Among these agreed-upon features are the following: The expanding market economies of medieval Europe, with various institutional accompaniments (such as the development of cities, merchant houses, and guilds) were the foundation on which later capitalism developed. Somewhere in the late Middle Ages the economic centre of Europe shifted from the Mediterranean littoral to Northern Europe, a shift that became further stabilized in the early modern period, with its first focus in Holland and a second (decisive) focus in England. Modern capitalism first became stabilized between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. But a decisive leap forward came in the nineteenth century, first in England, with the merging of a capitalist economy with the immense technological power released by the Industrial Revolution. The modern capitalist world system became established by the end of the nineteenth century and consolidated itself in the twentieth century. In this Unit, a brief survey of the theories of the emergence of capitalism has been made along with a detailed discussion of capitalist industrialization in different countries of Europe which also took different paths.

9.2 CAPITAL

Strictly speaking capitalism is a term denoting a mode of production in which capital in its various forms is the principal means of production. The term 'capital' (*capitale*, from the Latin word *caput* for 'head') first emerged in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, denoting stocks of merchandise, sums of money, and money carrying interest. Fernand Braudel quotes a sermon of St. Bernardino of Siena (1380- 1444), who refers (in translation from the Latin) to 'that prolific cause of wealth we commonly call capital' (*capitale*). The term came to denote, more narrowly, the *money* wealth of a firm or a merchant. In the eighteenth century it gained common usage in this narrower sense, especially referring to *productive* capital. The noun 'capitalist' probably dates from the mid-seventeenth century, to refer to owners of 'capital'.

In everyday speech now, the word 'capital' is generally used to describe an asset owned by an individual as wealth. Capital might then denote a sum of money to be invested in order to secure a rate of return, or it might denote the investment itself: a financial instrument, or stocks and shares representing titles to means of production, or the physical means of production themselves. Depending on the nature of the capital, the rate of return to which the owner has a legal right is either an interest payment or a claim on profits. Capital is an asset which can generate an income flow for its owner.

Two corollaries of this understanding are, first, that it applies to every sort of society, in the past, in the present and in the future, and is specific to none; and second, that it posits the possibility that inanimate objects are productive in the sense of generating an income flow. This is the neo-classical conception of capital. It exemplifies what has become known as fetishism, or the process in which men project upon outside or inanimate objects, upon reified abstractions, these powers which are actually their own. As Paul Sweezy, a critic of such economic theories argued, 'Since profit is calculated as a return on total capital, the idea inevitably arises that capital as such is in some way productive'. So a 'quantity of capital' is postulated and this rather than human labour is attributed with the power of producing wealth.

The Marxist concept of capital is based on a denial of these two corollaries. First, capital is something which in its generality is quite specific to capitalism. While capital predates capitalism, in capitalist society the production of capital predominates, and dominates every other sort of production. Capital cannot be understood apart from capitalist relations of production. Indeed, capital is not a thing at all, but a social relation which appears in the form of a thing. Although capital is undoubtedly about making money, the assets which 'make'money embody a particular relation between those who have money and those who do not, such that not only is money 'made', but also the private property relations which engender such a process are themselves continually reproduced.

9.3 CAPITALISM

Capital is accordingly a complex category, not amenable to a simple definition, and the major part of Marx's writings was devoted to exploring its ramifications. Whatever the asset form of capital itself, however, it is the private ownership of capital in the hands of a class – the class of capitalists to the exclusion of the mass of the population – which is a central feature of capitalism as a mode of production. Only Marxists have consistently sought to integrate in a single theoretical construction the economic, social, political and cultural dimensions of the capitalist phenomenon. Neither Max Weber nor Joseph Schumpeter, nor Friedrich von Hayek, all of whom attempted to construct non-Marxist frameworks to understand capitalism, succeeded in supplying a satisfactory framework. Weber's intellectual enterprise was essentially one of comparative history, designed to uncover the roots of the unique Western development of what he called 'modern rationality', which was intrinsic to the capitalist system. Schumpeter remained essentially an economist and his most durable contributions have remained in economics, for example, his theory of the economic role of entrepreneurship. Hayek made some highly astute observations about the relation of capitalism to various other phenomena in modern society, such as democracy and the rule of law, but he never set out to construct a comprehensive theory embracing all these relationships.

The term 'capitalism' is more recent than 'capitalist.' Adam Smith, commonly regarded as the classical theorist of capitalism, did not use the term at all; he described what he regarded as the natural system of liberty. It became common only after the publication of Werner Sombart's magnum opus (*Der moderne Kapitalismus*, Munich, 1928 [1902]) and by then was generally seen as the opposite of socialism.

The word 'capitalism' is rarely used by non-Marxist schools of economics. Even in Marxist writings it is a late arrival. Marx, while he uses the adjective 'capitalistic,' does not use capitalism as a noun either in *The Communist Manifesto* or in *Capital* vol. 1. Only in 1877, in his correspondence with Russian followers, did he use it in a discussion of the problem of Russia's transition to capitalism. This reluctance to employ the word may have been due to its relative modernity in Marx's day. The *Oxford English Dictionary* cites its first use (by William Makepeace Thackeray) as late as 1854.

Controversies concerning the origins and periodization of capitalism arise from the tendency to emphasize one out of many features which can be said to characterize the capitalist mode of production. Capitalism can be said to be characterized by,

1) Production for sale rather than own use by numerous producers. This contrasts with simple commodity production.

2) A market where labour power too is a commodity and is bought and sold, the mode of exchange being money wages for a period of time (time rate) or for a specified task (piece rate). The existence of a market for labour contrasts with its absence in either slavery or serfdom.

3) The predominant if not universal mediation of exchange by the use of money. This aspect accentuates the importance of banks and other financial intermediary institutions. The actual incidence of barter is limited.

4) The capitalist or his managerial agent controls the production (labour) process. This implies control not only over hiring and firing workers but also over the choice of techniques, the output mix, the work environment, and the arrangements for selling the output. The contrast here is with the putting-out system or with alternative modern proto-socialist forms such as the co-operative, the worker-managed firm, worker-owned and/or state-owned firms.

5) Control by the capitalist or the manager of financial decisions. The universal use of money and credit facilitates the use of other people's resources to finance accumulation. Under capitalism, this implies the power of the capitalist entrepreneur to incur debts or float shares or mortgage capital assets to raise finance. The contrast here would be with central financial control by a planning authority.

6) There is competition between capitals. The control of individual capitalists over the labour process and over the financial structure is modified by its constant operation in an environment of competition with other capitals either producing the same commodity or a near-substitute, or just fighting for markets or loans. This increasing competition forces the capitalist to adopt new techniques and practices which will cut costs, and to accumulate to make possible the purchase of improved machinery. This competition strengthens the tendency towards concentration of capital in large firms. It is to neutralize competition that monopolies and cartels emerge.

9.4 CAPITALIST INDUSTRIALIZATION

Capitalism is the first stage in the history of the world to coincide with the phenomenon of industrialization in its full-blown form. Together, the new economic institutions and the new technology (in Marxist terms, the relations and the means of production) transformed the world. Technical progress is the most essential characteristic of capitalist advance, but it is also one that is most difficult to quantify or explain. This is because its effects are diffused throughout the growth process in a myriad ways. It augments the quality of natural resources and labour power (human capital) and has an impact on trade. Investment is the major vehicle in which it is embodied, and their respective roles are closely interactive. There is no doubt of its importance in capitalist growth, or the contrast between its role in capitalist and pre-capitalist industry. A major driving force of capitalist industrialization is the strong propensity to risk capital on new techniques that hold promise of improved profits, in strong contrast to the defensive wariness of the pre-capitalist approach to technology.

Some scholars regard the application of science to industry as *the* distinguishing characteristic of modern industry. Despite its attractiveness, this view has its difficulties. In the eighteenth century dawn of modern industry the body of scientific knowledge was too slender and weak to be applied directly to industrial processes, whatever the intention of its advocates. In fact, it was not until the second half of the nineteenth century, with the flowering of chemical and electrical sciences, that scientific *theories* provided the foundations for new processes and new industries. It is indisputable, however, that as early as the seventeenth century the *methods* of science – in particular, observation and experiment – were being applied (not always successfully) for utilitarian purposes.

Nor were such efforts limited to men of scientific training. Indeed one of the most remarkable features of technical advance in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was the large proportion of major inventions made by ingenious tinkerers, self-taught mechanics and engineers (the word *engineer* acquired its modern meaning in the eighteenth century) and other autodidacts. In many instances the term *experimental method* may be too formal and exact to describe the process: *trial-and-error* may be more apposite. But a willingness to experiment and to innovate penetrated all strata of society, including even the agricultural population, traditionally the most conservative and suspicious of innovation.

The most significant improvements in technology involved the use of machinery and mechanical power to transform tasks that had been done far more slowly and laboriously by human or animal power, or that had not been done at all. To be sure, elementary machines like the wheel, the pulley, and the lever had been used from antiquity, and for centuries humankind had used a fraction of the inanimate powers of nature to propel sailing ships and actuate windmills and waterwheels for rudimentary industrial purposes.

During the eighteenth century, a notable increase in the use of waterpower occurred in industries such as grain milling, textiles, and metallurgy. The most important developments in the application of energy in the early stages of industrialization involved the substitution of coal for wood and charcoal as fuel, and the introduction of the steam engine for use in mining, manufacturing and transportation. Similarly, although metallic ores had been converted into metals for centuries, the use of coal and coke in the smelting process greatly reduced the cost of metals and multiplied their uses, whereas the application of chemical science created a host of new, 'artificial' or synthetic materials.

Though the *term* 'industrialization' is absent from the work of Marx and Engels, the *concept* is clearly present. Marx distinguishes 'Modern Industry' or 'The Factory System' or 'The Machinery System' from earlier forms of capitalist production, co-operation and 'Manufacture'. Modern industry is distinguished from manufacture by the central role of machinery: 'As soon as tools had been converted from being manual implements of man into implements of a mechanical apparatus, of a machine, the motive mechanism also acquired an independent form, entirely emancipated from the restraints of human strength. Thereupon the individual machine sinks into a mere factor in production by machinery'. (*Capital*, 1, chapter 13, section 1)

In parallel with manufacture, Marx distinguishes two stages in the development of the machinery system. In the first stage, 'simple co-operation,' there is only a 'conglomeration in the factory of similar and simultaneously acting machines' using a single power source'. In the second stage, a 'complex system of machinery', the product goes through a connected series of detailed processes carried out by an interlinked chain of machines. When this complex system is perfected and can carry out the entire process of production with workers only as attendants, it becomes an 'automatic system of machinery'. (*Ibid*, chapter 13, Section 1)

The conversion of hand-operated tools into instruments of a machine reduces the worker to a 'mere' source of motive power, and as production expands, the limits of human strength necessitate the substitution of a mechanical motive power for human muscles. In the factory system, all the machines are driven by a single 'motive force', the steam engine.

In *The Unbound Prometheus*, David Landes placed technology at the centre of the Industrial Revolution. He introduces this book by listing three areas of material advance that comprised 'the heart of the Industrial Revolution'. They are:

1) The substitution of mechanical devices for human skills;

2) Inanimate power – in particular steam – took the place of human and animal strength;

3) There was a marked improvement in the getting and working of raw materials, especially in what are now known as the metallurgical and chemical industries.

Theodore Hamerow has measured the course of this technological modernization in different European countries by citing the rising number of patents, the capacity of steam engines and their diffusion in production, the concentration of labour in factories and the increase in the efficiency of manufacture by way of rises in output per man- hour.

Maxine Berg has questioned some of the assumptions of these perspectives by pointing out that they reinforce the old 'technological determinism' of most accounts of the Industrial Revolution. Landes' approach, she argued, traced the history of the most 'progressive' industries without enquiring into the patterns by which they were adapted within different *regions* in Europe; Landes did not explore why mechanization occurred faster (and earlier in her industrial history) in the USA than in England; and he had no answer to the question of why French industry found it difficult to adapt to British power and coal-using techniques.

Industrialization has come to be used as a synonym for sustained economic growth. It is said to occur in a given country when output and real incomes per head begin to rise steadily and without apparent limit. Expansion of total output alone, however, is not a sufficient criterion of industrialization since, if population is rising more rapidly than output, it is compatible with declining real incomes per head. Nor can mere abundance of capital and land (which might give rise for a time to growing real incomes per head) produce a growth in the economy which can be described as industrialization if material technology remains unchanged. A country which retains a large, even predominant, agricultural sector may be described as industrialized if real incomes rise and technology changes.

Associated with industrialization are a number of economic and social changes which follow directly from its defining characteristics. For example, as real incomes rise, the structure of aggregate demand will change, since the income elasticities of demand for the various goods available differ considerably. Again, and partly for the same reason there will be a major, sustained shift of population from the countryside into the city. Whereas there is room for argument about the length and makeup of any list of the concomitants of industrialization, there is near unanimity upon the central identifying characteristic: the rise in real income per head.

9.5 INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

Probably no term from the economic historian's lexicon has been more widely accepted than 'industrial revolution.' This is unfortunate because the term itself has no scientific standing and conveys a grossly misleading impression of the nature of economic change. Nevertheless, for more than a century it has been used to denote that period in British history that witnessed the application of mechanically powered machinery in the textile industries, the introduction of James Watt's steam engine, and the 'triumph'of the factory system of production. By analogy, the term has also been applied to the onset of industrialization in other countries, although without general agreement on dates.

The expression *revolution industrielle* was first used in the 1820s by French writers who, wishing to emphasize the importance of the mechanization of the French cotton industry then taking place in Normandy and the Nord, compared it with the great political revolution of 1789. In 1837, Jerome-Adolphe Blanqui referred to 'la revolution industrielle' in England. Contrary to widespread belief, Karl Marx did not use the term in its conventional sense. It acquired general currency only after the publication in 1884 of Arnold Toynbee's *Lectures on the Industrial Revolution in England: Popular Addresses, Notes and Other Fragments*. Toynbee dated the British Industrial Revolution from 1760. The dates implicit in Toynbee's *Lectures*, 1760-1820, were arbitrarily determined by the reign of George III, on which Toynbee had been invited to lecture. This view went unchallenged for about 50 years, until Professor J.U. Nef stressed the essential continuity of history and traced its beginnings to 1540-1660, with the new capitalistic industries of Elizabethan England.

Early descriptions of the phenomenon emphasized the 'great inventions' and the dramatic nature of the changes. As an 1896 textbook put it, 'The change...was sudden and violent. The great inventions were all made in a comparatively short space of time...'a description that A.P. Usher dryly characterized as exhibiting 'all the higher forms of historical inaccuracy.'

Early interpretations also emphasized what were assumed to be the deleterious consequences of the new mode of production. Although increases in productivity as a result of the use of mechanical power and machinery were acknowledged, most accounts stressed the use of child labour, the displacement of traditional skills by machinery, and the unwholesome conditions of the new factory towns. For most of its history, for most people, the term 'industrial revolution' has had a pejorative connotation.

9.6 THEORIES FOR THE EMERGENCE OF CAPITALISM

The origins of capitalism are traced variously to the growth of merchant capital and external trade or to the spread of monetary transactions within feudalism by the commuting of feudal rent and services into money. This debate concerns the transition from Feudalism to Capitalism and pertains mainly to Western European experience where capitalism first emerged. Whatever the reasons for its origins, the period from about the fifteenth century to the eighteenth century is generally accepted as the merchant capital phase of capitalism. Overseas trade and colonization carried out by the state-chartered monopolies played a pivotal role in this phase of capitalism in Holland, Spain, Portugal, England and France. The industrial phase of capitalism opened with the upsurge in power-using machinery in the Industrial Revolution in England.

This section will briefly examine theories for the emergence of capitalism advanced by four major thinkers, namely Adam Smith, Karl Marx, Franklin Mendels and the theory of Proto-Industrialization and Immanuel Wallerstein.

9.6.1 Adam Smith

In the model put forward by Adam Smith (1723-90) in *An Enquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, Book 1, the development of a society's wealth – equated with the development of the productivity of labour – is a function of the degree of the division of labour. By this Smith simply means the specialization of productive tasks – classically achieved through the separation of agriculture and manufacturing, and their assignment to country and town respectively. The division of labour in industrial production made possible an unprecedented growth in output and productivity. If it was possible to sell this enhanced output over a wide market, then such division would prove profitable, and the profits could be ploughed back into further profitable activity.

For Smith, the degree of specialization is bound up with the degree of development of trade: the degree to which a potentially interdependent, specialized labour force can be – and is – linked up via commercial nexuses. Thus we get Smith's famous principle that the division of labour is limited by the extent of the market – literally, the size of the area and population linked up via trade relations. For Adam Smith the development of trade and the division of labour unfailingly brought about economic development.

Smith's argument that the separation of manufacture and agriculture and their allocation to town and country, consequently upon the development of trading connections, will lead to a process of economic growth, as a result of the increased productivity which 'naturally' follows from the producers' concentration on a single line of production rather than a multiplicity of different ones, has a certain plausibility. In locating the growth of wealth in the interaction between division of labour and growth of markets, Smith liberated economics from an agrarian bias such as the Physiocrats had imparted to it, or the narrow commercial bias that the Mercantilists had given it. Surplus did not originate in land alone, nor was the acquisition of treasure (precious metals) any longer the sole or desirable measure of economic prosperity. Thus wealth could take the form of (reproducible) vendible commodities. If the wealth holders then spent it productively in further investment wealth would grow.

The growth of commerce and the growth of liberty mutually determine each other for Smith. Smith and his fellow 'political economists' traced the advance of capitalism to the onset of conditions that liberated purportedly inherent human qualities and to the beneficent operation, in market transactions, of an 'invisible hand' that brought the common good out of the conflicting self-interest of all individuals. Commerce could be seen as a key to prosperity, but only its unhindered pursuit would secure the maximum prosperity. Commerce, by spreading world-wide and making the accumulation of wealth possible in liquid (that is, transportable) form, renders merchants independent of political tyranny and hence increases the chances of the growth of liberty.

9.6.2 Karl Marx

The transition from Feudalism to Capitalism was never a major preoccupation for Marx (1818-83) and Engels. It was nonetheless a problem addressed periodically in discussion of more central themes such as the historical materialist method, the capitalistic mode of production, or class conflict in history.

To Marx, capitalism was powerful and dynamic, a superior form of production that promoted economic growth far above anything possible in feudalism. He attributed its appearance not to the release of natural, unchanging human predispositions but to specific economic, political, and legal measures.

In Marx's interpretation of the emergence of capitalism two broad perspectives are offered. He first emphasizes the corrosive effect upon the feudal system of mercantile activity, the growth of a world market and new expanding cities. Mercantile capitalism, within an autonomous urban sphere, provides the initial dynamic towards capitalism: merchants entered production and employed wage labourers. The second variant, evident especially in *Capital*, centres on the 'producer' and the process whereby the producer (agricultural or in the crafts sector) becomes merchant and capitalist. Marx regards the latter as 'the really revolutionary path' to capitalism since this transforms the organization and techniques of production. This is because mercantile activity (the first variant) may well turn products for use into commodities for exchange, but it does not explain how and why labour power should itself become a commodity. Also, although the merchant path separates the worker from ownership of the product, it retains inherited techniques and social organization of production. It is therefore ultimately conservative. Hence it cannot explain the transition to capitalism.

The primitive (or original) accumulation of capital is a concept developed in Marx's *Capital* and *Grundrisse* to designate that process which generates the preconditions of the ongoing accumulation of capital. In Marx's words, 'primitive accumulation is nothing else than the historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of production'. (*Capital*, 1: 873-5). Marx's focus is upon how one set of class relations becomes transformed into another. In particular, how it is that a propertyless class of wage-labourers, the proletariat, becomes confronted by a class of capitalists who monopolize the means of production.

Many of Marx's contemporaries saw capital as the result of abstinence and saving, as the original source for accumulation. Marx's point is that primitive accumulation is not an accumulation in this sense at all. Abstinence can *only* lead to accumulation *if* capitalist relations of production, or the polarization between a class of capitalists and a class of wage-labourers, are already in existence.

Marx argued that since pre-capitalist relations of production are predominantly agricultural, the peasantry having possession of the principal means of production, land, capitalism can only be created by dispossessing the peasantry of the land. Accordingly, the origins of capitalism are to be found in the transformation of relations of production on the land. The freeing of the peasantry from land is the source of wage labourers both for agricultural and industrial capitalism. For Marx the first and foremost effect of the 'agricultural revolution' in England was to expropriate the peasant from the soil and establish capitalist agriculture. A new money-oriented nobility and gentry forcibly enclosed demesne, common and waste land, consolidated small farms into larger ones and at times converted to pasturage. Capitalist farmers grew from a differentiation of the peasantry. Enclosures converted property characterized by shared rights into private property.

The genesis of capitalist agriculture contrasts sharply with the birth of capitalist industry. While agriculture generated both its own capitalists and workers, the urban crafts played a distinctly secondary role in forming either pole of industry. Rather, the agricultural revolution supplied the labourers and merchants advanced much of the money to employ them and shaped markets in which their products were sold.

For Marx, merchants could foster primitive accumulation by usury, crushing artisanal guilds, expanding markets, providing employment or by investing profits. While Marx emphasizes domestic causes of proletarianization, he focuses primarily on international commerce in accounting for the genesis of the industrial capitalist. (*Capital*, 1, ch. 31) This interpretation stresses the forcefulness, often genocidal, and the unevenness of primitive accumulation. It was through servile labour in the colonies, the slave trade, and commercial wars that the English prospered and replaced the Dutch as the dominant mercantile power by 1700. Government laws, monopolies, taxes and debt assisted the process. Far from the state being a brake on or an enemy of capitalism, Marx held, it was one of its principal progenitors and servants.

9.6.3 The Theory of Proto-Industrialization

The theory of 'proto-industrialization' (henceforth PI) actually started with Franklin Mendels' 1969 dissertation at the University of Wisconsin, 'Industrialization and Population Pressure in Eighteenth-Century Flanders.' This was a study of the relatively rapid population growth experienced in an internal region of Flanders, where a peasant population combined agriculture with part-time linen manufacture. Much of the output was sold on overseas markets by entrepreneurs in Ghent and other market towns to distant markets, especially those of the Spanish Empire. The workers, family units of husband, wife and children, usually cultivated small plots of ground as well, although they also bought additional supplies in markets. The term has subsequently been refined and extended in both space and time to other, similar industries. In some instances – for example, the Lancashire cotton industry – it has been seen as the prelude to a fully developed factory system. In others, however, such as the Irish and even the Flemish linen industries, no such transition occurred.

PI had distinctive patterns of development. It generally originated in pastoral regions and declining or large-scale agricultural areas. Scholarship on PI emphasizes interconnections among widening markets, rising populations (especially rural) seeking wage-earning employment, and the search for cheap labour by entrepreneurs. Highlighting rural, household and regional changes, studies of *Industrialization Before Industrialization* by Peter Kriedte, Hans Medick and Jurgen Schlumbohm of the Max Planck Institut fur Geschichte in Gottingen in 1981 (but first published in German in 1977) attempted to situate PI within the 'transition from feudalism to capitalism.'

PI is credited with creating the key changes in the uses of land, labour, capital and entrepreneurship which made the Industrial Revolution possible in the following ways:

1) The generation of supplementary handicraft incomes will lead to an expansion of population, breaking up the self-regulating or homeostatic equilibrium of pre-

industrial populations – by this process, the natural rate of growth of population increases but also becomes adjusted to the augmented means of subsistence that are locally available. Accordingly, handicrafts generated the labour supply of the Industrial Revolution.

2) A region thus experiencing growing population and growing PI will soon begin to encounter diminishing returns as dispersed industry creates difficulties in the collection of output and the control of quality. This will conduce to the concentration of manpower in workshops and then to the use of labour-saving mechanical inventions. In this manner, PI created pressures leading to the factory system and to new technology.

3) As a result of PI development, capital for these workshops or the introduction of machines will accumulate locally in the hands of merchants, commercial farmers or landowners. In this manner, PI is supposed to have led to the accumulation of capital.

4) PI will lead to the accumulation of technical knowledge by merchants as a result of their experience with inter-regional and international trade. In this way it provides 'a training ground in which the early industrialists were recruited', and a new supply of entrepreneurs.

5) The simultaneous development of PI and a regional commercial agriculture will prepare the agricultural sector for the task of supplying food during the urbanization which accompanies the subsequent phase of industrialization, that is, PI leads to agricultural surpluses and reduces the price of food.

PI and the related terms refer primarily to consumer goods industries, especially textiles. Well before the advent of the factory system in the cotton industry, however, other large-scale, highly capitalized industries existed, producing capital or intermediate goods, and sometimes even consumer goods. The French *manufactures royales* were usually located in large factory-like structures where skilled artisans worked under the supervision of a foreman or entrepreneur, but without mechanical power. Similar 'proto-factories' were built by noble landowner-entrepreneurs in the Austrian Empire (Bohemia and Moravia) and elsewhere. Large landowners also acted as entrepreneurs in the coal industry, mining the deposits located on their estates. Iron-works, usually located in rural areas near timber (for charcoal) and iron ore, sometimes employed hundreds, even thousands of workers. Lead, copper, and glass-works also frequently had large-scale organizations, as did shipyards. The state-owned Arsenal of Venice, dating from the Middle Ages, was one of the earliest large-scale enterprises in history.

9.6.4 Immanuel Wallerstein

Capitalism was from the beginning, Wallerstein argues, a matter of the world-economy and not of nation states. Capitalism has never allowed its aspirations to be determined by national boundaries. For him, 'the only kind of social system is a world system, which we define quite simply as a unit with a single division of labour and multiple cultural systems.' There could be two varieties of such world systems, one with a common political system and one without. These he called, respectively, world-empires and world-economies.

The modern world system, which created a European world economy with an unprecedented structure originated in sixteenth century Europe, during what Braudel called the 'long sixteenth century' (1450-1660). The geographical limits of this world-economy, determined largely by the state of technology at the time, included North-West Europe, which became the 'core' of the system. Dividing the world into two more elements, Wallerstein placed Eastern Europe (but not Russia) and Spanish America at the 'periphery', while the Mediterranean littoral (Spain and the Northern Italian city-states) became a 'semi-periphery'.

How did the European world-economy operate? The core areas had mass market industries, international and local commerce in the hands of an indigenous bourgeoisie, and, relatively advanced and complex forms of agriculture. The peripheral areas were mono-cultural, with the cash crops produced on large estates by coerced labour. The semi-peripheral areas were in the process of de-industrializing, although they still retained some share in international banking and high-cost, quality industrial production. The form of agricultural labour control used there was mostly share-cropping, a form that was intermediate between the freedom of the lease system and the coercion of slavery and serfdom.

This world was comprised of a multitude of political entities. In the core states relatively strong state systems emerged with an absolute monarch and a patrimonial state bureaucracy. By contrast, the critical feature of the periphery was the absence of a strong state. The semi-periphery was, once again, in between in its polity. By the end of the sixteenth century the decline of state authority was clear in Spain and in the large city-states of north Italy.

The essential feature of a capitalist world economy is production for sale in a market in which the object is to realize the maximum profit. In such a system production is constantly expanded as long as further production is profitable, and men constantly innovate new ways of producing things that will expand the profit margin.

Wallerstein identified three stages in the development of the world-economy. The first was one of agricultural capitalism, from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century. In this stage wage labour is only one of the modes in which labour is recruited and paid; slavery, 'coerced cash-crop production' (his term for the so-called 'second feudalism'), share cropping and tenancy are all alternative modes. The second stage commenced with the world-wide recession of 1650-1730. In this stage England first ousted the Netherlands from her commercial primacy and then successfully resisted France's attempt to catch up. It was only in the third stage from the mid-eighteenth century, that capitalism became primarily industrial (rather than agricultural or mercantile). In this stage industrial production represents a constantly growing share of the world's total production. As importantly too, there is the geographical expansion of the European world-economy to include the entire globe.

Some of the other important theorists in this respect have been Robert Brenner, M.M. Postan and Emmanuel Le Roy Ladourie.

9.7 DIFFERENT PATHS TO INDUSTRIALIZATION: BRITAIN, FRANCE AND GERMANY

There have been and are many paths to industrialization between countries. One would expect this from their historical and geographical diversity, with associated differences in the gestation period involved. It is these variations that militate against a non-country specific theory of capitalist industrialization.

Britain's transition to capitalist industrialization was not at all typical of the European experience. Thus Patrick O'Brien and Caglar Keyder, suggest that the British experience is 'initial' rather than 'normal practice', especially with regard to the relative size and productivity of agriculture, They state that 'Economic theory lends no support to assumptions….that there is one definable and optimal path to higher per capita incomes and still less to the implicit notion that this path can be identified with British industrialization as it proceeded from 1780 to 1914'.

Instead of being presented as the paradigmatic case, the first and most famous instance of economic growth, the British Industrial Revolution is now depicted in a more negative light, as a limited, restricted, piecemeal phenomenon, in which various things did *not* happen or where, if they did, they had far *less* effect than as previously supposed. Instead of stressing *how much* had happened by 1851 (whatever the qualifications), it is now commonplace to note *how little* had actually altered (whatever the qualifications). Recent research has stressed the gradualness of change when seen from a macroeconomic standpoint and has also been tending to argue that the 'industrial revolution' was not merely economic, but social, intellectual and political too. The change in emphasis in historiography has been from national aggregates and sectoral analysis to regional variations and uneven development, from the few large and successful businessmen to the many small and inept entrepreneurs.

Social history has shifted away from analyses of new class formations and consciousness, as characterized by E. P. Thompson and emphasized by J. Foster to identifying continuity between social protest and radicalism between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Then, an influential tendency in the socio-cultural historiography of the 1980s has argued that the British Industrial Revolution was very incomplete (if it existed at all) because the industrial bourgeoisie failed to gain political and economic ascendancy. Economic and political power remained in the hands of the landed aristocracy: 'Gentlemanly capitalism' prevailed. The major division in the social and political life of nineteenth century Britain is argued to have been that between the dominant gentlemanly capitalism of the aristocratic and rentier classes, and a subordinate industrial capitalism.

The historiography of the British Industrial Revolution has moved away from viewing the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries (particularly 1780-1815) as a unique turning point in economic and social development. For example, A.E. Musson's survey, *The Growth of British Industry* criticizes what he regards as 'the general interpretation presented in most textbooks', namely that 'the industrial revolution had taken place by 1850, that the factory system had triumphed.' He stresses the extent to which consumer goods industries remained handicraft industries, located in small workshops; the degree to which, as shown in the 1851 Census, patterns of employment and occupational structure remained dominated by traditional craftsmen, labourers and domestic servants; and the very slow rate at which factories spread and steam power was diffused. He argues that 'There are good grounds for regarding the period 1850-1914 as that in which the Industrial Revolution really occurred, on a massive scale, transforming the whole economy and society much more deeply than the earlier changes had done.'

Some historians challenge the broad view of the Industrial Revolution expressed in T.S. Ashton's memorable phrase, 'Awave of gadgets swept over England.'Ashton's view was widespread during the 1950s and 1960s. His critics see the Industrial Revolution as a much narrower phenomenon, as the result of technical change in a few industries, most notably cotton and iron. Crafts wondered whether it was possible that there was virtually no industrial advance during 1760-1850.

Since the 1980s, studies of the Industrial Revolution have borne out its gradual pace of change. New statistics have been produced which illustrate the slow growth of industrial output and gross domestic product. Productivity grew slowly; fixed capital proportions, savings and investment patterns altered only gradually; workers' living standards and their personal consumption remained largely unaffected before 1830 and were certainly not squeezed.

Research by Williamson, Knick Harley and Feinstein has revealed the fact that Britain passed through a turning point around the 1820s. Growth in National Income was much lower before than after that date. There was a doubling in the growth rate of industrial production too. Feinstein's estimates of the rate of capital formation shows that it drifts upwards from then, as does the rate of capital accumulation and the growth rate of capital invested per worker employed in industry. The turning point was dramatic in the standard of living. The adult, male, working class real wage failed to increase between 1755 and 1819, but from 1819 to 1851, it rose at an annual rate of 1.85%, according to estimates in 1983 by Lindert and Williamson.

Among the early industrializers, France remains the most aberrant case. That fact gave rise to a large literature devoted to explanations of the supposed 'backwardness' or 'retardation' of the French economy. The dominant tendency in the Anglo- American literature on modern French economic growth was to treat it in this context. Indeed, in what might be regarded as the founding account of that development, Sir John Clapham went so far as to muse that 'it might be said that France never went through an industrial revolution.' What has impressed economic historians as they have looked at nineteenth century France is the failure of some dramatic breakthrough to appear, the absence of a marked acceleration in growth.

Recent new empirical research and theoretical insights have shown that the earlier debates were based on a false premise. In fact, although the *pattern* of industrialization differed from that of Britain and the early industrializers, the *outcome* was not less efficient and, in terms of social welfare, may have been more humane. Moreover, when one looks at the patterns of growth of successful late industrializers, it appears that the French pattern may have been more 'typical' than the British.

Two factors in the French situation account in large measure for its unjustified reputation for 'retardation', namely, the dramatic fall in marital fertility, which reduced the growth rate of the population to less than half that of other major nations; and, the scarcity and high cost of coal, which resulted in a lower output of the heavy industries (iron and steel, in particular) than in other large nations, such as Britain and Germany. Moreover, these two factors in combination help to account for several other features of the French pattern of industrialization, such as the low rate of urbanization, the scale and structure of enterprise, and the sources of industrial energy.

The well-known characteristic of French industrialization was a relatively slow expansion of large-scale capital-intensive forms of production. Investment in the advanced sector proceeded at a leisurely pace, there being no clear acceleration until the 1850s or 1860s and there was a correspondingly limited increase in new employment outlets. In 1851, at the first industrial census, what the French call *la grande industrie* occupied 1.3 million workers, or less than 25% of the industrial labour force. More in evidence were the 'proto-industrial' forms. The persistence of domestic workshops and hand tool methods until at least mid-century, if not beyond, was common to a whole variety of industries, with urban artisans tending to work full-time on the higher quality goods, leaving the less skilled tasks to the peasant-worker. Even in the more mechanized industries, large numbers of mines, iron works, spinning mills and weaving sheds were small by British or German standards, located in isolated rural areas and dependent on labour which continued to work part-time in agriculture.

Unlike Britain or France, capitalist industrialization in Germany had to wait the formation of a well-defined area, a unified Germany, before it could commence. Before the mid-nineteenth century political fragmentation, whether within the Holy Roman Empire or the German Federation, was reinforced by the economic conditions of numerous customs barriers, poor communications network, primitive roads and the reduction of economic activity to isolated islands that were separately linked to regional markets. As Sheehan has pointed out, there was nothing particularly *German* about these economies.

R.C. Trebilcock has argued that the German pattern of development was very different from that of the British 'prototype'. Britain had faced an industrialization of low cost, a technology of low capital intensity, and had acquired both by recourse mainly to the savings – personal, familial, or local – amassed by entrepreneurs and their thrifty reinvestment of profits. Bank participation was usually employed, at most, in the provision of short-term working capital and rarely in connection with long-term capital formation or share ownership. Banks were, in contrast, more important for German industrialization. Indeed Germany was the principal case of 'moderate backwardness' for some scholars, that case in which banks supply crucial financial and entrepreneurial inputs. Unlike Trebilcock, others have found close affinities in the British and German paths of industrialization. Both were concentrated within a relatively brief and clearly marked period of years. Both were based on the classical sectors of coal, iron, engineering, and, to a lesser extent in the German case, textiles. The development of the railways triggered a greater range of 'backward' and 'forward' linkages in Germany (on the metallurgical and mining industries, the employment structures and the rate of capital formation) than the industry had done in England, at about the same periods of the nineteenth century.

German industrialization was also distinctive on account of the role performed by cartels. Cartels were groups of firm that combined to control prices and markets. They either lined firms making the same range of products or those that engaged in different stages of the production of the same products. They began to emerge from the late 1870s, and in close collaboration with the biggest banks, gave German industry a degree of concentration in the spheres of capital and labour that was unmatched anywhere else except in Imperial Russia. They promoted rapid technical progress, a high rate of capital formation and an unrivalled supremacy in the export of manufactured products.

9.8 AGRICULTURE AND INDUSTRIALIZATION: BRITAIN, FRANCE AND GERMANY

The contribution of the agricultural sector to British, French and German industrialization has varied in its chronology and content. Agriculture's contribution in this respect has been broadly assessed on four counts, namely whether it created a food surplus for the non-rural population; whether it helped to widen home and foreign markets; whether it generated capital for industrial investment; and, whether it supplied a labour force for industrial employment.

The features of the so-called 'agricultural revolution' in northern Europe tended to be similar: they included the introduction of new crops like artificial grasses or roots, which preserved the soil's fertility and so abolished the earlier necessity for fallow periods. The earlier three-field system, where each field followed a cycle of wheat or rye, barley or oats, was replaced by a cycle which both eliminated leaving some area fallow and included the cultivation of forage crops. More forage meant that a larger number of livestock could be maintained, which, in turn, produced more organic manure and ensured a higher yield for the crops.

English agriculture became the most productive in Europe during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, well before the advent of industrialization. Landlords, who already by 1700 controlled three-quarters of England's farm land, contributed to rising output and yields by enclosing land and providing capital. But it is now increasingly recognized that it was not them but tenants and owner-occupiers who were in the forefront of the new land use patterns and technologies. Before about 1960, the standard view on British agricultural change assigned it to the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, during the period of parliamentary enclosures, which were seen as its cause. A few works suggest that that the fastest growth in agricultural output occurred *before* 1760 and this growth was surpassed (or probably doubled) in 1800-30, as agriculture became more capital-intensive.

The ability of British agriculture to sustain industrialization on an expanded food basis has, however, been questioned. Addressing the phenomenon of 'A British food puzzle' in 1995, Huberman and Lindert pointed out that even as per capita income was growing from 1770 to 1850, food supplies per capita stagnated or even declined. This is the food puzzle. To match the demand from rising real incomes, domestic agriculture should have grown, they suggest, by 172%-228% in 1770- 1850. But there was actually little gain in productivity in this period. This implies a decline in living standards since food consumption fell during the period of the British Industrial revolution despite apparently rising real incomes.

French agriculture increased markedly from 1815 to the early 1870s, the period during which rapid, sustained growth was seen to have occurred in both total and per capita agricultural production in all regions of France. It grew steadily and rapidly enough to feed a growing population, a decreasing proportion of which was engaged in agriculture, and to meet the demand for industrial raw materials (barring raw cotton, which was hardly surprising or unique to the case of France). Productivity per unit of capital employed in agriculture increased steadily throughout the nineteenth century.

Annie Moulin has elaborately argued a case for the consequences of the French Revolution having lain not in the creation of a capitalist economy but rather in the consolidation for a century and a half (up to about 1950) of a system of small-scale peasant agriculture based on subsistence and the intensive use of family labour. Over the nineteenth century (1815/24 to 1905/13), productivity per worker employed in French agriculture grew by 0.25% annually, against 1% in Britain. The main reason was apparently that the French economy retained a far higher share of its labour supply in the countryside rather than relocating it to industry. There was a pressure of population on the land and the cultivation of soils of declining fertility. Yields per hectare cultivated in France were around 75% of the British level for most of the nineteenth century.

It has been argued that rural France provided little impetus as a market for industrial goods. Overall, French cultivators saved to buy land rather than manufactured goods. There was, indeed, an enduring autarky in rural France. Until about 1870, notes Eugene Weber, 'many peasants bought only iron and salt, paid for all else in kind and were paid the same way, husbanded their money for taxes or hoarded it to acquire more land.' Through most of the nineteenth century, the internal terms of trade moved in favour of agriculture. The French countryside provided relatively few workers for industry; this reflects the fact that a majority of Frenchmen preferred to remain on farms. David Landes cites an estimate that as much as 55% of the labour force was in agriculture in 1789 and this was still true in 1886; by 1950, the proportion had fallen to one-third. Historians like Dunham and Kindleberger have, however, come to the conclusion that French industry had an adequate supply of labour in the nineteenth century.

The transformation of German agriculture had to await the emancipation of the peasantry. This process started with the legal reforms of 1807-21 and was largely accomplished by 1830 in the western provinces and by 1840 in the eastern provinces. The legislation effected the abolition of seigneurial duties concerning the legal protection of peasants, the removal of burdensome feudal obligations and improved efficiency of production by the use of wage labour. Agricultural production increased more than three-fold during the nineteenth century, while population increased by a factor of 2.3. The share of agricultural employment fell with industrialization. Germany was almost completely self-sufficient in foodstuffs till about 1850 and German farmers produced a surplus of grain, wool and timber for export. After that, Germany was increasingly unable to feed herself: Germany became a net importer of wheat, oats and barley. But agricultural productivity went on rising, although not as rapidly as in industry and the craft trades.

9.9 THE CAPITALIST ENTREPRENEUR

The pre-capitalist social system, that of the *ancien regime*, was one of 'estates'. An estate was a stratum in which all the three major benefits — privilege, power, and prestige — were largely determined at birth and, also, were fixed as *legal* inequalities. The aristocracy constituted the dominant estate, stratified within itself. The Church constituted a separate stratum, but not determined by birth. But even in the 'Third Estate', the stratum of urban tradesmen and artisans, the guild system carefully regulated the distribution of benefits. The modern bourgeoisie grew out of the Third Estate, as, for instance, the developments preceding the French Revolution make very clear. It is very significant that one of the first demands of this new class was legal equality of all – or at least of those above a certain minimal level of wealth. In other words, the relation of an individual to the order of privilege should no longer be determined by birth or by royal favour but rather by his role and success in the production process. Max Weber placed the contrast between estates and classes at the core of his theory of social stratification and Marx made this a key criterion in his analysis of what constituted a class. When Marx used the concept of class in political analysis, he held that a class must have a certain degree of cohesion and sense of common purpose, as well as a common relationship to the means of production. Feudal estates were too internally stratified to possess this attribute.

One very significant change with capitalist industrialization has been the enormous expansion of the middle strata. Capitalist accountancy called for a secular bureaucracy, an army of agents and clerks to keep accounts, to attend to correspondence, to furnish the news necessary in order to take advantage, if possible before anyone else, of changed market conditions. So perhaps the first visible entry of capitalism into the medieval town was made by the grammar school, where the elements of reading, writing, and arithmetic were the main objects of study. The control of paper became the mark of the new commercial bureaucracy. The institution that marked the turning point in the development of the commercial town was the Bourse, or exchange, which began to serve as a centre for large-scale, impersonal commercial transactions in the thirteenth century.

The basic cause of this development was undoubtedly technological. An ever-smaller portion of the labour force was required for the actual tasks of material production, allowing the diversion of ever larger numbers of workers into administrative activities. There was also a vast expansion of the state bureaucracies. The rise of the capitalist firm as a new and immensely important form of economic organization has also encouraged the growth of a bureaucracy. It has meant a separation between the legal ownership of property and the function of economic control of the assets it entails. It has been suggested that effective *control* over economic resources rather than legal *ownership* of them is the defining criterion for the top capitalist class. Thus Nicos Poulantzas, in *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism* begins by defining the bourgeoisie not in terms of a legal category of property ownership but in terms of 'economic ownership' (that is, real economic control of the means of production and of the products) and 'possession' (that is, the capacity to put the means of production into operation). By this criterion, the managers belong to the capitalist bourgeoisie proper.

In *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, Max Weber makes it clear that a capitalist enterprise and the pursuit of gain are not at all the same thing. People have always wanted to be rich, but that has little to do with capitalism, which he identifies as 'a regular orientation to the achievement of profit through (nominally peaceful) economic exchange'. Pointing out that there were mercantile operations – very successful and of considerable size – in Babylon, Egypt, India, China, and medieval Europe, he says that it is only in Europe, since the Reformation, that capitalist activity has become associated with the *rational organisation of formally free labour*.

It called for a new type of economic agent, the capitalist entrepreneur. One of Weber's insights that has remained widely accepted is that the capitalist entrepreneur is a very distinctive type of human being. Weber was fascinated by what he thought to begin with was a puzzling paradox. In many cases, men — and a few women — evinced a drive toward the accumulation of wealth but at the same time showed a 'ferocious asceticism,' a singular absence of interest in the worldly pleasures that such wealth could buy. Many entrepreneurs actually pursued a lifestyle that was 'decidedly frugal'. Was this not odd? Weber thought he had found an answer in what he called the 'this-worldly asceticism' of Puritanism, a notion that he expanded by reference to the concept of 'the calling'. This idea dates from the Reformation, and behind it lies the idea that the highest form of moral obligation of the individual, the best way to fulfil his duty to God, is to help his fellow men, now, in this world. Weber backed these assertions by pointing out that the accumulation of wealth, in the early stages of Capitalism, and in Calvinist countries in particular, was morally sanctioned only if it was combined with 'a sober, industrious career'. For Weber, capitalism was originally sparked by religious fervour. Without that fervour the organization of labour that made capitalism so different from what had gone before would not have been possible.

Weber was familiar with the religions and economic practices of non-European areas of the world, such as India, China or the Middle East, and this imbued *The Protestant Ethic* with an authority it might otherwise not have had. He argued that in China, for example, widespread kinship units provided the predominant forms of economic co-operation, naturally limiting the influence both of the guilds and of individual entrepreneurs. In India, Hinduism was associated with great wealth in history, but its tenets about the afterlife prevented the same sort of energy that built up under Protestantism, and capitalism proper never developed. Europe also had the advantage of inheriting the tradition of Roman Law, which provided a more integrated juridical practice than elsewhere, easing the transfer of ideas and facilitating the understanding of contracts.

For Max Weber, 'rational restlessness' was the psychological make-up of Europe, the opposite of what he found in the main religions of Asia: rational acceptance of social order by Confucianism and its irrational antithesis in Taoism; mystical acceptance of social order by Hinduism; the worldly retreat in Buddhism. Weber located rational restlessness especially in Puritanism.

Such persons are 'enterprising' because they are liberated from strong communal ties, which enable them to seek new opportunities without the constraints of collective traditions, customs and taboos. This clearly involves a certain 'ego ideal', a strong discipline, traits that Weber called 'inner-worldly asceticism.' This type of individual is concerned with the affairs of this world, is pragmatic and geared to action, as against the more contemplative or sensitive values. He is also self-denying, prepared for 'delayed gratification', as against someone who immediately spends all he makes. Weber pointed out that it is this 'asceticism', rather than acquisitiveness, that distinguishes the capitalist entrepreneur.

Joseph Schumpeter stressed the central role of the capitalist entrepreneur, rather than the stock of capital, as the incarnation of technical progress. In *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (1943), he sought to change thinking about economics no less than John Maynard Keynes had done. Schumpeter was firmly opposed to both Marx and Keynes. His main thesis was that the capitalist system is essentially static: for employers and employees as well as for customers, the system settles down with no profit in it, and there is no wealth for investment. Workers receive just enough for their labour, based on the cost of producing and selling goods. Profit, by implication, can only come from innovation, which for a limited time cuts the cost of production (until competitors catch up) and allows a surplus to be used for further investment.

Two things followed from this. First, capitalists themselves are not the motivating force of capitalism, but instead entrepreneurs who invent new techniques or machinery by means of which goods are produced more cheaply. Schumpeter did not think that entrepreneurship could be taught, or inherited. It was, he believed, an essentially 'bourgeois' activity. What he meant by this was that, in any urban environment, people would have ideas for innovation, but who had those ideas, when and where they had them, and what they did with them was unpredictable. Bourgeois people acted not out of any theory or philosophy but for pragmatic self-interest. This flatly contradicted Marx's analysis.

The second element of Schumpeter's outlook was that profit, as generated by entrepreneurs, was temporary. Whatever innovation was introduced would be followed up by others in that sector of industry or commerce, and a new stability would eventually be achieved. This meant that for Schumpeter capitalism was inevitably characterized by cycles of boom and stagnation.

9.10 BOURGEOIS CULTURE

From the viewpoint of the aristocracy, the bourgeoisie appeared above all as 'vulgar.' What did this mean? It meant, essentially, that these people insisted that economic success should count as much as noble birth, family virtue, personal honour, and proximity to the throne. The word 'vulgar'derives from the Latin *vulgus* denoting common, ordinary people, as against the patricians. This 'vulgarity' was morally shocking as much as it was politically threatening.

Bourgeois culture, at least from the seventeenth century and into its triumphal nineteenth century, developed in sharp and conscious distinction from the culture of the aristocracy, the earlier ruling class against which the bourgeoisie had to establish its ascendancy. The ideal of the bourgeois gentleman was deliberately counterposed to the older, aristocratic, ideal of the gentleman. The bourgeois extolled 'rationality' against the aristocrat's reliance on 'healthy instinct'and spontaneity. The bourgeois knew that his life-style was a matter of self-cultivation; the aristocrat always believed (falsely) that his was the result of genetic inheritance or, as he would say, of 'breeding.' The bourgeoisie was, virtually from the beginning, a literate class; the aristocracy contained many individuals who were proudly illiterate. The bourgeoisie believed in the virtue of work, as against the aristocratic idealisation of genteel leisure. The deliberate display of wealth was an aristocratic rather than a bourgeois trait. Bourgeois culture, most importantly for industrialization, was individuating at the core of its world-view.

This prompted R.H. Tawney in 1921 to argue that capitalism had created *The Acquisitive Society*. He thought that capitalism misjudged human nature, elevating production and the making of profit, which ought to be a means to certain ends, into ends in themselves. This had the effect, he argued, of encouraging the wrong instincts in people, by which he meant acquisitiveness. A very religious man (and a socialist intellectual), Tawney felt that acquisitiveness went against the grain – in particular, it sabotaged 'the instinct for service and solidarity' that is the basis for traditional civil society. He thought that in the long run capitalism was incompatible with culture. Under capitalism, he wrote, culture became more private, less was shared, and this trend went against the common life of men – individuality inevitably promoted inequality. The very concept of culture therefore changed, becoming less and less an inner state of mind and more a function of one's possessions. He also contended that capitalism was incompatible with democracy because the inequalities endemic in capitalism, made more visible than ever by the acquisitive accumulation of consumer goods, would ultimately threaten social cohesion.

9.11 SUMMARY

In this Unit, you have seen the myriad ways in which capitalist industrialization took place in Europe. You have also seen the ways in which scholars have tried to understand this phenomenon which even today remains central to our lives. Terms like bourgeoisie, capitalist entrepreneur, bourgeois culture have become parts of our everyday vocabulary and despite a comprehensive criticism of this phenomenon which presumably led to large-scale underdevelopment in large parts of the globe, especially by Marxist thinkers, it retains its hold over our existence. There have been attempts to provide alternative frameworks of shaping human lives, economic structures, etc., one of them being the socialist industrialization (about which you would read in the next Unit).

9.12 EXERCISES

1) Define Capital and Capitalism.
2) Discuss the role of technology in the process of capitalist industrialization.
3) Who is a capitalist entrepreneur? Discuss in the light of the debates around the term.
4) How different was bourgeois culture from the aristocratic culture?

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UNIT 10 SOCIALIST INDUSTRIALIZATION

Structure

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10.1 INTRODUCTION

In the previous Unit, you have read about industrial capitalism. In the early years of 19th century a parallel critique of this market driven capitalist economy had begun. There was attempt to think of alternate economic models. Foremost among such thinkers were Marx and Engels apart from others. But the real testing time for this socialist model came with the October Revolution in Russia in 1917. It is in the backdrop of these developments that you would read about the background and later developments in the formulation and application of this model, mainly in Europe.

The Nineteenth Century Background

Inevitably, since the socialist critique of capitalism was so varied in Europe, socialism meant different forms of practice before the October Revolution in Russia (1917).

It implied activity to strengthen Trades Unions, Friendly Societies and labour 'syndicates' with or without the assistance of political parties. It also implied the encouragement of utopian communities (such as Robert Owen's New Lanark) which would be a beacon of what was most fit and most wholesome. Socialism could also mean an interest in cooperative enterprise and various forms of community enterprise that would benefit the public as a whole rather than any one individual. The latter led to initiatives associated with 'municipal socialism' or 'municipal trading', i.e. the running of urban facilities for fuel, water and lighting. There was little here that envisaged how the economy as a whole could be reoriented in practice, even if there was some focus on wide-ranging measures to protect labour through schemes or insurance against unemployment and sickness, or the redistribution of land among peasant proprietors. Suggestions for government controls over the 'commanding heights' of the economy (that is the coal industry or the steel industry) were voiced. But it was not certain how this would be done. Most socialists had an abiding fear of the state and state control as a possible source of intensification of exploitation rather than a solution to it. Before the onset of the First World War, in fact, nationalization (i.e. the state take-over of industry) was looked upon as merely one way of constituting an area of activity where the proletariat had no say, rather than as a means of controlling capitalism.

10.2 DEVELOPMENT OF THE 'SOCIALIST' MODEL OF ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION

With the coming of the October Revolution, entirely new sets of economic principles and policies were sought to be employed with the purpose of achieving a socialist state. In this section, different phases of these programmes have been discussed and also the kind of impact it brought on the Soviet economy and society.

10.2.1 Significance

In such circumstances, where there was no model of a 'socialist' economy before 1914, practices in Soviet Russia after the October Revolution were the first major large-scale experiment with socialism in Europe and became a model of socialism. By 1939, the main features of this 'model' were fundamental restrictions on private property, major state regulation of production, finance and trade, and a system of Planning which schematized the economy and provided flexible targets and goals. Governments, as they evolved state control of the economy, used public welfare as their reference point. The economy was regularly mapped, in order to indicate where state investment was necessary: initially through 'control figures' and later through adjustable Plan figures. Hence, the economy, as it matured, was called a 'Planned Economy'. The system of 'Planning' was highly innovative. It was only feasible because relatively high control over different economic sectors made the mobilization of resources possible on an unparalleled scale, ignoring market pressures of demand and supply. Such control over the economy was unknown in any economy before 1917, even in conditions of War.

The Bolshevik Party, which took power in October, was the Bolshevik faction of the Russian Social Democratic Workers'Party, which was duly renamed the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik). Its members were committed socialists and encouraged the notion that the Soviet economy was a socialist economy, and was an exemplar for socialism. Each step of economic reform was justified as a contribution to socialism. The Komintern, and Communist Parties in Europe took up the refrain. Socialist parties in France, Britain, Germany and Italy did not adopt Soviet technique when in power. But since a long stint of socialist government was rare anywhere else, the Soviet economy became the reference for what socialism was. After 1945, the prototype was exported to Eastern Europe, whose experience added a new dimension to the model. Economists such as Maurice Dobb, encouraged such notions, as did CMEA economists such as Oskar Lange, W. Bruz, etc.

The Soviet Planned Economy was considered the archetype of socialist experiment. The Bolsheviks set out to provide the benefits of industrial development to as many people, in as just a manner, in as short a time as possible.

Here, we shall deal with how the Soviet system came to take shape during 1917-1989, and how it evolved in the CMEA countries. The stages of development are important, since all of them, at various times, have been defined as 'socialist'. Also, two points must be noted in addition to the features mentioned above. First, the socialist initiative cannot speak for all initiative in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe at this time. Both in Russia and in Eastern Europe, sectors operated (however weak) which did not follow the priorities and logic of socialist experiment. Again, ideas from the Soviet model were taken up and used by 'socialist' governments in France, Britain and Italy after 1945. Their initiatives must also be added to the economic record of European socialism.

10.2.2 Debates

Some debates about Soviet industrialization deserve attention.

i) Was socialist industrialization on the Soviet pattern more concerned with socialism and justice than with economic growth?

Socialist historians such as Maurice Dobb have argued that Soviet industrialization came about through policies that had an eye to economic and industrial growth as well as social justice. Ideas of socialism, defined by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, were important in everything that occurred; and steps taken for growth were a success. Some non-socialist historians such as Jasny have agreed that growth was achieved, while others, such as Alec Nove, have argued that, even if there was growth, the industrialization was inefficient and the weaknesses were the result of obsessions with socialist doctrines. E.H. Carr and R.W. Davies pioneered work that goes against this kind of perspective. They showed how the Soviet leadership was divided on the meaning of socialism and evolved policy while adapting to problems of growth. Davies, though, disagrees with Carr that this was *generally* true. He feels that concerns with doctrine and politics became crucial in the 1930s in Soviet policy. In recent writings in the Russian Federation, there is a division of opinion about how important doctrine was in socialist industrialization. The debate is important because it raises questions about whether Soviet socialism deserves attention as an experiment that took stock of what was convenient and useful for the country's population. Clearly one perspective runs that it was an experiment where policy makers lost a sense of what could lead to prosperity because they became wrapped up in Soviet politics and in ideas about what was socialism.

ii) Was socialist industrialization on the Soviet pattern a product of Russian circumstances and inapplicable for other countries or regions?

A line of argument also runs that Soviet industrialization was not socialist since socialism could not be constructed in an underdeveloped country like Russia where industrial capitalism had been weak. V.I. Lenin, the leader of the October Revolution, himself did not consider it possible for Russia to build socialism without a revolution in the West. He was disturbed about the prospects of constructing socialism in a country which was mainly agricultural, where industrial and finance capitalism were features of the late 19th century. Following this position, socialism in Russia is regarded as a travesty: economic experiment on a bad foundation with socialist jargon thrown in.

There are some problems with this argument. It implies that socialist experiments cannot occur where there is no advanced capitalism: that socialist industrialization must post-date capitalist industrialization. Marx was not certain about this. In correspondence with Vera Zasulich, the Populist activist, in the 1870s, Marx conceded that Russia might be able to proceed to socialism, bypassing capitalism, since Russia possessed institutions which lacked capitalist orientation and which were deeply influential. They were discussing the prevalence in Russian agriculture of the repartitional commune, which prevented accumulation of land in peasant land tenure. Other questions can also be raised. What is adequate capitalism? Lenin wrote in 1891 that Russian agriculture was capitalist, and that the commune was in retreat. Did not this provide some ground for socialist construction, even it was not the foundation that Lenin wanted? Again, in countries which are backward even when capitalism has developed elsewhere, is full-blown capitalist development always possible? Or will socialism have to finish off the job that capitalism was meant to achieve? Leon Trotsky suggested that this might be necessary. In the Soviet Union and later in Eastern Europe, were we dealing with such situations? These remain important questions in economic history, and debates on 'development'.

iii) Was Soviet socialism an instrument of a new ruling class in Russia and a Russian instrument to rule non-Russian territories of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe?

This perspective has been raised by Leon Trotsky (*The Revolution Betrayed*), and the historian who has followed his ideas most closely, Isaac Deutscher (in his biographies of Trotsky and Stalin). Since it is somewhat a social question, it will be dealt with in the unit on social development under socialism. Certainly, as 10.3.8 and 10.3.9 of the next sub-section indicate, Soviet economic development registered a good deal of inequality. Also, in Eastern Europe, in the early phase and in the late 1970s, the Soviet Union was harsh in his treatment of 'fraternal' socialist countries. It remains a moot point though whether these 'inequalities' were substantial. Surely they came to be considered substantial when growth itself was in a poor state (in the 1980s)?

iv) The Anders Aslund perspective

The anti-Soviet economist has recently advanced the notion that Soviet production was so incompetent that it does not deserve serious attention as growth. This has been his answer to contemporary criticism of the post Soviet economy of the Russian Federation, where growth rates have been negative (i.e. the economy has contracted). The argument runs that so much worthless production took place in the Soviet economy and that shortages were so great that we cannot seriously talk of growth.

Aslund's perspective *may* hold good for a limited period (the 1970s and 80s) — although only with heavy qualifications. More significant, though, is an underlying assumption of most of his work i.e. that the Soviet economic system was, in the long term, incapable of wealth-generation.

10.3 THE SOVIET EXPERIENCE

The focus of these debates, that is the construction of a socialist economy in Soviet Russia (the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic until 1924, the USSR thereafter), occurred in five major stages: the period of workers' control (1917-June 1918), War Communism (June 1918-March 1921), the New Economic Policy (1921-1927); the Planned Economy in its early phase (1929-1939); the reconstruction of the Soviet economy (1945-56); the development and crisis of a globally oriented socialist economy (1956-1989). The existence of stages of development indicates that there was no one sense of what a socialist economy should be. Ideas changed, as the USSR moved to the state-controlled economy that was the mark of socialism from 1939 to 1989.

10.3.1 Background and the Period of Workers' Control

The period before the construction of socialism in Russia after the 1917 October Revolution was marked by the following features: small-scale cultivation in agriculture, an artisanal sector weakened by wartime inflation and military conscription, large concentrations of commercial agriculture in the Ukraine and South Russia, and large, heavily cartellized privately-owned industrial complexes in the Donbass (Ukraine), the Urals and the Central Industrial Region (the belt from Moscow to Petrograd). Inflation was ubiquitous. Deterioration of infrastructure (railways, roads and canals) was clear. Government controls over pricing and production were constituted under the Tsarist war effort (before the 1917 February Revolution), operating through a series of committees made up of management and officials. In the metals industry, for instance, a committee set down production quotas and pricing restrictions. Such committees continued to exist at the time of the October Revolution. The Provisional Government (February 1917 – October 1917) instituted severe restrictions on grain pricing and distribution. The Government also set up land committees to look into the possibilities of redistribution of land in the localities. A lack of care over strict budgeting led to spiralling inflation. Currency was printed with little respect to how much specie or other securities the government possessed. The rouble depreciated rapidly, resulting in a deterioration of the market. The latter was already in a sad state since diversion of industry for manufacture for the war economy had led to a decrease of goods available to everyday consumers. This in turn had discouraged production for the market in the Russian countryside.

The Bolsheviks shaped policy to deal with all this in a territory which varied in size during 1918-21. After the October coup, and limited violence, the Bolshevik government (an alliance of Left Socialist Revolutionaries and Bolsheviks, legitimized by sanction from the All-Russian Congress of Soviets), had reasonable control over the territories of the Tsarist Empire that were free from German occupation. Following the elections to the Constituent Assembly in December 1917 and the dismissal of the Constituent Assembly in the following month, the situation changed. 'White' (pro-Tsarist) forces gathered in the area north of the Black Sea, to oppose Bolshevik authority. After the Treaty of Brest Litovsk (March 1918), Bolshevik Russia lost large territories to Germany in the east, and also lost the Ukraine (which became a German puppet state). The break with the Left Socialist Revolutionaries (March 1918) led to an enlargement of the opposition network in South Russia, where a Committee of the Constituent Assembly was formed to represent the parliament that had been disbanded. Thereafter a Civil War broke out which was supported by Western interventionist forces: a war which continued until early 1920. During the period, Russia west of the Urals passed out of the hands of the Bolsheviks, as did almost all of the land of the Lower Volga and CentralAsia. From 1920, the Bolsheviks established control in Siberia and Central Asia.

10.3.2 The Revolution, State Capitalism and Workers' Control

The main watchwords initially followed by Bolshevik policy makers to deal with the economy were 'state capitalism' and 'workers' control'. Here, state capitalism meant the operation of industry, trade and finance with the collaboration of the old entrepreneurial class, but with rigorous supervision by and participation from the state. This participation Lenin justified in his arguments in *State and Revolution* (discussed above). Workers control was an unspecific term: it did not indicate whether this meant the control of a factory by the factory workforce, or the control of a factory by a broader workforce which spanned an industry/many industries. The term did, however, clearly indicate some form of workers' control over management.

Following such watchwords, and wary of nationalization (which Bolsheviks did not think was necessarily socialist since it could be used as much by 'imperialists' as by socialists), the Bolsheviks first followed a policy of state take-over only in limited areas. Where nationalization took place, it was mainly the consequence of initiatives by factories or the soviets. The soviets which mattered in this case were the urban soviets, composed of 'workers' and 'soldiers': bodies constituted with little reference to electoral lists or proper procedure, but acknowledged to have greater popular authority than any other forms of local government. Nationalization and sequestration also took place in the countryside: but the scale was smaller, and restricted to handling large estates which had escaped redistribution.

The only case of outright state take-over was the banks. Following refusal to cooperate with the Bolshevik government by the banking establishment (the State Bank and 50 or so other major private and joint stock concerns), troops took over the State Bank premises (20th November 1917), and the main banks in Petrograd and Moscow (November 27th and 28th). This followed the declaration of the Central Executive Committee of the (VtsIK) of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets that banking was a state monopoly (27th November). Nationalized banks were merged into a National Bank later in 1918.

Elsewhere, in agriculture, land was redistributed according to principles of equality and labour (8th November 1917), except in the case of large estates which were devoted to 'industrial' crops, which would pass to state control under the Government's Land Committees. In industry, by a VTsIK decree of 27th November, manufacturing units were placed under workers' control, where workers' factory committees were to be responsible to an All Russian Council of Workers' Control and the local bodies on control that constituted it. Regulation of pricing of grain and other goods, however, was firmly continued through the Committees set up earlier.

Spontaneous nationalization of industry by workers, mismanagement under worker's control and the emigration of employers and management quickly took this situation to a new stage. Beyond the standard systems of control by special committees and the Komissariats (Narkomprod for supplies, Narkomfin for finance), a new regulating and supervisory agency was created on 18th December 1917 – the All Russian Council for the National Economy (Vesenka or VSNKh). Together with its local agents (the Sovnarkhozy) in law it assumed authority over manufacturing. Vesenka took over committees which co-ordinated prices and industrial quotas, renaming them *glavki* (centres), which had greater administrative authority than their predecessors. Following the Treaty of Brest Litovsk (March 1918) and the onset of the Civil War, Vesenka ruled that the glavki control of individual enterprises be increased (3rd March), and each 'centre' was required to appoint a commissioner and two directors to firms under its control. From March, Larin, the leading light of Vesenka, called for 'planned nationalization'and suggested major public economic projects. The drift was reinforced by the essential rejection by senior Bolsheviks of Lenin's ideas of 'state capitalism' moreover – a rejection represented in the failure of negotiations with the steel magnate Meshcherskii and the entrepreneurs Stakheev and Gukovskii to set up powerful trusts which included capitalists and an official interest. The trend attained its fulfilment in the decree of 28th June 1918 (by VTsIK) where every branch of industry was nationalized. The overall running of industry was entrusted to Vesenka.

Throughout this workers' welfare was a major concern. After the October Revolution the VtsIK was quick to pass decrees on 11th November to establish the 8-hour day and the 48-hour week in industry, to specify limitations on the work of women and juveniles and forbid the employment of children under 14. Measures of unemployment and sickness insurance were anticipated in decrees of 24th December and 22nd December 1917. The All-Russian Congress of Trades Unions supported the measures and the Trades Unions (which embraced entire branches of industry rather than, as in Western and Central Europe, a particular trade), became agents for the enforcement of the measures. The conditions of war made it difficult to enforce the regulations, but they became a hallmark of the new order.

10.3.3 War Communism

The nationalization of industry (June 1918) marked the beginning of a regime of rigorous state control, which followed the period of 'workers' control'. The regime was termed 'War Communism' and developed as follows, covering industry in the core provinces of European Russia primarily, since other areas were in the hands of 'Whites' or 'Greens' until early 1920.

In agriculture, the period was characterized by attempts to encourage community cultivation over private cultivation. The Bolsheviks had broken with the Socialist Revolutionaries after the treaty of Brest Litovsk and the assassination of Mirbach (March 1918). The latter were the main supporters of private peasant cultivation in the government after October. After the break, the Bolsheviks tried to reshape agriculture by the formation of committees of poor peasants (kombedy) by a decree of June 1918. These committees were to assist the gathering of cereals by labour detachments from the towns: a crucial function since peasant grain marketing had plummeted following currency depreciation and decline in industrial production. The kombedy were also to spread propaganda in the countryside. The Bolsheviks also encouraged community cultivation through grants for agricultural associations, Soviet collective farms (sovkhozy), agricultural communes and other forms. By the end of 1918, when the poor response to the policy was evident, Party conferences ceased to talk about it.

Other aspects of economic policy were disastrous for agriculture. To provide food to the urban areas, brigades were sent to requisition grain at the prices established by the state. This took place often with no regard for the stock the peasant required during the subsequent season, and led to a steady worsening of the infrastructure for cultivation during 1919-20.

In industry, controls by Vesenka and Komissariats over enterprises increased during 1919-20. This was the result of attempts to remedy major problems of the Civil War and catastrophic inflation. Such problems were: the out-migration of population from urban areas owing to poor food supplies; the collapse of any system of credit and investment due to over issue of paper money; poor supplies of essential raw material to industry. Here, where the supplies crisis was met by forced requisitions, Narkomfin and Vesenka handled other problems by use of the glavki's powers to concentrate use of labour and ending payments between nationalized industries. By 1920 (when Soviet Russia's remaining bank, the National Bank, was abolished), Vesenka had all industrial payments referred to it or its agents. Where possible, such payments would be adjusted against each other; and the outstanding referred to the Komissariat of Finance which would note it for future adjustments. Rationing of food, clothes and fuel was standard.

Within such a system, trade was declared a state monopoly, except when it occurred through cooperatives or licensed traders operating a special area.

10.3.4 Variations in the Historian's Perspective on the Revolution and War Communism

Most European and US historians are agreed that the development of socialist industrialization to this point followed a meandering course, in which willingness to work with capitalists was clear and evident. They have also stressed the survival of Tsarist practices and institutions through the period. Russian historians, however, have disputed this, arguing that the Bolsheviks always meant to establish rigid state control over the economy. The new Russian scholars point to the doctrinaire obsessions of the period. Certainly, much of policy was justified by Lenin in terms of the proletarian and socialist character of the new regime: so there is good cause for thinking that Lenin was not working from expediency. Bolsheviks like N. Bukharin also justified aspects of what happened, such as the demonetization of the economy, as 'socialist'. It is unlikely, though, that in conditions of war, that inflexible doctrine was the lodestone of the new order, even if it was its reference point. Continuous adaptation was the order of the day, and the idea that ideology guided everything comes from its recurrence in what was said: the fact that some principle had to be followed as adaptation took place.

10.3.5 The New Economic Policy

Whatever such preoccupations, from 1921, perturbed by the low agricultural output in South Russia and the Ukraine, and the display of disenchantment among strong Bolsheviks during the Kronstadt uprising (March 1921), Bolshevik policy makers, it is agreed, introduced measures to make the economy more flexible and performance-oriented. The changes gave 'socialism' a new image: less centralized and less hostile to the practices of the capitalist economies.

The urgency of reforms was demonstrated by the famine that swept south and south-east Russia during the summer of 1921. The New Economic Policy, which was set in motion in February 1921, sought to revitalize the market, which had come to be associated with rationing, cooperative trading or black market operations. Dependence on requisitions for food supplies was abandoned. A tax in kind was levied on cultivators, enabling peasants to gauge state requirements precisely, and establish an impression of what could be kept in reserve and how much could be sold on the market. Later, this tax was transformed into a proper tax in cash, while government purchased grain on the market at specified rates.

Encouragement to peasants to market grain was provided by currency reform — whereby gold roubles and later chervonets (gold and securities-backed currency) was put into circulation (1921-22). Inflationary pressure on the new currency was reduced through a return to budgetary orientation (rather than an orientation to the needs of industry) and a proper system of revenue collection, based on customs dues, excise on a number of goods and taxation on certain professions. The creation of a new banking system (based on a State Bank which was established in October 1921) was intended to strengthen the new dispensation. Private trade was legalized to improve the distribution of agricultural produce and other goods.

A strong orientation towards everyday consumer demand was required of nationalized industry. Enterprises were to proceed to a system of khozrachet, i.e. to relate expenditure to income, rather than to rely on state subsidies. The authority of the glavkis was weakened, and enterprises were required to form trusts which would function independently. Measures were taken to encourage private enterprise, to make up for the weaknesses of state-run industry. A decree of 17th May 1921 revoked the decree nationalizing all small-scale industry; by a law of 7th July 1921, permission was given for the organization of enterprises provided he employed less than 20 workers; and by a decree of 5th July 1921, arrangements were made for the leasing of state enterprises.

The upshot of the new measures was initial uncertainty and long-term recovery. Socialism was given a new image: of a mixed economy, with limits on capitalism, and run by autonomous state corporations (trusts), under the supervision of the Vesenka. Teething trouble was evident and suggested greater problems. With the demand for industrial goods in 1922, a great increase in industrial prices took place, together with a fall in prices for agricultural goods. This threatened the precarious interest shown by peasants in the market and was known as 'the scissors crisis'. Official intervention dealt with the problem on this occasion, but the very existence of the crisis indicated the poor level of consumer goods production at this time, as well as the dangerous consequences for relations between industry and agriculture should such poor production persist. Again, in 1921-23, many industries were unable to adjust to khozrachet and had to curtail activities drastically. In the case of some crucial sectors, the government intervened, but by and large trusts had to stand on their own feet, even though their access to the network of private trade was weak in the first years after the legalization of private trade.

10.3.6 Move towards Collectivization and the Planned Economy

A number of Bolsheviks were dissatisfied with the 'retreat'of the NEP. An exception was the economist Nikolai Bukharin (initially a great supporter of War Communism!). He argued for dependence on peasant consumption, imports where necessary and slow industrial growth based on it. Again, A. Chayanov was uncertain that bourgeois forces were taking over in the countryside, and pointed out that such impressions came from poor understanding of the 'peasant economy', where united family activity gave an impression of great prosperity, although the property that was accumulated around it was quickly divided in the long term, as the family itself divided. L.N. Trotsky and E.I. Preobrazhenskii warned that the new dispensation would derail socialism, leading to dependence on rich peasants and the 'NEP bourgeoisie', i.e. the main traders and entrepreneurs of the time. Their 'left opposition' persistently argued this position (and demanded the encouragement of revolution elsewhere as a solution to Soviet Russia's problems). They were ignored by Bolsheviks who were satisfied with the terms of the NEP, and the industrial recovery it achieved. The 'left', hence, collapsed as a political force by 1927.

The sharp decline of grain supplies in 1928-29, at prices set by the state, however, changed the opinions of many Bolshevik leaders (except Bukharin and his supporters). The phenomenon disturbed them as, from 1927, they focused on the First Five Year Plan for economic growth, to go beyond industrial 'recovery'. This 'Plan', which later became an essential connotation of a socialist economy, was a general assessment of the economy, indicating potentials, and isolating possible targets for different sectors. How hard and fast the targets were depended on who handled the plan — with politicians regarding them as necessary and possible, while economists considered them as possible, desirable but adjustable.

The poor availability of food at government rates boded an ominous future for the growth of the industrial economy on the scale Soviet politicians wanted. In certain areas of the Urals and Siberia, the shortfall in grain procurements by the government led to requisitions on the War Communism model. But a more severe alternative was pursued in the following year. Faced with a repetition of the 1928 situation, if not worse, as grain prices soared on the private market, the CPSU Politburo decided to embark on strict regulation of agriculture through the Collectivization of agriculture. Here, peasant farmers were grouped into collective farms (kolkhozy), which covered the territory of several peasant settlements. The kolkhoz administration took over the land cultivated, as well as the inventory (machines, livestock, ploughs etc.), leaving the peasant a small plot, adjacent to his house, which he was permitted to cultivate for his own personal use. The cultivator was required to continue with his work, the difference being that his produce would be marketed by the kolkhoz administration and he/she would receive a remuneration linked to the work put in. In most cases, the head of the kolkhoz administration was a Bolshevik loyalist – frequently a 'worker' from the urban areas.

Collectivization was resisted with force in the Ukraine and Kazakhstan (where independent peasant farming was strong, and where community farming was weak). By 1932, however, the kolkhoz was the standard institution of peasant land organization and cultivation. Using the collective farm, the government increased grain procurements. It was also able to set rock-bottom prices for agriculture, charge 'turnover'taxes when grain left the kolkhoz, and charge high taxes elsewhere, when agricultural products were sold. Thereby it provided reasonably priced food for workers in the factories set up under the First Five Year Plan, and ensured adequate revenue for itself, which could be invested in industrial construction. The peasant was thus forced to invest in capital industry – a process which socialist theoreticians equated to the process of industrial capital accumulation that had taken place during the Industrial Revolution in the West, albeit through the means of the market. Sales of grain abroad also gave the government funds to buy machinery for industrialization under the First Plan, while the only gain to agriculture was the slow establishment of Machine Tractor Stations (MTS) which were designed to improve agricultural productivity. Inevitably, figures for industrial output for the First Plan were impressive (even if they fell short of Plan targets).

	1927-28	1932 (plan)	1932 (actual)
Coal (million tonnes)	35.0	75.0	64.0
Oil (million tonnes)	11.7	21.7	21.4
Iron ore (million tonnes)	6.7	20.2	12.1
Pig iron (million tonnes)	3.2	10.0	6.2

Source: A. Nove, *An Economic History of the USSR*

10.3.7 Further Developments during the Period of Recovery (1945-64)

Collectivization, the Planned Economy, nationalized banking and the prevalence of large trusts in industry and trade (often called 'kombinaty') were to be the hallmarks of Soviet socialism for the next fifty years. The institutions came to represent economic socialism. The Soviet government undertook large projects within the framework of the system (such as General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev's 'Virgin Lands'scheme to increase land under cultivation). A major feature of the economy for the whole period was the use of revenue for arms industries and expansion of the armed forces with only a marginal eye to improvement of consumer goods. The mechanism of the Planned Economy made this possible.

Innovations did take place. Some were undertaken with a fixed eye to collective enterprise; some were undertaken with an eye to a decrease of the burden on agriculture, and some bearing in mind the private sector that survived in agriculture. In the case of the burden on agriculture, for instance, procurement prices were increased after 1952 to set right the anomalous nature of prices paid to the kolkhoz - which were often insufficient to meet the cost of delivery of collective farm products. Taxes on private plots in agriculture were substantially reduced. Various experiments of the post 1952 period, however, with no attention to local circumstances, indicated often how the Planning system could be misused. After 1956, for instance, Nikita Khruschev, the Party General Secretary, disapproved of the cultivation of grasses (for fodder): and many fields were dug up just because of this disapproval. Attempts at decentralizing the Planning process through the creation of 'sovnarkhozy' - in principle admirable for the increase of popular involvement - merely led to 'localism' in industrial policy. This meant that the broad sense that planners had, as well as their knowledge, was wholly downplayed, and ridiculous instances of local favouritism crept into economic development.

10.3.8 On the 'Heroic' Phase of Socialist Industrialization

This last phase of socialist industrialization has attracted imaginative comment recently. Stephen Kotkin, for instance, in his *Magnetic Mountain*, (University of California Press, 1995), proceeds far beyond the position of Alec Nove and his sympathizers. Nove stresses the inefficiencies and bottlenecks of the planned economy, as well as the imaginative ideas that went into it, while Kotkin regards such unintegrated treatment, or a fixation with Bolshevik ideology, to be a limited perspective. Providing a picture which goes beyond these perspectives, Kotkin's focus is Magnitogorsk i.e. the steel production centre created during the First Five Year Plan in the high flatlands of the Urals, on the Ural River, by Magnetic Mountain. Kotkin treats the city as a microcosm of Soviet life. He shows how this putative showcase for Soviet socialist living came to be conceived; how the plans for its construction were pell mell executed and how 'the idiocy of urban life' was the consequence.

The 'heroic', 'breakneck' construction of the factory complex at Magnetic Mountain is reduced to a farce in Kotkin's history. He points out that the location itself was deemed questionable and, despite later legend, the complex got off the ground slowly. The reality was a shoddy plant where there were 550 stoppages of work in the first year alone and ultimate closure for complete reconstruction in November 1933.

Expansion at Magnitogorsk, in the years to come, followed a pattern common to the Planned Economy. Over invoicing, cooked books, exaggerated statistics of production and mismanagement for the sake of record and rhetoric: this litany, meticulously documented by Kotkin, lay behind the further construction of blast furnaces, coke batteries, open-hearth ovens and blooming mills. Much of this held good for industrial expansion in established sites in the Ukraine and St. Petersburg. It also held good for new sites such as Kuznetsk.

There was often little choice of whether to go or not, and mobilization went along the lines described by one labourer: 'Comrades, you're going to Magnitka. Do you know what Magnitka is?'/'No, we haven't a clue'/'Unfortunately neither do we, but you're going to Magnitka all the same'.

Social and family life in the city's cold and isolation degenerated into cards, drinking, abuse and delinquency, despite the efforts of the Komsomol and Party stalwarts. The various 'clubs' for locals were characterized by lack of heating and other elementary facilities; poor urban communications, appalling distribution arrangements for essentials (all planned with a lack of appreciation for local requirements) left little time for recreation and culture. The only hot spots in this mess were the Magnit cinema hall, the circus and a small local theatre. Little wonder that many who came initially arrived on short contracts, and fled at the earliest. When passports were introduced to restrict movements, a trade in false documents quickly ensued.

In such conditions, the lexicon of Soviet achievement was spread; the bruiting of socialist attainments and the 'heroic' depiction of every venture compelled public wonder for what was often little better than a cloaca. Equally, the labour achievement awards for Stakhanovites, the 'proper' classification and description of workers, and the 'proper' recording of worker biographies, providing the necessary terms, gave the inhabitants of the socialist urban complex their social identity. As Kotkin points out, however, many failed to play their allotted role, just as solid proletariat refused to lay off rearing goats and cows, despite the exhortations of Party faithful.

10.3.9 The Private Sector

Imaginative though Kotkin's perspective is, it fails to detail the strength of private enterprise in the midst of this 'planned system' or 'command economy'. In agriculture, this was crucial, as indicated in the following statistics of kolkhoz market sales (i.e. returns from the sale of produce from private plots in the collective farm). At a time when kolkhoz incomes in total came to about 12.5 billion roubles, such sales provided (in billions of roubles):

1940	29.1
1950	49.2
1951	50.8
1952	53.7

Source: Alec Nove, *An Economic History of the USSR*

In industry also, however, there was a tendency for various deals to be made within the framework of the plan as many memoirs have recently pointed out. The dynamic role of management in the Soviet space is rarely discussed as yet, the assumption being that blind following of the plan was the order of the day. Soviet sources, who always congratulated themselves, give the impression that whatever the Party said was good enough. They rarely show (except in stray incidents) how planned production worked, despite many obstacles, and how it also created a space for aggrandizement which gave the enterprise under socialist industrialization a dynamic of its own.

10.4 SPREAD OF THE SOVIET MODEL IN EASTERN EUROPE

After the Second World War, Eastern European countries and the Baltic states adopted many aspects of the Soviet model, although they initially favoured very moderate versions of it since, unlike the case of Russia in 1917, the state had hitherto played a moderate role in the economy. In the Baltic states, the assimilation into Soviet practice was quick, since Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia became members of the USSR. Elsewhere in Eastern Europe, the move came after the statement of the Truman Doctrine, the initiation of the Marshall Plan and the formation of the Cominform (1947). After this the USSR encouraged countries under its political control to adopt its own perspectives on economic development. The Soviet model's crucial role in the region's economic development was the result of the USSR's post-war military presence in the region and its position as the main recipient of reparations from Hungary and Rumania, who had supported the Axis powers. In a departure from what occurred in the Soviet Union, though, almost in all cases, in the form of socialist industrialization that took place, small-scale cultivation played an important part in agriculture, although collectivization was encouraged in the years after 1949 for a brief period, and various measures were taken to hold such cultivation together in collective or cooperative enterprise. Hungary, (and to some extent Rumania) were slightly exceptional. Here large state farms also had a major role in agriculture. This was an outcome of the organization of agriculture in Hungary and Rumania before 1945, when large latifundia played a considerable part in agriculture. The share of such latifundia substantially passed on to the state.

A decade-long experience of extreme varieties of Soviet-style planning and state control in these countries came under the aegis of the Cominform and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, acting in tandem as sources of pressure, in the period after 1949. A good deal of industrial output was sold to the USSR at reduced rates (sometimes linked to reparations, as in the case of Hungary and East Germany, but sometimes not, as in the case of Poland). The 'Stalinist' experiment was subject to major attacks during the mid 1950s (during the disturbances in Hungary and Poland in 1956), but it was only modified in any meaningful manner after the approval to economic reform by the Soviet economist Liberman in the Soviet newspaper *Pravda* in September 1962. Here, the reform focused on: a reduction in planned targets; a greater stress on profitability; economic rewards for efficiency; greater variety in pricing; greater industrial concentration, accompanied by decentralization. Stiffer controls were reintroduced rapidly, though, after 1968 (and the move against economic reform in Czechoslovakia). The only country which was able to maintain its reforms was Hungary, where, despite the ups and downs of the reform system, imports of Western technology, relative freedom of movement abroad and encouragement of small-scale private industry became a permanent feature of the country by the late 1970s. In all countries, increase of Soviet oil prices in 1975 seriously destabilized the economies.

10.4.1 Hungary

With Soviet occupation, a Hungarian National Independence Front, comprising a number of radical and socialist parties formed a Provisional Government (December 1944) which quickly moved towards economic reform. At the time, large-scale private wealth dominated the economy. In agriculture, there existed a number of latifundia or great estates that were commercially oriented and that were owned by aristocratic families (Esterhazys, Szechenyis, Karolyis and others). Smallholdings which belonged to peasant proprietors were divided: some were very small, others substantial and geared to the market. Industry was concentrated, with the Credit Bank and the Commercial Bank having major shares in over 60% of what there was, and a number of important players running the important manufactures (the Vida, Kornfeld, Weiss and Dreher-Haggenmacher families primarily).

The reforms came in the following stages:

i) In January 1945, workers control was introduced in almost all industry through a decree which gave major powers to factory committees.

ii) By a decree of 17th March, the great estates were taken over by the state, as were the holdings of the Catholic Church. Almost all peasant farms were exempt from the decree. About 60% of the land was distributed — a large portion going to agricultural labourers and small-scale proprietors.

iii) Despite the success of the non-socialist parties in the elections of November 1945, pressures from Soviet forces, the Communist and Socialist parties and a section of the Smallholders' Party forced through the nationalization of four of the country's largest industrial enterprises.

iv) A Three Year Plan was adopted in July 1947. In the wake of the political crisis of 1947 (after the elections of August) in November 1947, nationalization of the major banks followed, as did the adoption of a Three Year Plan. On 25th March 1948, the nationalization of factories employing more than 100 workers took place.

The implementation of the reforms fell to the Hungarian Working People's Party, which was created from a fusion of the Social Democrat and Communist Parties in June 1948. This party was reconstituted in 1956 as the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, following the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. Both before and after 1956, the party dominated the government and followed the model of the Soviet economy. In the period up to 1956, intensive industrialization was the order of the day, with a stress on capital goods industries. Hence, under the first Five Year Plan (1950-54), industrial production increased by 130%, and machine industry production by 350%. There was little development of consumer industry, and collectivization of agriculture was encouraged. After 1956, cooperativization among small-holders, rather than collectivization, became the goal of the socialist economy, and a greater diversification into consumer industry was noticeable.

Under the New Economic Mechanism (launched on 1st January 1968), steps to develop a programme of 'liberalization' were undertaken. These involved greater imports of Western technology and freer travel abroad and independence to major enterprises: measures devised by Rezso Nyers, the country's best known 'reformist'. Increases of oil prices by the USSR led to a restoration of controls on enterprises, and heavy subsidies to maintain low domestic prices (and Nyers' removal from the Politburo). A return to a reform programme began in 1977, with restrictions on private farmers relaxed in 1980 (they were permitted to acquire machinery), gradual division of large enterprises and license to small foreign firms to work in the country. Prices were permitted to rise in 1979 (to allow them to come to world levels) and in 1982, the country joined the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Attempts to return to a system of controls and subsidies in 1985 led to the consolidation of a dissident radical group in the country under Imre Pozsgay. The group's influence was felt when long-serving President Janos Kadar was forced to step down (22 May 1988), Pozsgay was admitted to the Politburo of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party in a prelude to Hungary's quiet revolution of 1989.

10.4.2 Rumania

Soviet troops were in occupation of Rumania from August 1945, although the Communists (the Rumanian Workers' Party) only formally established control over the government of the country after the abdication in 1947 of King Michael. Under occupation a number of steps were taken to adapt the economy to the Soviet model.

The main stages of the adaptation of the Rumanian economy to the Soviet model were:

i) The dissolution of the main Rumanian banks in August 1948 and concentration of financial activities in the National Bank of Rumania (later the Bank of the Rumanian People's Republic).

ii) The formation of a number of joint stock companies (Sovroms) based on Soviet and Rumanian government investments in various industries — iron and steel, where (the Resita organization was transformed into a Sovrom), petroleum, where the Sovrompetrol was formed, insurance and mining. Here the USSR took over the German and Hungarian shares in the industries concerned by a law of April 1946. During 1954-56, Soviet shares in industry were systematically transferred to the Rumanian state.

iii) The creation of centres of control for the mining industry in 1948 at Bai Mare (northern Transylvania) and Brad (Bihor mountains, central Transylvania).

iv) The promulgation of Land Reform Acts on March 22 1945 (mainly involving the expropriation of properties over 50 hectares) and March 2nd 1949 (which involved the confiscation of the land of property owners of more than 15,000 hectares). This intensified inter-war expropriation of large estates and redistribution of property. The main beneficiaries were peasants (who dominated the wool and subsistence agriculture oriented economy of the Carpathian uplands and Transylvania; but, as in Hungary, larger holdings were directly controlled by the state also the commercial grain economy of the Banat and the cash crop belt of the Carpathian lowlands (Moldavia and Wallachia), where vineyards and market gardens are common.

The considerable influence in Rumania of the National Peasants' Party during 1944-45, and thereafter of peasant proprietors in general ensured that peasant ownership continued to be a decisive feature of the Rumanian economy until recent times. Industry was dominated by state ownership, though, a small private sector (especially in trade) persisted even after large scale nationalization of the trading apparatus. Investments under the Rumanian Five Year Plans were directed to oil-based industry, commercial agriculture and timber felling and export.

10.4.3 Poland

The Polish Committee of National Liberation undertook the application of the Soviet model of socialist economic development to Poland. Formed in 1944, this was the core of the post 1945 government. The main features of the socialist transition (eventually supervised by the Polish United Workers' Party) were:

i) The decree of 6 September 1944, which confiscated all landholdings above 50 hectares. This followed up legislation of the inter-war period which pushed through redistribution of great estates. Together with the confiscation of Church land ((1950), the 1944 measure increased the domination of agriculture by peasant holdings, albeit to the advantage of richer peasants. Hence, while 65% of the land was held in allotments of under 10 hectares, over 33% was still held in allotments of between 10 and 50 hectares. Polish governments did not focus on collectivization after redistribution, except for a brief period during 1947-53, when they encouraged collective farms, which only covered 10% of arable land by 1954, and maintained state farms. Collectives were allowed to dwindle after 1956 (in 1959 they only covered 1% of arable land). Since state farms came to 15% of the arable land at their peak, the bulk of agriculture was based on peasant smallholdings until the most recent times. The government tried various measures to induce collective activity (for instance the formation of Agricultural Circles in 1956, where members could rent machinery at reduced costs). These had hardly any effect.

ii) The formation of a Central Planning Office which organized a Three Year Plan (1947-49), and later a Six Year Plan for the economy. Most industrial production and mining were transferred to state hands after 1945. By 1949-50, 92% of industry was nationalized.

Call for reform by Polish economists such as Lange and Brus in 1956 included demands for flexibility in approach to economic policy, encouragement of foreign investment and decentralization of industrial organization. Demonstrations in favour of this intensification of the 'New Course' (initiated in 1953 by First Secretary Bierut after Stalin's death) merely led to a change in leadership in Poland (the selection of the 'moderate' Gomulka as head of the Party). Reforms after 1962 (concentrated around 1968-70), led to price increases and increased investment in 'modern industries' (machine building, electricals and chemicals). This in turn led to demonstrations against the effects of such measures (in December 1970) and to the ascendancy of Edward Gierek in the Polish Party.

10.4.4 Czechoslovakia

Soviet troops moved out of Czechoslovakia in November 1945. But a Works Council Movement began in 1945, which demanded nationalization of mines and industry, establishing workers' control. After initial reluctance by the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia to accept this nationalization plan, it gave way slowly, and measures in this vein were systematically undertaken, especially after 1947 and the statement of the Truman Doctrine and the formation of the Cominform.

The pattern of land redistribution and rapid state take over of industry was followed here as elsewhere:

i) In March 1948, all estates of over 50 hectares were confiscated, redistribution and cooperativization were initiated. Thereafter, all cooperatives were merged into collective farms by a law of 23rd February 1949, which was enforced with special severity after 1953.

ii) By 1949-50, 96% of industry was nationalized, after initial restraint in this area (in 1948, 20% of industry was still in private hands). Under planning, stress fell heavily on heavy industry and munitions production.

A programme of economic reform was attempted under the encouragement of Alexander Dubcek and the economists Sik and Selucky (all of the Slovak republic) in 1968. This would have involved a degree of freedom to workers to demand wage increases, a freeing of prices and due allowance for the formation of private enterprises. The invasion by the Warsaw Pact of Czechoslovakia, however, forestalled the implementation of the programme.

10.4.5 Bulgaria

Collectivization was more marked here in the earlier stages of economic reform, although peasant production never ceased to be important. Small plots occupied 13% of the arable land in 1975, and produced 25% of produce (dominating potato and fruit output). A commitment to large scale industrialization developed in the late 1960s, when there was a move away from traditional stress on food processing.

i) During 1945-48, landholdings were limited to 20 hectares, and holdings above this level were redistributed. Thereafter, smallholdings were merged into collective farms, and 50% of arable land was in these by 1953. All privately owned machinery and farm equipment was compulsorily acquired by the state, and a kulak defined as one owning over 5 hectares. Proprietors owning over 10 hectares had to sell 75% of their grain crop to the state (1950), while collectives had their delivery quotas reduced (1953).

ii) By 1949/50, 95% of the limited industry that existed in the country was nationalized.

10.4.6 East Germany (German Democratic Republic)

Adaptation to the Soviet model began late here, since a myth was maintained that East Germany would be united with West Germany in the long term, and radical alteration in the production system was not a good idea considering this. Nationalization of industry and trade, however, began long before the formal decision to embark on socialist construction by the Socialist Unity Party in 1952 under the direction of Walter Ulbricht. Industry and trade in private hands (19% and 37% respectively) was taken over by the state thereafter, and collectivization of agriculture begun and intensified (especially after 1958).

The Liberman-sanctioned reforms took shape in the GDR in the form of the New Economic System that lasted from 1963 to 1970 (when controls through Planning were intensified). Industrial production grew by 5.8% between 1960 and 1964, and 6.4% between 1964 and 1970. Per capita growth rate and increase in standard of living was of the order of 4.9% between 1970 and 1975. Abandonment of the New Economic System was marked by the dismissal of Gunter Mittag from the Council of State in 1971, and adaptation to increased Soviet oil prices (after 1975) by increases in state subsidies of domestic prices.

10.4.7 Yugoslavia

An alternative variety of socialist industrialization, the case of the Yugoslav Federation was marked by a ‘mixed economy’, where, like the other East European cases, emulation of the Soviet model was clear, but where a large non-state sector grew up over time. The following stages are noticeable in the Yugoslav model:

i) 1946 - a nationalization law which made permanent government takeover of most German and Italian property in the country.

ii) Redistribution of land in German hands and of holdings over 45 hectares to peasant proprietors. Peasant holdings were restricted to 20-25 hectares.

iii) Initiation of the First Five Year Plan. The USSR agreed to set up a number of joint ventures in shipping and air transport. But these were quickly closed down after the Yugoslavs considered these excessively favourable to the Soviet Union. Grants from UNRRA were very important in this early phase.

iv) Slow move away from the Soviet model, after the political break with the Soviet Union in 1948. This took time. Initially, the state favoured collectivization through concentration of peasant households in Peasant-Worker Cooperatives, in order to control grain marketing. But poor performance here and in nationalized industry under central direction led to the development of self- managed state enterprises (1950) and a decrease in interest in collective agriculture (although maximum holdings were reduced to a size of 10 hectares). The standard practice of using centralized investment was modified by the creation of communal banks that had their own sphere of investment. After the First Five Year Plan, the planning system was amended to involve less of the 'command style' and permit greater cooperation between state industry, independent of the central (and state) planning commissions. The trend was assisted by investment from the USA, although government stress on the development of heavy industry and armaments industry persisted.

v) Following Stalin's death, relations with the Soviet bloc varied. Initially, improvements led to a large increase in trade with the CMEA countries. But continuous inflow of soft loans from the United States and good relations with Western Europe led to the development of several ventures in close association with these countries: ventures which were not guided rigidly by the Planning system. The significance of the state remained significant. Despite the existence of self-management, communal banks etc., the Central Investment Fund controlled 70% of investment and industry bore marks of political control. Marks of central control included the focus of investment in heavy industry and the existence of 'political factories', i.e. factories which were set up with non-economic considerations in mind.

vi) Associate membership of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) in 1960 led to pressure on the 1961-65 Five Year Plan and intensification of the move away from central control in the Planned Economy. Investment came increasingly from communal banks, and devaluation took place to encourage foreign trade. Initially, to curb inflation and maintain aspects of the old system, a wage freeze was initiated. But this situation proved unworkable, led to a debate on the future of the economy, and intensification of the development of private enterprise and decentralization after 1965 (in the so-called 'market-oriented reforms').

vii) The new course (which involved the development of a commercial banking sector), received great impetus in the 1970s with the greater inflow of foreign loans, and, after 1979, the country moved into a debt crisis in which the political crisis of the late 1980s took shape, leading to the disintegration of the Federation.

10.5 THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF SOCIALIST INDUSTRIALIZATION IN EASTERN EUROPE

The main achievement of the investments in agriculture and industry that occurred under socialist industrialization is indicated by the following statistics:

	Index of industrial production	Index of agricultural production
	1938=100	1938=100
	1964	1960-63 average
Bulgaria	625	111
Rumania	498	129
Poland	370	132
Hungary	314	98
Czechoslovakia	242	92
East Germany	208	80

Source: Walter Laquer, *Europe since Hitler*

As much of this system initially took shape, it was moulded by bilateral agreements with the USSR (for imports of primary products from the Soviet Union at exaggerated costs initially, and exports of primary and finished goods to the USSR at excessively reduced prices). Bilateral trade between the countries was worked out within the framework of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. But such trade was notoriously lacking in a real bilateral quality: i.e. little trade developed according to the initiative of any two CMEA states independent of the rest. Common investments in Soviet oil and natural gas industries paid trumps for most CMEA countries in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when all of them received output at rates below the world price at a time of increases in oil prices in the West. All the countries benefited from the USSR's special relations with Angola, Mozambique, Syria, Iraq, Vietnam and India. Moreover, from June 1971, under the terms of the 'Complex Programme for the Further Extension and Improvement of Cooperation and Development of Socialist Economic Integration' of the CMEA, coordination was given more importance, and its status raised in CMEA affairs. A number of international economic organizations were begun: the Interstate Commissions for the implementation of specific tasks; the International Bank for Economic Cooperation; the International Investment Bank; research and development coordinating centres and international laboratories. At various sessions of the Council during 1973-81, integration measures were introduced into the member countries' plans and harmonized into a coherent plan by the Committee for Cooperation and Planning.

Such measures did not come to much where it really mattered: in the development of technology which could compete with global standards after the information revolution. US blockade of sales of such technology to the 'east' was substantially responsible for this. Equally responsible, though, was inertia within state-run industry, which was willing to work with minor innovations, but unwilling to fundamentally change what existed. The resulting poor performance in trade relations with the West coincided with a major problem in the 1980s. The CMEA did not prevent member countries interacting with the West — either through trade or through application for loans. The decrease in oil prices globally in the 1980s, the refusal of the USSR to reduce its prices, and the high level of indebtedness of many CMEA countries (Poland and Yugoslavia especially) to the West led to a troubled situation. By 1989, the CMEA had ceased to be useful in almost any sense and had ceased to represent a common interest. Not only were some countries initiating experiments with 'market reforms', but the common cause that had marked the bloc in the 1950s, 60s and 70s was gone.

10.6 SOCIALIST INITIATIVES OUTSIDE THE SOVIET BLOC

Attempts to rein in capitalism were common in a number of countries where socialists were powerful during the inter-war and post-Second World War period. In France, for instance, under Leon Blum and the Popular Front (1936-38), attempts were made to control capital transfers out of the country, and important steps were taken to establish state control over the munitions' industry. Major reforms were introduced in the factories — where employers were compelled to give workers a minimum paid holiday each year, and where working hours were strictly limited. In Britain, after the Second World War, the Labour government nationalized the coal and steel industries and introduced the 'welfare state' (i.e. the National Health Scheme, which reduced health costs dramatically, as well as the introduction of unemployment benefit to the out-of-work). The Labour governments of Harold Wilson (1964-70), extended cheap housing for the population through the agency of local government, while socialist governments on the Continent introduced their own version of the 'welfare state' through systems of insurance.

Much of this initiative was in imitation of the state-led model prevalent in the USSR (and Eastern Europe). But in developing their own focus on 'insurance' (where the state, the employer and the employee contributed to a common fund), countries such as France, Germany and Italy developed their own variety of 'welfare' which involved a smaller role for the state. This dimension to socialism outside the Soviet bloc is what made it unique. Accepting capitalist enterprise and a limited place for state initiative, it was strictly non-Leninist.

10.7 SUMMARY

In this Unit, you have read about the way Soviet experiment in application of the socialist model underwent various phases in accordance with the demands of the time. You have also read how it was not a model which could completely shun the principles of market economy, but tried very often to overcome the restrictions put in its way. There were contradictions from within and outside which eventually led to its disintegration. At the same time, the same model was applied differently even in the countries under the Soviet influence, which gradually gave way to the dominant capitalist system. Yet, it would be immature to argue that this model was a complete failure as it was this model which forced the so called capitalist economies of the western Europe to integrate welfare economic principles and strengthen social distribution networks albeit with a limited role for the state. On the other hand, the criticisms of the capitalist economic system and visions of alternative models have continued to drive the thinkers and activists alike.

10.8 EXERCISES

1) Write a note on debates about Soviet industrialization.
2) Differentiate between capitalist industrialization and socialist industrialization.
3) Briefly discuss the pattern of the spread of the Soviet industrialization model in Eastern Europe.

UNIT 11 IMPERIALISM

Structure

11.1 Introduction

11.2 Definitions of Imperialism

- 11.2.1 Empire Versus Imperialism
- 11.2.2 Imperialism Versus Colonialism

11.3 Modes of Imperialism

11.4 Theories of Imperialism

- 11.4.1 The Economic Explanations
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- 11.5.1 Mercantilism and Early Trading Empires
- 11.5.2 Industrial Capitalism — Imperialism of Free Trade
- 11.5.3 Finance Capitalism

11.6 The Empire on Which the Sun Never Set

11.7 Summary

11.8 Exercises

ignou THE PEOPLE'S UNIVERSITY

11.1 INTRODUCTION

This Unit attempts to explain imperialism both as a concept and historical phenomenon. Various scholars have attempted to explain imperialism from various perspectives but also differentiate it from terms like colonialism. The stress is also on the ways in which imperialism adopted different forms at different historical junctures. The Unit begins by looking at some of the definitions of imperialism. It will then go into the theories of imperialism and examine different explanations of imperialism that have been offered by scholars over the last century. The Unit will also focus on the stages of imperialism and see how these stages correspond with the rise and expansion of capitalism. It will finally take up Great Britain as a case study of the largest imperial power of the 19th and the 20th centuries.

11.2 DEFINITIONS OF IMPERIALISM

There is no one standard definition of imperialism. Let us look at some often used ones. Imperialism refers to the process of capitalist development which leads the capitalist countries to conquer and dominate pre-capitalist countries of the world.

OR

Imperialism is the system of political control exercised by the metropolis over the domestic and foreign policy and over the domestic politics of another polity, which we shall call the periphery (countries at the margins of the economic hierarchy).

OR

The term **imperialism** is used to designate the international practices and relations of the capitalist world during the distinct stage of mature capitalism that begins in the last quarter of the 19th century.

All these definitions, their differences notwithstanding, firmly establish imperialism as a modern phenomenon and distinctly different from pre-modern forms of conquests and political domination. In this context four important characteristic features of imperialism are:

- sharp increase in international flow of commodities, men and capital,
- interdependent set of relations between countries at different levels of industrial development,
- advanced and superior technology in imperialist countries, and
- competition between advanced capitalist countries.

11.2.1 Empire versus Imperialism

It is important to distinguish between **empires** and **imperialism.** There were many empires in history but **empire in the era of capitalism is imperialism.**

What was new about imperialism in the modern era? What made it different from earlier expansions of empire? In earlier eras the motive was exaction of tribute. Under capitalism the economies and societies of the conquered or dominated areas were transformed, adapted and manipulated to serve the imperatives of capital accumulation in the imperialist countries placed at the centre of the economic hierarchy.

11.2.2 Imperialism versus Colonialism

The distinction between imperialism and colonialism is equally important. The history of imperialism is different from the history of particular colonies. **Imperialism is a specifically European phenomenon** whereas colonialism is the system prevalent in the colonies. It can also be argued that since European imperial history had a basic unity – therefore to study an empire in isolation would be pointless.

When we study imperialism we examine the **impact of empire on the metropolis,** whereas colonialism refers to the impact on the colony. The advantages of the empire to the mother country ranged from the colonial wealth which financed the industrial revolution to the evolution of superior military technology, mechanisms of control such as the army and bureaucracy and disciplines such as anthropology.

11.3 MODES OF IMPERIALISM

Imperialism can be both formal and informal. Formal imperialism involves annexation and direct rule while informal empire means indirect rule by local elites who are independent legally but politically dependent on the metropolis. Similarly, there are three broad types of empires which have either existed in a linear chronology, one succeeding the other, or also co-existed with each other at a particular historical juncture. These types are:

1) trading empires which took the initiative in early conquests but eventually lost out in the era of industrial capitalism, such as Portugal and Spain;
2) industrial empires with full-fledged colonies, such as Britain and France;
3) industrial empires without, or with few, formal colonies, such as Germany.

At the same time, it is important to remember different historical stages through which capitalist expansion took place leading to the formation of empires. The changing nature of imperialism was dependent upon the stages of capitalist development. Broadly speaking capitalism may be said to have gone through five stages, mentioned below:

1) end of 15th to mid 17th Century — rise of commercial capital and rapid growth of world commerce
2) mid 17th to latter 18th Century — commercial capital ripens into a dominant economic force
3) late 18th Century to 1870s — the era of industrial capital
4) 1880 to World War I — rise of monopoly capital, division of globe, etc.
5) Post World War I — socialism, decolonization, rise of multinational corporations

In this sense stages of imperialism coincide with stages of capitalism

	Stage of capitalism	**Imperial Powers**
1)	Merchant capitalism	Portugal and Spain
2)	Industrial capitalism	Britain, France and Netherlands
3)	Finance capitalism	Britain, USA and Germany

The history of the European colonial empires falls into two overlapping cycles. The first began in the 15th Century and ended soon after 1800, the second in the late 18th Century lasting into the twentieth. During the first cycle America was important as a colony — in the second Africa and Asia.

11.4 THEORIES OF IMPERIALISM

The theories of imperialism can be grouped into two broad types, **economic** (J.A. Hobson, Hilferding, Rosa Luxembourg and Lenin) and **political** (Schumpeter, Fieldhouse, Gallagher and Robinson). They can also be distinguished as **metrocentric (**Schumpeter, Lenin, Hobson) and **pericentric** (Gallagher and Robinson, Fieldhouse). Let us look at these separately.

11.4.1 The Economic Explanations

The **economic explanations** offered by Hobson, Hilferding, Rosa Luxembourg and Lenin had a common feature — a political agenda.

Hobson's purpose was to alert the British public to "the new plutocratic phenomenon that was hijacking British foreign policy" — to the expansionist agenda that was extracting a heavy price from the ordinary people merely to satisfy the financial capitalists who cared for nothing except maximizing returns on their investments. Hilferding was a German Social Democrat who was Finance Minister and paid with his life for being anti Nazi. Rosa Luxembourg, born in Poland, was a fiery revolutionary Social Democrat leader in Germany. Vladimir Lenin, the prominent Bolshevik leader and maker of the Revolution in Russia in 1917, wished to convince the Russian people that World War I was an imperialist war which they would do best to stay out of.

In *Imperialism* (1902) Hobson explains imperialism as an outcome of the capitalist system. The key concept used is **under consumption**. Industry looked for foreign markets as it cannot find domestic markets for its goods, wages being low. With major industrial powers competing for foreign markets there was a race for colonies which would serve as captive markets. Under consumption also leads to over saving as domestic investment does not make sound economic sense when there is little purchasing power.

Here again colonies serve as channels for investment.

Thus Hobson concluded that "..the dominant directive motive" behind imperialism "was the demand for markets and for profitable investment by the exporting and financial classes within each imperialist regime." He dismissed other motives as secondary, be it power, pride and prestige or "trade follows the flag" or the mission of civilizing the natives.

Rudolf Hilferding, in his work, *Das Finanzkapital, (Finance Capital*) published in 1910, demonstrated how big banks and financial institutions in fact control industrial houses in this last stage of capitalism, better known as finance capitalism. Monopoly capitalists looked to imperialist expansion as a way of ensuring secure supplies of raw materials, markets for industrial goods and avenues for investment. As each big European power was a monopoly capitalist, economic competition soon became political rivalry, which in turn escalated into war.

Rosa Luxembourg's study titled *Accumulation of Capital* (1913) highlighted the unequal relationship between the imperial powers and the colonies. The European powers gained captive markets and secured profitable avenues for investment. In contrast, the colonies were merely suppliers of raw materials and foodstuffs.

In *Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism* (1916) Lenin argued that advanced capitalist countries invest in backward countries because the limits of profitable domestic investment have been reached. To invest at home would require development of the economy and better standard of living for workers, neither of which was in the interest of the capitalists. Lenin's argument was that imperialist interests lay behind the rivalries between European powers that culminated in World War I. His intention was overtly political – to expose the capitalist designs and convince the people of Russia that they should not participate in the War.

11.4.2 Non-economic Explanations

Schumpeter's *Imperialism and the Social Classes* (1931) broke away from the leftist paradigm which located imperialism and capitalism on the same grid. In his scheme, imperialism and capitalism were seen as clearly separate phenomena. Imperialism was atavistic, generated by pre-capitalist forces (pre-modern in essence). In contrast, capitalism was modern, innovative and productive and did not need control on a territory in order to prosper.

Whereas the writers on the left saw imperialism as an economic **system,** for Schumpeter, "Imperialism is the objectless **disposition** on the part of a state to unlimited forcible expansion." However, the problem with the usage of a conceptual attribute like 'disposition' is that it cannot be empirically tested and can, therefore, never be proved or disproved. Gallagher and Robinson (*Africa and the Victorians*) questioned the common interpretations of modern imperialism on two counts. They understood the distinction between pre 1870 and post 1870 imperialism to be invalid. Also, imperialism of free trade or informal imperialism was seen to be as important as formal imperialism. Political expansion was a function of commercial expansion — "trade with informal control if possible; trade with rule when necessary."

Gallagher and Robinson's explanation of imperialism was *pericentric*. In their view imperialism was a process driven by pressures from the peripheries — Asia, Africa and Latin Africa. The scramble for colonies was a preemptive move by European powers to occupy whatever territory they could in Asia and Africa so as to keep out rival nations. This view questioned the traditional Eurocentric explanation of the scramble for colonies in terms of the great conflicts of European diplomacy or the great thrusts of expansionary financial capitalism.

Fieldhouse advanced a **political** explanation for imperialism. The new imperialism was the extension into the periphery of the political struggle in Europe. At the centre the balance was so nicely adjusted that no major change in the status or territory of any side was possible. Colonies became a means out of this impasse. For the British this "impulse" meant protecting the route to India through Egypt and the Suez Canal which necessitated control over the headwaters of the Nile and a predominant position in North Africa. For the French and Germans the impulse meant acquiring "places in the sun" to demonstrate national prestige. Fieldhouse concluded: "In short, the modern empires lacked rationality and purpose: they were the chance products of complex historical forces operating over several centuries and more particularly during the period after 1815."

Colonialism, according to AJP Taylor, became a "move" in the European game of balance of power. Doyle uses the term 'colonialization of the diplomatic system' to describe the developments between 1879 and 1890. Bismarck acquired colonies in the early 1880s in the hope that a colonial quarrel with England would establish German credibility in France. France had to be compensated with colonies and overseas adventures in lieu of her loss of Alsace Lorraine. Competition for colonies led to a rift between England and Italy and Italy went over to the side of Germany.

To sum up this section, a whole range of theories and explanations have been offered for imperialism and are now available with us. These can broadly be classified into economic and non-economic explanations. The economic explanation includes the factors pertaining to overproduction and under consumption (Hobson), requirements of finance capitalism (Hilferding), unequal exchange between the imperial powers and the colonies (Rosa Luxembourg), and the highest stage of capitalism (Lenin). The non-economic explanations have looked at imperialism as a pre-modern atavistic force (Schumpeter); or have offered a pericentric view concentrating on the developments in the colonies rather than the metropolis (Gallaghar and Robinson); or have seen it merely as an expression of political struggles within Europe (Fieldhouse).

11.5 STAGES OF IMPERIALISM

The previous section was a discussion of the different *ways* in which imperialism has been understood and defined by scholars. In this section, let us examine its development through various stages.

11.5.1 Mercantilism and Early Trading Empires

What enabled Europe to become the world leader? If we looked at the world in 1500 Europe's dominant position could not be taken for granted. The Ottoman Empire, China under the Mings and India under the Mughals were at the same stage of development. They suffered from one major drawback, however, and that was their domination by a centralized authority which did not provide conditions conducive to intellectual growth. In contrast, the competition between different European powers encouraged the introduction of new military techniques. For example, the long range armed sailing ship helped the naval powers of the West to control the sea routes. **This increased military power combined with economic progress to push Europe forward and ahead of other continents.**

The growth of **trans - Atlantic trade** was spectacular. It increased **eightfold** between 1510 and 1550 and threefold between 1550 and 1610. Trade was followed by the establishment of the empires and churches and administrative systems. The Spanish and Portuguese clearly intended their empires in America to be permanent. The goods obtained from America were gold, silver, precious metals and spices as well as ordinary goods like oil, sugar, indigo, tobacco, rice, furs, timber and new plants like potato and maize. Shipbuilding industry developed around the major ports of London and Bristol in Britain, Antwerp in Belgium and Amsterdam in the Netherlands. The Dutch, French and English soon became keen rivals of the Spanish and Portuguese. This competition encouraged the progress of the science of navigation. Improved cartography, navigational tables, the telescope and the barometer made travel by sea safer. This strengthened Europe's technological advantage further.

The discovery of America and of the route to the Indies via the Cape of Good Hope had great consequences for Europe. It liberated Europe from a confined geographic and mental cell. The medieval horizon was widened to include influences from Eastern civilizations and Western peoples.

Discoveries, trade and conquests, which followed them, had practical consequences. Every colony or trading centre was a new economic stimulus. America was a market and American bullion increased the supply of money circulating in Europe and intensified existing economic and social developments. The volume of trade with America increased. For four centuries America satisfied the hunger for land among Europeans. Gold and silver stimulated exploration and conquest and attracted immigrants, who were followed close on their heels by missionaries. American colonies were set up by individuals; the state, patriotism and missionary impulse played little part.

Before 1815 Spain and Portugal were the pre-eminent imperial powers. Their primacy lay not only in the fact that they were the first discoverers but that they worked out four of the five models for effective colonization which were typical of the first colonial empires. Both made huge profits from their colonies.

Portugal had a huge empire in Asia and then in America and Brazil. Colonial revenues brought in the equivalent of 72,000 pound sterling in 1711. This was almost equal to metropolitan taxes. One special feature of the Portuguese empire was that she made no distinction between her colonies and the metropolis. No separate colonial department was set up till 1604.

France, like Spain and Portugal, carried out expansion in the Americas – in the regions of Canada and Latin America. This was undertaken by individual Frenchmen supported by the Crown with the aim of ensuring supplies of groceries and increasing naval power. The task of setting up the empire was carried out by the chartered companies. This worked to the advantage of the state as it was at a minimum cost. After 1660s the colonies became royal possessions and royal agents headed the government. French colonial government was as authoritarian as that of Spain. France was then an absolute monarchy and ruled colonies without giving them any constitutional rights. Local administration and law in the colonies were modeled on those prevailing in France. Her colonial empire suffered from too much state interference. France made no fiscal profits on her colonies, in sharp contrast to Portugal. This was despite the fact that more than two fifths French exports in 1788 were to colonial governments. By 1789 France lost most of her colonial possessions in America and India to Britain. The crucial weakness was her inferior naval power.

Some of the Western states developed their **colonies in the tropics**, in India, Africa, Latin America and Australia. The Europeans did not settle in Africa, they were content with slaves, gold dust and ivory. The colonies were crucial to the British economy, they supplied raw materials and were markets for metropolitan products. The French minister, Choiseul, regretted that 'in the present state of Europe it is colonies, trade and in consequence sea power, which must determine the balance of power upon the continent."

Of the five big European powers, France, Britain, Austria, Russia and Prussia, Britain soon emerged as the leader. She had many advantages — the first was a developed banking and financial system. Her geographical location at the westward flank of Europe helped her to maintain a distance from the continent when she wished. The most important factor, which gave Britain an edge, was that it was the first country to undergo the Industrial Revolution. This enabled it to dominate Europe and to acquire colonies. In Bernard Porter's words, she was the first frogspawn egg to grow legs, the first tadpole to change into a frog, the first frog to hop out of the pond.

The first empires represented European **ambition, determination and ingenuity** in using limited resources rather than European predominance throughout the world. "Christendom is also the proper perspective from which to view the religious drive behind the Spanish justification for empire."(Doyle:110) Doyle further sums up Spanish and British empires: "Spain and Britain focused on trade in the east, on settlement and production in the west, and neither acquired colonies for immediate reasons of national security."

Decline

The old colonialism had its natural limits. Flow of precious metals declined. By the late 18th Century Spanish and Portuguese power declined and they lost their colonies. Dutch monopoly on shipping ended. Colonial rivalry between France and Britain ended in Britain's preeminence. Britain was now the world leader in empire, finance and trade. As Eric Hobsbawm put it, "Old colonialism did not grow over into new colonialism. It collapsed and was replaced by it."

Let us sum up the discussion so far. Europe's conquest of America, Africa and Asia from the sixteenth century was possible only because of her mastery of the seas. In this the countries on the Atlantic seaboard, Portugal, Spain, France, Britain and Holland, had an obvious advantage because of their geographical location. Europe's domination was disastrous for other peoples: the indigenous populations in the Americas were wiped out and twelve million Africans were made slaves between 1500 and 1860. Europe benefited vastly in this era when merchant capital controlled the world economy. Institutions such as the modern state and bureaucracy and the scientific revolution in knowledge laid the foundations of the modern world.

11.5.2 Industrial Capitalism— Imperialism of Free Trade

Hobsbawm describes the Industrial Revolution in Britain as that unusual moment in world history when the world's economy was built around Britain; when she was the only world power, the only imperialist, the only importer, exporter and foreign investor. The description of Britain as the workshop of the world was literally true in the middle of the nineteenth century when she produced most of its coal, iron and steel. The Industrial Revolution was followed by the single liberal world economy (in the 1860s possibly because of the monopoly of Britain) and the final penetration of the undeveloped world by capitalism.

The early British industrial economy relied for its expansion on foreign trade. Overseas markets for products and overseas outlets for capital were crucial. The cotton industry exported eighty per cent of its output at the end of the nineteenth century. The iron and steel industry exported forty per cent of its output in the mid nineteenth century. In return Britain bought specialized local products such as cotton from the US, wool from Australia, wheat from Argentina, etc.

Britain's trade also increasingly became greater with the empire. In cotton Latin America accounted for thirty five per cent of British exports in 1840. After 1873 the East absorbed over sixty per cent of British cotton exports. Thus there were sound economic reasons for Britain opposing these areas being opened up to others.

By 1815 Britain had already become the preeminent world power, combining **naval mastery, financial credit, commercial enterprise and alliance diplomacy**. The following decades of British economic hegemony were accompanied by large-scale improvements in transport and communications, by the increasingly rapid transfer of industrial technology from one region to another, and by an immense increase in manufacturing output, which in turn stimulated the opening of new areas of agricultural land and raw material sources. The age of mercantilism was over and with it tariff barriers stood dismantled. The new watchword was **free trade** and this brought international harmony rather than great power conflict.

Europe's **military superiority** continued. The improvements in the muzzle loading gun, the introduction of the breechloader, the Gatling guns, Maxims and light field artillery constituted a veritable firepower revolution, which the traditional societies could not withstand. The decisive new technology was the gun, the symbol of European superiority in the armament factory. As Hilaire Belloc said, "Whatever happens, we have got the Maxim gun, and they have not."

In the field of colonial empires, Britain brooked no rivals. The empire grew at an average annual rate of 100,000 square miles between 1815 and 1865. One group of colonies comprised those acquired for strategic and commercial reasons like Singapore, Aden, Falkland Islands, Hong Kong and Lagos. A second group was that of settler colonies, such as South Africa, Canada and Australia.

With the spread of industrial capitalism the need grew for colonies as markets for manufactured goods especially textiles and suppliers of raw materials such as cotton and food grains. The colony emerged as a subordinate trading partner whose economic surplus was appropriated through trade based on unequal exchange. This international division of labour condemned the colony to producing goods of low value using backward techniques.

Late industrializers and colonial powers

By the 1860s the other countries like Germany and United States, were catching up with Britain in industrialization. In 1870 the figures for share of world industrial production were 13 per cent for Germany and 23 per cent for the United States. The extent of the declining domination of Britain among the super powers can be understood by the table given below.

Table

Per Capita Levels of Industrialization

Relative to Great Britain in 1900 = 100

		1880	1900	1913	1928	1938	Rank in 1938
1	Great Britain	87	100	115	122	157	2nd
2	United States	38	69	126	182	167	1st
3	France	28	39	59	82	73	4th
4	Germany	25	52	85	128	144	3rd
5	Italy	12	17	26	44	61	5th

In 1900 Britain was the unquestioned world leader. Her empire extended to twelve million square miles and a quarter of the world's population.

The race for colonies speeded up from the 1880s with the entry of Germany, Italy, US, Belgium and Japan into the race for colonies. These rivalries between the powers led to a race for new colonies as each power sought to make secure her markets, raw materials and investments. Backward regions were annexed in order to control their raw material supplies. Malaya gave rubber and tin and the Middle East gave oil. Empire was a cushion in a hard world.

These imperialist rivalries which carved up the world into colonies, semi colonies and spheres of influence also divided Europe into blocs armed to the teeth, the logical corollary of which was World War I.

World War I ended in the defeat of Germany and the Ottoman Empire and redivision of colonies among the imperial powers, who were henceforth called trustees. The Depression of 1929 brought a change in the attitude of imperial powers. Gone were the days of Free Trade; protectionism was the new catchword.

11.5.3 Finance Capitalism

Stages of capitalism and imperialism could overlap, as in the case of industrial capitalism and financial capitalism, where one did not replace the other, it was superimposed on it. The informal empire of trade and finance was added to the empire of industrial capital.

Many major changes took place in the world economy after 1860. Industrialization spread to several countries of Europe, the US and Japan with the result that Britain's industrial supremacy in the world came to an end. For Britain this was a setback. She exchanged the informal empire over most of the underdeveloped world for the formal empire of a quarter of it, plus the older satellite economies.

The application of scientific knowledge to industries led to an intensification of industrialization. Modern chemical industries, the use of petroleum as fuel for the internal combustion engine and the use of electricity for industrial purposes developed during this period. Moreover, there was further unification of the world market because of revolution in the means of international transport.

Capital accumulation on a large scale took place because of the development of trade and industry at home and extended exploitation of colonies and semi-colonies.

This capital was concentrated in a few hands. Trusts and cartels emerged and banking capital merged with industrial capital. Outlets had to be found for this capital abroad.

Significant export of capital had been there even before the stage of predominance of finance capital. By 1850 Britain's capital exports were 30 million pounds a year. In 1870-75 this was 75 million pounds. The income from this came to 50 million pounds, which was reinvested overseas. This financed the trade with the colonies, wherein huge quantities of raw materials were procured and equally vast quantities of industrial goods sent out. As Paul Kennedy puts it so evocatively, the world was the City of London's oyster.

The stranglehold of monopoly capital can be gauged from the statistic that by 1914 European nations controlled over 84.4 per cent of the world. Capital was concentrated in and channeled through first, the City of London and then New York, the centres of the international network of trade and finance.

The metropolitan country also used empire for political and ideological ends. Jingoistic nationalism and glorification of empire acted to reduce social divisions in the metropolis. Bipan Chandra notes that the slogan —'the sun never sets on the British empire' – generated pride among British workers on whose hovels the sun seldom shone in real life. Each country justified its empire in different ways – for example, the "civilizing mission" of the French and the pan – Asianism of Japan.

Between 1870 and 1913 London was the financial and trading hub of the world. By 1913 Britain had 4000 million pounds worth abroad. Most international trade was routed through British ships at the turn of the twentieth century. After World War I Britain lost this position to the US. The US became the major dominant capitalist economy. She was now the world's largest manufacturer, foreign investor, trader and banker and the US $ became the standard international currency.

From the mid-twentieth century onwards, decolonization gathered pace, as did the rise of multinational companies, international donor agencies and the entire gamut of mechanisms of international economic influence. This process is generally known as neo-colonialism.

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11.6 THE EMPIRE ON WHICH THE SUN NEVER SET

Let us take Britain and her empire, especially India, as a case study to assess the advantages accruing to the mother country from her imperial possessions.

Bipan Chandra draws our attention to the simultaneity of birth of the Industrial Revolution and the British Empire in India, which, interestingly, was not merely coincidental. The conquest of Bengal in 1757 enabled the systematic plunder of India and the Industrial Revolution took off around 1750. The **drain of wealth** or the unilateral transfer of capital from India after 1765 amounted to two to three per cent of the British national income at a time when only about five per cent of the British national income was being invested.

In the 19th Century India emerged as a major market for British manufactures and supplied food grains and raw materials. Opium from India was sold in China, enabling Britain's triangular trade with China. Railways were a major area of investment of capital. Britain's international balance of payments deficit was handled by the foreign exchange got from Indian exports. British shipping grew in leaps and bounds on the back of its control over India's coastal and international trade.

India played a crucial role in the development of British capitalism during this stage. British industries especially textiles were heavily dependent on exports. India absorbed 10 to 12 per cent of British exports and nearly 20 per cent of Britain's textile exports during 1860-1880. After 1850 India was also a major importer of engine coaches, rail lines and other railway stores. Moreover, the Indian army played an important role in extending British colonialism in Asia and Africa. Throughout this stage the drain of wealth and capital to Britain continued.

England was particularly keen on the Indian empire as it provided a market for cotton goods; it controlled the trade of the Far East with her export surplus (opium) with China. The Home Charges (India's payments for receiving "good" administration from Britain) and the interest payments on the Indian Public Debt were important in financing Britain's balance of payments deficit.

India strengthened Britain's position as an international financial centre. India's trade surplus with the rest of the world and her trade deficit with England allowed England to square her international settlements on current account. Also India's monetary reserves helped Britain. Hence in India even the free traders wanted formal control.

The projection of India as the brightest jewel in the British crown played an important role in the ideology of imperialism. The British ruling classes were able to keep their political power intact even when it was being riven with class conflict. Thus the pride and glory underlying the slogan of the sun never sets on the British Empire were used to keep workers contented on whose slum dwellings the sun seldom shone in real life. India also played a crucial role in one other, often ignored, aspect. India bore the entire cost of its own conquest. India paid for the railways, education, a modern legal system, development of irrigation and detailed penetration of administration into the countryside.

Lastly once the struggle for the division of the world became intense after 1870 India was the **chief gendarme of British imperialism.** She provided both the material and the human resources for its expansion and maintenance. Afghanistan, Central Asia, Tibet, the Persian Gulf area, Eastern Africa, Egypt, Sudan, Burma, China and to some extent even South Africa were brought or kept within the British sphere of influence by virtue of Indian men and money. The British Indian army was the only large scale army contingent available to Britain. It is therefore not a surprise that the British Empire in Asia and Africa collapsed once Britain lost control over the Indian army and finances.

11.7 SUMMARY

Hobsbawm has described the history of the world from the late fifteenth to the mid twentieth century as the rise and decline of its domination by European powers. Britain was the first unquestioned world power. Since 1870 this position was under challenge from other countries in Europe who were industrializing and gaining military and economic power. Even when this domination ended formally, the influence of Britain, and then the US, continued, be it in multinational banks and financial institutions, parliamentary democracy or association football. This Unit then is an exploration of the domination of these geo-political forces in different forms in modern times.

11.8 EXERCISES

1) What are different theoretical explanations for imperialism? Discuss briefly.
2) Describe different historical stages through which imperialism took different forms on a global scale.
3) Why was India crucial as a colony in the expansion of British imperialism?

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UNIT 12 COLONIALISM

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12.1 INTRODUCTION

If Imperialism is what happens in the metropolis, then colonialism is what happens in the colonies. The same system of capitalism that produced development in the Western world created underdevelopment in the colony. In this sense imperialism and colonialism are two sides of the same coin.

In the previous Unit, you were familiarized with imperialism as a modern phenomenon directly related to capitalism. You also learnt how the process of conquest, expansion and domination brought wealth and prosperity to the economies of the European countries. This Unit is a discussion of what this process meant to the economy and society in the colonies. It will provide a definition of colonialism and prepare a typology of colonies (colonies of settlement and of exploitation, inland colonies and overseas colonies, colonies under direct rule and colonies controlled only indirectly). It will then go into a discussion of the stages of colonialism and see how these stages functioned in different colonies.

South Africa, Australia, Canada were colonies of white settlers whereas India and Indonesia were colonies exploited economically and politically over centuries. There was a process of colonization which took place through inland expansion (as in Russia) while there were many cases of overseas colonization as in the case of China. In this Unit, we shall be studying colonies of exploitation.

Similarly colonization could happen both through direct and indirect rule. Direct rule meant a colonial state as in the case of India; indirect rule meant control over the politics, economy and society without taking on the onus for ruling the country as was the case in China. In this sense, colonialism could be both absolute and partial in terms of political control. Hence, **colonialism and semi-colonialism were different in basics.** In the case of a semi colony like China control was over the economy rather than over the polity. Also, no one imperial power had a monopoly of control as it was exploited by many powers unlike the case of India, where it was mainly Britain which retained absolute political control.

Again, **neo-colonialism** is the continuation of colonialism by non-formal means. Economic policies were dictated and military might was harnessed by the imperial power. The US was the foremost neo-colonial power in the later phase.

12.2 APPROACHES TO COLONIALISM

There are mainly two approaches to the understanding of colonialism. The successful liberation movements of the 1960s and the Cuban and Algerian revolutions led to a plethora of writings on colonialism. Andre Gunder Frank's major contribution was followed by those of C. Furtado, Theodore Dos Santosa, Paul Prebisch, Paul Baran, Samir Amin, Immanuel Wallerstein, Arghiri Emmanuel and F. Cardoso. According to the *dependency school* (Andre Gunder Frank, Samir Amin etc.) a colony would continue to be economically dependent even after achieving political freedom, as long as it remains a part of capitalism – as the capitalist class was incapable of undertaking the task of development. Wallerstein's *world systems* approach divided the capitalist world into the centre, periphery and semi-periphery, between which a relationship of *unequal exchange* prevailed. The *core economies* of the centre produced high value products and had strong states. The periphery was constrained by low technology and low wages, the state was weak as was the capitalist class and the economy was dominated by foreign capital. The countries on the semi-periphery, like India, were marked by greater control of the state in the national and international market. Economic nationalism was the hallmark of such states, which were able to negotiate a stronger position for themselves in the world system. Cultural aspects of colonialism were highlighted by Amilcar Cabral, Franz Fanon and Edward Said. Bipan Chandra analyzed colonialism in terms of colonial structure, colonial modernization, stages of colonialism and the colonial state.

12.2.1 What is Colonialism?

Colonialism is as modern a historical phenomenon as industrial capitalism. It describes the distinct stage in the modern historical development of the colony that intervenes between the traditional economy and the modern capitalist economy. It is a well structured whole, a distinct **social formation** in which the basic control of the economy and society is in the hands of a foreign capitalist class. The form of the colonial structure varies with the changing conditions of the historical development of capitalism as a world wide system.

It is best to look upon Colonialism as a specific **structure.** What took place during colonialism was not merely the imposition of foreign political domination on a traditional economy, as argued by some scholars. Nor was it merely the outcome of a vast confidence trick that relied on the docility, cooperation or disunity of the colonized, buttressed by the racial arrogance of their better-armed white governors. The view that 'Empires were transnational organizations that were created to mobilize the resources of the world' (Hopkins, 1999) is also incomplete; it focuses on the metropolis, not on the colony. Neither was a colony a transitional economy which, given time, would have eventually developed into a full blown capitalist economy. It is also incorrect that the colony suffered from "arrested growth" because of its pre-capitalist remnants. Many apologists, for example, Morris D. Morris, portrayed colonialism as an effort at modernization, economic development and transplantation of capitalism which could not succeed because of the restricting role of tradition in the colonies.

Colonial economy was neither pre-capitalist nor capitalist, it was colonial, i.e., a hybrid creation. Colonialism was distorted capitalism. Integration with the world economy did not bring capitalism to the colony. The colony did not develop in the split image of the mother country – it was its other, its opposite, non-developmental side. Colonialism did not develop social and productive forces, rather, it **underdeveloped** them, leading to contradictions and a movement forward to the next stage.

12.2.2 Definition

Colonialism is the **internal disarticulation** and **external integration** of the rural economy and the realization of the extended reproduction of capital not in the colony but in the imperialist metropolis.

Colonialism is a **social formation** in which *different modes of production* coexist from feudalism to petty commodity production to agrarian, industrial and finance capitalism. Unlike capitalism, where the surplus is appropriated on the basis of the ownership of the means of production, under colonialism *surplus is appropriated by virtue of control over state power*. When one understands colonialism as a social formation rather than as a mode of production, we are able to see the *primary contradiction as a societal one*, rather than in class terms. Thus we have a national liberation struggle rather than a class struggle against the colonial power. The primary contradiction in society is the national one, not the class one; the struggle against the colonial power is political.

12.2.3 Basic Features of Colonialism

One basic feature of colonialism is that under it the colony is integrated into the world capitalist system in a subordinate position. Colonialism is characterized by **unequal exchange.** The exploitative international division of labour meant that the metropolis produced goods of high value with high technology and colonies produced goods of low value and productivity with low technology. The colony produced raw materials while the metropolis produced manufactured goods. The pattern of railway development in India in the second half of the 19th Century was in keeping with the interests of British industry. Bal Gangadhar Tilak, the Indian nationalist leader, described this as decorating another's wife. The colony was articulated with the world market but **internally disarticulated**. Its agricultural sector did not serve its industry but the metropolitan economy and the world market. The **drain of wealth** took place through unrequited exports and state expenditure on armed forces and civil services. **Foreign political domination** is the fourth feature of Colonialism.

Therefore, unequal exchange, external integration and internal disarticulation, drain of wealth, and a foreign political domination may be understood as the four main features of colonialism.

12.3 THE COLONIAL STATE

The colonial state is integral to the structuring and functioning of the colonial economy and society. **It is the mechanism by which the metropolitan capitalist class controls and exploits the colony.** The colonial state serves the long term interests of the capitalist class of the mother country as a whole, not of any of its parts.

Under colonialism all the indigenous classes of the colony suffer domination. No class is a junior partner of colonialism. Thus even the uppermost classes in the colony could begin to oppose colonialism as it went against their interests. It is useful to remember that big landlords led the anti-colonial movements of Poland and Egypt. This is a major difference between colonies and semi-colonies, where there are compradors, native classes that are part of the ruling class.

The role of the colonial state was greater than the capitalist one. The state itself was a major channel of surplus appropriation. The metropolitan ruling class used the colonial state to control colonial society.

The colonial state guaranteed law and order and its own security from internal and external dangers. It suppressed indigenous economic forces hostile to colonial interests. The colonial state actively fostered the identities of caste and community so as to prevent national unity. The state was actively involved in reproducing conditions for appropriation of capital, including producing goods and services. Another important task is the transformation of the social, economic, cultural, political and legal framework of the colony so as to make it reproductive on an extended scale.

There is an explicit and direct link between the colonial structure and the colonial state. Thus it is easy to politicize the struggle against colonialism. As the mechanism of colonial control lies on the surface, it is easy to expose the links with the industrial bourgeoisie of the home country. The state is visibly controlled from abroad and the isolation of the colonial people from policy and decision making is evident.

The colonial state relied on the whole on domination and coercion rather than leadership and consent. However, it functioned to some extent as a bourgeois state with rule of law, property relations, bureaucracy and constitutional space within which colonial discontent was to be contained. We shall discuss this in detail with reference to India.

12.4 STAGES OF COLONIALISM

There were three distinct stages of colonialism. Some countries went through one or two stages only. India went through only the first and second stages, Egypt only through the third stage, and Indonesia the first and third stage. These stages lasted over two hundred years. The forms of subordination changed over time as did colonial policy, state and its institutions, culture, ideas and ideologies. However, this did not mean that stages existed in a pure form. The older forms of subordination continued into the later stages.

The stages were the result of four factors:

- the historical development of capitalism as a world system;
- the change in the society, economy and polity of the metropolis;
- the change in its position in the world economy; and lastly
- the colony's own historical development.

12.4.1 First Stage: Monopoly Trade and Plunder

The first stage had two basic objectives. In order to make trade more profitable indigenously manufactured goods were to be bought cheap. For this competitors were to be kept out, whether local or European. Territorial conquest kept local traders out of the lucrative trade while rival European companies were defeated in war. Thus the characteristic of the first stage was monopoly of trade.

Secondly, the political conquest of the colony enabled plunder and seizure of surplus. For example, the drain of wealth from India to Britain during the first stage was considerable. It amounted to two to three per cent of the national income of Britain at that time. Colonialism was superimposed on the traditional systems of economy and polity. No basic changes were introduced in the first stage.

12.4.2 Second Stage: Era of Free Trade

The interest of the industrial bourgeoisie of the metropolis in the colony was in the markets available for manufactured goods. For this it was necessary to increase exports from the colony to pay for purchase of manufactured imports. The metropolitan bourgeoisie also wanted to develop the colony as a producer of raw materials to lessen dependence on non-empire sources. Increase of exports from the colony would also enable it to pay for the high salaries and profits of merchants. The industrial bourgeoisie opposed plunder as a form of appropriation of surplus on the ground that it would destroy the goose that laid the golden eggs.

Trade was the mechanism by which the social surplus was to be appropriated in this stage. In this stage changes in the economy, polity, administration, social, cultural and ideological structure were initiated to enable exploitation in the new way. The slogan was development and modernization. The colony was to be integrated with the world capitalist economy and the mother country. Capitalists were allowed to develop plantations, trade, transport, mining and industries. The system of transport and communications was developed to facilitate the movement of massive quantities of raw materials to the ports for export. Liberal imperialism was the new political ideology. The rhetoric of the rulers was to train the people in self-government.

12.4.3 Third Stage: Era of Finance Capital

The third stage saw intense struggle for markets and sources of raw materials and food grains. Large scale accumulation of capital in the metropolis necessitated search for avenues for investment abroad. These interests were best served where the imperial powers had colonies. This led to more intensive control over the colony in order to protect the interests of the imperial power.

In the sphere of ideology the mood was one of reaction. The need for intensive control increased. There was no more talk of self government; instead benevolent despotism was the new ideology according to which the colonial people were seen as children who would need guardians forever.

A major contradiction in this stage was that the colony was not able to absorb metropolitan capital or increase its exports of raw materials because of over exploitation in the earlier stages. A strategy of limited modernization was implemented to take care of this problem but the logic of colonialism could not be subverted. Underdevelopment became a constraint on further exploitation of the colony.

The third stage often did not take off. Colonialism had so wrecked the economies of some colonies that they could hardly absorb any capital investment. In many colonies the older forms of exploitation continued. In India, for example, the earlier two forms continued, even in the third stage.

12.5 COLONIALISM IN DIFFERENT TERRITORIES

So far you have seen the general pattern of colonial expansion spread over three stages. In the next two sections, we will take up specific case studies of colonies.

12.5.1 Africa

The conquest of Africa took place in the last decades of the nineteenth century. Till as late as 1880 only 20 per cent of Africa had come under European rule. With the spread of the Industrial Revolution to other countries of Europe rivalries increased as did the search for colonies. The emerging industrial powers looked for a place in the sun. A continent of over 28 million square km was partitioned and occupied by European powers by a combination of two strategies, treaties and conquest.

In Africa in 1939, 1200 colonial administrators ruled 43 million Africans – through local chiefs.

Three eras of conquest

The first phase, 1880-1919, was one of conquest and occupation. The colonial system was consolidated after 1910. The second phase, 1919-35, was that of the independence movements. The third stage was from 1935 onwards. Within forty five years the colonial system was uprooted from over 94 per cent of Africa. Colonial rule lasted for a hundred years on an average. British territories in Africa consisted of Nigeria, Gold Coast, Gambia, Sierra Leone, Kenya, Tanganyika, Nyasaland, Uganda, North and South Rhodesia and South Africa. Algeria, Morocco, Cameroon, French-Congo, Tunisia, and Madagascar were some of the main French colonies.

Impact

The impact of colonialism in Africa was tremendous. The self sufficient African economies were destroyed, transformed and subordinated by colonial domination. Class differentiation in African society occurred as a result of the impact of colonial domination. The links of African countries with each other and with other parts of the world were disrupted. European powers reduced the economies of Africa to colonial dependencies through the power of finance capital. The loans for the Suez Canal enmeshed Egypt in debt.

There are **different interpretations** of the impact of colonial rule. The imperialist school of thought would have it that Africans welcomed colonial rule. Social Darwinism justifies colonialism by arguing that the domination over the weaker races was the inevitable result of the natural superiority of the European race. Both colonial rulers and latter day apologists have presented colonial rule as a blessing. It is said that modern infrastructure, health and education would not have reached the colony had it not been part of the colonial system. Other scholars, like D.K. Fieldhouse, have described the effects as "some good, some bad".

The primary motive behind colonialism was of course satisfying imperial interests. The positive effects of colonialism, if any, were byproducts; they were clearly not consciously intended. The negative impact was huge and in all spheres, with long lasting legacies. For example, ethnic conflicts which paralyze many parts of Africa today are rooted in the arbitrary superimposition of territorial boundaries on an essentially tribal society.

12.5.2 Egypt

Egypt was under the protection of both France and Britain. She became an agrarian and raw material appendage of the metropolitan countries. Two stages of colonialism were merged into one in Egypt.

Britain developed Egypt as a supplier of cotton for her textile industry. By 1914 cotton constituted 43 per cent of agricultural output. It accounted for 85 per cent of exports in 1913. Being a single crop economy was disastrous as Egypt became dependent on imports for her essential food supply. The control of foreigners over cotton was total, from owning or controlling the land it was grown on, the cotton processing and cotton cleaning industry and the steamships it was transported in. There was not a single mill in Egypt.

Egypt was also a valuable field of investment of banking capital. Five per cent capital went into industry and construction, 12.36 into trade and transport and 79 per cent into public debt, mortgage and banks. Egypt was enmeshed in indebtedness as a result of exploitation by foreign powers.

The First World War showed up the exploitation of Egypt fully. Her natural resources, manpower and economy were harnessed to the war effort. Crops were seized by the army. The British Treasury took over the gold reserves of the National Bank of Egypt. Egypt became a British protectorate in 1914.

12.5.3 South-East Asia

Colonialism in South-East Asia lasted five centuries, from the late fifteenth to the mid twentieth century. Even after the heyday of the spice trade, South-East Asia remained important as a supplier of basic raw materials like oil, rubber, metals, rice, coffee, tea and sugar. The impact of colonialism in this region was considerable, even on countries like Thailand, which did not formally become colonies. Traditional forms of government disappeared, trading patterns were disrupted and the rich cultural traditions of these regions were destroyed.

12.6 INDIA

India has generally been considered a classic colony. A study of colonialism in India can tell us a great deal about the functioning of colonialism in general. Let us see how the different stages of colonialism operated in India.

12.6.1 First Stage

In the first stage both the objectives – the monopoly of trade and appropriation of government revenues – were rapidly fulfilled with the conquest first of Bengal and parts of South India and then the rest of India. The East India Company now used its political power to acquire monopolistic control over Indian trade and handicrafts. Indian traders were ruined while weavers were forced to sell cheap. The company's monopoly ruined the weavers. In the next stage cheap manufactured goods finished them.

The drain of wealth was admitted to by British officials. In the words of the Deputy Chairman of the Court of Directors, "Our system acts very much like a sponge, drawing up all the good things from the banks of the Ganges and squeezing them down on the banks of the Thames."

The colony did not undergo any fundamental changes in this stage. Changes were made only in military organization and technology and at the top level of revenue administration. Land revenue could be extracted from the villages without disturbing the existing systems. In the sphere of ideology too there was respect for traditional systems in contrast to the denunciation of traditional values in the second stage. The respect with which Sanskrit was held by British Indologists like William Jones was in sharp contrast to Macaulay's later dismissal of traditional learning as not being enough to fill a bookshelf of a good Western library.

12.6.2 Second Stage

The era of free trade saw India emerge as a market for manufactured goods and a supplier of raw materials and food grains. Import of Manchester cloth increased in value from 96 lakh sterling in 1860 to 27 crore sterling in 1900. Traditional weavers were ruined by this competition. Rather than industrialization, decline of industry or deindustrialization took place. In the middle Gangetic region, according to historian A.K. Bagchi, the weight of industry in the livelihood pattern of the people was reduced by half from 1809-13 to the census year 1901.

Estimates by Sivasubramaniam indicate that in the last half century of British rule per capita income in India remained almost stagnant. Dadabhai Naoroji calculated per capita income at Rs.20 per annum.

Railway expansion was undertaken and a modern post and telegraph system was set up. Administration was made more detailed and comprehensive so that imports could penetrate the villages and raw materials could be taken out easily. Capitalist commercial relations were to be enforced. The legal system was to be improved so as to ensure upholding the sanctity of contract. Modern education was introduced to produce *babus* to man the new administration. Westernized habits were expected to increase the demand for British goods.

Transformation of the existing culture and social organization required that the existing culture be denounced. Orientalism, by depriving people of the power to study their own languages, was an appropriation of the processes by which people understand themselves. The new ideology was one of development. Underdevelopment was not the desired but the inevitable consequence of the inexorable working of colonialism of trade and of its inner contradictions.

12.6.3 Third Stage

The third stage is rightly known as the era of finance capital. A huge amount of capital was invested in railways, loans to the Government of India, trade and to a lesser extent in plantations, coal mining, jute mills, shipping and banking in India.

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In this stage, Britain's position in the world was constantly challenged by the rivalry of new imperialist countries. The result was further consolidation of its control over India. Control had to be strengthened to contend with competition from rival imperialist powers.

Lord Curzon, Viceroy of India, wrote:

> Other channels of investment, outside of India, are gradually being filled up, not merely by British capital, but by capital of all the wealth- producing countries of the world; and if this be so, then a time must soon come when the current of British capital, extruded from the banks between which it has long been content to meander, will want to pour over into fresh channels, and will, by the law of economic gravitation, find its way into India, to which it should be additionally attracted by the security of British institutions and British laws.

Reactionary imperialist policies characterized the viceroyalties of Lytton and Curzon. All talk of self government ended and the aim of British rule was declared to be permanent trusteeship over the child people of India.

Loosening of links

The major spurts in industrial investment took place precisely during those periods when India's economic links with the world capitalist economy were temporarily weakened or disrupted. In India's case, foreign trade and the inflow of foreign capital were reduced or interrupted thrice during the 20th Century, i.e. during the First World War, the Great Depression (1929-34) and World War II. But as the links were not disrupted, merely loosened, what took place was only industrial growth, not industrial revolution.

12.7 BRITISH COLONIAL STATE

That the British wielded brute force to maintain their rule in India and to crush opposition is well known. Very often, the state did not actually repress; the very fact that it had the capacity to do so was enough to contain revolt. Hence, the British considered the maintenance of a large, disciplined, efficient and loyal army to be a prime necessity, for the armed forces remained, in the ultimate analysis, the final guarantor of British interests. But generally, for the continued existence of their rule and for the perpetuation of imperialist domination, they relied on a variety of ideological instruments. It is in this sense that the British colonial state in India was, in however limited a way, a hegemonic or semi-hegemonic state. Its semi-hegemonic foundations were buttressed by the ideology of pax Britannica, law and order, the British official as the *mai-bap* of the people, as well as by the institutions of the ideological, legal, judicial and administrative systems.

The impression of the unshakable foundations of British rule, the aura of stolidity and general prestige of the Raj contributed towards the maintenance of imperial hegemony. The prestige of the Raj, by showing the futility of attempts to overthrow it, played as crucial a role in the maintenance of British rule as the armed might behind it. The prestige of the Raj was very largely embodied in its much vaunted 'steel frame', the Indian Civil Service (ICS), and, more specifically, in the district officer, who represented authority in the countryside: "At the centre of the 'benevolent despotism' that British rule in the subcontinent adopted stood the steel frame of the Indian Civil Service... and in particular the figure of the district officer himself, the physical 'embodiment of Government' across the Indian countryside..."

Rudyard Kipling's 'A Song of the English' (1893) went thus – Keep ye the law

Be swift in all obedience Clear the land of evil

Drive the road and bridge the ford –

By the peace among Our peoples let men know we serve the Lord!

A state structure of this kind, based on "semi-hegemonic foundations", called for certain specific policies in the political sphere. A reliable social base for the state had to be secured on the one hand; on the other, strategies had to be devised to limit the social reach and effective clout of the anti-imperialist forces. Active cooperation of 'native allies' in running the country was gained by a variety of techniques, ranging from the handing out of jobs, favours and positions of some authority to concessions to the 'legitimate' political demands of the loyalist and liberal sections. As regards the snowballing of anti-British discontent, it was sought to be neutralized by confining it within the constitutional arenas created by the political reforms. Constitutional concessions were regularly made, though under pressure, to the demands raised by the anti-imperialist forces.

12.8 COLONIALISM OR COLONIALISMS?

If we look at British and French colonial rule it is clear that they are informed by different perspectives though often the reality on the ground amounted to the same. Some scholars point to this fact of the same reality on the ground to argue that all colonialisms were the same. For example, historian D.A. Low disagrees with the view that there were different patterns of colonialism on the ground that British and French colonies achieved independence at the same time. In this section, the existence of different patterns of colonialism is discussed.

Wallerstein would have it that there was a basic paternalism which ran through the philosophies of all the colonial powers. But this basic paternalism expressed itself in very different forms, depending on the history and national character of the colonial powers.

From the beginning there was a sparseness and economy about British colonial policy. The British used trading companies to acquire colonies, insisted that colonies be self-sustaining and varied the political structure in each of the colonies to suit local needs. "This, then, is the classic contrast between Africa's two colonial powers, Britain and France: Britain – empirical, commercial, practising indirect rule, keeping Africans at a distance, verging on racism; France – Cartesian in its logic, seeking glory, practicing direct administration, acting as apostle of fraternity and anti-racism. Anyone who travels in both British and French Africa will see the grain of truth in these generalizations. The flavour of life *is* different; the two colonial governments *have* produced two different cultures. And yet, anyone who travels there well knows the severe limitations of these generalizations."

In practice the differences were not so clear. The French often supported chiefs where they were powerful rather than rule directly. As for 'empiricism' versus 'Cartesian logic', this comparison is more the stuff of polemics than of analysis.

To contrast motives of money and glory seems even more dubious. For the British were surely proud of their empire, and the French surely profited by theirs. As for ‘racism’ and ‘fraternity’, it may be that French paternalism was based on the exclusive virtue but universal accessibility of French civilization and British paternalism on the equal virtue of all traditions but the unique accessibility of British culture. Nevertheless, in practice, there were parallel degrees of political, social and economic discrimination in two settler territories like Kenya and Algeria, and there were parallel ideologies among the settlers. There was also parallel absence of legal discrimination in non settler British and French West Africa, though until 1957 the exclusive white clubs of both areas barred Africans as members or as guests. There were differences also regarding the role of the civil service. In Britain civil servants were nonpartisan whereas in France junior civilians were political. But after independence this made little difference.

No clear distinction can be made between French direct rule and English indirect rule which allowed traditional institutions to survive when we look closely at the actual working of administration. Fieldhouse has shown that after 1929 and especially after 1932 attitudes and practices came closer together.

12.9 SUMMARY

Colonialism is as modern a historical phenomenon as industrial capitalism. While the metropolis experiences growth under capitalism the colony undergoes underdevelopment. Colonialism is more than foreign political domination; it is a distinct social formation in which control is in the hands of the metropolitan ruling class. In short, colonialism is what happened in the colony and imperialism is what happened in the metropolis.

12.10 EXERCISES

1) What is colonialism? How is it different from imperialism?
2) Explain different approaches to the understanding of colonialism?
3) What were the different historical stages of colonialism? How did it impact the Indian economy?

UNIT 13 DECOLONIZATION

Structure

13.1 Introduction
13.2 Types of Decolonization
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13.1 INTRODUCTION

This Unit discusses that important phase of the 20th Century when the erstwhile empires gave way to the emergence of new nation-states or led to the independence of former colonies. This era is often called decolonization. This Unit will discuss the broad scope of the term with respect to various theoretical approaches, its historical manifestations and two case studies of France and Britain, the two erstwhile imperial powers whose distinct approach to decolonization led to different historical trajectories. Lastly, the case of Indian decolonization is discussed.

Decolonization or struggle for independence? In the historiography of national liberation the terms represent two opposite poles of interpretation. The first one suggests a process of disentanglement by the imperial power, as it were, in the manner of a kite flyer pulling back the thread of the kite when the kite is mangled. The second interpretation highlights the proactive process wherein colonial power is whittled away, eroded by the action of mass nationalism. The term decolonization is used here in the second sense, as coterminous with the colonial peoples' struggle for achievement of independence.

The term decolonization is believed to have been coined in 1932 by an expatriate German scholar Moritz Julius Bonn for his section on Imperialism in the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.

A recent study (Springhall, 2001) has defined decolonization as the surrender of external political sovereignty over colonized non European peoples plus the emergence of independent territories where once the West had ruled, or the process of transfer of power from empire to nation state.

13.2 TYPES OF DECOLONIZATION

There are broadly four types of decolonization:

1) self government for white settler colonies as it happened in Canada and Australia

2) formal end to empire followed by independent rule as in India
3) formal empire replaced by informal empire or neo-colonialism as in Latin America
4) mere change of imperial masters — in Indo-China when the French reluctantly left, the US moved in.

In this Unit, we shall focus on the second type, which was the most significant and the representative pattern of decolonization.

13.3 APPROACHES

The explanations of decolonization have been classified as follows:

- The nationalist approach
- International context approach
- Domestic constraints approach

13.3.1 The Nationalist Approach

In the nationalist view indigenous resistance and anti imperialist struggle led to independence. According to D.A. Low, the primary factor behind the end of empire was anti-imperialist movements — the metropolitan response only influenced the nature of this confrontation, not the outcome.

According to the nationalist approach the resistance movements of the colonial peoples determined the pace of decolonization. Colonial rule became unviable once the groups which sustained it withdrew support, often under nationalist pressure or influence.

The British imperialists presented the unravelling of empire as an orderly and rational process but the messy reality was much less consistent and unavoidable, as John Darwin has pointed out. In short, far from a planned withdrawal from empire, there was the irreversible erosion of position as imperial powers struggled to retain power by one means or another, conciliation or repression.

For example, in India, from the 1930s onwards, there was a swing of the pendulum from repression to conciliation. This had demoralizing consequences for the officials who had to implement both poles of policy. The same set of colonial officials who put the nationalist leaders in jail during the civil disobedience movement in 1930-34 had to serve under them during the period of formation of provincial ministries of 1937-39. The same dilemma racked officialdom in 1942 and 1946 — officials were demoralized as they feared that the leaders they had given harsh punishment to in the War years, and particularly to contain the 1942 revolt, would soon be their political masters in the provinces in 1946.

Whatever some of the metropolitan-centred accounts may suggest, the growth and development of a vigorous nationalism was almost invariably the principal propellant of sustained progress towards the ending of colonial rule.

13.3.2 International Context Approach

According to the approach highlighting the international context of decolonization, empires could not survive in the new world order after the Second World War. As John Darwin put it, in the Cold War era "colonial empires appeared as quaint survivors of a prewar age, to be quickly dismantled lest they be knocked to pieces in the turbulent wake of the superpowers.” The changed international climate was reflected in the Atlantic Charter issued by the Allies during the War which called for the independence of colonial peoples. The United Nations General Assembly went a step further in 1960 in its Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples. It sharply condemned colonial rule as a denial of fundamental human rights in contravention of the UN Charter.

The myth of European invincibility was shattered by the Japanese takeover of South East Asia during World War II, especially the British desertion of Singapore in 1942. Yet decolonization was not the inevitable result of World War II – though its pace quickened.

This international approach attributes the end of empires to the opposition of the US and USSR to ‘old style imperialism’. The US and USSR had nothing to gain from the older imperial powers, such as Britain and France, retaining their colonies. They had everything to gain from the end of empire as this enabled these two emerging superpowers to establish their influence over the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa. For example, US neo-colonialism replaced France in Indo-China, Japan in Korea and Britain in Pakistan, one of the two successor states of British India. The USSR treated Eastern Europe, Cuba and Mozambique, among others, as little more than ‘colonies’. Western Cold Warriors were quick to dub this as ‘socialist imperialism’, much to the chagrin of self respecting socialists, for whom the very word imperialism was anathema.

13.3.3 Domestic Constraints Approach

The metropolitan or domestic constraints approach focuses on how the colony became too big a burden on the mother country. From being the proverbial goose which laid golden eggs a time came when it was not worth expending money and men on it. British colonialism, it is argued by Holland, ‘became dysfunctional to the operational necessities of the metropole.’

In this explanation the end of empire is seen as a political choice made under pressure of domestic constraints and calculations of national interest. The mother country’s will to rule slackened once empire became too much of a nuisance, financially, militarily and in international relations. Historians John Gallagher and other scholars in the imperialist tradition argued that British imperial interests in India were declining, that India no longer fulfilled its role in the maintenance of imperial interests in the fields of either defence or commerce or finance and that, in fact, over the years it had become a liability for the British. Gallagher and Anil Seal argued that during the Second World War Britain footed the bill for India’s defence requirements.

Aditya Mukherjee has conclusively contradicted this view and demonstrated that British imperial control intensified considerably during the war and the economic exploitation of India increased manifold – “the colony, far from ceasing to pay, was subjected to a greater and most blatant appropriation of surplus through currency manipulations, forced loans, large military expenditures and numerous other unilateral transfers.”

B.R. Tomlinson is critical of the theory which sees decolonization only as a technique by which formal empire became informal in the interests of maximizing advantages to Britain. He concedes that there was an Indian angle to the end of empire, apart from changes in the metropolitan and world economies, but the Indian factor in his view was not nationalist pressure, but discontent with the ever-increasing financial burdens imposed by the colonial government on its subjects.

The end of the Second World War found Britain in a severe economic crisis and a war weary British populace wished to get rid of empire as quickly and painlessly as possible. This theme of getting rid of empire is suggested by the very title of R.J. Moore's book on Attlee and India – *Escape from Empire*.

Another factor was the post war expansion of the welfare state. Decolonization gathered pace once social reform became a priority and empire began to be perceived as a drain on resources. Politicians who were in favour of withdrawing from empire became the flavour of the day. It was no accident that the British public elected the Labour Party to office in 1945 despite Churchill, a Conservative Party prime minister, having just won the war for them. The new understanding was that the Labour Party was suitable for national reconstruction, which was the need of the hour. Another domestic constraint was that suppressing colonial revolts, be it in Palestine, Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus or Aden, was no longer viable. This was the argument given by Prime Minister Attlee against reassertion of authority in India in 1946:

"In the event of a breakdown of the administration or a general alignment of the political parties against us are we prepared to go back on our policy and seek to reestablish British rule as against the political parties and maintain it for 18 years? The answer must clearly be no because

a) In view of our commitments all over the world we have not the military force to hold India against a widespread guerilla movement or to reconquer India.

b) If we had, pub. [public] opinion in our Party would not stand for it.

c) It is doubtful if we could keep the Indian troops loyal. It is doubtful if our own troops would be prepared to act.

d) We should have world opinion agst. [against] us and be placed in an impossible position at UNO.

e) We have not now the administrative machine to carry out such a policy either British or Indian."

(Attlee's note, c. 13 November 1946, cited in Sucheta Mahajan, *Independence and Partition*, p.162)

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The argument, that the costs of coercion became too high, clearly has no basis. One can show that very high costs were indeed tolerated. Thus there are many problems with the Domestic Constraints Approach. One major problem, of course, is that it looks for the causes of decolonization, not in the colony but in the metropolis. A direct example of this approach is the assertion made by historian David Potter:

'an explanation for the end of colonialism is unlikely to be found within the boundaries of the subject country. Historians have so far been unable to account satisfactorily for political events like the end of colonialism because, quite simply, they have not been looking in the right place.'

This is overly Eurocentric. This approach refuses to acknowledge the powerful political initiatives taken in the colonies and explains independence (in other words decolonization) merely as an internal political arrangement within the metropolitan countries.

13.4 THE ERA OF DECOLONIZATION

The twentieth century was the era of decolonization. At the end of the twentieth century the world was no longer Eurocentric. The twentieth century had seen the decline and fall of Europe, which had been the centre of power, wealth and western civilization at the beginning of the century.

In the first decade of the twentieth century the nationalists posed a challenge in Asia and Africa. They were encouraged by the ability of Japan, a small Asian country, to inflict a crushing defeat on Russia, a European power, in 1905. Some of the well known leaders of the national movements were Sun Yat Sen in China, Arabi Pasha in Egypt and Bal Gangadhar Tilak in India. These movements were led, in this stage, by middle class English educated elites whose demand for a say in the running of their countries was changing into a demand for independence.

The First World War further fuelled nationalist discontent. The War effort had meant increased exploitation of colonies for raw materials, manpower and taxes and nationalists naturally questioned why the colonies should bear this burden. In 1919 when a new international order was emerging in Europe the national movements in the colonies underwent a transformation in a mass direction. In India this change was wrought by Gandhi; China had the May 4th Movement; in Turkey Kemal Ataturk rose to power; and in Indonesia the national movement reached a membership of 2.5 million. This phase also saw the deepening and spread of movements in Philippines, Burma and Ceylon.

Differences emerged between the old imperial powers like Great Britain and the newer ones like the US and Japan, on whether the old order should continue at all, and if so in what form? This stance of the **newer world powers encouraged** nationalists greatly.

The old imperial powers were undergoing a decline in their position. Britain's position as the global power par excellence was challenged by other powers from the late nineteenth century onwards. By the beginning of the twentieth century Britain lost her commercial preeminence.

But decline in imperial power did not mean collapse of empire as the interest of imperial powers in their colonies did not wane. In fact empire had to be maintained at any cost, including severe repression, such as the brutal gunning down of innocent men, women and children in Jallianwala Bagh in Amritsar in India in 1919.

In the years after the Russian Revolution the process of colonial emancipation and decolonization went much further. In the non western world countries either went through revolution or the prophylactic decolonization by empires doomed in an era of world revolution. Revolution, then, did change the world if not quite in the way Lenin expected.

Anti-imperialist activity was fuelled because of the **world wide Depression of 1929**. Sharpening of conflict as in Egypt and India and victory of Republican ultras under De Valera in the Irish elections of 1932 were belated anti-colonial reactions to the economic breakdown. In the economic sphere, the Depression furthered the trend to set up local production, which had begun after the First World War when imperial powers made their colonies industrially self-sufficient. Japan had encouraged limited industrialization in Korea and Manchuria and Britain in India. Bipan Chandra has described the impact of the Depression as the loosening of links between the colony and the metropolis, which encouraged independent capitalist growth in the colony.

World War II showed up Great Britain as a second fiddle to the US in the Anglo-American alliance. After 1945 the US and Russia became the two superpowers. Where earlier London held this position, now the world was no longer its oyster, to use Paul Kennedy's evocative phrase. As a US official put it, it is now our turn to bat in Asia. As the Russians were equally keen to have a global role, a bipolar world emerged. Britain had been one of the big three in the war. But for her, victory in the war did not bring with it consolidation of power. The war had overstrained the British economy vastly and it needed American help to keep going. The US propped up her economy with the Lend Lease offer. But it was some years before the British withdrew from India and later Palestine and even then this was presented as preserving more important areas of imperial interests elsewhere. Outwardly Britain remained a big power, second only to the US.

In the third world the Second World War had caused great upheavals, political and economic. Within years of the end of the War many colonies gained independence, but often after protracted disagreement, encouraged by the imperial power, on the contentious issue of distribution of power, leading to partition and civil war. Various areas of troublesome conflict in the 1970s and 80s, Middle East, Cyprus, South Africa, Kashmir, Sri Lanka, were legacies of British decolonization.

In India the imperial power delayed in handing over power on the specious ground that it must await agreement between the communities on how power was to be transferred. Specious in retrospect because when they left, they left any which way. Gandhi appealed to them to leave India, to anarchy if need be. He understood that agreement could not be brokered by a partisan broker. Once the colonial power left, he believed, the two communities would, like siblings dividing ancestral property, agree or agree to disagree. At worst, civil war would result but even that fire would be purifying. Given that the much celebrated agreed solution left at least 200,000 dead, perhaps Gandhi could have been tried out.

13.5 DECOLONIZATION OR DECOLONIZATIONS? FRANCE AND BRITAIN

Was there decolonization or were there as many decolonizations as there are colonial powers or even colonies? As we have seen, though there is a **wider pattern of decolonization** – it was generally a mid twentieth century phenomenon under the impact of the national liberation movements – there are also **significant differences** between, for example, French and British decolonization. For example, if the British maintained strategic, political and cultural interests in its erstwhile colonies through the Commonwealth, cultural integration was the mode of association preferred by the French. The French had no mechanism like the British Commonwealth to ease the transition of colonies to independence. Assimilation remained the imperial ideal. The French Union was federal only in name and the National Assembly continued to be sovereign.

If we look at British and French India, a difference that strikes one is the long and protracted negotiations for transfer of power in French India in contrast to the way the British quit India. Seven long years after the achievement of Indian independence from British colonial rule the de facto transfer of power in the French Indian enclaves took place in 1954. This was linked to the political developments in Indo-China, considered to be one of the more important areas under French imperial control. However, much water was to flow under the bridge and eight years lapsed before the French Indian enclaves achieved de jure independence from French colonial rule in 1962. This time around the association was with the political developments in Algeria, a colony crucial for France. The milestones of 1954 and 1962 were the culmination of a long and protracted struggle for independence waged by the nationalists in the French colonial enclaves in India.

A study of British and French colonialism in a comparative perspective in the specific context of decolonization is extremely revealing. Whereas the liberation of India from British colonial rule set off a chain reaction of independence in other British colonies, such as Burma and Ceylon, France continued to cling to its colonial possessions. It had the second largest colonial empire in the world and was keen to keep Indo-China and Algeria and Morocco even if others saw this as beyond their means. It did not even give up its five colonial enclaves in India with grace, perhaps because of their strategic link with Indo-China. In this, there was a parallel with His Majesty's Government's short-lived attempt to retain the Andaman and Nicobar Islands as a vital link on the Suez-Singapore route.

France refused to see the writing on the wall in Indo-China. Following an armed revolt in 1930 and peasant revolts led by communists in 1930-31, the French executed nearly 700 nationalist and communist leaders. They made it plain, by the use of repression, that Vietnamese ambitions of independence would not be tolerated. By 1945 there were popular revolts against the French in many parts of Vietnam, which then came under communist control, with the help of the quite remarkable Vietnamese guerrilla army. The French were conclusively defeated in the battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954.

In contrast, the British were interested in preserving their empire in India but when a non violent mass agitation fashioned by Gandhi steadily eroded their power, they saw that they did not have the wherewithal to maintain rule and preferred a graceful withdrawal to a messy holding on.

Indian independence in 1947 was followed by independence in Burma in 1948 and Ceylon in the same year. Malaya gained independence nine years later. In Africa the British were willing to grant independence except where there were large numbers of white settlers as in South Africa and Kenya. Ghana gained independence under Kwame Nkrumah in 1957. Togo, Cameroons, Somalia and Nigeria became independent in 1960. In 1964 all seven British East and Central African colonies, Somaliland, Tanganyika, Uganda, Zanzibar, Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia became independent. Botswana and Swaziland followed in 1966. Britain was not willing to hand over power in Kenya because of white settlers there and hence got embroiled in suppressing a protracted and violent revolt, such as the Mau Mau.

The French colonies of Morocco and Tunisia gained independence in 1956. In contrast, independence was completely ruled out for Algeria as it was seen as an integral part of France. This short sighted policy was to lead to a bloody war, as in Vietnam. In Africa local autonomy was granted in 1956 but the colonies were placed in a union, termed the French Community, strictly controlled by France. Eight colonies in French West Africa, four in French Equatorial Africa and Madagascar gained independence in 1960. Thus there were three different policies followed by the French in Africa.

In the words of Immanuel Wallerstein, “as a result of their special framework of thinking concerning the colonies, the British were the first to begin the process of decolonization.” They accepted national independence as a legitimate objective. They were anxious to avoid a repetition of what happened in America in their other settler colonies, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. In Africa local people were given representation in legislative bodies. Once India became part of the Commonwealth, which was earlier White, the road was clear for Africa. “Thus, the pace of constitutional development in British non-settler Africa was rapid and marked by a minimum of violence and antagonism.”

In contrast to the British acceptance of national independence as a legitimate objective, the French did not believe in the legitimacy of nationalism for colonial subjects “the French concept of constitutional advance was to draw colonies closer to France, not push them farther away.” This policy was reconsidered only after the Second World War. French Africans were elected to legislative bodies in France. The British associated Africans with local bodies whereas the French associated Africans with French bodies. African political parties were extensions of metropolitan parties or attached themselves to French parties. At the end of World War II French colonies started on a radically different path of development from that of the British colonies. Yet fifteen years later they had arrived at the same point as the British – viz., national independence. What had happened to make the French pattern conform to the British pattern?

There were two factors that influenced a change in the French pattern of constitutional development. The first was the events in Ghana, the second was the developments in North Africa and Indo-China. Tunisia and Morocco became restive, as did Togo and the Cameroons. After their defeat in Indo-China in 1954 the French took decisive steps towards independence of Algeria, l’Afrique noire and Madagascar. The difference between the British and the French was that one long accepted the path to independence while the other did it late and with the greatest difficulty.

But these were not the only differences. The British sought to maintain influence in their colonies after the end of empire by encouraging their ex-colonies to follow the Westminster model of parliamentary government with its multi party system. The French did not care what form of government was adopted, their concern was with cultural rather than political influence.

The British and French differed in their approach to larger political federations. The French opposed federations in French West and Equatorial Africa as the nationalists were behind them whereas the British worked towards federations as they would be useful in the post-independence situation. However, as the overall trend was towards unitary structures within states, differences in British and French attitudes eventually made little difference.

There were differences between the British and French perceptions of the role of the civil service. In Britain civil servants were nonpartisan whereas in France junior civilians were political. However, this made little difference after independence.

Not all agree with the view of the particularity of the British style of transfer of power, that it was planned, phased and orderly. It is pointed out that in practice transfer of power in many British colonies was patchy, disorderly, reluctant and enforced. A middle view is that they were pushed along the path of self-government. In the words of Dennis Austin, "it was a peculiar and distinctive feature of British colonial rule to have always contemplated its end: the colonial governments went (we might romantically say) consentingly to their fate, but they had also to be pushed in that direction and they were pushed primarily by local events within the colonial territories which obliged the Colonial Office and local colonial governments alike to introduce reforms at a pace which, in the post-war years, began to quicken beyond all earlier calculations."

In sharp contrast, independence was dismissed as impossible at the French African Conference in Brazzaville in Algeria in 1944:

> The aims of the civilizing labours of France in the colonies exclude all possibilities of development outside of the French imperial system; the eventual formation even in the distant future of 'self-governments' in the colonies must be dismissed [and the empire was to be conducted] in the Roman not the Anglo-Saxon sense.

Yet, the outcome of these very different policies of the British and French was the same. Widespread economic and political discontent in Africa led to the uniform collapse of empire across British and French colonies. This seriously questions the view that French and British Africa were poles apart. Under pressure from a continent-wide 'wind of change', in the words of the British Prime Minister, Macmillan, colonial empires collapsed in Africa between 1957 and 1964 like "the proverbial row of dominoes", in the words of D.A. Low.

Also, it is very interesting that General de Gaulle's explanation of decolonization is a general systemic one which does not distinguish between British and French patterns:

> The relative weakening of England and France, the defeat of Italy and the subordination of Holland and Belgium to the designs of the United States; the effect produced on the Asians and Africans by the battles fought on their soil for which the colonizers needed their support; the dissemination of doctrines which, whether liberal or socialist, equally demanded the emancipation of races and individuals; and the wave of envious longing aroused among these deprived masses by the spectacle of the modern economy – as a result of all these factors the world was faced with an upheaval as profound, though in the opposite direction, as that which has unleashed the discoveries and conquests of the power of old Europe. *(Memoirs of Hope)*

13.6 INDIAN INDEPENDENCE: A CASE STUDY OF DECOLONIZATION

India selects itself as a case study. It was the classic colony. Its mass movement was the greatest the world has seen. Indian independence had an amazing demonstration effect. The achievement of independence in India triggered off a wave of similar developments across Africa and Asia.

When did the realization dawn upon the imperial power that the end of the fabled empire, on which the sun never set, is near? At the end of the War, when the British authorities in India evaluated their position in the context of the post-1942 situation, it was clear to them that the hegemonic foundations of their rule were fast crumbling. Even erstwhile loyalists were deserting and the Indian Civil Service (ICS) was reaching a breaking point. The general consent of the people to British rule had diminished and the open, military repression of the 1942 movement had contributed greatly to this. Even liberal opinion in the country had shifted, slowly but steadily, away from the British and towards the nationalist forces.

The Civil Service was deemed to be at breaking point by the end of 1943. The problem of declining recruitment, which had plagued the ICS ever since the end of the First World War, had reached alarming proportions by the Second World War. By 1939, its British and Indian members had achieved parity. Overall recruitment was first cut in order to maintain this balance and then stopped in 1943. By August 1945, the number of British officials was down to 522 and Indian officials up to 524. Besides, the men coming in were no longer Oxbridge graduates from upper class families, many of whose fathers and uncles were 'old India hands' and who believed in the destiny of the British nation to govern the 'child people' of India. The new officials were increasingly grammar school and polytechnic boys for whom serving the Raj was a career, not a mission.

However, the main factor in the debilitation of the ICS was not manpower shortage but the slow, invidious decline of its prestige and authority. Here the erosion of authority had been taking place over the years, when the rising nationalist forces had been sought to be contained by a policy of conciliation mixed with repression. But the strategy of the national movement, of a multifaceted struggle combining non-violent mass movements with working of constitutional reforms, proved to be more than a match for them. When non-violent movements were met with repression, the naked force behind the government stood exposed, offending the sensibility of the government's supporters; whereas if government did not clamp down on 'sedition', or effected a truce [as in 1931 when the Gandhi-Irwin Pact was signed] or conceded provincial autonomy under the Government of India Act, 1935, British government was seen to be too weak to wield control and its authority and prestige were undermined.

The impact of the nationalist movement on the bureaucracy was not only indirect, through weakening morale under pressure from mass movements and ministries. The permeation of nationalist sentiment among the Indian element of the services, especially the subordinate services and even the police, directly affected their loyalty and reliability. Even earlier, during the provincial ministries of 1937-39, the tendency of Indian officials to look up to the Congress was apparent, but, by 1945, the Indian services were assertively nationalist. For example, railway officials in east U.P. decorated their stations in honour of Nehru and Pant and in one instance detained a goods train for three hours to enable Nehru to make a speech and then travel by it. In the Central Provinces the clerical staff voted for the Congress at the elections and more interestingly, wanted this to be known. The British, of course, preferred to see their feelings as merely the tendency of the natives to worship the rising and not the setting sun.

By 1945, nationalist feeling had reached the army, which was otherwise, too, in a state of flux. Politicized elements had entered the army, especially the technical services, under the new recruitment policy, which was liberalized because the carefully selected men of the 'martial races' did not suffice. The soldiers who fought in Europe and South East Asia and liberated countries from fascist control, returned home with new ideas. When the issue of the Indian National Army (INA) prisoners came up, the army authorities discovered that army opinion was not clamouring for punishment, as initially expected, but predominantly in favour of leniency. The Commander-in-

Chief's opinion had changed by February 1946, when he stated that "any Indian officer worth his salt is a nationalist".

It was increasingly clear to the British that the old basis of British rule would not continue for long, and a new structure would have to be devised, if rule was to continue. Later, in mid-1946, many officials, including the Viceroy, were to argue that in the face of such an eventuality the whole nature of British rule could be transformed to one of strong, autocratic authority, replenished by new officials, which could then maintain British rule for 15-20 years. Even then, their argument was turned down, but in early 1946 this option was not even proposed.

In late 1945, when the British saw the imminence of collapse, they sought to avert it by offering constitutional concessions. They could not take the risk of the concessions being rejected, for, if that happened, a mass movement would follow which they might not be able to contain. With the need being to avoid a contingency of negotiations breaking down, the concessions had to be of substance, which largely met the demand of the Congress. And so, faced with the Congress demand of Quit India and with the large majority of people affirming it, the Cabinet Mission went out from England in 1946 to negotiate the setting up of a national government and set into motion the machinery for transfer of power. It was not an empty gesture like the Cripps Mission in 1942; they intended to stay till they succeeded in securing some agreement. The reality was that they could not afford failure, for failure would lead to a humiliating surrender before a mass movement or would necessitate a basic change in the character of British rule from semi-hegemonic to repressive and autocratic. The first was obviously to be avoided at all costs; the second was also not likely to appeal either to the Labour Government that was in power, or to British and American public opinion, which was still conditioned by the pro-democratic and anti-Fascist euphoria of the War years. As a result the outcome was somewhat contradictory. Although the British expressed a political wish to transfer power to a United India, they actually ended up partitioning India into two countries. Though it was meant to be a smooth, peaceful transfer of power from British to Indian (and Pakistani) hands legitimized by an Act of British Parliament, it turned out to be a violent and brutal process leaving millions of people dead and homeless.

13.7 SUMMARY

The second half of the twentieth century witnessed the collapse of colonialism. Between 1945 and 1965 over fifty decolonizations took place in Asia and Africa and a handful more ten years later. The 1970s freed another clutch, notably Portuguese Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Angola. Zimbabwe was freed as late as the 1980s.

It is a paradox that the end of empire changed the world as much as the establishment of empire did. The end of Empire deprived Europe of status and grandeur. Europeans lost freedom of movement and economic activity given by empire. The foremost imperial power, Britain, became a second rate power. The third world comprising the countries which emerged from colonialism became a powerful force in world politics.

In the words of historian Eric Hobsbawm, "the huge colonial empires built up before and during the Age of Empire, were shaken and crumbled into dust. The entire history of modern imperialism, so firm and self confident when Queen Victoria of Great Britain died, had lasted no longer than a single lifetime."

13.8 EXERCISES

1) What do we broadly understand by decolonization? Discuss different approaches to understand it?

2) Discuss the historical context within which decolonization of different countries took different paths? How would you categorize India in this context?

3) Analyze the differences between France and England towards decolonization.

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UNIT 14 MIGRATIONS AND SETTLEMENTS

Structure

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14.1 INTRODUCTION

Cross-continental migrations of people started with the origin of humanity and continues till now. Migrations occur for economic reasons and occasionally also result due to coercion by the political regime. The latter type of migration could be categorized as forced migration. The migration of the Europeans in the early modern era was most systematic and well recorded. This migration was mostly sea borne and occurred in the east-west direction. Along with human beings, this migration also involved movement of animals, plants and diseases. Some of the migrations occurred long before speech and writing was invented. So, detailed accounts of these migrations are lost forever in the mist of time. In this Unit, you will study different patterns of immigrations, socio-economic and political changes brought out by them and how they have affected world history, particularly during modern times.

14.2 MIGRATION IN HISTORY

Probably human beings (*homo sapiens*) first surfaced in Central Africa. Many thousands of years ago, India and Africa were linked by a land bridge. So, from Central Africa, some marched into India. These migrants in history are known as Dravidians. They introduced agriculture and the art of constructing cities in the sub-continent. The landmass known as Gondwanaland moved up in the northerly direction due to changes in plate tectonics. This resulted in breaking up of the land connection with Africa and crushing of the Tethys Sea which became the Himalayas. About 50,000 years ago, the people from South East Asia settled in Australia. They reached Australia by island hopping in small canoes. Or probably a landmass connected Australia with South East Asia which in later times broke up and now constitutes the Indonesian archipelago. At that time, the sea levels were much lower than at present. The aborigines of Australia moved further east and inhabited New Zealand and Polynesia. Around 35,000 BC, the hunters from Siberia crossed the Bering

Straits and moved into Alaska. They migrated down south into Chile. The descendants of these early migrants are the 'native Americans' whom the Europeans of the post-Columbian era encountered. Around 3000 BC a group of people in Central Asia speaking what philologists call Indo-Aryan language moved into India, Persia (Iran) and in the region along eastern Mediterranean. In India they are known as Aryans. In Persia they are known as Indo-Iranians. And in the Balkans they are known as Dorians who founded the Greek Civilization. The Germans also trace their ancestry to the Indo-Aryan groups settled in Central Europe.

Long before Columbus, the Vikings in their long ships discovered Greenland and also made a landfall in Newfoundland. However, large scale migration from Scandinavia to Iceland, Greenland and North America did not occur. Rather the Scandinavians and the Goths moved south into central and southern Europe. Demographic expansion pushed the Goths further south into the Roman Mediterranean. German (Teutons and the Goths) tribal invasions had occurred before 100 BC but became more systematic after 350 AD. The Germans attacked the Western Roman Empire due to rising demographic pressure and the riches that could be obtained by plundering the rich Roman provinces of Gaul (France), Spain and Italy. Why did these migrations take place? Scholars have pointed out a number of factors that motivated these migrations. Let us look at some of them.

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14.2.1 Economy

The lure of fertile land, pillage and plunder as well as prospect of trade also encouraged migrations and settlements. Greece was full of mountains and ravines. Fertile agricultural land was scarce and quite constricted. The land hunger of the Greeks encouraged city states like Corinth to occupy Sicily and South Italy where Greek cities like Tarentum, Regusia, etc. came up around 400-300 BC. The Greeks exported wine and olive oil and imported wheat especially from the Black Sea region. Because the staying power of the triremes was small, during the night every Greek ship had to make a landfall along the coast. The maritime trade route moved across the straits of the Dardanelles hugging the shoreline of Asia Minor. And the prospect of monopolizing maritime trade with Anatolia (Turkey) and the Danubian principalities encouraged Athens to set up colonies along the coast of Asia Minor. Before the Greeks, when the Achaemenid Emperors of Persia occupied Tyre, the chief city of the Phoenicians, mass migration of the latter occurred. The Phoenicians were the best mariners and most aggressive traders of the ancient world. They founded the city of Carthage in Tunisia in North Africa. The Phoenicians also founded colonies along the Mediterranean and Atlantic coasts of Spain. Carthage colonized Sardinia and Corsica.

Afghanistan is full of ragged mountains. Some of the tribes survive even now by practising pastoral nomadism. The deficit economy of the Afghans forced them to migrate to India with their families in the medieval era. As military labourers the Afghans took service with the Delhi Sultans and the Mughal Emperors and settled in India especially in the fertile plains of Rohilkhand and Bihar.

14.2.2 Climate

Climatic changes also generated large scale migration for survival. The gradual desiccation of Central Asia pushed the steppe nomadic tribes into Southern Asia and Eastern Europe. Due to the drying up of the heartland of Eurasia and falling water table, the horse riding nomads attacked the sedentary civilization. The Chinese called them *hsung-nu* (horse people). One group of Central Asian nomads known as Huns migrated west along with their families. They attacked India, Persia and both the Eastern and Western Roman Empires. Some of the Huns settled in present day Rajasthan, Gujarat and Sindh. In India the descendants of the Huns were known as Scythians who after intermarriages came to be known as Rajputs. Long before the Huns, Persia encountered intrusion of the Central Asian nomads in the form of Scythians and Parthians. Along with the Huns, Sarmatians and Avars (other branches of the Central Asian nomads) also attacked both the Eastern and Western Roman Empires. Some of the Central Asian tribes settled in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary. The present day Magyars of Hungary were descendants of the Huns. Increasing cold in Scandinavia also encouraged Viking migration in the late medieval age. The Vikings settled in Denmark, England, Normandy province in France and also in south Italy. By sailing along the rivers of Russia, the Vikings also reached the Eastern Roman Empire or the Byzantine Empire. Some Vikings settled in the trans-Caucasus region.

14.2.3 Culture

Besides economy, climate, demography and technology, culture has also been an important determinant of migration and settlement. In 1400 China's maritime technology was equal to that of West Europe. During 1405-33, China had maritime relations with South East Asia. A Chinese fleet under Admiral Cheng Ho came upto East Africa by sailing along Sri Lanka. The Chinese junks also visited the shores of Australia and the Pacific coast of North America. But, Confucian China held itself to be culturally and politically superior to its neighbours. China looked down upon the surrounding nations as barbarians who were fit only to pay tribute to the Chinese Emperor. Cheng Ho's voyages were motivated by a quest for tribute and for luxuries and curiosities for the Chinese court and not by a desire to extend China's knowledge about the rest of the world or to establish permanent maritime trade relations and overseas settlements. Commerce and merchants occupied a low position within the Chinese Empire. In contrast, the merchants in early modern Europe were assertive and prosperous. Cheng Ho's voyages were not followed up by the Ming dynasty which retreated into its self-imposed isolation till the mid-seventeenth century. Thus Confucianism in a way discouraged discovery and settlement of the overseas regions. Again, the Romans believed that the world was in the shape of a square and if anybody were to sail beyond the straits of Gibraltar into Atlantic, he would fall into hell. This discouraged a Roman breakout from the constricted inland Mediterranean Sea into the western direction. Associated with culture is the factor of religion. Driven by poverty and the zeal of Islam, the Arabs in the seventh century burst out of the desert of Arabia and settled along the coast of North Africa, Asia Minor and *Ajam* (Iran and Iraq).

14.3 THE EUROPEAN EXPANSION: 1400-1800

The era of mass migration of the Europeans in the extra-European world was preceded by what could be categorized as the 'Age of Discovery'. The latter term refers to intensive maritime exploration of the oceans by the European mariners. For the first time, Ferdinand Magellan circumnavigated the globe during 1519-22. The sturdy European cogs could cross the Atlantic regularly. Relying on a new capacity for long distance voyaging the Europeans charted out the coastal features and principal outlines of the major landmasses of the globe thus creating a new sort of knowledge which previously did not exist. According to David Arnold, the age of discovery was sustained by the invention of printing press. William Caxton first printed books in 1470s. Printed pamphlets and books along with sophisticated techniques of map making disseminated knowledge about the new worlds. This occurred during the fifteenth and the sixteenth centuries. The mastery over the seas and the growth of European geographical knowledge enabled the Europeans to control the commerce of the non-European world. This also aided the expansion of European territorial control in the non-European world.

The principal motive behind Europe's expansionist drive was the search for trade. Europe saw itself as the poorer neighbour of Asia and Africa. This was because of the exaggerated travellers' tales and the nature of products which reached Europe. Africa and Asia exported gold, jewel, silk, carpets, spices and porcelains to Europe. All these created the notion among the Europeans about luxury, wealth, skilled artisans and thriving craft industries in Afro-Asia. The Indonesian archipelago was famous for spice. Cloves were grown in the Moluccas, nutmeg and mace in the Banda islands and pepper in Sumatra. Sri Lanka was famous for cinnamon and South West India (Malabar coast) produced pepper. Due to inadequate fodder, the animals in Europe had to be slaughtered before every winter. There were few fruits and vegetables available at that time. And the principal diet of the Europeans remained meat. Spice was used to add flavour to the stale and salted meat. Spices were also used in the cakes, drinks and confectionary. Very few European products were in demand in the East. Coarse woollen goods produced in Europe had no takers in the East. The Europeans needed gold in order to pay for goods brought from Asia and for coinage which was required to sustain Europe's internal trade. This 'gold famine' encouraged the Europeans to explore and trade overseas. The Europeans also searched for fish at ever increasing distances from Europe's shores. Dried salted cod formed a major item of Portugal's trade with the rest of Europe. In search of fish, the Portuguese moved west of North West Africa and in the North Atlantic where the discovery of Azores in the 1430s gave them a strategic base for further reconnaissance of the mid Atlantic. Before Cabral's discovery of Brazil, the Portuguese had conducted reconnaissance of the shores of South America. Spain, from its bases in the Caribbean islands, despatched repeated expeditions in search of a route to the East Indies for getting spices.

Instead of the Italian cities which were most interested in maritime trade, it was the West European powers which took the lead in oceanic voyages. This was partly because the Italian galleys were suited for calmer waters of Mediterranean than the rough seas of the Atlantic. Again the geographic position of Spain, Portugal and Britain is more suited than Venice and Genoa for undertaking exploration of the Atlantic. The Italian cities were more interested in continuing their traditional lucrative trade with Asia through Levant rather than to engage in the risky Atlantic ventures especially when economic returns from such explorations remained uncertain.

Initially the European enclaves in the newly discovered lands were forts and ports. In Asia the indigenous potentates were quite powerful. The Ottoman Empire, the Ming Empire and the Mughal Empire were formidable entities. In such a scenario, the Europeans found themselves in the role of supplicants and observers rather than as conquerors and settlers. Since indigenous resistance in the New World was weak, the European coastal enclaves quickly expanded into big territorial empires. Unlike the commercial empires of the Italian city states, Spain went for a territorial empire. The mobile sheep herders of southern Spain and the cattle herders of Andalusia joined the ranks of conquerors and functioned as soldier-settlers. Militant Christianity enabled them to believe that they were bound to win and bring the heathens into the fold of Christianity. The search for the mythical Christian King Prester John who would aid the Europeans in their struggle against the Muslims also encouraged the voyages of discovery. Finally the search for a route to India was part of the Spanish programme of *Reconquista* i.e. the crusade against Islam. This was because the Muslim Ottomans controlled the land routes to Asia.

14.3.1 Migrations to South America

Columbus found gold in Hispaniola which in turn attracted more European settlers. Returning to the West Indies in 1493, Columbus brought 1500 settlers with him including farmers and craftsmen to colonize Hispaniola. Another 2500 arrived in 1502. They were expected to form a self-sufficient community. But, the Spanish conquerors, greedy for gold and contemptuous of manual labour, had no intention of tilling the land. The Crown of Castile granted them legal power to command the labour of the local populace. Many Indians died due to harsh treatment at the hands of the settlers. The search for labour resulted in the conquest of Puerto Rico in 1508, Jamaica in 1509, and Cuba in 1511. Cuba, settled by Diego de Valazquez, started yielding gold from 1511 onwards. The aggressive land hungry conquerors then moved on to the mainland of America. In 1519 an expedition of about 600 men with 16 horses, 14 cannons and 13 muskets arrived under Hernan Cortes on the Gulf coast of Mexico from Cuba.

In 1428 the Aztecs defeated the city state of Atzcapotzalco and established an empire that extended from the Gulf of Mexico to the Pacific Coast. However, the Americans' stone edged swords and fire hardened arrows were no match against the steel swords and cannons of the Europeans. The Spanish were able to defeat Montezuma in 1521. Between 1522 and 1524 most of the Pacific coast as far north as Santiago River was conquered. The interior was full of dense rain forest, big rivers, riparian swamps and mountain ranges.

Pachauti Inca in 1438 defeated Chimu and controlled northern Peru. He established a dynamic centralized state. Topa Inca (1471-93) conquered northern Chile and northern Argentina. His successor Huyana Capac (1493-1525) conquered Ecuador. From the core area of Peru, the Incas extended their dominion upto Ecuador in the north and Maule River in Chile in the south. At heights between 9000 and 13000 feet the Incas established an empire which from north to south extended upto 2175 miles. The empire was held together by an impressive road system. Their cities were built of solid dressed stones. The capital was Cuzco. Huyana Capac founded a second capital at Quito. In 1531 Francisco Pizarro invaded Peru with 180 men and 27 horses. At that time, the Inca Empire was passing through a succession crisis. Atahualpa and his half brother Huescar were dominant in the northern and southern sections of the empire respectively. Atahualpa commanded 65000 men. Nevertheless hand held firearms and cannons gave victory to the small European forces. Almagro traversed Bolivia and penetrated into Chile before returning to Cuzco in 1537. Almagro's reconnaissance in force was followed by Pedro de Valdivia who in 1541 founded the city of Santiago and settled Spanish farming communities. Around 1572, the Inca resistance came to an end in Peru.

By 1600, Portugal was controlling Brazil, West Africa plus the seaboard of China. And the Spanish American Empire extended from Texas to Chile. The Araucanians in Central Chile and the Muras in Central Amazonia tried to check the aggression of the Europeans unsuccessfully. The Maya Civilization (also known as Itzas) extended along Guatemala and Yucatan. In 1523 Pedro de Alvarado attacked the Mayas at Guatemala. The Mayas lacked political unity. Fighting was going on between the Cakchiquel and Quiche. This internal division allowed Alvarado to subdue both. Nojpeten, the capital of the Maya people fell to Spanish attack in 1697.

14.3.2 Migrations to North America

From Mexico, the Spaniards expanded north into the southern portion of North America. In 1781 the Yuma rebellion thwarted Spanish expansion along the Colorado Valley into Arizona. Due to pressure on the Great Plains, the tribes like Comanche and Utes started moving south and exerted pressure along the northern section of the fledgling Spanish frontier. These tribes were mounted on horses and equipped with firearms supplied by the French. By 1790 the Spaniards expanded in California.

The North American tribes practised rudimentary hunting and fishing. The British in North America after settling down became fishermen, farmers, traders, etc. The early English settlements in Americas were at Jamestown and Virginia. In 1760 fighting broke out between the British and the Cherokee whose hunting land in east Tennessee and west North Carolina were under pressure due to the advancing frontier of British-American control and settlement.

In 1608, the French settled in Quebec. In 1699 Pierre Le Moyne founded Fort Maurepas in Biloxi Bay, Mobile was set up in 1702 and New Orleans in 1718. The French also consolidated their position on St. Lawrence in 1701. French missions were already established at Cahokia in 1699 and in Kaskaskia in 1703 on the upper Mississippi. Fort St. Charles came up on the Lake of the Woods in 1732 followed by another fort at the southern end of Lake Winnipeg. In 1732 the French established a garrison post to check the Chickasaws. Fort La Reine in 1738 was established on the Assiniboine River. Fort Bourbon in 1739 expanded French presence to the northwest shore of Lake Winnipeg and Fort Dauphin established French presence on the western shore of Lake Winnipegosis. In 1748 Fort St. Jean was rebuilt to strengthen the French position near Lake Champlain. A new wagon road linked the fort to Montreal. In 1750 the French erected Fort Rouille (Toronto). And Fort La Corne in 1753 came up near the Forks of the Saskatchewan. In the south the French expanded from Louisiana. The Natchez tribe around New Orleans was crushed by the French.

In the sixteenth century, between 1000 and 2000 Iberians migrated to the Americas annually. During the 1630-40s, the Europeans were attracted towards West Indies due to availability of land in easy terms which was used for growing tobacco, indigo and cotton. In 1640 the population of Barbados was 30000 or 200 per square mile. St. Kitts' population in the same year was 20000. In the middle of the century, the shift was towards large scale sugar plantations. Between 30000 and 50000 white migrants arrived in Jamaica in the first half of the eighteenth century. And they took to cultivation. Many French immigrants went to West Indies especially Saint-Domingue. The Spanish Americans took to farming, ranching and mining of precious metals. The Americas exported hides, tallow and sugar. In the 1540s the Spanish discovered the silver mines at Potsoi (Bolivia) and Zacatecas (Mexico). There was a higher percentage of Spaniards in Central Mexico and Peru than in Columbia and Ecuador. The Cuiaba goldfields in the interior of Brazil was discovered in 1719. In the 1760s about 5000 Portuguese migrated to Brazil annually. They totalled about 400,000 by the end of the eighteenth century. In 1763-4 about 9000 French colonists were shipped to Cayenne in South America. Many of the European settlers were wage labourers, peasants and indentured servants. In Latin America the indigenous population was mostly rural and the Spaniards and the Portuguese were disproportionately present in the major towns. In North America also the size of the European towns went on increasing. Philadelphia was planned in 1680 and had a population of 2500 in 1685; 4000 in 1690; and 25000 in 1760.

14.3.3 The English and French Approaches to Migration

The rise of European population in British North America was greater than in New France because the British were willing to accept people of all religious backgrounds. By contrast, the French colonial policy was to establish Catholic colonies in North America. So, the Huguenots (French Protestants) went to British North America. An Act of Parliament in 1697 which allowed people to seek work outside their own parish if they carried a certificate made the poor mobile and encouraged their migration to America and West Indies as indentured labours. In the seventeenth century English migrants dominated emigration from the British Isles to the New World. But, in the eighteenth century there was extensive emigration from Scotland and Ireland. Lack of economic opportunities in Scotland and Ireland encouraged migration in North America. Between 1643 and 1700, the population of Massachusetts increased from 16000 to 60000 and that of Connecticut from 5500 to 20000, and that of Virginia from 15000 to 60000. By the end of the seventeenth century, the population of New York increased to 20000. The total population of the English mainland colonies at the end of the seventeenth century was above 200,000 which was greater than the French colonies.

By 1666 there were only 3200 French in New France. During the 1660s and the 1670s the French government provided money to the settlers. Especially the immigration of the orphans was subsidized. Fur dominated exports from Quebec, a principal French colony. The French minister Colbert wanted to develop the St. Lawrence Valley as a source of food and industry which would complement the fishing off Newfoundland. Grain, fish and timber were exported from New France and Newfoundland to the West Indies. By the end of the seventeenth century, while the number of French inhabitants was about 10000, there were about 210000 Europeans in British North America. In 1740 while New France had only 56000 inhabitants of French origin, British North America had about one million people of European background. Between 1608 and 1759, only 11370 French settled in New Canada. About 6-7 people per million left France annually for New France. New Amsterdam had become New York which was taken by the British in the second half of the seventeenth century in the aftermath of the Second Dutch War. Under the Plantation Act of 1745 it was possible for all except the Catholics to become eligible for naturalization after seven years in a British colony. After 1730 as readily cultivable land grew scarcer in Maryland, Pennsylvania and Virginia, the colonists expanded along the Shenandoah Valley, James River and Roanoke Gap and then moved into the Carolinas. Between 1730 and 1775, the white population of North Carolina rose from 30000 to 255,000. The combined population of the blacks and the whites (but not the Red Indians) in Georgia was 23375 in 1770 and 33000 in 1773.

Among the early migrants there were more men than women. So, many Spaniards and Portuguese took Indian women as wives or concubines. Their offspring were known as *mestizos* and they settled mostly among the coastal regions. By the 1690s in certain areas such as the Chesapeake Bay, the percentage of American born inhabitants rose which meant a better balance of men and women. The product of European-indigenous American marriages helped the European settlers as translators and also played a major role in trade. Such intermarriages were very common in the frontier societies at Hudson Bay and in West Africa. In the eighteenth century tension broke out between the *peninsulares* (natives of Spain) and the *criollos* (creoles, American born descendants of Spanish settlers).

The Germans and the Dutch were minor players in the whole project of overseas expansion. After the Thirty Years War, many poor people from North Germany went to the New World. The Germans were concentrated in Pennsylvania. In North Carolina, Swiss and German immigrants established New Bern which became the capital of the colony in 1770. About 30% of the colony's population were of German descent. But, immigration from Germany fell because they were more interested to settle in Russia.

The Russians unlike the West European maritime powers expanded the frontiers of Europe in East Asia by overland migration. As the *Tsarist* Empire expanded into that Crimea and Siberia, most of the Russians were concentrated in the urban areas. During the reign of Peter the Great, the Russians started exploiting the mines. The Russian population in Siberia rose from 100,000 in 1701 to 700,000 in 1721. Mining and metallurgy developed first in the Urals and then in the Altay region creating concentrations of people that had to be fed and protected. The Aleuts of Aleutian Islands clashed with the Russians in mid-eighteenth century who were searching for fur. In 1766, the Russians using cannons destroyed indigenous resistance in the Fox Islands.

14.4 A BIOLOGICAL INVASION

In the tropics most Europeans died or could not sustain self- replicating populations. But, in temperate America where few Europeans went they flourished demographically. A few Dutch agricultural settlers went to South Africa. Some Europeans also settled in the region around the Cape of Good Hope. But in general the Europeans failed to settle in Africa in considerable numbers. Tropical diseases like malaria and yellow fever checked the Portuguese migration in Africa. Yellow fever went with the European mariners from West Africa to West Indies. And in the eighteenth century, it caused devastating mortality among the European soldiers and settlers in these islands. In Jamaica, white death rates were higher than those of the slaves.

Disease brought by the Europeans devastated the indigenous population of the New World. In 1492 the population of the Americas was over 50 million. Even the Caribbean islands supported one million 'natives'. But, indigenous population declined drastically under the Spanish rule due to a combination of enslavement, disease and demoralization of the Indians. The indigenous population of the West Indian islands — the Arawaks and the Caribs — were more or less extinct by mid-seventeenth century. Before 1519 the population of Central Mexico was 20 million. In the course of the sixteenth century the population declined by 90%. Malaria introduced by the Europeans in the Americas was one of the chief killers of the 'native' population. In Peru the Indian population declined by 40%. After 1704, influenza and smallpox caused rapid decline of the Maya people. During 1743-9, half of the indigenous population of the Amazon Valley fell victim to measles and smallpox.

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Due to smallpox, the Indians continued to die in large number in North America. Simultaneously increasing migration from Europe enabled the British to increasingly outnumber the 'natives' along the seaboard of Atlantic. Smallpox wiped out half of the Cherokee in North America in the late 1730s. However, in South Carolina the Cherokee continued to outnumber the Europeans even in 1730.

The Europeans transformed the ecology of the New World which in turn accelerated the decline of the Indian population. The Indians of Mexico and Peru depended on the cultivation of maize, potatoes, beans, etc. They had few domesticated animals. By the 1490s, the Europeans introduced pigs, sheep, goats, cattle and horses from Europe to the Americas. British cattle were introduced into Virginia. They multiplied rapidly and the agricultural lands of the Indians were changed into grazing and pastoral land. Horses spread throughout North America through trade and theft. Gradually North American tribes like the Apache and the Commanche adopted the horses. The European traders along the St. Lawrence Valley also introduced horses. So forest and agricultural land were replaced by big ranches.

Instead of allowing the Indians to grow their vegetable crops, the Spanish introduced sugar plantations, cotton, tobacco and vineyards. The Europeans introduced timber and dyewood in Brazil which were exported. Citrus fruits brought from Spain were introduced in the New World in the early sixteenth century. The Spaniards brought banana in 1516 to West Indies from the Canary Islands. Actually the Portuguese had introduced banana in the Canary Islands from tropical Africa. Even now banana remains a major export item of the West Indies. For feeding the slaves yam was grown. Guinea yams entered West Indies from Africa. In the seventeenth century a superior form of yam came to Africa from India. From West Africa it was introduced to West Indies. Wheat was introduced in the sixteenth century in favoured highland areas of the American tropics like the Puebla Valley in Mexico. In the seventeenth century the English and the French settlers introduced wheat in temperate North America. Thanks to the intrusion of the Spaniards, the edible dogs of Mexico became extinct.

The aboriginal society in Australia was not a surplus producing economy. The aborigines were highly fragmented. From the linguistic point of view, they were divided into 700 tribes. In Australia smallpox, measles, influenza and tuberculosis as well as common cold mostly wiped out the aborigines. In 1791, the aborigines around Richmond died due to smallpox. In 1789 and in 1829 a wave of smallpox killed 6% of the Wiradjuri people along the Murrumbidgee River. During 1847-8, the influenza epidemic finished them off.

Warfare also reduced the indigenous population. Between 1725 and the 1780s, the Portuguese wiped out the Paiagua tribe along River Paraguay. In 1780-1, due to rigorous collection of taxes, the last descendant of the Inca ruler Tupac Amaru led an uprising. The rebellion was crushed and about 100,000 people died. The European victory over the Tuscaroras in the 1710s resulted in the decline of the latter's numbers from 5000 to 2500. From 1715 onwards most of the Yamasee were killed and enslaved by the colonial militia. Between 1712 and 1738, the French repeatedly attacked the Fox tribe of Illinois-Mississippi region. The Fox numbering 10000 were reduced to a few hundred. John Sullivan's pacification campaign against the Iroquois in 1779 resulted in widespread destruction of villages and 160,000 bushels of corn. The Colonial Militia and the mounted police in Australia were in charge of suppressing the aborigines. To give an instance, in 1860 at Queensland about 4000 aborigines were killed.

14.5 FORCED MIGRATION AND SLAVERY

The expulsions of the Muslims from the Iberian peninsula due to *conquests* and the Africans Death left southern Portugal thinly populated. So, Portuguese overseas colonies required cheap labour. In the Canary Islands the indigenous people known as the Guanches were conquered and driven to extinction. Catastrophic mortality among the 'native' Americans following the arrival of the Europeans generated search for cheap labour for working in the estates, plantations and mines. The Europeans imitated the cultivation and consumption of sugar from the Arabs. Columbus introduced sugar in West Indies in 1493. Very soon sugar plantations became common in Brazil. Slaves were required for the collection of cacao and other forest products in Amazon. Virginia and Maryland required slaves for working in the tobacco cultivation.

The resulting slave trade altered the demography by initiating a major movement of the Africans from Africa to South America, West Indies and the southern states of North America. Between 1680 and 1860, the loss of population due to slavery from West Africa was a little over 10%. Slaves were acquired from Africa either by raiding or through contacts with the African rulers. Prisoners in inter-tribal wars within Africa were enslaved. At times the African rulers engaged in wars which could be categorized as slave hunts. The slaves were sold to the European traders in return for guns, gunpowder and European clothes. And the African potentates used the guns for acquiring more slaves for selling to the Europeans. Thus a vicious 'gun-slave' cycle developed. Trade and slavery at different moments of history had been common in other regions also. To bridge over the unfavourable trade balance, Charlemagne's Empire exported white women who became slaves in the households of the Muslims in the Arab Empire. And Akbar sold prisoners of war to Kabul for buying horses.

During the fifteenth century, African slaves were transported to Lisbon for sale. Founded in 1575, Luanda in Angola became the leading port through which slaves were shipped to Brazil. Congo was a vital source of slaves. Between 1450 and 1500 about 150,000 African slaves were taken to Europe and most of them went to Portugal. Then the slaves from Africa were transported to the islands of Madeira and Sao Tome. In 1515 African slaves for the first time were sent to the Americas. Spain sent the African slaves to Hispaniola in the Caribbean and started receiving slave grown American sugar. Direct large scale trans-Atlantic traffic in slaves started from 1532. The British transported more slaves than the French. Between 1691 and 1779, British ships transported 2,300,000 slaves from the African ports. The slave ships used to sail from London, Bristol and Liverpool. The British slave ships supplied slaves to the British possessions in North America and in the Caribbean colonies. The British also supplied slaves to the colonies of the other powers.

In the sixteenth century about 367,000 African slaves were sent to the Americas. Between 1700 and 1763, the number of slaves in British North America rose from 20000 to 300,000. In the eighteenth century, the French colonies obtained 1,015,000 slaves and in 1788 the French West Indies contained 594,000 slaves. During the 1780s, the French West Indies colonies received 30000 slaves annually. By 1580, there were 60 sugar mills in Brazil. And the population amounted to 20000 Portuguese, 18000 Indians and 14000 slaves. By 1600, there were about 100,000 African slaves in Eastern Brazil. Angola supplied 2 million slaves in the eighteenth century mostly to Brazil. Most of the Africans transported as slaves in the eighteenth century went to Brazil and West Indies, and less than a fifth went to North America. The Portuguese moved slaves into the sugar plantations of Northeast Brazil and from 1710s into the gold and diamond fields of Mionas Gerais. In the late eighteenth century the slaves were used in the sugar and coffee plantations near Rio De Janeiro.

In most cases the number of black slaves exceeded the number of white colonists. Barbados had only a few hundred blacks in 1640. By 1645, there were over 6000 blacks and 40000 whites. In 1685, there were 46000 blacks and 20000 whites (bond or indentured servants and free). In 1687 Saint Domingue contained 4500 whites and 3500 blacks. Between 1766 and 1771 Saint Domingue received 14000 slaves annually. And during 1785-9, the number of slaves received rose to 28000 annually. In 1789 there were only 28000 whites, but 30000 free blacks and 406,000 slaves. On Montserrat in the West Indies, 40% of the 4500 inhabitants in 1678 was black. The percentage of the blacks grew to 80% of the 7200 people in 1729. By 1700, the French islands had only 18000 whites but 44000 black slaves. In 1730 the African slaves outnumbered both the Cherokee and the Europeans in South Carolina. Between 1730 and 1775, the number of blacks in North Carolina rose from 6000 to 10000. Gradually American born slaves dominated in the Chesapeake. In 1763 at Louisiana there were 5000 blacks and 4000 whites.

The extensive scope of slavery in the New World becomes clear when compared with the extent of slavery in the ancient world. Athens in 400 BC had 60000 slaves who constituted about 30% of the city-state's population. Roman Italy between 225 BC and 31 BC possessed between 600,000 to 2,000,000 slaves. And the total population of Roman Italy (including slaves) in that period was 10 million. About one million slaves worked in the *latifundias* (large estates of the senators) of Italy. In 1800, about 15% of the 800,000 population in Venezuela were slaves. Brazil between 1800 and 1850 had between 1,000,000 to 2,500,000 slaves. The slaves amounted to 33% of the population of the country. Slavery was rampant in the southern states of USA. Between 1820 and 1860 the number of slaves rose from 1,500,000 to 4,000,000 which represented about 33% of the populace. Finally Cuba between 1804 and 1861 possessed about 80000 to 400,000 slaves who amounted to about 28% to 30% of the total population.

Statistics does not give any glimpse of the picture at the micro level especially when emotions and sensibilities of the slaves were concerned. Individuals were taken away from their communities and families in Africa. Many died while being captured. In the port towns and in the ships while being transported across the Atlantic, they were crowded together in hazardous circumstances. About 10% of the slaves died while being transported across the Atlantic. Hacking down sugarcane was a backbreaking task. Slaves lived in deplorable conditions. They were less well fed, housed and clothed than the white population. As a result, the slaves were more vulnerable to disease. *Uncle Tom's Cabin* remains the best description of a black's life in the New World. The slaves migrated to the towns where control over them was weaker. Some of the skilled slaves in the towns enjoyed a life style which was higher than the European peasants.

Some white settlers were also coerced by the state to migrate overseas. The British government was concerned due to the rising crime rate after the War of Spanish Succession (1702-13). This, writes Jeremy Black, resulted in the Transportation Act in 1718. This Act allowed for transportation not only as part of the pardoning process in cases of capital offences but as a penalty for a wide range of non-capital crimes including theft of property. Between 1720 and 1763, the Parliament passed another 16 Acts that established transportation as a penalty for crimes of perjury and poaching. Between 1718 and 1785, about 50000 convicts were sent from Britain to America and West Indies. Of these 50000 'undesirable' persons, 30000 from England, 13000 from Ireland and 700 from Scotland were sent to America. The shipboard mortality was 14%. It is to be noted that this rate was higher than the rate of mortality of the slaves during trans- Atlantic voyages. Most of the convicts settled in Virginia, Maryland and Pennsylvania. After considering transportation to Africa, Australia was founded as a penal colony in 1788. Besides the criminals Parisian vagrants were seized in 1749 and were sent to Cayenne. Many prostitutes were also sent away from France. In 1767 'reformed' prostitutes were sent from Britain to aid in populating Florida.

14.6 SUMMARY

History shows that maritime exploration was not an exclusive affair of the West Europeans. The European expansion was partly the result of militant Christianity, economic inducement and the rise of new military and naval technologies. The first wave of migrants from Europe consisted of people from Iberia. Due to mass migration of the Europeans in the Americas, population growth especially in the Iberian countries slowed down in the mid-eighteenth century. The second wave of migrants included people from North West Europe especially Britain. And finally the Africans as slaves constituted the third wave of migrants. To an extent, state sponsored migration of selected individuals was also a sort of social control. The aim was to sanitize home society by getting rid of the undesirable characters. It would be no exaggeration to argue that the Europeans intentionally engineered a holocaust in the New World. To sum up, the European expansion in the extra-European world was sustained due to the enslavement of the indigenous population. And when they died their place was taken over by the African slaves. Compared to the 'natives' of the western hemisphere, the indigenous population of the eastern hemisphere was demographically more numerous and possessed more stable state systems. So, they were able to offer stronger resistance to the Europeans. Moreover the hot climate of the tropics and extreme cold of Siberia did not suit large scale settlement of the West Europeans. Thus European settlement in the eastern hemisphere of the world was not as effective as migration and settlement of the white people in the New World.

14.7 EXERCISES

1) Discuss in brief various factors behind migrations during different phases of history.

2) Explain the process of migrations to South and North America.

3) Write a note on forced migration and slavery.

UNIT 15 NATION-STATE SYSTEM

Structure

15.1 Introduction
15.2 The Historical Context
15.3 The Ideological Concerns
15.4 Regional Variations in Europe
15.5 The Role of Economic Development
15.6 Imperialism and Nation-State System
15.7 Nation-State System and International Relations
15.8 Summary
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15.1 INTRODUCTION

Nationalism was perhaps the most significant outcome of the French domination in Europe during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars in the early 19th century. The power of the nation state was to become overwhelmingly crucial in international relations throughout the 19th century. A strong sense of national pride would overwhelm other sentiments. French revolutionary ideas spread across the European continent during the Napoleonic Wars but equally significant was the emergence of a cultural revolution. This was rooted in a growing sense of one's civilization symbolized by historical memories, shared sense of pride in language, literature, folk traditions, food, dress and many other elements of daily lifestyle. Countries like Britain, France, Russia and Spain were already nations in the beginning of the 19th century. Germany and Italy apart from many other smaller entities were yet to emerge as nations. A sense of cultural identity could very easily flow into a strong sense of national pride. The political situation in the first decade of the 19th century in Europe is therefore of crucial importance to determine the various ramifications of European nationalism and the impact of the French ideas of liberty, equality and fraternity on those republics which were occupied by France.

15.2 THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Feudal systems of land tenure were done away within countries of West Europe occupied by France. So also were citizens granted equality before law. The stability of a government was now increasingly linked to a written constitution. The Code Napoleon seemed to have left a considerable impact and this could be linked to the idea of liberty. France had kept Europe engaged in almost continuous warfare for nearly two decades now, so one could hardly talk of fraternity existing between different political entities, but Europe was never going to remain the same after the French Revolution and the wars thereafter. The symbols of the revolution were to be the most enduring, ideological aspects in 19th century. Europe. Nationalism and concept of the nation state led to many significant changes in the map of Europe. Changes already made in the frontier by the Napoleonic wars and the imposition of peace terms on France by the victorious Allies opened up a tremendous diplomatic exercise. It was further complicated by Napoleon's second bid for power when he reclaimed his position from 20th March to 22nd June 1815 that is till his defeat at Waterloo.

Just a year before Napoleon's return, on 9 March 1814, Austria, Britain, Prussia and Russia decided to restore the Bourbons to the French throne. On 12 April 1814, Napoleon by signing the treaty of fontain bleau formalized his abdication and was given the island of Elba, his imperial title and an annual income of 2 million francs. Alongside, diplomatic decisions were taken to maintain the territorial integrity of several European countries. The allies i.e. England, Russia, Austria and Prussia decided to meet in Vienna on 10th Oct 1814, to look into further territorial problems like those of Poland. German states were united into a federation and France had to go back to her territorial possessions of 1792. The final treaty of Vienna was signed on 9th June 1815 (after dealing with Napoleon's final bid for power) a few days before the battle of Waterloo where Napoleon was finally defeated by the combined armies of Austria, Russia, Prussia and Britain. On 20th Nov 1815, a second treaty of Paris was signed and France had to go back to her frontiers of 1789 which meant returning territory to Piedmont and Switzerland. A war indemnity of 70 million francs was imposed and an allied army of occupation along her borders was stationed. The allies also signed the Quadruple Alliance to guarantee each other's sovereignty, to ensure "repose and prosperity" of nations for the peace of Europe.

Balance of power and peace of Europe had been rudely shaken by France in the first decade of the nineteenth century so the task of restoring this balance through diplomatic exercises fell on the big four - Austria under Metternich the Foreign Minister, Britain under Castlereagh, again the Foreign Minister, Tsar Alexander I of Russia and the Prussian foreign minister. Peace was no doubt the main aim of these powers but each country had its own specific ambitions. For example, Prussia had its eyes on Saxony, as Russia had on Poland, Austria wanted a continuing influence on Northern Italy and Britain wanted to firm up her many maritime and colonial rights in many areas. Conflicting ambitions were bound to complicate matters as would the principles of legitimacy be constantly under challenge. Napoleonic wars had significantly distributed the power equations in many states. For example, the Holy Roman Empire had been dissolved and many states had thus become independent of Austria. So had German states like Bavaria, Baden and Wurttenberg. A new German Confederation was thus established with 39 states — which although under the Austrian emperor, now had more important forms of independence like non-interference of the confederation in internal affairs. There was however to be no representative government as yet. Countries like Austria were compensated with Lombardy and Venetia, Tuscany and Modena. Naples of Sicily went to Spain. Geneva went to Switzerland and Britain added to her overseas possessions by taking Ceylon and Cape of Good Hope (from Holland) and Trinidad from Spain.

15.3 THE IDEOLOGICAL CONCERNS

The Congress of Vienna therefore restored territorial rights to major powers and thus put the clock back. Can we say that the peacemakers in Vienna were ignoring the principles of liberation and nationalism and reconfirming the reactionary hereditary states of the old rules in their retrospective countries? During the Napoleonic wars, states had fiercely defended their people, their frontiers, their identity and so national heroes and national symbols became an important part of the common man's existence. The 19th century citizen with important constitutional rights also developed strong nationalistic loyalties and the concept of the nation state thus struck deep roots in the body politic of nations. The French Declaration of Rights 1789 said — "The principle of all sovereignty resides essentially in the nation." Nation state loyalties were bound to the political rights of the people. Universal suffrage did not come to West Europe till 1870 and in East Europe till 1919. Thus it was mainly the educated, urbane middle class who pursued the ideologies of nationalism and liberalism and built movements around them. Many 19th century philosophers guided a highly teleological course towards nationhood by linking it with a common race, a common language or common folk traditions. This could become problematic when proclaimed nationalistic political boundaries intervened with ethnic nationhood giving rise to aggression and destruction.

In Europe, after the Congress of Vienna, such conflicts would take on alarming proportions in the Habsburg, Russian and Turkish empires. Many empires would thus have to have their boundaries reworked. Nationalism could thus act as a means of breaking up empires or of bringing together people who were increasingly identifying themselves by a common language, culture or religion.

Examples of both are provided below. Italy and Germany are two important examples of how language, folk culture and common historical memories lead to very strong nationalistic feelings helping to build the two people into sovereign, united and independent nation states by 1870. The Sultan of Turkey was the nominal head of the Balkan Peninsula which was inhabited by different ethnic groups like Bulgarians, Croats, Serbians, Montenegrins, Romanians and Greeks. All these groups would soon be clamoring for independence. Similarly, the Poles, Ukrainians and Finns would be demanding independence from the Russian empire. Hungarians, Czechs, Slovaks would also gradually start demanding certain political rights. Thus ethnic nationalism would become an extremely significant political issue leading to many new movements in the future.

Nationalist movements in Europe were mainly confined to the educated groups. Language was very often besides religion, the most important means of identifying with each other. Hungarian, Romanian and Croatian languages for instance were recognized as languages to write in, rather than in the previously dominant languages.

Beginnings of nationalistic sentiments in universities and student circles in the urban areas, supported often by gentry groups were however confined to small numbers. A number of revolts took place in Italy, Spain, Greece and Belgium at this time. The agenda was mostly some sort of democratic rights or nationalistic independence.

15.4 REGIONAL VARIATIONS IN EUROPE

In the period between 1818 and 1825 several conferences were held in Europe where autocratic rulers of Russia, Prussia and Austria expressed fears about these revolts seen as threats to peace and tranquility. Britain preferred to maintain a position of neutrality and non-interference. Participating countries in the conferences also maintained ambiguous positions when it came to supporting or opposing the revolts. Examples below would clarify the point — when revolts in Italy took place they were put down by Austria. Yet revolutionary groups were allowed to thrive in some of the democratic countries. If the revolts happened to threaten monarchical rule, they were suppressed, Britain supported Belgium's full claim for independence from Holland — the new ruler was Leopold, uncle by marriage to Victoria. Similarly, although nationalities like Serbs, Romanians, Bulgarians, Albanians, Montenegrins, Bosnians and Greeks were struggling for independence from the Ottoman Sultan, countries like Austria, Russia, France and Britain had some interest at stake in the Ottoman Empire. Britain's naval domination in the Mediterranean could be threatened by the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Russia, however, since the 1820s had been thrusting forward energetically in the Balkans, often intervening on the side of Greece, Serbia and Romania thus threatening the stability of the Ottoman Empire. French ambitions deepened the crisis, because French naval presence in the straits of Gibraltar led to disagreements with Russia which had taken it upon herself to protect the 12 million Orthodox Church members within the Ottoman Empire. This annoyed the Turks who were further enraged when Russian troops entered Moldavia and Wallachia to support Rumanian claims. This led to almost a state of war, with France and Britain helping Turkey against Russia. Neither Austria nor Prussia came to Russia's aid. The Crimean War ended in September 1855 after 2 years with the fall of a Russian naval base on the Black sea called Sevastopol. Casualties in the Crimean War were close to 500,000 out of which 300,000 were Russians. The Treaty of Paris signed on March 30, 1856, guaranteed integrity of the Ottoman Empire, the Sultan in turn promised a policy of religious tolerance and the Black Sea was demilitarized. Nationalistic aspirations clashed with territorial ambitions of bigger powers and armed conflicts in these areas would continue through the nineteenth century.

Around this time the nationalist ideology was becoming the most important political creed among middle class liberals in Greece fighting monarchical rule or Italian nationalists led by Mazzinni, trying to inspire the people of Italy towards a united nation free from Austrian dominance. Republicanism, civil liberties, adult suffrage and other aspects of liberalism were becoming the most important subjects of political debate in many parts of Europe. In France the Bourbons had been restored, but the rulers from Louis XVIII to Charles X to Louis Philippe were under constant pressure to establish constitutional monarchies. Revolutionary, middle class political organizations continued to fight for political rights including the right to vote which they did not have. The 1830 and 1848 revolutions in France represented precisely these struggles for democratic rights.

In another monarchical state that is Austria, the Chancellor Metternich was the main upholder of the conservative system, which fell only during the 1848 revolution in that country. Metternich had been completely indifferent to the nationalistic sensibilities of different ethnic groups within the Austrian empire and he believed only in the hereditary principle of monarchical rule. He felt that middle class urban nationalism was disturbing the aristocratic tranquility in politics and society. The 1848 revolutions took on different forms in France, Italy, Prussia, Austria and Belgium. Reactionary politics and conservatism was not however simplistically replaced by republicanism. Louis Philippe was replaced by Louis Napoleon in France. Metternich was replaced by Schwarzenberg in Austria. However the middle class revolutionaries had at least fought against the status quo and against aristocratic rule as never before. Rulers would now be more conscious of liberal principles and new states like Greece, Belgium and Serbia came up as a result of the revolutions of 1830 and 1848. In Russia and many other East European countries however, absolutism continued to thrive.

After 1848, the Unification of Italy and that of Germany were significant political events and a total vindication of middle class nationalism. In Italy, Mazzinni, Cavour, Garibaldi and Victor Emmanuel II were instrumental in forming the Italian State. The vision of a united, liberal republic based on democratic values and popular sovereignty led to the founding of young Italy, an organization which spread these ideas among the middle classes. The struggle for unity and republicanism would also involve outside powers like France, Britain and Russia who were supportive, critical of misgovernance or tolerant towards a united Italy. Piedmont was an important centre of struggle under Cavour the Prime Minister of the Piedmontese ruler Victor Emmanuel. Cavour turned to Napoleon III for help against Austria after 1849. Austrian troops were sent to protect her interests. In the ensuing armed conflict, Milan fell to the Piedmontese forces and this led to withdrawal ofAustrian troops from Northern Italy. By 1860, other parts of Italy including Parma, Modena, Tuscany, Savoy, Nice, Lombardy and the eastern parts of the Papal states merged with Piedmont. Rome and Venetia were occupied in 1870 to complete the unification process. However the newly formed Italian state was not to be ruled by a popular republic as envisioned by Mazzinni but by an elite which was obviously from the privileged class.

German unification was as much a political as a cultural process. The formation of the German state was not easy. There were a number of non-German speaking people in South and West Prussia, Bohemia, Moravia, Slovenia; and Schleswig - Holstein was ruled by Denmark and Hanover by England. Thus many solutions were considered. Prussia nursed ambitions as the leader of a future united Germany. Bismarck, appointed Minister – President in 1862, was a conservative and would favour monarchical rule.

Under Bismarck, Prussia went to war with Austria and forced Austria to surrender Schleswig Holstein, Hesse-Cassel and he also made peace with South German states like Baden, Bavaria and Wurttemburg. Austria withdrew from any involvement with the German Confederation. Prussia also went to war with France in 1869 when France tried to secure Luxembourg and Belgium and opposed Prussia's support for a Hohenzollern candidate for the Spanish throne. This war led to a new nationalist wave sweeping through the South German states as well. This would obviously help in the process of unification. The war ended with the treaty of Frankfurt in February 1871 by which Alsace Lorraine was ceded perpetually to Germany and France also had to pay an indemnity of 5 billion francs.

In January 1871, the German empire was proclaimed at Versailles. The dominance of Prussia was obvious over the rest of Germany, just as Piedmont seemed to have dominated the process of Italian unification.

15.5 THE ROLE OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

In the period under review industry and empire can be considered as the most significant aspects of European political, economic and cultural life. Formation of nation — states like Germany and Italy in the 1870s was an important step towards redefining imperial spaces which were earlier occupied primarily by Britain, France and Spain.

The world economy of capitalism from mid 19th century onwards was a conglomeration of national blocs or national economies which had emerged with the growing number of nation states. These states protected their industrializing economies against competition from other nations. Thus these nations also became rival economies. Domestic markets became the chief concern of national industries. Broadening profit margins was not easy. Depression in the 1890s had seen a fall in prices worldwide. Capitalist concentration was an important development in this period. Large enterprises went through significant transformations between 1880 and 1914.

This period inevitably saw the hunt for more profitable investment and more markets. This led to the clamor for colonies outside the areas traditionally dominated by Britain. There was a gradual decline of Britain and growing presence of the U.S and Germany. Populations increased by leaps and bounds. In Germany the increase was from 45 to 65 million and in the U.S.A. from 50 to 92 million. Britain being smaller was not the only reason for her being left behind in the aggressive stride towards industrialization.

The world economy was becoming increasingly global because on one hand developed nation states were growing fast and on the other hand, the un-developed countries supplied goods to the capitalist nations depending on what they produced most, like coffee, bananas or beef.

Britain continued to dominate the international capital market till the 1st World War. In 1914, France, Germany, U.S.A., Belgium and Netherlands, Switzerland and others had 56% of the world's overseas investments and Britain alone had 44%. Yet pluralism was a fast growing characteristic of the world economy. Two significant and parallel developments were taking place in this period. Governments were under increasing pressure to adopt social welfare policies and to defend economic interests of voters who were facing challenges of economic concentration. At the same time, economic competition and economic rivalry between nation states led to imperialism of the 20th century and to the genesis of the 1st World War. The world had come closer together than ever before through more complex economic transactions, a growing network of transportation and with technological advancement came the growing need for raw materials like oil, rubber, copper and precious metals. All this meant that imperialism would grow in directions it had never done before. Remote undeveloped countries in Africa or Asia supplied a lot of the raw material. Sugar, tea, coffee, cocoa and tropical fruits were also in great demand now and big business grew around these products leading to the growth of gigantic companies in the west who now had vital business interests in the undeveloped world. Markets in these areas were another motive which drove the western nations to look for colonies. Political prestige was not far behind as an important motive especially for countries like Germany and Italy. Britain and France had already established themselves as old colonial powers. The ideological and political content of nationalism from the 1880s till the 1st World War acquired new, culturally aggressive dimensions. A larger number of entities would now start staking their claims as 'national'. Thus nationalism along with other ideologies like Marxism and socialism gave Europe new languages of political articulation and brought up concerns which had never disturbed the men and women of the 19th century.

15.6 IMPERIALISM AND NATION-STATE SYSTEM

Sticking to the nationalistic energies prevalent in Europe at this time taking new shape and flourishing as movements in many parts of the continent, we can identify a number of nationalities like the Finns, Slovaks, Estonians, Macedonians etc. expressing themselves as unified groups. In the 1890s, the Gaelic League for the Irish nation, the Hebrew for the Jews and the Baltic languages by the turn of the century were gaining prominence too. Around such sensibilities including sense of space or territory, an 'imaginary' community of the nation grew. The state was an integral part of that nationhood reaching every level of the citizens' socio-economic, political and cultural existence. According to E.J. Hobsbawm the 'nation' was the new civic religion of the states.

The significant linkage between the state and nationhood also led to further divisions within already formulated nations because many groups within these entities felt alienated and struggled for their own identity. After 1870, imperialism was not only because of factors related to economies and capitalism but also political concerns which prompted nation states to protect their overseas territorial interests in an aggressive manner which included interventionist territorial claims, common patriotic pride in empire building and backing often given by big entrepreneurs and industrialists. From 1880s for instance, European powers divided up almost the whole of Africa amongst themselves in what historians have called 'Scramble for Africa'. Economies and politics were blurred which became blurred in these contexts.

Disraeli, the British Prime Minister was promoting and popularizing imperialism in a big way in Britain. Victoria was now Empress of India. It seemed like a psychological booster. Conservative ideologies were tying up patriotism to imperialistic triumphs. Bismarck the German Chancellor had also launched an imperialistic crusade for a 'place in the sun'. France was making colonial claims in Africa among other places. Her sense of prestige had to be nurtured vis a vis the powerful German empire.

At the Congress of Berlin 1878, there was general agreement among nations like France and Britain, to protect the Ottoman Empire and the Austro Hungarian Empire from Russian ambitions in the Balkans. Meanwhile, the issue of Alsace Lorraine remained a sore point between France and Germany and France was eagerly looking for allies.

Relations between Germany and Russia were also not good. In 1890, Bismarck was removed from Chancellorship and Germany had meanwhile moved closer to Austria - Hungary with the signing of the Dual Alliance in 1879. This made Russia feel isolated. Russia and France came together in an alliance concluded in 1894. Britain and France also struck deals as far as colonial claims were concerned with Britain acquiring Cyprus during the Congress of Berlin 1878 and also encouraging France to further its Moroccan interests. This was also meant to counter German pressure on Morocco. Thus the two traditional colonial rivals decided to embark on the Entente Cordiale in 1904. Italy supported the French in Morocco. Germany continued to challenge the French there. France however was eager to recover her lost prestige during her defeat in the Franco Prussian War 1870-71 and thus reached multiple agreements regarding colonial claims with Russia, Britain and Italy. Meanwhile, after Russia's humiliating defeat at the Russo-Japanese War 1904-05, Russia was eager to reach agreements with Britain in 1907.

Germany's territorial gains between 1890 and 1914 were actually quite meager although Bismarck's successors began a rather aggressive expansionist policy. Bismarck had been more conscious of maintaining good relations with Russia, Italy and Austria and had indeed isolated France. Now at the turn of the century the maze of alliances was going to provide the seed bed for future military alliances.

1890-1912 was the period when Germany found herself increasingly isolated because France was reaching agreements with Britain, Russia and Italy; getting her colonial policy sorted out and tilting the European balance of powers in her favour. Austria was also losing her pre-eminence after the unifications of both Germany and Italy. Austria had also lost to France in 1859-60 and to Prussia in 1866, so not much remained of the Habsburg Empire. Austria turned more towards the Balkan problem and thereby clashed with Russia and Serbs supported Slavic interests in the Balkans. This led to inevitable ups and downs between Russia and Austria between 1860 and 1914. After Russia had imposed Treaty of San Stefano on the Turks, Austria was additionally disturbed to see Russia supporting Bulgarian claims. Austria meanwhile laid its claims on Bosnia - Herzegovina. The Congress of Berlin had ratified Austria's claim — this had alienated Russia and in 1879 when Austria and Germany signed the Dual alliance, Russia felt all the more threatened.

In 1907, the Serbs publicly adopted a resolution demanding independence of Bosnia from Austrian domination. In 1908, matters got worse when Austria annexed Bosnia - Herzegovina. Germany supported Austria in this. Serbia recognized this annexation in1909 as if to maintain good relations with Austria but Serbia nationalist organizations were fast coming up in support of Serbia's expansion with Bosnia. Russia was supporting the Slavs in the Balkan region who were clamoring for independence from either Austria or the Turkish Empire. Russia's diplomatic isolation in the 1890s as a result of the Dual Alliance and subsequently her humiliating defeat in the Russo-Jap War made her more vulnerable. She had finalized a treaty with France in 1894. She also wanted to settle differences with Britain which in turn was getting disturbed by the growing naval power of Germany. All this led to the signing of the Triple Entente between Britain, France and Russia. Afghanistan was now conceded by Russia as a British sphere of influence as was a part of Persia. Although the entente was not a military alliance, nor was it targeted against Germany, yet it led to rival alliances being formed by Germany and Austria - Hungary. This gives us an idea about how the alliance system solidified on the eve of the World War. In 1899 at The Hague, peace conferences were held - war seemed a distinct possibility in early 1900s and a vast network of military alliances was in the process of being finalized.

From 1908-09, the Bosnian Crisis was exacerbated because Serbia, much to the annoyance of Austria, continued to push for Bosnian independence. Germany was behind Austria and this aggravated the situation. Europe got divided into rival military camps and disputes tuned in to what Hobsbawm calls 'unmanageable confrontations' — beyond the control of respective national governments. In 1882, when Germany, Austria and Italy had signed the Triple Alliance, it was already a significant step towards solidification of rivalries, though Italy in 1915 went over to the anti-German camp. The Triple Entente firmed up the anti-German bloc.

The international power game in these years was marked by an extremely important development — namely, the widening of political interests outside one's own immediate regions. The world was now a stage where power games were played. For instance, naval power by the beginning of the 20th century was no longer the prerogative of Britain. By 1897, Germany had built a large fleet. Also, Britain was no longer the sole economic power around which the world economy revolved. A worldwide industrial capitalism had emerged and there was growing competition for control of the world market and control of different regions. Diplomatic rivalry led to the formation of blocs and when the Franco - German clash over Morocco erupted into the Agadir crisis (when Germany sent a gunboat to seize the south Moroccan port of Agadir) and Austria annexed Bosnia followed by Italy's occupation of Libya in 1911 and with Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece pushing Turkey out of the Balkans by 1912, these multiple crises culminated in the crisis of 1914.

On 28th June 1914, a Serbian student terrorist Gavrilo Princip assassinated the Austrian heir to the throne Archduke Franz Ferdinand who was visiting Sarajevo, the capital

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of Bosnia. Within five weeks, Europe was plunged into a World War. A freshly energized wave of patriotism swept over nations in Europe the moment the war began. Liberal, labour and socialist opposition to the War notwithstanding, the number of volunteers went up phenomenally by the next few weeks. Nationalism came to the forefront as the overwhelming ideology of this era driving men and women to sacrifice for their country.

Nations were at war with each other, putting behind them the tranquil years of the 19th century liberal utopia and the bourgeois sense of security. Now crisis would be followed by crisis, revolutions would dramatically change the social hierarchies never to be reversed again and the existing moralities would be severely challenged. Bourgeois liberalism would itself undergo drastic changes and the ideology of nation and nationalism, a product of 19th century Europe, would henceforth extend to multiple political groups. States after the First World War, given the status of nations, would no longer be confined to the old, 'developed' world.

15.7 NATION-STATE SYSTEM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

After the defeat of Germany and her allies in 1918, President Woodrow Wilson of the United States succeeded in having a charter for a League of Nations incorporated in the Treaty of Versailles — the peace treaty with Germany. The covenant of the League of Nations which formed Part I of the Treaty of Versailles, was signed on June 28, 1919 and came into effect on January 10, 1920.

On 14th February 1919, President Wilson had already presented to the Paris Peace Conference, a plan for a League of Nations, declaring it as a guarantee of peace against aggression. The armistice had commenced on November 11, 1918 but the peace conference of the victors began in January 1919. England, France, the U.S, Italy and Japan constituted themselves into a Council and the League was incorporated into the Treaty. Wilson became Chairman of the League Commission. Members comprised the victorious powers and on vote of 2/3rd of the Assembly, any self-governing state, dominion or colony, could be a member. Article X of the Covenant read 'The members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity of all members. In case of any such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation should be fulfilled.'

The articles' meaning was uncertain and its implementation might be slow. The Treaty including the League Covenant was however not ratified by the American Senate. Without the U.S., the League could not pursue collective security as originally conceived.

However, the 'general association of nations' that President Wilson had called for in the last of his Fourteen Points — meant that henceforth diplomacy would proceed more or less under the dictum laid down in the first of these Fourteen Points that is 'frankly and in public view'. In the League therefore, open diplomacy came into widespread use. Wilson had set certain utopian standards of cooperation and the pre-existence of common interests among nations. But this was not always practically possible. However, without expecting the League to have been instrumental in altering the fundamental behaviour of individual nations between 1919 and 1939, it is significant to remember that the League was more the creature of its members rather than a higher body imposing codes of behaviour.

If the main function of the League was to prevent war, it failed to do so. The respect due to international law and to territorial status established by the allied powers could be open to confusion and the League ultimately proved a weak and ineffective organization. Ten years later, the Kellogg - Briand peace pact signed at the instigation of the U.S proclaimed the illegality of war as a political instrument. Bringing about imposing changes by peaceful methods was beyond any International organization in this period. When Japan encroached into Manchuria and was condemned by the League, she left the organization. Germany left the League when there were differences in matters of disarmament. The Italian invasion of Ethiopia was another instance when the League was unable to use effective sanctions. The more powerful member nations were generally unwilling to use force to settle acts of aggression by other states. International law seemed ineffectual in many situations. Emotions and desires were overwhelmingly forceful energies which made most efforts to maintain peace between nations unsuccessful in the long run.

15.8 SUMMARY

This unit is an exploration of the ways in which nation-state system came to the centre stage in international relations. From a stage where international relations meant courtly exchange and recurrent warfare between various ruling armies, nation-state system defined the modern world with a new definition of international relations. Coming of Germany and Italy as new kinds of nations in the eighteenth century, the subsequent treaties between various nations, a new economic configuration due to large scale industrialization and subsequent colonization of the world led to various diplomatic exchanges which set the scene for the twentieth centuries international politics.

15.9 EXERCISES

1) Explain the role of nationalism in defining the modern international relations?
2) Write a note on imperialism and nation-state-system.
3) What was the ideological and economic impetus behind the emergence of modern international relations?

UNIT 16 INTERNATIONAL RIVALRIES OF TWENTIETH CENTURY

Structure

16.1 Introduction
16.2 The Cold War
16.3 The Nuclear Arms Race and Efforts to Control Proliferation
16.4 Decolonization and Non-Aligned Movement
16.5 The End of the 20th Century and Issues in International Relations Theory
16.6 Summary
16.7 Exercises

16.1 INTRODUCTION

You must be familiar with the main features of the modern world, including the formation of nation states, the expansion of Europe, technological changes, and the incorporation of the whole world into one international system. Technological change and economic integration were greatly accelerated during and after the global conflicts marking the 20th century, leading to 'globalization'and conditions for new challenges, opportunities, and rivalries in the 21st Century. In this Unit we will discuss:

- the course of the Cold War and the global roles played by the 'super powers', the United States of America (US) and the Soviet Union (USSR);
- the nuclear arms race;
- the Non-Aligned Movement; and
- the chief characteristics of the twentieth century.

The 20th century was termed the "age of extremes" by historian Eric Hobsbawm because it saw unprecedented death and destruction during two world wars and other conflicts, more than one genocide, bitter ideological and religious clashes, indiscriminate violence, destruction of the natural environment, and threats or uses of weapons of mass destruction. Yet, during the same century there was spectacular scientific advance, economic growth, and widening humanitarian concern. The 20th Century is also called the "short century" (1914-1991) to highlight the impact of the Great War, the Russian Revolution and the collapse of the Soviet Union on the whole world. Many also refer to the 20th Century as the "American Century" because the US soon became the most productive and largest single economy in the world, possessing unprecedented military power and technological ascendance, along with a moral conviction of the superiority of its own socio-economic- political-value system over those of others, and showing at times the willingness to play an active, at times hegemonic and unilateral role in the Western hemisphere and the rest of the world.

Rivalries between the traditional 'Great Powers' of Europe brought about the catastrophes of the first and second world wars, but the second half of the 20th Century was dominated by a multifaceted rivalry known as the Cold War between the Western or capitalist 'bloc' and the Eastern or communist 'bloc', in which enormous arsenals of nuclear weapons were amassed by both the US and the USSR as ‘deterrence’ against open military conflict between them. Other international rivalries in various regions of the world such as South Asia and West Asia, and international tensions within many newly independent, ethnically plural, and economically underdeveloped countries, sometimes dovetailed with the Cold War, but did not necessarily end with it, so that several unresolved conflicts continued into a new century.

All of these changes influenced international rivalries either directly, for example by altering the calculus of national power from quantity to quality, or indirectly, for example by exacerbating the gulf between those who gained and those who lost from change. It is not easy, therefore, to generalize, and analysts adopt various theoretical approaches in order to discern pattern in international relations. The traditional historical approach providing a reasoned description of events on the basis of written records is therefore used in this Unit. But we must not ignore different scientific approaches stressing the importance of domestic and international environmental factors, perceptions, personalities, and policy-making processes in world polities. Nor can we focus entirely on international conflict and ignore the construction of an impressive body of literature, law and organization. Faced with a super-abundance of facts about change and contrast, some might see the 20th century as a time of transition between the Eurocentric civilization of the modern era to an as yet unpredictable post-modern.

16.2 THE COLD WAR

The two world wars in the first half of the twentieth century proved the point that wars don’t provide solution to challenges facing the world rather efforts towards peace should be the major concern to create an atmosphere of peace and development. Still the rivalries among great nations continued. Within two years of the end of the Second World War the chief victors had fallen out with each other, the Soviet Union was ranged against Britain and the US in an armed truce, and the division of Europe into two antagonistic spheres became evident. That divisive rivalry soon extended over the rest of the world, despite efforts made by some newly independent countries, such as India, to remain unentangled in it and form ‘nonaligned’ movements of their own. The Cold War defined all international relations until its sudden end in 1989-91, brought about by the reunification of Germany and the collapse of the USSR. Considerable research into the origins and course of the Cold War continues to be conducted – facilitated by declassification and availability to scholars of relevant governmental archives in the protagonist countries – and some general approaches are common in the literature along with differences on details and attributions of blame.

The Cold War differed from the First and Second World Wars because ideological conflict between the US and USSR, between capitalism and communism, infused and sharpened all other sources or their rivalry, even when ideological motivations were missing from their policies or practices. From this point of view the origins of the Cold War lay in the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the image of communism as a militant faith determined to produce world revolution and liquidate non-believers through a combination of internal subversion and external pressure that was held by many American policy-makers from the 1920s onwards. US policies of ‘containment’as well as President Reagan’s depiction of the Soviet Union as an “evil empire” in the 1980s grew out of that mindset. For their part, Soviet and Chinese Communist leaders depicted ‘bourgeois capitalism’ in equally extreme and condemnatory terms as oppressive, imperialist, bent on encircling and destroying 'progressive forces', but ultimately doomed to be buried under Socialism. Thus, two universalistic but contradictory blue prints on how to organize domestic and international order were in opposition throughout the Cold War, partially modified by Soviet and Chinese offers of 'peaceful coexistence' made in the mid-1950s, efforts toward détente made in the 1960s and 1970s, and the US-China rapprochement in the 1970s and 1980s.

The Cold War also originated in and reflected conflicts of tangible interest between the two major victors of the Second World War, the US and the USSR. Conferences between their leaders, and including British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, were held in Teheran (November 1943), Yalta (February 1945) and Potsdam (July 1945) to set out post-war territorial and international arrangements. The supreme power of the US in 1945 was evident in its economy that accounted for about 50 per cent of total world GNP, its superiority, and its technical prowess seen in the detonation of two atomic bombs over Japan to end war in the Pacific. The USSR had lost 20 million men in war casualties and approximately the same number in related events and suffered the devastation of industry and about one third of its territory, but its armies controlled eastern and central Europe into the centre of Germany as well as the Balkans and its prestige overall was very high. Stalin insisted that Soviet security demanded a zone of friendly, communist dominated, states along its perimeter, and seemed to have won US President F.D. Roosevelt's agreement to this at Yalta. But Allied understanding broke down between American insistence on applying the principles of 'free elections' and 'free markets' throughout post-war Europe and Soviet methods of achieving complete control successively in the Baltic states, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania.

Defeated Germany was divided into four occupation zones, as was its capital Berlin situated within the Soviet zone. The occupying powers differed on many subjects including de-Nazification, reparations, the German-Polish border, currency and economic policies, and transit rights. The American, British and French zones were soon fused and when the Soviet Union made an attempt to cut western road access to Berlin, the city was kept supplied by a year long Anglo-American air-lift in 1948-49. No written agreement resulted so that a similar crisis over Berlin continued during the existence of two German states until 1990 : the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in the west and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in the east. The 'German problem' lay at the heart of the Cold War, with no unanimity of opinion anywhere on key questions of reunification, neutralization, rearmament; events provided their own answers over the years. Mutually reinforcing fear and suspicion could be seen on the one hand, in Soviet convictions that the US intended to renege on promises made at Yalta and use a rearmed Germany against the USSR, and on the other hand, in American convictions that the Soviet Union intended to control all of Germany and advance into as much of Europe and the rest of the world as possible. To forestall such an eventuality through a policy of 'containment' of communism became the prime foreign policy objective of the US.

The US took several far-reaching measures in pursuit of this objective. In March 1947 President Truman announced a 'doctrine'for opposing communism. All Latin American countries committed themselves to joint defense against internal and external communist subversion in the Rio treaty signed with the US in 1947. In June 1947

Secretary of State John Marshall launched a plan of massive economic grants ($17 billion between 1948 and 1952) to 16 non-communist European counties conditional on their removing barriers to economic integration. The formation of a six-member European Coal and Steel Community in 1952 led, through successive difficult steps, to one of the most remarkable achievements of the 20th century, namely, the creation of an European Union (EU) in 1992. This body adopted a common currency in 1999 and aspired to common foreign and security policy. Long before that, however, a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was formed in April 1949 under US leadership and including Canada to provide defence and security for the West. Turkey joined in 1952 and the FRG was included in 1955 at the same time as the central and eastern European countries were brought together in the Warsaw Pact time under leadership of the Soviet Union. Confrontation between these two military alliances armed with increasingly sophisticated conventional and nuclear weapons was the central feature of the Cold War. Though both sides probably overestimated the aggressive intentions of the other, fear of their capabilities spurred an arms race and sharpened the sense of danger of imminent nuclear conflict over several decades, especially at times of crisis such as over Berlin in 1948 and 1961, the Hungarian nationalist uprising of 1956, the Taiwan Straits in 1958, or the Cuban Missile crisis of 1962. Gradually, however, nuclear weapons came to be seen as non-usable and the territorial status quo in Europe was accepted by both sides,

Post World War II Occupation Zones of Germany

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even when challenged by internal events such as the 'Prague Spring' of 1968. A European détente was initiated and in 1975 all the European states along with Canada, the US, and the USSR came together in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) affirming the status quo as well as the need to protect human rights.

The Cold War came to Asia first when the proclamation of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) in October 1949 was interpreted as a grievous 'loss' in the US, (sole occupying power in Japan and chief supporter of a Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan). The Chinese leader Mao Zedong saw the US as his chief adversary and decided to "lean to one side" in alliance with Stalin's USSR. In June 1950 the partitioned peninsular nation of Korea erupted in war and the US led United Nations forces against communist North Korea forces assisted by PRC 'volunteers'. The Korean War ended in a stalemate and an armed armistice in 1953 that created a demilitarized zone along the 38th parallel. Communist North Korea, in alliance with neighbouring PRC, seemed to freeze in time even as substantial US forces were stationed in South Korea and remain there to the present time. The Eisenhower Administration in the US deployed its Seventh Fleet to neutralize the Taiwan Straits and prevent open conflict between the PRC and ROC. The US also announced a doctrine of 'massive retaliation' – that is, possible use of nuclear weapons – to deter communist expansion, supported the French in Vietnam against nationalist forces led by communist leader Ho Chi Minh, and erected two multiparty alliances to confine the Sino-Soviet bloc within continental Eurasia. A defence pact setting up the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) was signed on 8 September 1954 by the US, Australia, Britain, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand. The following year the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) was established by the US with Britain, Iran, Iraq (withdrew in 1958), Pakistan and Turkey to knit together countries on the vulnerable southern border of the USSR. The Soviet Union and PRC did not attempt to replicate the Warsaw Pact in Asia but each stepped across the Western line of containment by conducting an active diplomacy of political support, trade, economic assistance, and arms supplies with various neighbouring and/or nonaligned states such as Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Pakistan, Syria, and North Vietnam. There was no simple dichotomy in Asia, however, and the picture was greatly complicated by regional rivalries as well as the rift between China and the Soviet Union that became public knowledge in the early 1960s and nearly erupted in war in 1969.

The most dangerous crisis of the Cold War took place in October 1962 over the issue of Soviet missiles placed in the Caribbean island of Cuba. There a popular revolution led by Fidel Castro had displaced the military regime of Fulgencio Batista in January 1959 and US backed attempts by Cuban émigrés to overthrow Castro had failed. The Soviet post-Stalin leader Nikita Khrushchev decided to protect Cuba against American invasion by positioning nuclear missiles in Cuba. The US President John F. Kennedy reacted in anger to their discovery by a reconnaissance aircraft on 10 October 1962, demanding removal of the missile bases and ordering a naval blockade of Cuba on 18 October. No other episode of the Cold War has received such microscopic scrutiny from historians and re-enactments by prominent participants of the time, partly because every facet of American-Soviet competition intersected in it: conflicting ideologies, the nuclear arms race, relations with allies and newly independent states, domestic political linkages with foreign policy, public and private diplomacy exemplified in United Nations leaders, neither of whom could afford to publically step down. By mid-November the crisis was over. Soviet missiles were withdrawn from Cuba and some months later American Jupiter missiles were withdrawn from Turkey; Castro remained in power and threats of open invasion were ruled out; Kennedy won a victory with dignity and without war; the Soviet Union was not humiliated. Most importantly, both sides were shocked by realization of their own vulnerability and moved towards avoiding direct confrontation in areas of peripheral interest and framing rules for conducting the nuclear arms race such as the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 and the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty of 1972.

If the two major antagonists in the Cold War avoided direct confrontation after 1962 they did not eschew participation in regional conflicts by providing materials, training and sometimes active military assistance to their respective favourites or 'clients'. For example, American involvement in the Vietnam War began in support of an anti-Communist but weak South Vietnam facing insurgency backed by communist

The Cold War World from 1945 to 1989

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North Vietnam in the early 1960s. A central security premise of US policy in Asia at the time was the subsequently ridiculed 'domino theory' that the toppling of one non-communist government inevitably would lead to successive falls and expanding communism. A major US bombing campaign from the air in the mid and late 1960s was accompanied by the introduction of larger and larger number of American combat troops on the ground, where they were bogged down in a quagmire of guerilla warfare, and an enlargement of the war zone into Cambodia and Laos. Vocal opposition to the Vietnam War within the US and its allies, as well as strategic considerations about détente with the Soviet Union, led US President Nixon to make a dramatic rapprochement with China in 1971-72 and extract American troops from Vietnam in 1973. Not surprisingly, a reunification of Vietnam by the communist North followed soon after in 1975. The US underwent considerable self-questioning and loss of confidence in the mid-1970s and earlier bipartisan consensus on national security policies was fractured.

By a coincidence of time, perhaps, the Soviet Union enjoyed a period of stability and self-confidence under the leadership of Leonid Brezhnev in the 1970s and appeared to expand its political and military influence in South and Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean, West Asia, Africa and even Latin America. Without direct Soviet participation too, events in what had come to be called the Third World, such as the assertiveness of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1973 and after, the growth of the Non Aligned Movement, conflict within the former Portuguese colonies in Africa, and the Islamic Revolution in Iran of 1979, militated against Western interests. The Soviet Union used the 'Brezhnev Doctrine' to justify military intervention to protect a communist (or leftist) government outside its own borders – as in Czechoslovakia in 1979. American reactions, and the election of Republican Ronald Reagan as president in 1980, ushered in a 'New Cold War' of proxy conflict fought by government forces and Islamicist Mujahedin in Afghanistan, in Nicaragua between Sandinista government forces and right-wing 'contras', and in El Salvador and other Central American countries between right-wing governments and left-wing guerilla fighters. None of these wars, or the many other conflicts erupting at the time throughout the Third World, fitted tidily into the rigid dichotomy of the 1950s, and the bipolar international system itself had been modified by a war less amenable to simple analysis than the original Cold War. The costs of continued conflict, however, were similarly high, especially as the nuclear arms race between the US and the USSR was renewed, and contributed directly to the economic undermining of the Soviet system and the end of the Cold War.

16.3 THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AND EFFORTS TO CONTROL PROLIFERATION

Spectacular advances in scientific knowledge in the first half of the 20th century included theoretical and experimental discovery of how to split the atom, the smallest particle of a chemical element. It was no easy task, however, to learn how to release atomic (nuclear) energy though a controlled chain reaction of fission in the element uranium, and during the late 1930s leading scientists in America, Britain, Denmark, France, Germany, perhaps Japan, and Russia separately worked on the problem. In 1942, after the US had entered World War II, President Franklin D. Roosevelt authorized the Manhatten Project, a costly programme with several locations and many scientists and engineers, to build nuclear reactors and fabricate an atomic weapon as soon as possible and before Germany could do so. Project Y headed by Robert Oppenheimer at the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, New Mexico, successfully tested one such device at Alamogordo on 16 July 1945 when he saw “a thousand suns”. Truman conveyed this news to his allies Churchill and Stalin at Potsdam where they were conferring after the defeat of Germany, and also made the decision to use two remaining bombs on Japan which had not yet acknowledged defeat. Accordingly, an atom bomb equivalent to 15,000 tons of TNT named “Little Boy” was dropped on Hiroshima on 6 August and a larger one named “Fat Boy” on Nagasaki on 9 August. The resulting death and destruction through the effects of blast, fire, heat, and radiation far exceeded anything experienced before, even during extensive ‘carpet bombing’ of cities during the war. Japan surrendered on 15 August 1945. Reports compiled soon after, as well as later reports on the effects of nuclear tests in the Pacific Ocean and elsewhere, provide incontrovertible scientific evidence that the use of nuclear weapons in any conflict would be catastrophic for all life on earth, to say nothing of civilization as we know it.

Yet, an integral part of the Cold War was the nuclear arms race, primarily between the US and the USSR that tested its first atomic weapon on 26 August 1949. Neither superpower explicitly ruled out use of nuclear weapons – indeed their status as superpowers as well as their respective doctrines of national security rested heavily on their possession and threatened use of nuclear weapons – and the numbers of nuclear warheads of different kinds they produced multiplied exponentially to total over 60,000 at the height of the Cold War. Even after both had agreed to strategic arms limitations and reductions in the 1980s and 1990s, their arsenals remain formidable. According to reliable 2001 estimates the US possessed 7,206 strategic nuclear weapons, 1,670 non-strategic nuclear weapons and between 1,000 and 2,000 other nuclear weapons, while the figures for Russia in the same categories are given as 5,606; 3,800 and 10,000. The destructive power of a single such weapon, often measured in terms of megatons or one million tons of TNT, was enough to wipe out an entire city and exceed the total of all conventional bombs dropped in the Second World War. Adding to the many complexities of the super power arms race was the fact that despite strenuous efforts, the US did not long retain its nuclear monopoly, and after the Soviet Union, others too tested and produced their own nuclear weapons: Britain in 1952, France in 1959, China in 1964, Israel probably and in secret in 1968, India in 1973 though it did not weaponize until after 1998, and Pakistan in 1998 or possibly in 1987. Iraq, Iran and North Korea also have been widely suspected of having nuclear weapons ambitions and possible capability. None of these states amassed large arsenals of nuclear weapons, reliably estimated in 2001 as totaling 410 for China, 348 for France, 185 for Britain, about 200 for Israel, between 80-150 for India and between 30-50 for Pakistan. Nevertheless, the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction continues to be a serious problem in contemporary international politics.

Some of the profound questions raised in the atomic age are the following:

- Are scientists obliged to refrain from ethical judgments about the use to which their discoveries may be put by governments?
- What is the proper relationship between technical possibilities of creating weapons systems and political decision making on national security?
- Did nuclear weapons serve to maintain stability in Europe though balance of power during the Cold War, and would they produce stability or instability elsewhere?

- What were or are the economic and psychological costs of constructing national security policies on the basis of nuclear power with their implicit threat to all civilization and all life?
- Is it possible to control the proliferation of nuclear weapons to other states, and possibly to non-state groups, without nuclear disarmament by everybody?

As is evident, more than one answer has been offered, and will continue to be offered by thinking persons, to every one of the above questions. In this Unit, we confine our interpretation of the historical record to separate three distinct strands: the role of nuclear weapons – and successive stages of their sophistication – in the security policies of the super powers during the Cold War fueling an arms race, perceptions of aggressive intention on either side, and heavy reliance on the military component of state power, created a spiral of competitive interaction expressed in electoral rhetoric in the US about a so-called 'missile gap' and increased military spending and arms accumulation in both states that is called the 'arms race'. Scholars studying the American-Soviet arms race, as well as arms races that have occurred between other rival pairs of states, seek to explain causes and suggest ways of controlling such ultimately self-destructive behaviour. Bruce Russett writes that while international hostility and conflicts over spheres of influence suffice to begin and maintain high levels of military spending, domestic influences are equally important. In the context of the US as well as the USSR he stresses bureaucratic polities, organizational dynamics and inter-service rivalry in obtaining budget allocations, technological momentum in developing (or matching) new and superior weapons systems such as inter continental missiles (ICBMs) and multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs), and pressures generated by mutually reinforcing networks within society and the economy that came to be called the "military-industrial complex". He also notes that the arms race did not proceed in a regular spiral but with occasional upward spurts and few periods of significant reduction.

American and Soviet nuclear doctrines must be added to the above list of factors producing an arms race during the Cold War and these need more detailed analysis that can be attempted here. Very briefly and broadly speaking, in the first decade of the Cold War the US relied on its air and nuclear superiority to counter Soviet conventional and ground superiority in Europe and threatened 'massive retaliation' against any attempted change in the status quo; in the 1960s it relied on 'flexible response' and the creation of an invulnerable 'second strike' capacity based on a triad of air, land and sea based missiles aimed at a range of targets including cities to 'deter' any possible 'first strike' by the Soviet Union; in the 1970s the US aimed for stability in the status quo through arms control negotiations and détente; and then in the 1980s engaged in a military build-up that included deployment of intermediate range missiles in Europe to reassure Western Europe of American commitment to its defence, and a new Strategic Defence Initiative, what Reagan called 'Star Wars'. The theory of 'deterrence' – itself a term capable of flexible interpretation but based on the assumption of two roughly comparable hostile powers with common conceptions of what constituted 'rational action' – was central to American strategic doctrine throughout. In the absence of open debate it was more difficult to decipher Soviet military doctrines and objectives beyond security, equality, equality of status and stability or assess the role of deterrence theory in Moscow. It can be seen, however, that what kept the Cold War from becoming hot was Mutual Assured Destruction. Though the Soviet Union in its search for strategic parity and possible and strategic or tactical superiority more or less kept pace with US weapons innovations, and initiated breakthroughs in some areas such as orbiting satellites in space, Reagan's initiatives in the 1980s convinced the new reformist Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev that his country could neither afford the arms race economically nor sustain it technologically.

Meanwhile, the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 had brought the dangers of a nuclear exchange shockingly close to decision makers, and the US and USSR moved toward arms control measures beginning with the Partial Test Ban Treaty (banning atmospheric tests) signed on 5 August 1963. Arms control negotiations were extended exercises in bargaining and conflict management, not efforts to bring about disarmament or conflict resolution, so that perennial Cold War disputes over Berlin, Korea, Taiwan, remained unsettled and the multiplication of weapons systems continued. Moreover, some systems were kept on hair trigger alert so that accidental conflagration easily could have been flared as is well documented by Scott Sagan. Arms control measures were intended to reduce risks, to remove incentives for first strike by either side, and to stabilize the arms race around notions of strategic parity and balance. There were lengthy and often vituperative disagreements on what constituted balance or equivalence in force structures and weapons systems, as well as over the technology and credibility of verification. The details of these debates, as also the agreements eventually reached, were extensively reported at the time so that it is not necessary to repeat then here. The major bilateral nuclear weapon treaties signed by the US and the USSR/Russia are as follows:

26 May 1972	Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I)
03 July 1974	Threshold Test Ban Treaty
18 June 1979	Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II)
08 December 1987	Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty
31 July 1991	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I)
03 January 1993	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II)

Notwithstanding significant reduction in nuclear arsenals promised in START I and II, and a plethora of writings, resolutions and conferences on the desirability of universal nuclear disarmament – developing nuclear weapons raised acute anxiety in world capitals. Measures were undertaken to prevent and check that type of 'horizontal' proliferation, notably the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) negotiated over three years and opened for signature by states on 1 July 1968 with an initial validity of 25 years. With 135 initial and 187 current signatories, the NPT is the largest multilateral treaty on record and was indefinitely extended in 1995. The NPT specifically defines a nuclear-weapon state (NWS) as one that had manufactured and exploded a nuclear device before 1 January 1967, thus recognizing two different categories of states, and makes different requirements of them. Article 1 stipulates fully that NWS undertake not to transfer any nuclear explosive device, or any encouragement to or means of manufacturing them, to any non-nuclear weapons state (NNWS). Article II of the NPT obliges non-nuclear explosive devices. This explicit bargain between NWS and NNWS was struck only when it was agreed that the treaty would establish the norm that no state should have nuclear weapons embodied in Article VI stating that the parties to the treaty undertake to pursue negotiations in good faith to "general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." Also the treaty recongnized the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) created in 1954 to foster the exchange of scientific and technical information on the peaceful uses of atomic energy while ensuring that none of it was used to further any military purpose.

In addition to the NPT the US and others took further measures to discourage and prevent proliferation. Some industrialized and nuclear capable countries such as the FRG, Japan, and Sweden were in the NPT as NNWS. Other potential proliferators, such as Argentina and Brazil, were persuaded or pressurized into singing regional bans on nuclear weapons. Increasingly stringent limitations have been placed on trade and transfers of any materials or technologies that could be used for military purposes by suppliers, groups such as the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Supplies Group founded in the 1970s, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) of 1987 and the Warsaw Guidelines of 1992. Domestic legislation and vigorous surveillance in some countries since the 1970s, notably in the US, raise very high barriers to transfers of doubtful materials and technologies, and "counter proliferation" tactics devised to discourage potential proliferators. International public opinion rose against nuclear weapons after the end of the Cold War. Former republics in the Soviet Union, Kazakastan and Ukraine relinquished nuclear weapons. South Africa terminated its nuclear weapons programme at the time of making a transit to democracy. The US and Russia agreed to reduce their stockpiles of nuclear weapons. The International Court of Justice issued an advisory opinion on the Nuclear Weapons Case in July 1996 and held that the use of nuclear weapons would violate humanitarian law. In September 1996 a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was opened for signature and negotiation for a multilateral treaty on a cutoff of production of fissile material for nuclear weapons was in process.

Not withstanding the above, the proliferation clock was ticking again by the end of the century. The CTBT required the 44 states, judged to be nuclear capable to sign and ratify it before coming into force; India objected to being numbered one of the 44 and did not sign, and though President Clinton signed in 1999 the US Senate did not ratify the treaty. India, and Pakistan, openly tested nuclear weapons in May 1998 and moved toward their deployment; US pressures on them to "roll back" their programmes failed. It also became evident that some state signatories of the NPT, and some private companies within signatory counties, had previously violated prohibitions on transfers of technology and materials to the then NNWS such as Pakistan; and North Korea not only threatened to withdraw from the NPT but boasted of having manufactured weapons. At the heart of the proliferation dilemma, however, is the issue of equity. The NPT created a hierarchy of states, privileging the NWS on condition that they sincerely move toward the abolition of nuclear weapons. Their failure to do so and their adoption of counter-proliferation measures (including development of new types of nuclear weapons) raised suspicions that they wanted a perpetual freeze of hierarchy. In the words of Richard Butler, former head of the UN Special commission to disarm Iraq, "it is simply beyond any concept of civilization to maintain the security of any state or person on the basis of the threat of mass destruction of others. It is inevitable that as long as the threat exists, others will seek to defend against it by measures of a similar kind. The consequences of such action and reaction are an endless spiral of proliferation."

16.4 DECOLONIZATION AND NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT

The Second World War brought about the dissolution of European empires in Asia and Africa, beginning with the independence of the Philippines, India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Burma in the mid-1940s, Ghana in 1956, and most of Francophone Africa in the early 1960s. The process of decolonization was neither easy not rapid and was only completed in the last decade of the century, when South Africa threw over its apartheid regime, and when Britain returned Hong Kong and Portugal returned Macao to China in 1997 and 1999 respectively. One immediate effect of decolonization was the multiplication of state members in the international system, mentioned at the beginning of this Unit as a characteristic of the 20th century. Another immediate effect was to widen the agenda of the international system, especially that of the United Nations General Assembly of which the newly independent states were members, to include subjects of interest to them such as decolonization, racial equality, and economic development. A third effect was to alter the functioning of the international system somewhat, away from the *realpolitik* of power play toward norms of equity, international law, universal participation and legitimization of collective action by the UN. Efforts of multiple parentages to so reform the international system were delayed, diffused, and incomplete no doubt, but none the less discernible in the latter half of the 20th Century when the Cold War was at its height. For example, a victory for the principles of decolonization and self-determination was seen in passage of UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV): Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, on 14 December 1960 and its virtual elevation to international law.

Decolonization came to be associated with the development of a Nonaligned Movement (NAM) because important countries such as India, Indonesia, Egypt, and Ghana gained their independence at a time when the world was riven in two blocs by the Cold War and they naturally wished to assert their diplomatic and ideological independence not only from their former colonial masters, but from that particular conflict, which was not their own. As Jawaharlal Nehru announced in 1946, "We propose as far as possible, to keep away from the power politics of groups, aligned against one another, which have led in the past to world wars and which may again lead to disasters on an even vaster scale." In much the same way a newly independent USA had declared its non-involvement in the Napoleonic conflict of early 19th Century Europe. And in similar fashion Yugoslavia's President Tito asserted the independence of a communist state from the Soviet bloc in 1948. Initially, therefore, nonalignment denoted the foreign policy orientation of a particular state disassociating itself from the major international conflict of the time, and easily was confused with neutrality or neutralism, negative terms often used to denigrate such assertions of independence. Nonalignment was always different from neutrality or neutralization, however, because nonalignment was a freely chosen position and not imposed by others as in the case of neutralization, because nonaligned states never claimed to be strictly equidistant from the two super powers and tolerated cynical allegations of manipulating Cold War rivalries for their own benefit, and because nonalignment, as Nehru often explained, demanded an active participation in the international arena and not the passive withdrawal of a neutral.

These positive aspects of a nonaligned position became evident in the course of the Korean War (1950-1953) and UN debates about its conduct and end. First, the Korean War raised anxiety about the prospects of international peace, seen as a prerequisite for the independence and self-development of new states, and so led to India's successful attempts to mediate differences between the opposing sides on the disposition of prisoners of war and condition for armistice, as well as many exhortations to peace and 'zones of peace'. Secondly, Asian and Arab members of the UN cooperated in drafting mediatory resolutions and found an affinity in mutual concerns for accelerating decolonization and emphasizing economic and social development in the functioning of the UN over the ideological and military conflict of the super powers that dominated the agenda.

The first Asian-African Conference was held at Bandung, Indonesia, in April 1955 among high representatives of 29 states to consider problems of common interest and discuss ways and means of reaching fuller cooperation. This conference is regarded as a precursor to NAM; its final communiqué heralded future final communiqués of NAM summit meetings in stressing the need for economic and cultural cooperation, human rights and self-determination, attention to the problems of dependent peoples, and promotion of world peace and nuclear disarmament. But there was no agreement at Bandung on what was one criterion of nonalignment, that is, abstaining from membership of (Western sponsored) military alliances, because some states, including the Philippines and Pakistan, hoped to gain security from such alliance. The following year President Nasser of Egypt, Prime Minister Nehru of India, and President Tito of Yugoslavia met at Brioni to review international developments and reaffirmed their commitment to the principles laid down at Bandung as well as the need to persevere in settling international problems and creating an atmosphere of peace. By the late 1950s the term 'nonalignment' was in usage, as also the French term *Tiers Monde* and its Anglicized form Third World, denoting a group of countries in contradistinction to the First World of capitalist liberal democracy and the Second World of command economic planning. Though not synonymous the terms 'newly independent', 'nonaligned', 'developing countries', and 'third world' came to be used more or less interchangeably.

The first Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries was held at Belgrade in September 1961 and issued a passionate appeal to the US and USSR to "suspend their recent war preparations" and "resume negotiation for a peaceful settlement" of outstanding differences between them. The final communiqué noted the weakening of imperialism and reaffirmed support to UNGA Resolution 1514. In addition, the communique called for general and complete disarmament and urged participation of nonaligned states in all world conferences on disarmament, denounced the establishment of foreign military bases as a violation of sovereignty, advocated policies of peaceful coexistence, and called attention to specific problems, such as racial apartheid in South Africa and the rights of the Palestinian people, to be tackled in conformity with UN principles. The 25 leaders assembled at Belgrade denied "any wish to form a new bloc" but agreed to convene similar meetings every three years and tried to specify criteria (such as non-acceptance of foreign military bases) for invitees. NAM was launched and steadily gained members. 92 heads of state or government met at the Havana summit in 1979 and 114 at the Kuala Lumpur, 13th summit of 2003. Meanwhile, NAM criteria had been so enlarged that there was little similarity among members beyond their relative weakness in the international system both political and economic.

The goal of economic independence and self-reliance proved to be more elusive than that of legal independence. Third World members of the UN conferred and often voted together as a group (the G-77) in the General Assembly and new agencies such as the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in the 1960s to try and redress adverse terms of trade and gain concessions for their exports in more developed and affluent markets. Ideas about revising the entire international system of economic relations were aired at the NAM Summit at Lusaka in 1970 and presented as a manifesto at the Algiers Summit three years later, before being adopted at a special session of the General Assembly in 1974 as a Programme for

Action for the establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO). It was no coincidence that demands for an NIEO were launched concurrently with the first dramatic oil-price hike and demonstration of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries' (OPEC) bargaining power with industrialized economies dependent on imports of cheap energy. For a time it appeared as if a fundamental shift of economic and therefore diplomatic power away from the industrial North toward the pre-industrial South were possible. The reforms demanded under NIEO fell under five main heads as follows:

- Reforms in the terms of trade and pricing for primary products and commodities, and better access to the markets of the advanced industrial countries through preferences.
- Reforms in the major international economic institutions, especially the International Monetary Fund, to benefit developing countries.
- Recognition of the growing problem of Third World debt and measures to alleviate it.
- Greater economic assistance and technology transfers to developing countries.
- Recognition of sovereign rights to direct national economic policy and control the activities of Multi-National Corporations.

The above charter of demands for socio-economic justice was addressed to the advanced industrial countries of the First World but had little tangible effect on their policies, though the rhetoric of various reports such as those of the Commissions on South-South cooperation echoed that of NIEO. The Second World Socialist countries claimed to be a "natural ally" of NAM but disclaimed responsibility for the injustices of the capitalist international economic system or the means to redress them. The victory of conservative leaders with hard ideology in the West, especially Margaret Thatcher in Britain and Ronald Reagan in the US, was certainly a setback to the cause of international social justice, and a blaze of militarism accompanied the New Cold War of the 1980s. Once again nonalignment was denigrated as 'immoral' and 'anti-American' and UN voting records of NAM members scrutinized and sometimes penalized. NIEO demands had not been met by the end of the 20th Century and some problems, such as Third World debt, had become more acute, even as increasing globalization and the rules of the World Trade Organization presented new challenges to all countires, including those belonging to NAM.

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In advocating an NIEO, NAM also addressed its own members in exhorting them to increase cooperation and exchanges of information and technology among themselves and improve them abroad. These exhortations had only limited effect, mainly because the economies of the newly independent countries remained firmly linked to those of the metropolitan 'core' of advanced industrial countries, and the ruling elities of the former frequently were dependent on the explicit or tacit approval of the latter in order to remain in power. Their ability and willingness to implement the NIEO charter within their own countries was correspondingly weak. Linkages between 'periphery' and 'core' were evident in Latin America and inspired the neo-Marxist theory of *dependencia* to explain contemporary international relations; practical instruction on how to end the cycle of dependence without revolution, however, was largely confined to making declarations in international conferences. Lack of means was a ready explanation for the paucity of South-South cooperation. But even when financial means were available, as from petro-dollars generated by successive oil-price hikes, they were directed more toward arms purchases from and investments in the West than toward assisting broad-based economic development in oil-importing countries of the South.

Other weaknesses of NAM deserve attention. Most stemmed from the diversity of its members, drawn as they were from every continent and therefore lacking the common perspectives of a geographically contiguous region, and having leaders of varying ideological leanings and practical experience in governance. Many members were racked by internal divisions and conflicts as well as by authoritarian governments. India was for long a rare democracy in the Third World. Each member had its own definition of national self-interest, and of nonalignment, that did not coincide with another's definition strongly enough to produce an alliance or even a coalition capable of joint action, except at the level of declaration and, it must be added for some, in lending moral and material assistance to the anti-apartheid forces of democracy in South Africa during the 1980s. Even the problems of the Arab people of Palestine that featured in every NAM summit document inspired no substantive common action beyond granting membership to the Palestine Liberation Organization, and drafting resolutions criticizing Israel and Zionism (predictably offensive to the US). Typically, NAM comments on important areas of conflict, including Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Central America in the 1980s, were drafted by members from that particular region and paragraphs put into a collage of the final statement to await the next summit meeting. Institutional underpinning was slight, derived from the diplomatic missions of members at UN headquarters in New York.

The weaknesses of NAM, in short, stemmed from the administrative, diplomatic, economic, financial, institutional, and political weaknesses of the individual members themselves. These were most evident in cases of civil conflict that racked most of Africa, and of conflict among member states, such as between Iran and Iraq for years of bitter war during1980-1988, and perennial disputes between Pakistan and India, that NAM could neither prevent nor seriously attempt to mediate. NAM still lacks the mechanisms and power to resolve conflicts; but then, so do other states and international organizations. The strengths of NAM arose from the courageous efforts of its founding leaders to approach questions of international peace and security from the point of view of the larger good of humanity, to provide representatives of distanced and newly independent states opportunities for free discussion of issues and interaction with each other that were not easily available elsewhere, and to articulate principles that might not have been matched by practice but pointed toward a more equitable and humane international code of conduct produced by power politics. It is for this reason, perhaps, that NAM did not disappear with the end of the Cold War, as was expected by those who judged it relevant only to bipolar military-security configuration. Instead, NAM continues to grow and change its role with the demands of the day, while reaffirming the realities of diversity and pluralism in the contemporary world.

16.5 THE END OF THE 20TH CENTURYAND ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

For those who see the Russian Revolution of 1917 as the most important event of the 20th Century, the unexpected dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 marked not only the equally unexpected termination of the Cold War but the end of century itself. Events of the 1990s illustrated dilemmas, issues, and problems that also dominate the first years of the 21st Century. These stemmed both from the end of a bipolar balance of power international system that had lent some predictability to world polities since the end of the Second World War, and from the collapse of a great multi-ethnic superpower with a command economy. The 1990s also saw the breakdown of civility and governmental authority in several states, such as Yugoslavia and more than one in Africa, that were not caused by changes in the international system as such and evoked muddled responses from it, but which stimulated debates inside and outside the UN about ethnic identity, displacement of peoples, and so on. It is difficult to generalize about international rivalries at the 20th Century's end than at its beginning and we confine ourselves to a brief overview.

When an ailing Brezhnev passed away in November 1982 the internal problems of the Soviet Union had been severe for a decade or more, though concealed by the aura of a superpower from the outside world, including US intelligence agencies. Brezhnev was succeeded by men of his own generation, first by Yuri Andropov, who died in February 1984, and then by Konstantin Chernenko, who died in March 1985. Neither had the time nor energy to attempt internal reform or external initiatives. The credit for doing so belonged to the next General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 54 year old Mikhail Gorbachev, who came to be described as "the man who changed the world" in five years. Gorbachev saw the imperative of revitalizing a stagnant Soviet economy and the near impossiblity of doing so without loosening state control that had corrupted administration, introducing open debate to stimulate initiative, and reducing defence expenditures then amounting to an estimated 25 per cent of GNP. But the latter was unfeasible while the Soviet Union was engaged in a debilitating war in Afghanistan and faced a vociferously hostile Reagan Administration that was raising the US defence budget above $400 billion a year, albeit less than five per cent of American GNP.

Gorbachev simultaneously launched three campaigns and conducted them personally. One was externally directed to establish good relations with world leaders, especially in the West beginning with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, and to restructure relations with other Socialist states on the basis of independence rather than the Brezhnev Doctrine of intervention. Another campaign was to promote the idea of *perestroika* – meaning reform and an all-embracing modernization so as to improve economic performance and living conditions of the people – among Soviet officials and the public during his many tours around the country. And a third campaign was also internal, to introduce *glasnost* – meaning openness – in sharing information with the frequently alienated intelligentsia, and reaching economic and political decisions on the basis of facts rather than secretly fabricated statistics. *Perestroika* and *glasnost* amounted to a reversal of Soviet policy and practice of over 60 years and needed active support from Party and State *apparatchiks* (functionaries) at every level in order to succeed. Not surprisingly, well entrenched, highly placed *apparatchiks* collectively known as the *Nomnclatura* offered the greatest resistance to *perestroika* and *glasnost*. Gorbachev's vocal attacks on the system and Party he had inherited, especially at the 27th Party Congress of February 1986, merely strengthened their opposition to modernization or democratization, while the habits of dependence and obedience to authority in the general population were not easily overcome. *Glasnost* too made the task of reform from above more, not less, difficult, partly because it delegitimized the use of coercion, and partly because it provided no adequate response to the catastrophic meltdown of a nuclear reactor at the Chernobyl power station on 26 April 1986, the worst nuclear accident in the world. Gorbachev wrote in his Memoirs (1995) that he laid the basis for *perestroika* in the years 1985-1988 and expected democratization to take place peacefully in the next phase. In fact, his reforms sparked a kind of uncontrolled revolution leading to economic chaos, political fragmentation, and self-assertion by larger and smaller 'national groups – including Russia itself – that unraveled the Soviet Union in 1991.

Before that happened, however, Gorbachev's diplomacy assisted by Foreign Minister Eduard Shevarnadze, brought an end to the Cold War. The Cold War was described earlier as being an ideological conflict between communism and capitalism, a territorial conflict over control of Central Europe epitomized in the division of Germany, and a power struggle between the US and USSR played out by proxy on all continents but most of all in the arms race. Gorbacehv's economic reforms moving the Soviet Union away from its state controlled 'command' model toward a mixed and even a market economy obviously diminished ideological conflict, as did his public advocacy of universal 'democratic' values reiterated on the occasion of his summit meeting with US President George Bush at Malta in December 1989.

Meanwhile, unrest in the Socialist states of Eastern Europe caused Gorbachev concern, but he did not go back on his principle of non-interference so that demands for change were no longer met by repression backed by Soviet arms. Instead, elections in Poland brought Solidarity to power in place of the Communist Party. Hungary embraced a multiparty system and opened its border with Austria in May 1989. The regimes in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and later Romania collapsed. Gorbachev wrote that when he visited Berlin for a meeting with GDR leaders in October 1989 he was reminded "of an overheated boiler with the lid tightly closed". On the night of 8 November the crises came to a head with huge crowds gathering at the Berlin Wall and tearing parts of it down with their hands; the checkpoints to West Berlin were opened to allow for an exodus. The future of Germany, in one or in two states, was a difficult question to resolve against the background of 20th Century wars, the growing weight of Germany and the crucial importance of German-Soviet relations to the stability of Europe. Gorbachev had met FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl for the first time in October 1988 when they both agreed in Moscow to promote links between NATO and the Warsaw Pact and found they could do business with each other. But Kohl's ten point plan for the rapid unification of Germany put forward in November 1989 dismayed Gorbachev as well as British and French leaders. Intricate consultations among concerned parties worried about possible instability followed, and all questions were then refereed to a body consisting of the four occupying powers – Britain, France, the US and the USSR – plus the two German states. Soviet delegates were not able to achieve their objective of effectively neutralizing Germany through membership of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and no one anticipated the practical difficulties of reunification. But finally, skilful diplomacy resulted in all accepting a re-untied Germany within NATO, at the same time renouncing forever possession of WMDs and formally committed to "good neighbourliness, partnership and cooperation."

More than one account has been published detailing interchanges between Moscow and Washington between 1985 and 1991 that brought about an end to the Cold War and produced significant agreements on arms control after tough negotiations. All these accounts show the importance of individual personalities and their interaction with each other in making initiatives possible, the cleavages that existed *within* each side between hard- liners who scorned any diminution of hostility and new thinkers hoping to bridge the chasm of mistrust through compromise, and the constant negative influence of domestic politics and media coverage in each country on the progress of bilateral negotiations. Without discussing these general propositions affecting all international relations, we outline the main events in US-USSR relations between 1985 and 1991.

The New Cold War of the 1980s intensified danger not only because of heightened conflict in Asia, Africa, and Central America, but because of the introduction of new and more lethal nuclear weapons into superpower arsenals and the deployment of some in Europe, as well as Reagan's proposed Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) that threatened stability of the 1972 ABM Treaty by taking the arms race into space. The principal Soviet and US interest was to reduce the threat posed by these weapons to their respective countries but the chasm of mistrust between them was immense. After intricate negotiations between foreign ministers, Gorbachev awaited the outcome of the first meeting between American and Soviet heads of state since 1979. Despite their ability to communicate with each other as human beings, the two men could reach no agreement beyond the desirability of meeting again. They did so next at Reykjavik, lceland, on 11-12 October 1986 and bargained seriously about eliminating offensive ballistic missiles from their arsenals within ten years, and all other nuclear weapons too. Their respective advisers were appalled by this unplanned leap their leaders had made, and relieved when negotiations failed because Reagan refused to relinquish SDI. (He also ignored the six-continent initiative launched byArgentina. India, Greece, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania on behalf of NAM, calling for a worldwide moratorium on the testing, production and development of nuclear weapons and delivery systems.) Nevertheless, Reykjavik was a turning point in new thinking; it made possible the INF Treaty of December 1987 eliminating some species of missiles from Europe and opening the way for reductions in all classes of nuclear weapons subsequently agreed to in START I and II in July 1991 and January 1993. Gorbachev's state visit to Washington D.C. in December 1987 was a public relations triumph for him and the beginning of a personal rapport with then Vice-President George Bush that was carried forward into the next few years. For example, the US and the IMF tried to assist marketization of the Soviet economy – though the actual impact of their efforts is controversial.

Gorbachev was acutely aware of internal economic problems as he introduced *perestroika* and reduced costly external commitments. Thus, on 9 February 1988 he announced specific steps for a political settlement in Afghanistan through the UN, including the withdrawal of Soviet troops over the following year. Multilateral settlement of the Cambodia problem and UN supervision of elections followed soon after, as also settlements in Angola and Namibia with active UN participation. Gorbachev quickened the pace of normalizing relations with China and received a warm welcome in Beijing in May 1989, an event overshadowed for the international media present to cover it by the unrelated pro-democracy student demonstrations taking place in Tiananmen Square at the same time and their subsequent repression by force. Also, the Soviet Union was diplomatically active during the crisis caused by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990; it could not persuade Saddaam Hussein to withdraw peacefully and joined the rest of the Security Council in sanctioning military action against him. A long-standing Soviet objective was advanced in October 1991 when it co-sponsored with the US an international conference on the Middle East convened at Madrid to set out a programme – or 'road map' as it was called – to resolve conflict between Israel and Palestine. But success abroad could not conceal failures and fissures at home, especially on the 'nationalities problem' constituting relations between Moscow at the centre and constituent units or Republics of the federated USSR, as well as between different ethnic groups in each constituent Republic. There were many anomalies in the vast multi-ethnic expanse of the Soviet Union and

Gorbachev had no new thinking to offer on those subjects; he showed a preference for centralized and ethnic-Russian authority. But once 'national' urges to recover language, religion and identity were stirred at the grassroots, a momentum grew. The Baltic Republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania exploded in resentment against Russians and the CPSU, tacitly helped in their drive for independence by the US, which had always refused to recognize them as part of the USSR. Corruption in Uzbekistan led to an insurrection there in 1986, followed by troubles in Kazakhstan and throughout the Trans-Caucasian region including Nagorno-Karabakh, Georgia, and later Chechnya. An attempted coup against Gorbachev in August 1990 failed, but his leadership was noticeably depleted. Meanwhile, the revival of Russian national feeling – in contrast and subsequent opposition to Soviet feeling – was also strong, and owed much to the ambitions of Boris Yeltsin, perhaps, who became President of the Russian Federation in 1990 and successor to Gorbachev in 1991. The Soviet Union was officially dissolved in December 1991, replaced in name by the Commonwealth of Independent States. Fourteen new states became members of the Untied Nations.

Yugoslavia, a conglomerate state created by the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, had survived the death of its unifying leader Josip Broz Tito in May 1980 but faced intensifying tensions between the more and the less economically developed republics and shrinking resources fueled animosity among different ethnic and religious groups. Croatia and Slovenia declared independence in 1991 and Slobodan Milosevic became leader of a nationalistic Serbia determined to build a 'Greater Serbia'out of the remaining units of multi-ethnic Yugoslavia at the cost of minority groups, including the Muslims of Bosnia and the Albanians of Kosovo. Atrocities that came to be called 'ethnic cleansing' led to military conflict, expressions of international alarm, and an inadequate United Nations intervention in Bosnia in 1991-92 that was replaced by a NATO force in late 1995. Neither force could restore peace nor prevent massacres and population transfers that resulted in an ethnically-partitioned Bosnia reflected in the final Dayton peace agreement. Further conflict flared in Kosovo and US led-NATO forces conducted 11 weeks of air strikes on Serbia and its capital on Serbia and its capital Belgrade in 1999 before stationing peace keeping troops in Kosovo. Milosevic was displaced and taken to face trial for 'crimes against humanity'at the International Tribunal in The Hague. The OSCE subsequently attempted to outline a regional strategy for dealing with crisis prevention and post-conflict rehabilitation in Europe.

The internationally publicized Yugoslavia episode illustrated several trends noticeable also in other parts of the world at the end of the 20th Century but not discussed here. Very briefly, five of these trends were as follows:

- Increasing economic integration, or globalization, while welcomed in many prospering quarters, also quickly transmitted economic problems across national frontiers and caused societal stress. Yugoslavia suffered from Western Europe's economic slow down and unemployment in the 1980s. In 1997 a financial crisis caused by rapid transfers of capital spread from South Korea through all of Southeast Asia, undercutting the dynamism hitherto displayed by the 'Asian Tigers' and affecting world trade negatively.
- The breakdown of central governmental authority in multi-ethnic states was accompanied often by inter-ethnic conflict and the commitment of atrocities that sometimes amounted to genocide. The Bosnian horrors viewed on international television were equalled or exceeded by 'humanitarian crises' in

various parts of Africa, particularly in Rwanda in 1994 when the Hutu massacred the Tutsi people in their thousands, but also in Mozambique, Somalia, Sudan, and Zaire.

- Crises often hit international headlines too late to be prevented or managed by multilateral diplomacy. As an association of sovereign member states, the UN did not possess the institutions, the finance, or the mechanisms to meet the challenges posed by human disasters and failing states. Nor did regional organizations such as the EU or the OAU. The inability of concerned persons to put potential crises high on the international agenda sometimes was an unavoidable tragedy, as in Rwanda.

- The issue of protecting human rights received increasing international attention in the aftermath of the Cold War and the Tiananmen Square event in China, with non-governmental organizations playing important roles in the effort both domestically and internationally. No world-wide consensus was reached, however, on what constituted violation of human rights or how such violations were best remedied. There was even less agreement on the legitimacy or modality of 'humanitarian intervention' encroaching on traditional notions of state sovereignty.

- In the absence of effective UN or EU action the US took the lead in Bosnia and Kosovo. An image of the US a 'hyper power', the 'indispensable power', gained currency in the 1990s when it was the only remaining super-power, but also triggered expressions of preference by many world leaders for a multi-polar international system. Thus, evident strains developed between the US and its closest allies in Europe, Japan, as well with its more recent and problematic partners, Russia and China.

The last decade of the 20th Century seemed to justify it being called the 'American Century'. American military spending was more than the next 15 military budgets added together, US military power was overwhelmingly superior to that of every other country and truly global in its reach. The US economy showed more dynamism than those of Europe or Japan and American corporations were at the core of the international economy. The US attracted more immigrants per year from all over the world than any other country. American universities were global centres of study and research. American popular culture expressed the hard power of the US. American triumphalism in the collapse of socialism and easy victory in the Gulf War of early 1991 was evident in calls for a New World Order, and succinctly expressed in the title of Francis Fukuyama's celebrated book, *The End of History*, which argued that there were no viable alternatives to capitalistic democracy left in the world. American hegemony over the international system at the end of the 20th century appeared to be even greater than it had been 50 years earlier (when it accounted for approximately 50 per cent of World GDP in contrast to the current approximate 20 per cent) or that of Great Britain one hundred years earlier. One result was widespread resentment of the US, not merely among newly independent developing countries that experienced difficulty to having their voices heard in Washington DC, but also among well-established great powers, and other permanent members of the UN Security Council, several of which complained of American heavy handedness in diplomatic style. While no one state or group of states was able or willing to create a counter balance to the US, there was much talk in world capitals about 'multi polarity' providing a more widely acceptable basis than 'hegemonic stability' for world order. Since large swathes of the world were infected with transnational crime, drug trafficking, insurrection, terrorism, and destruction of the natural environment in the last decade of the 20th Century, no one could pretend that world order prevailed or that American power alone was sufficient to establish it. Within the US there were many references to the illusionary or transient nature of a unipolar world and speculation on how a rising power, such as China, could be accommodated or changes in the international system be brought about peacefully. At the same time, Samuel Huntington, an eminent political scientist, seemed to predict protracted conflict between the Judeo-Christian West and other major civilizations such as the Islamic or Sinic, in his widely read *Clash of Civilizations.*

16.6 SUMMARY

The 20th Century was indeed an age of extremes and provided ample empirical data to support or refute various social and political theories. Also, it was in the 20th Century that International Relations came to be recognized as an academic discipline separate from history or political science, and a respectable body of theoretical literature on relations among states was accumulated. The field of International Theory is too rich to be surveyed here, but some schools of thought as well as the major issues that attract attention can be mentioned. The two major schools of thought, once labeled 'Idealist' and Realist', have long since spawned many variations and refinements under the rubrics 'Neo-liberal' and 'Neo-realist' as well as explanations that bridge both schools. The crucial difference between them is of emphasis in explanation. Realists stress the pursuit of survival and national interests defined as power by states and the predominance of conflict among them. The Mid-century produced a methodological revolution in the social sciences known as 'behaviourism' that pushed international relations in a 'positivist' direction for many decades. Structuralism and neo-Marxism also influenced international theory. Some of the assumptions and conclusions underpinning these schools were challenged towards the end of the century by 'critical theory', by 'feminism', by 'constructivists' and by those social historians who saw the behaviour of states as an interplay of external and internal factors. Debates were sustained between and among different theories and greatly enlarged the field of research. Some questions of practical and theoretical interest recur in the literature, such as:

- What is the appropriate level of analysis for the study of international relations? Is it the global or transnational, the state-centric, or other? Stated differently, the question is, who are the actors in world politics?
- What is the meaning of state sovereignty in conditions of the late 20th Century?
- What kind of international system is most conductive to order and stability, human welfare, and legitimacy from among the known international systems of balance of power-whether multi-polar or bipolar in configuration – and hegemonic or imperial, also with variations?
- What are the causes of violent conflict?
- What constitutes 'just war'?
- What are the sources and sanctions of international law?
- What are the mainsprings of foreign policy in a given state?
- What, if any, are the ethical or normative dimensions of international relations?

The brief summary of international rivalries in the 20th Century given in this Unit hints at possible answers to these questions of continuing interest, which can be explored through further research and participation in the engrossing subject of world history.

16.7 EXERCISES

1) What was the impact of Cold War on world politics?

2) Write a note on the nuclear arms race and its consequences.

3) Briefly discuss the importance of the Non-Aligned movement.

4) Where does world polity stand at the end of the 20th century?

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UNIT 17 POLITICAL REVOLUTION: RUSSIA

Structure

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17.1 INTRODUCTION

This Unit will not focus on the details of the Revolution but on how it influenced the politics and society in the post-revolution period. The Russian Revolution was an unprecedented event in the sense that it was the first revolution that was based on a concrete and explicit theory of revolution. The coming of the revolution, though not its details, had been both predicted and anticipated. Another crucial aspect of this Revolution was that it was not projected as a national or a Russian event. Russian Revolution was visualized as an important step in the coming of the world socialist revolution. It was for this reason that the Russian Revolution was called, not a national revolution but a world revolution, by many scholars. This Unit will examine a range of factors that prepared the Russian society for the revolution. It would then focus on the major events surrounding the Revolution. Finally it will briefly talk about the legacy of the Revolution and what it meant to the rest of the world.

17.2 PRELUDE TO REVOLUTION: RUSSIAN SPECIFICITIES

An important paradox of the Russian Revolution is its self-image as a global phenomenon and the specificity of Russian conditions that brought it about in Russia. According to the Marxian theory of revolution, it was to take place first in advance industrial societies as a result of the maturing of the contradictions of capitalism. But the Socialist Revolution occurred in a backward industrial country like Russia. However, the coming of the revolution was nothing short of a storm that had a dramatic impact on the society and people of Russia. The following quote is an attempt to capture this impact:

> All Russia was learning to read, and *reading-politics,* economics, history - because the people wanted to *know*....In every city, in most towns, along the

> front, each political faction had its newspaper — sometimes several. Hundreds of thousands of pamphlets were distributed by thousands of organizations, and poured into the armies, the villages, the factories, the streets. The thirst for education, so long thwarted, burst with the Revolution into a frenzy of expression. From Smolny Institute alone, the first six months, went out every day tons, car-loads, train-loads of literature, saturating the land. Russia absorbed reading matter like hot sand drinks water, insatiable. And it was not fables, falsified history, diluted religion, and the cheap fiction that corrupts — but social and economic theories, philosophy, the works of Tolstoy, Gogol, and Gorky... (From John Reed, *Ten Days That Shook the World,* 1987 Edition, Moscow, p.37.)

That was Russia in 1917 as described by John Reed, an American journalist, who had come to Russia to cover the event and who was, in the words of Lenin's wife, Krupskaya, " not an indifferent observer, but a passionate revolutionary...." There were many others like him, who flocked to the city of St. Petersburg, or Petrograd as it was called from 1917 onwards, simply because that city symbolized all that they dared to believe in and hold dear. If the French Revolution symbolized Liberty, Equality and Fraternity, the Russian Revolution symbolized much more-organized struggle, clarity of perspective and courage to go against the tide even if it meant being isolated in the whole world wide.

How did all this happen? Why did Russia and not Germany stage the first socialist revolution, contrary to the expectations of everyone? How could the working class of this backward country, with its half-baked capitalism, have the courage to overthrow the Tsarist autocracy and move, with almost lightning speed from a semi-feudal political and social order, into a socialist system, bypassing the capitalist phase almost completely?

The answers lie in the many peculiarities of Russia. It had a weak bourgeoisie and the industrial development that had taken place in Russia from the 1880s was entirely at the initiative of the Tsar and financed by foreign capital. While the French companies invested in the mining and metallurgy sectors, oil was in the hands of the British concerns and the chemical and electrical engineering industries in the hands of the Germans. Within Russia, the capital for industrialization was raised largely by taxing the peasantry even as the agrarian sector continued to remain backward technologically, the best lands remaining with the nobility.

Industrialization in Russia was limited to certain pockets in the country like St. Petersburg and Moscow districts, the Donetz and the Dneiper basins. They were, in the words of Maurice Dobb, no more than industrial islands in a vast agricultural sea. Yet, these industries gave rise to a powerful working class movement. This was because the typical Russian factory was a huge industrial unit with a high level of concentration. All stages of production were housed under one roof. This meant that workers of all kinds — from the unskilled to the highly skilled — were thrown together and the task of mobilizing them was correspondingly easier.

The Russian worker was part-peasant, part-worker, with strong roots in the villages. The fact that Russian industrialization was built, not upon a strong agricultural base as in the case of England, but on a backward rural sector where many problems had been unresolved, contributed to the growth of an extremely volatile working class movement in this country.

The Russian working class was largely concentrated in the textile industries, but there were substantial numbers of workers in the metallurgical and railway sectors as well. The working class, even while chafing against its abysmal working and living conditions and threatened with job insecurity, was able to absorb the flood of pamphlets and books which were being smuggled into the country, defying all attempts at censorship by the Tsarist authorities. Hence Russia had a peculiar combination of backwardness and modernization. This was evident not just in the industrial sector.

The Tsarist autocracy was unimaginatively backward even while the intelligentsia was the most vibrant intelligentsia in the whole of Europe in the nineteenth century. The autocracy, which originated in the medieval period, was said to have been influenced by the Mongol tradition. After the break- up of the Mongol Empire, the power that emerged was that of Muscovy, a principality centered around Moscow. In Muscovy, the position of the Tsar was one of unique strength-all authority in the country emanated from him. Until the very end the Tsarist autocracy remained a top-heavy political structure, in which the individual competence of the Tsar was of vital importance. Of course, Tsars like Alexander I (1801-1825) drew upon the talent of officials like M.M. Speranksy, who has been described as the most brilliant Russian statesman of the nineteenth century. Yet Speranksy himself suffered disgrace and exile when the Tsar, puffed up with his victory over Napoleon and Russia's primacy in the Concert of Europe, retracted on his reformist promises and became more and more reactionary. The reforms of Tsar Alexander II, remembered as the man who carried out the Emancipation of the Serfs and instituted the Zemstvos, were carried out in an authoritarian manner. He brushed aside all suggestions for popular participation in government even though he had encouraged such expectations.

Gradually, a mood of discontent spread over all of educated Russia. The first expression of this spirit of revolt was the Decembrist uprising of 1825, known by this name because the revolt occurred in the month of December. The "Decembrists", as those who participated in the revolt came to be known, were patriotic, intelligent young men of the aristocracy who had served as officers in the Tsar's army. They had fought in the Napoleonic Wars and when they travelled abroad they were greatly influenced by the Western way of life and the ideas of the French Revolution. When they returned to Russia in 1816, they formed a secret society for constitutional and judicial reform, for the abolition of serfdom that was still prevalent in Russia and for — the curbing of foreign influence on the Tsarist state. When Tsar Alexander I died unexpectedly in 1825, there were some weeks of confusion before the next Tsar ascended the throne. The Decembrists used this opportunity to make their point. They tried to prevent several military regiments from taking the oath of allegiance to the new Tsar unless he committed himself to a constitutional form of government.

Most of the Decembrists were serving officers under the age of thirty. There were also some senior officers of distinguished lineage. John Keep and Lionel Kochan have described the Decembrist uprising as "an attempted revolution on the people's behalf by a section of the educated elite."

The Decembrist uprising may have been crushed brutally and news of it blacked out completely in the press, but it remained in popular memory as a heroic struggle and inspired several generations thereafter. As the nineteenth century advanced, the numbers of educated Russians who turned against the Tsarist system grew by leaps and bounds. There emerged a clearly recognizable class known as the intelligentsia. In fact, the word "intelligentsia" had its origins in Russia and was first used in this country in the mid-nineteenth century. The Russian intelligentsia represented a small crust of well-educated people with a European outlook, who had few links with Russian society.

It was the reforms of Tsar Alexander II, which marked the turning point for the intelligentsia. He was known as the reforming Tsar and when he announced his intentions of carrying out reforms, there were great expectations amongst the intelligentsia. There was hope that he would consult the progressive sections of his people. But soon there was disappointment. All suggestions for a nationally representative body or parliament were firmly turned down. So great was the anger of the intelligentsia against the Tsar that he faced a series of assassination attempts.The mid-nineteenth Russian intelligentsia was of two kinds. There were the Westernizers and the Slavophiles. While the former, i.e., the Westernizers, were ashamed of Russia's past and believed that the future for Russia lay in imitating the West, the Slavophiles maintained that Russia's salvation lay in a return to the true traditions of Russia. It is important to note that the Slavophiles were also in favour of change. But they felt that the Western values of rationalism and individualism were disintegrating forces. The strength of Russia lay in the faith of her people and the sense of community of which the *mir* (village community) was the essence. Russia, in fact, should show the way to the West. This controversy between the Westernizers and the Slavophiles was but the first of a series of polarizations amongst Russian intellectuals. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century Russian socialism split into the Populists and the Marxists and still later, the Russian Marxists split into the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks.

In the post-Decembrist period the new intellectual tradition that unfolded was characterized by an indifference to political reforms. There was a general belief that it was more important to improve the material conditions of the people than to give Russia constitutional liberties.

An interesting aspect of the Russian intelligentsia was that many of its members were creative writers who produced excellent short stories, plays and even novels. Their works were reflective of the politics of the times in a way which has seldom been seen in other countries. Ivan Turgenev's *Fathers and Sons,* for instance, while being an important literary work, was the best account of two generations of Russian intellectuals — the men of the forties and the men of the sixties, as they were known.

This period of emigrant revolutionary activity was, however, a very productive one. In the 1880s, even as industrialization was proceeding apace in Russia, the first Marxist groups began to be formed among Russian intellectuals. The major voice was that of Plekhanov who, in his pamphlets, 'Our Differences' and 'Socialism and the Political Struggle' made the following points:

1) Socialism cannot be based on the peasantry. It has to be based on the industrial working class.

2) Capitalism was going ahead in Russia and the growth of the working class was inevitable.

3) The village commune was an anachronism — a mere survival of a pre-capitalist order.

The fundamental break had been made. Populism continued to survive in Russia, reincarnated as the Socialist Revolutionary Party, but it was now marginal to Russian politics. It was now Marxism and Social Democracy which became the mainstream.

Meanwhile, within Russia, the first volume of Karl Marx's major critique of capitalism *Das Kapital* had been published in Russian in 1872. The Tsarist censorship regarded it as too academic and irrelevant to Russian conditions to be subversive.

Vladimir Ilyanovich Lenin, born in 1870, had been converted to Marxism in 1889. In 1893 he moved to St. Petersburg to work with the Marxist underground groups. He also visited Plekhanov and other leaders of the Russian Social Democratic Party in Switzerland. In 1895 he, along with Martov, founded the St. Petersburg Union of Struggle for the Liberation of the Working Class to disseminate Marxist ideas among the working classes and to prepare leaders for the future revolution. However, Lenin was soon arrested and he had to spend the next four and a half years in prison and in exile in Siberia. It was while he was thus incarcerated that he published his important work 'The Development of Capitalism in Russia', which proved conclusively that capitalism in Russia was an accomplished fact and contained all the conditions of economic viability. This work was published illegally in Russia in 1899.

Another group of legal Marxists had also come into being around this time. They were basically a liberal group, consisting largely of sociologists and economists. They made a powerful contribution to the debate against the Populists. Peter Struve, for instance, brought out his "Cultural Remarks on the Question of Economic Development in Russia" in 1894 in which he argued that the advent of capitalism in Russia should be welcomed since it would, along with its miseries, also bring the material and spiritual culture of Western Europe to Russia. This included political· liberty. The Legal Marxists, however rejected the revolutionary aspects of Marxism.

As E.H. Carr has pointed out, by the turn of the century there was a general feeling among the Marxist groups that the time was ripe for passing from mere lecturing on Socialist principles to more systematic and political work among the masses. The time for making the transition from propaganda to agitation had arrived. In 1898, it was decided to hold a Congress of existing Marxist groups in order to form a Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party. The Russian Social Democratic Party became a part of the Second International. It may be recalled that the First International Working Men's Association had been founded by Marx in 1864 and had existed until 1871. It symbolized the coming together of working class parties across national boundaries in the belief that Marxian socialism was essentially international in character and that all members of the working class shared certain common interests. The Second International, founded in 1889, was dominated by the German Social Democratic Party and continued its existence until the First World War. After the Revolution of 1917, there would be a tussle over who was to lead such an International-Russia as the first country to carry out a working class revolution, or other forces in Europe.

17.3 THE 1905 REVOLUTION: A DRESS REHEARSAL FOR 1917

Russia's humiliating defeat at the hands of Japan in the Russo Japanese War made the Russian people seriously wonder about the strength of their mighty empire. The workers were in any case agitated about their conditions of work and poor wages. On 9 January 1905, a huge crowd of workers, led by a priest, Father Gapon, marched towards the Winter Palace to submit a petition to the Tsar, Nicholas IL This was intended to be a peaceful procession and the participants had full faith in the Tsar. They believed that he was surrounded by bad advisers, who kept the truth about the actual plight of the people away from him. Despite the church icons and portraits of the Tsar that they carried, the Tsarist Guards received the petitioners with a hail of bullets. Over a hundred fell dead, many more were injured. This was the last straw. It was also the signal for the revolution. Strikes spread throughout the country. Revolutionaries assassinated the Grand Duke Sergei, one of the leaders of the court coterie. Soon, peasant revolts broke out in various parts of the country. Even the fringes of the Russian Empire were affected. There were armed risings in Poland and in the Black Sea port of Odessa, the crew of the battleship Potemkin joined in the revolt.

All this shook the self-confidence of the Tsar and he promised to convene a Duma, or Representative Assembly, in which, however, the working class would not be represented. All parties of the opposition, from the Liberals to the Bolsheviks, protested against this edict. In October 1905 a general strike spread from Moscow and St. Petersburg throughout the country. The strikers of St. Petersburg elected a Council of Workers' Deputies, the St. Petersburg Soviet, which virtually became the centre of the Revolution. The Soviet called on the country to stop paying taxes to the Tsar. Its members, along with the chairman, Leon Trotsky, were arrested. New strikes broke out and the pressure led the Tsar to issue his October Manifesto of 30 October, in which he promised to extend the franchise to those classes which had until now been excluded. There was also an assurance that no law would take effect without the approval of the Duma. The Manifesto split the ranks of the revolutionaries into those who wanted to withdraw the movement and work the proposals and others, like the Social Democrats, who wanted a Constituent Assembly. This split proved to be fatal for the Revolution and slowly the Tsarist forces recovered their strength. By 1907 the Tsar had regained his self-confidence and begun withdrawing the semi-liberal concessions which he had been compelled to make in October 1905.

Yet, 1905 was an important landmark in Russia's history and things were never the same thereafter. The revolutionaries could learn from their mistakes in this encounter and, when the next opportunity came in the First World War, they were able to plan their strategy with greater maturity. The Soviets, however brief their existence, were a model for the future.

17.4 THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION

But the February Revolution was only the beginning of a long and complicated process, which ended in the final Bolshevik Revolution of October 1917. This revolution occurred through a series of dramatic political events leading eventually to a capture of power by the Bolsheviks. This phase of the revolution was completely dominated by the Bolsheviks. Let us now turn to them.

17.4.1 Who were the Bolsheviks?

The name derives from the Russian term *bolshinstvo* which means majority. When the Russian Social Democratic Party held its second Congress in 1903, differences arose over the way in which the party was to be run and the kind of members that it should have. Lenin wanted to restrict the membership of the party to hardened professional revolutionaries, while Martov, another influential leader of the period, believed in a more broad-based and inclusive formula. The party split and Lenin's group managed to obtain a majority, hence the name 'Bolshevik'. Martov's group became the Mensheviks *(men'shintvo* - minority) but they controlled the party newspaper the 'Iskra'. This split weakened the Russian Social Democratic Party, as do all splits within parties. What made this parting of ways all the more unfortunate was the fact that Russia was then on the brink of its first revolution i.e., the Revolution of 1905.

Over time, the Mensheviks became more and more like the German Social Democratic Party whereas the Bolsheviks under Lenin's leadership made some significant departures from traditional Marxist formulations.

In July 1905 was published Lenin's pamphlet 'Two Tactics of Social Democracy'. In it he argued that Russia would strike a different path — even though Russia too would have a bourgeois revolution, going through all the stages of France after 1789, the leadership would come, not from the bourgeoisie but from working class, in alliance with the peasantry. This idea, of involving the peasantry in the revolutionary process, was a relatively new one. Traditionally the Marxists believed that the peasantry was incapable of creating or supporting a revolution. But Lenin maintained that, in Russia, the rich and middle peasants could be more dependable allies than the bourgeoisie. The latter was weak and cowardly and was capable of betraying the revolution and compromising with the ruling class. The rich and middle peasants, on the other hand, would be interested in overthrowing the landed class and confiscating their large estates.

Lenin's pamphlet also outlined the scenario after the overthrow of Tsarism, as he visualized it. A "Provisional Government", which would be a "revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry", would be set up. However, the type of government that would emerge would be a bourgeois-democratic, not socialist in nature. For the achievement of socialism, it was necessary for a more advanced proletariat of some other major industrial country of Europe to create a socialist revolution. Only then would it be possible for Russia to bypass its bourgeois-democratic stage and create a socialist revolution.

Thus, in many ways, Lenin was able to anticipate the turn of events in Russia. Where he, as well as many of his fellow revolutionary leaders, went wrong was in their expectation that the first socialist revolution would occur in Germany or any other highly industrialized country of Europe. That was not to happen and it fell to the lot of Russia to carry out this task.

Leon Trotsky, a charismatic leader who was to play a dynamic role in the St. Petersburg Soviet, was a Menshevik for a long time even though his views were quite close to those of Lenin. Where he differed with Lenin was on the question of the peasantry's potential. He was skeptical of the peasants and firmly believed that they had a role, to play in the crushing of the Revolution of 1905.

From February to October

After the February Revolution, the internal contradictions within Russia became evident and were accentuated over time. The Provisional Government, headed by Prince Lvov, and representing the moderate forces, was committed to carrying on the war effort. The more radical forces were concentrated in the Petrograd Soviet. They were infavour of introducing democratic reforms, confiscation of landed estates and promulgating an eight-hour day for workers. They also wanted to enter into negotiations with the proletariat of other countries in order to bring an end to the war.

Though the Provisional Government was the official regime in the eyes of the world, within Russia it was unable to take a single important decision unless it was endorsed by the deputies of the Soviet.

17.4.2 Soviets

What was the Soviet? First constituted in the course of the 1905 Revolution the St. Petersburg Soviet was a Council of Workers' Deputies, which, in the words of Isaac Deutscher, "soon became the most spectacular centre of the revolution." The orders and instructions of this Soviet commanded universal obedience. It was the people's parliament par excellence and in the absence of any parliamentary institutions, it was the broadest and most representative body that Russia possessed. In 1917, a few days after the Tsar's abdication the St. Petersburg Soviet was reconstituted. Its members were elected from factories, workshops and later in the barracks of regiments that were stationed in the capital. They were not elected for any fixed term – the electorate had the right to replace them by other men at any time. It was also the de facto executive power in Russia. The writ of the Soviet ran in factory, railway depot, post office and regiment alike. In fact the Provisional Government was virtually a prisoner in the hands of the Soviet.

In the months after the February Revolution, Soviets mushroomed all over Russia — in provincial towns and in villages. Because of the mode of their election, they did not represent the nobility and the middle classes. By August 1917, there were 600 Soviets in Russia. They had assumed all the responsibilities of government.

17.4.3 Lenin's April Thesis

IInd April 1917 Lenin arrived in Russia from Finland and issued his 'April Theses' in which he set forth the newslogan "All power to the Soviets". Capitalism had to be overthrown and the war brought to an end. The bourgeoisie and the Mensheviks were deceiving the proletariat. The Revolution had entered the socialist phase. Land and banks should be nationalized, the police and the army abolished. Those who heard Lenin's ideas were stunned and thought that he had taken leave of his senses. It was like an avalanche and some of the proposals sounded completely like flights of fancy. But slowly, in the following weeks, the ideas seeped in and Lenin was able to win over many to his views.

17.4.4 Worsening Situation

Meanwhile the Provisional Government was alienating itself from the people continuously. They wanted peace but the Government had already declared that all the Tsarist Government's commitments to the war would be adhered to. In the face of mounting opposition, the members of the first Provisional Government had to resign and in May, a new government, still headed by Prince Lvov, but with six socialist Ministers drawn from the Soviets, was constituted. But this new government was even less able to tackle the problems of the day. These were internal differences: while the liberal group wanted to delay certain fundamental reforms until the convening of a Constituent Assembly, the socialists were anxious to respond to the popular demands for immediate reform.

The economic situation grew worse. When workers demanded more wages, the industrialists, unwilling to grant them any increase, began to close down factories. The Government provided no protection to the workers. To add to the problems a Russian military offensive in Galicia ended disastrously. The Provisional Government was unable to handle the wave of popular unrest which was triggered off by the offensive and Prince Lvov had to resign.

Thus, by July 1917, in little more than four months, a third Provisional Government had been constituted. Clearly these Governments were incapable of providing stability to Russia and tackling its pressing problems. Sensing their own incompetence, the Government became more and more defensive. They began directing their anger against the Bolsheviks, who were the only group among the socialists which had not joined the Provisional Government.

Orders were issued for the arrest of Lenin and other Bolshevik leaders like Zinoviev and Kamenev. Lenin and Zinoviev evaded arrest and escaped to Finland while Kamenev got arrested. It was at this time that Trotsky and several other members of the Menshevik party decided to join the Bolsheviks. They too were promptly arrested.

Throughout this period, there was growing unrest in the countryside. Thoroughly disillusioned with one Provisional Government after another, the peasants decided to carry out a veritable agrarian revolution on their own. They seized the estates of the landlords and began cultivating them with the help of local land committees. Peasant anger also found reflection in the army, as more and more soldiers began deserting the war front and returning to the villages.

17.4.5 The Kornilov Mutiny

Thereafter, events moved with lightening speed. In August 1917 there was an attempt at a military coup. General Kornilov, the head of the armed forces, had been invited by Kerensky to the capital in order to help him crush the Bolshevik forces. But Komilov exceeded his brief. He thought he could seize this opportunity to wipe out not just the Bolsheviks but also the Soviets, the moderate Socialists and Kerensky himself.

The Kerensky government was panic-stricken. It realized that it could not defeat the forces of Komilov without the help of the Bolsheviks, many of whom were behind bars. They were released. Trotsky's services were sought for obtaining the help of the Kronstadt sailors (Kronstadt was a naval base outside Petrograd), who were extremely radical and powerful. Trotsky used to address the Kronstadt sailors frequently. They faithfully followed him, even idolized him.

The Soviets formed a Committee for struggle against Counter-Revolution. Komilov's troops deserted him. The railway workers stopped his trains, the telegraph operators refused to relay his messages.

This aborted military coup clearly showed where the actual power resided. The Kerensky Government had lost face and credibility. A fifth Provisional Government was formed on 21 September. It had ten Socialist ministers and six others. The Bolsheviks continued to steer clear of the government. However, they were steadily gaining more and more seats in the Soviets.

In October 1917, following a series of defeats in the war, the Provisional Government planned to shift the capital from Petrograd to Moscow. This was seen by the people as the final act of betrayal and the Bolsheviks, along with the Soviets, called for a defence of Petrograd as the capital of the revolution. They managed to get the support of all the parties and the Provisional Government thereby stood exposed.

Lenin, though still in hiding, had moved closer to the scene of action by this time. In a short article titled 'The Crisis is Ripe', he wrote:"we stand on the threshold of a worldwide proletarian revolution". It was important to seize the moment - the timing was crucial. Trotsky on the other hand was adamant that any armed insurrection must coincide with the convening of the All Russian Congress of Soviets. Lenin warned that if they were to “let slip the present moment, we shall ruin the revolution”.

On 9 October Lenin came to Petrograd in disguise and on 10 October the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party met. By a majority vote of 10 to 2, the Committee voted infavour of armed insurrection. A ‘political bureau’ consisting of seven members was to be formed to carry out the task. In the meantime, the Petrograd Soviet had also formed a Military Revolution Committee (MRC) to make the military preparations for the coming resolution.

Thereafter the Bolsheviks and the Soviets began acting in unison in the countdown for the revolution. In any case the Soviet had already assumed the responsibility for the defence of the capital, thus lifting itself to a new prominence and authority which would enable it to undo the Provisional Government.

17.4.6 The Bolsheviks Take Power

25 October (7 November according to the English Calendar) was the date fixed for the revolution. The All Russian Congress of Soviets was to meet in the evening and the insurrection was to be carried out before that. The final touches were given on the eve of the revolution. The members of the Bolshevik Central Committee along with those of the MRC took charge of the different arms of the government — posts and telegraphs, railway communications, food supplies and even the Provisional Government itself!

Early on the morning of the 25th, the Bolshevik forces went into action. The key points in the city were occupied and members of the Provisional Government were taken into custody. There was virtually no resistance to this takeover. The news agency, Renters, reported only two causalties whereas in February over 1000 people had been killed or wounded.

In the afternoon, Lenin announced to a meeting of the Petrograd Soviet, the triumph of the workers’ and the peasants’ revolution. In the evening, the Second All Russian Congress of Soviets proclaimed the transfer of all power to the Soviets throughout Russia. It may be mentioned here that when the first All Russian Congress of Soviets had been convened in June 1917, the Bolsheviks had been treated with disdain. One of the speakers had challenged the delegates to say whether there was a single party in Russia that was prepared to shoulder the responsibility for government. Lenin had got up and said that his party was willing to do so. His words were drowned in hilarious laughter.

Now Lenin had shown that he meant what he had said. In the confused, ever- changing scenario that had unfolded from February to October, it was the Bolsheviks alone, under the leadership of Lenin that had understood the needs of the people and assessed the true strengths and weaknesses of the various classes in the country. It had figured out that the capitalist class was a weak one, whereas the peasantry had revolutionary potential.

It was with this clarity of perspective that, on the day following the revolution, three Decrees were promulgated: The Decree on Peace, the Decree on Bread and the Decree on Land. These were the three issues that were uppermost in the minds of the Russian people: they wanted Russia to pull out of the war immediately; they wanted an amelioration of the conditions of acute food scarcity; and the redistribution of the large landed estates. Though the Land Decree proclaimed that henceforth there would be no private property in land and all land was to pass into the hands of the Soviets, it was realized that the small peasants would be unwilling to part with their lands yet. Hence the Land Decree was only partially implemented.

17.4.7 Early Legislation of the New Regime

The new regime was keen to show that it represented a radically new and different order. All institutions and customs associated with the autocracy were to be abolished. All ranks, titles and decorations were to be done away with. Army commanders as well as judges were to be elected. All agencies of local government were set aside and replaced by a hierarchy of Soviets. Women were given equal rights with men. All banks and joint stocks companies were nationalized. Payment of interests and dividends were prohibited. Safe deposit boxes were opened and all valuables confiscated, since they were now considered national property. In January 1918, it was announced that all state foreign and domestic loans would be annulled. This caused the new regime to become extremely unpopular, especially in the eyes of those countries which had loaned large sums for Russian's industrialization.

In the factories, an eight hour day was introduced. For the first time in the world, workers' control of industrial enterprises became legal. Universal labour service was introduced and only those with workers' books could receive rations. Lenin explained that his immediate purpose in introducing compulsory labour service was to fight the forces of counter-revolution.

Many of these policies were to be revised and even reversed later. But the commitment to ending Russia's involvement in the war was steadfast and so was that of redistributing the nobility's estates amongst the peasants. These were the reasons for the survival of the Bolsheviks and the spreading of their influence in the crucial months after the October Revolution.

17.5 THE LEGACY OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

The new regime set up by the Bolsheviks survived, no doubt with many changes and even distortions, for some seventy-odd years, until the 1990s. Though regarded with apprehension, suspicion and at times with awe, Soviet Russia influenced the course of events in many parts of the world, sometimes in predictable but more often in unpredictable ways. Some historians regard the Russian Revolution as the most significant event ofthetwentieth century and see most ofthe major developments in the world during this period and even thereafter, as being related to this event in some way or the other. In the words of E.J.Hobsbawm in his *Age of Extremes:*

> ... with the significant exception of the years from 1933 to 1945, the international politics of the entire Short Twentieth Century since the October revolution can best be understood as a secular struggle by the forces of the old order against social revolution, believed to be embodied in, allied with, or dependent on the fortunes of the Soviet Union and international communism.

The old order was that of capitalism and imperialism. It felt threatened by the onset of socialism from the very outset. When Russia signed the Treaty of Brest Litovsk with Germany in March 1918 and pulled out of the First World War, the Allies felt betrayed. They regarded this action as strengthening the hands of Germany, their enemy, even though Soviet Russia had pulled out of the War as much because it could no longer sustain the war effort as because of the ideological commitment of the Bolsheviks to end all imperialist wars. The subsequent surge of confidence amongst all left-minded groups in Europe and in other parts of the world caused great alarm to entrenched political systems based on exploitation and maximization of profit. A revolutionary wave swept Europe in 1918 and 1919, with German revolutionary sailors carrying the banner of the Soviets through the country. Spanish revolutionaries experienced anew burst of energy, a short lived socialist republic was proclaimed in Bavaria in 1918 and another one in Hungary in March 1919. Other parts of the world were also in ferment. "Soviets" were formed by tobacco workers in Cuba, revolutionary student movements erupted in Argentina and in China. In Mexico, the revolutionary forces under Emiliano Zapata now drew inspiration from revolutionary Russia and in India too, M.N. Roy and later many others were greatly influenced by communism. Jawaharlal Nehru has explained, in his *Auiobiography,* what Russia meant to people like him:

> Russia, following the great Lenin, looked into the future and thought only of what was to be, while other countries lay numbed under the dead hand of the past and spent their energy in preserving the useless relics of a bygone age.

Yet, there were certain negative aspects too. There was a strong authoritarian streak in Boshevism which carried over into Communist Russia as well. The spirit of democracy was often compromised with and individual Communist Parties which were set up in different countries were too closely tied to the apron strings of the Comintern (The Communist International, set up by Soviet Russia in 1919 to promote the world revolution) for them to grow in a healthy, organic fashion. Within Russia too, especially in the Stalinist years, terror and dictatorial methods became the order of the day and a bureaucratic machine replaced the Soviets which had caught the imagination of the world. Though Stalin's Russia heroically defended itself against the onslaught of Hitler and was responsible for beating back the forces of Fascism to a significant extent, in the years that followed the regime turned inwards, drawing an iron curtain across Europe and cutting itself off from the outside world. Anti-cosmopolitanism and xenophobia came to replace the internationalism of the early years and that was the great irony. It negated the very spirit of the Russian Revolution, which had an ingrained internationalism, which had discarded old divisions of nationality as obsolete and whose vanguard, the Bolshevik, had once proudly regarded himself as a citizen of the world.

17.6 SUMMARY

This Unit was a discussion of the Russian Revolution, as an important political phenomenon of the 20th century, that had global implications. One major feature of the Russian Revolution was that although the revolution occurred in Russia, it was not conceived of as a national event but rather as a global event. It was hoped and anticipated that a series of socialist revolutions in various parts of the world would cumulatively create a world revolution. The leaders of the revolution actually provided a theory of the transformation of the world from a capitalist order into a socialist one. The revolution inspired similar activities in other parts of the world and also motivated a number of anti-imperialist liberation struggles taking place in Asia, Africa and Latin America against colonial domination.

17.7 EXERCISES

1) Why did the Socialist Revolution take place in Russia?

2) Explain the political developments leading to the capture of power by the Bolsheviks.

3) Write a note on the legacy of the Russian Revolution.

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UNIT 18 SCIENCE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

Structure

18.1 Introduction

18.2 Emergence of Modern Science

18.3 Developments in Modern Science

18.4 Implications of Modern Science on Society

18.5 Summary

18.6 Exercises

18.1 INTRODUCTION

The rise of modern science between 1450 to 1700 A. D. in Europe is generally considered as the watershed moment of the modern age. The scientific accomplishments of Bacon, Descartes, Copernicus, Galileo, Newton and others contributed to the liberation of the human spirit from religious dogmatism and encouraged the spirit of enquiry. Earlier knowledge system based on the teachings of the ancient philosophers was replaced by the belief that knowledge of the natural world can only be acquired through observation and experiments. Modern science used experimentation precisely to understand fundamental notions of reality. Significant discoveries and innovations brought far-reaching changes in the scientific practice which in turn had great implications in changing people's life and thoughts. In ancient period compared to the advanced civilizations of Asia and Islamic world Europe was rather latecomer in the field of science. But modern science had its origin in Europe. Joseph Needham, great Chinese scholar, in his monumental work on Chinese civilization posed the question that why did modern science rise in the West, why modern science did not develop in China. Political developments accompanied by economic and cultural developments contributed to the advancement of scientific knowledge in Modern Europe. The development of modern science is seen as a continuous process of successive ideas. In modern science the role of scientist and experimental and observed evidence contributed to the development of a scientific methodology in which empiricism played significant role. In this Unit, we will begin with an analysis of the historical context in which modern science emerged in Europe. This will be followed by discussion on the developments in different branches of modern science. Finally, we will discuss the impact of modern science in addressing human needs and how did it influence intellectual life.

18.2 EMERGENCE OF MODERN SCIENCE

We will begin this section with the question that how modern science first came about. In majority of research works on the rise of modern science it is explained that how some eminent European scientists through their works invented modern science which revolutionized scientific research subsequently. Interestingly James Poskett, author of ***Horizons: A Global History of Science***, has raised question about the justification of the dominant account of the origin of modern science as a result of a unique European culture. He argues that Europe drew on the knowledge of the rest of the world and modern science was more a product of a global cultural exchange. He writes:

> ‘We now know that many of the pioneers of modern science in Europe relied on theories and observations borrowed from elsewhere. In his 1543 book *On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres*, Copernicus cited no less than five Muslim scientific writers, including the Syrian mathematician Thabit ibn Qurra and the Iberian astronomer Nur ad-Din al-Bitruji. Most importantly, Copernicus made use of a mathematical technique first developed by the Persian astronomer Nasir al-Din al-Tusi. Known as the Tusi couple, this allowed Copernicus to model the oscillating movement of the planets around the sun. Copernicus’s book even features an uncredited copy of a diagram taken from al-Tusi’s *Memoir on Astronomy* from 1261. Copernicus is just one example of a much wider trend. Almost all the famous figures from the history of science in Europe relied on their global connections. When Newton was writing about gravity, he cited experiments conducted in Asia, Africa and the Americas. When Charles Darwin was collecting evidence for evolution, he consulted a 16th-century Chinese encyclopedia. And when Albert Einstein began developing a new statistical account of quantum mechanics, he teamed up with the Indian physicist Satyendra Nath Bose.’ (**Source:** www.newscientist.com, 22/03/2022)

Poskett in his book has shown that how achievements and ideas of people across the non-Western world shaped modern science. Writing on the origin of mathematics Seidenberg concluded that India was the source of the geometric and mathematical knowledge of the ancient world. Noted scientist Albert Einstein said, ‘We owe a lot to the ancient Indians, teaching us how to count. Without which most modern scientific discoveries would have been impossible’. The ideas of zero, decimal system, concept of atom, etc. are considered major contributions of ancient Indian science in the development of modern science. It is argued by scholars that many theories and techniques discovered by the ancient Indians contributed towards the development of modern science and technology. Ancient China made significant progress in science and technology and besides the four great inventions — papermaking, printing, gunpowder and the compass — Ancient China contributed significantly to future development in science. China is also credited for first recorded observations of comets, solar eclipses. Traditional Chinese medicine, acupuncture and herbal medicine were known to the world. Joseph Needham’s voluminous research on science and civilization in China elaborates the scientific achievements of Chinese civilization. When Europe witnessed cultural and economic decline following the decline of the Roman Empire Arab world entered a period of remarkable progress in Astronomy, Mathematics and Medical sciences. Arab scholars used the ancient Greek knowledge to find answers related to the natural world. Greek scientific texts were translated in Arabic and provided the required stimulus for major advances in mathematics, science and medicine. Modern algebra and optics had its origin in Arabic sciences. The point to make here is that there is merit in Poskett’s argument that modern science is the product of exchanges of knowledge between Europe and other civilizations of the world. Scientific thought that underwent revolutionary change since seventeenth century in Europe was based on progresses made in science and technology in other civilizations at different points of time. We will now explain how Europe became the centre of development in modern science.

It is said that reason for development of modern science in Europe was the prevailing political stability and intellectual atmosphere. The Greco-Roman ideas, the birth of medieval universities in Europe and the Renaissance created an atmosphere of intellectual life which was conducive for enquiry and creative thinking. Scholars began to rely more on their observations rather than on the written ancient texts. The growing urge to experiment brought new ideas which shaped the future discoveries in the field of science. The Universities provided an intellectual ferment and a cultural life paving way for pursuing research to find answers for questions related to the natural world. Renaissance generated new interest in reference to the physical world. The spirit of geographical exploration in Europe provided opportunity for experimentation of many new specimens leading to studies in botany and biology. Moving away from the accepted Aristotelian norms and the authority of the Church the spirit of enquiry encouraged people for investigation of reality. The Protestant Reformation led by Martin Luther in 1517 radically transformed theological and political atmosphere in Europe. People began to question the undisputed authority of the Church. The Reformation and the Counter-Reformation movement in Europe created an atmosphere of enquiry outside the dominance of the Church and the spirit of scientific enquiry developed. During the 15th and 16th centuries translated works of ancient Greek scholars like Plato, Euclid, and Archimedes were made available in Europe which had significant influence in shaping ideas of modern science. Interests in observation and experimentation in understanding natural world owed to the classical works of the Greek philosophers. This was the background in which modern science developed in Europe in the seventeenth century and the contributions of scientists like Nicolaus Copernicus, Francis Bacon, Galileo Galilei, Johannes Kepler and others provided new directions to scientific discoveries. New scientific ideas in Europe gave birth to the Enlightenment which applied scientific method to understand human behaviour and society during the eighteenth century. Scientific thinking gave primacy to individualism and the power of the human mind. Importance of human mind influenced the development of the Enlightenment value of rationalism. This in turn led to gradual decline in reliance on the traditional teachings of the Church. Thus began the Age of Reason which altered people's attitudes and views towards a host of ideas in politics, society and science.

Nicolaus Copernicus (1473-1543) made significant contribution in the field of astronomy. He went a step ahead of Ptolemy in his view of astronomical truth based on a theory combining physics and mathematics. He placed the sun at the centre of the universe rather than the earth. He said that the earth is one of the seven planets in the solar system around the sun. In his view the earth-sun distance is negligible compared to the distance to the stars and the apparent rotation of the stars is caused the earth's rotation on its own axis. Astronomy based on Ptolemy's celestial geometry was replaced by the heliocentric system with the earth and other planets revolving around the sun. Copernicus's theory brought revolutionary advancement in scientific knowledge which was taken forward by his successor scientists Galileo and Kepler.

Francis Bacon (1561-1626) discovered and popularized the scientific method focusing on experiments and observations rather than by using logic-based arguments. His method marked the end of the old natural philosophy of Aristotle. He popularized new concept of natural philosophy by emphasizing human power and control over nature. He is credited for establishing and popularizing the 'scientific method' of inquiry into natural philosophy. Bacon's inductive method began with observations, followed by inferences and then experiment. Based on Bacon's idea a mechanical philosophy was developed in which all of nature was seen as functioning like a gigantic machine.

Galileo (1564-1642) was influenced by the idea of natural philosophy applicable to the mechanical arts. His investigation of the laws of motion and improvements of the telescope gave a new direction of understanding the world and universe around him. He studied the sky with his improved telescope and based on evidence he proved that the Earth revolves around the Sun, prior to this belief was that the Sun revolved around the Earth. This was a radical departure from the accepted belief. This led to his trial by the Church in Rome and he was forced to spend last years of his life in house arrest. His pioneering work in gravitation and motion combining mathematical analysis with experimentation made him the founder of modern mechanics and experimental physics. Galileo put forward his ideas of machine in his treatise "**On Mechanics**". He argued that machines transformed natural force for a useful purpose. He is credited for designing the first pendulum clock. He questioned the Aristotelian approach to physics and proved that all objects irrespective of their density fall at the same rate in a vacuum. Galileo made significant contribution in the advancement of modern scientific thought.

Kepler (1571-1630) is remembered for his discovery of the three principles of planetary motion which is referred as Kepler's laws of motion. These laws toady not only describe planetary motion but also determine the orbits of satellites. His laws of planetary motion debunked the thought that solar system had planets travelling in circles around the Earth. Kepler's three laws of planetary motion are as follows: a) all planets move in ellipses with the Sun at one focus; b) second law is called the law of areas which states that "the line joining the planet to the Sun sweeps over equal areas in equal time intervals."; and c) Kepler's 3rd law is called the law of periods. According to this law, "for any planet, the square of its period of revolution is directly proportional to the cube of its mean distance from the Sun." Kepler's laws revolutionized planetary astronomy. His laws of planetary motion later provided the platform for Isaac Newton to discover the law of universal gravitation. This became part of the theoretical canon of modern scientific knowledge.

Isaac Newton (1642-1727) is considered one of the greatest physicists of all time who contributed immensely in the ensuing period of incredible growth in modern science. He is remembered for contribution in the development of a universal law of gravitation and his laws of motion. It is said that Newton formulated gravitational theory seeing an apple falling having thought in his mind that why the apple fell straight down rather than sideways or upward. He proved that "the force that makes the apple fall and that holds us on the ground is the same as the force that keeps the moon and planets in their orbits." In his famous publication "*Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica*" ("Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy"), generally called *Principia*, he talked about the three laws of motion for the universe. First law suggests that objects move at the same velocity unless an outside force acts upon it. Second law is about calculation for how forces interact. Third law states that for every action in nature, there is an equal and opposite reaction. Based on these principles he calculated the universal law of gravitation. Newton's the laws of motion and universal gravitation dominated scientists' view of the physical universe over the centuries.

Giving references to some great scientists and their contributions we have tried to explain that how modern science emerged in Europe primarily in the late 16th and 17th century. In brief the contributions made by scientists discussed here is not adequate to mention the achievements of a period that witnessed so many new discoveries and advances in scientific methods. Following the Renaissance cultural and social context, political stability and economic development provided a congenial atmosphere in Europe to break the hold of tradition and to encourage new ways of thinking. New frontiers of scientific knowledge were opened. In the next section, we will discuss that how new scientific ideas helped the development of different branches of modern science.

18.3 DEVELOPMENTS IN MODERN SCIENCE

The rise of modern science began with the professionalization of science in the nineteenth century. Research in the history of science has shown that how present-day demarcation of scientific disciplines developed following interactions among scientists to discover the natural world. Scientific discoveries mentioned in the earlier section promoted new developments in scientific knowledge and practice. Writing on the origins of modern science John Henry has observed that '… a number of socially aware studies of various technical arts and sciences have shown how the practice of those arts and sciences is crucial to our understanding of how they contributed to contemporary developments, and which ultimately led to the formation of something recognizably like modern science. It is thanks to this work that we can now see that the history of science cannot be told as merely a history of great ideas, a succession of brilliant intellectual insights. If we wish to approach a full understanding, we need to recognize that the way in which various practitioners did their work was as important a factor in the development of modern science as the more abstract philosophical thinking which is all too often presented in intellectual histories of astronomy, mathematics or physics…' (**Source:** John Henry, **The Scientific Revolution and the Origins of Modern Science**, Third Edition, 2008, p.8). Many new ideas contributed to the development of modern science based on observation and experiment. Developments in mathematics, astronomy, physics, chemistry and biology transformed knowledge about nature having significant impact on human life.

Science is a method of understanding the natural world through experiments and observations. Scientific enquiry is based on development of hypotheses and experiment to test these hypotheses. Science depends on verifiable facts and theoretical reasoning about physical phenomena. With developments in scientific knowledge and specialized enquiry disciplinary boundaries developed giving birth to various disciplines like mathematics, physics, astronomy, chemistry, biology, etc. It is said that 'The division of science into various disciplines started in the 19th century when science emerged as a profession in the European university system.' The rise of disciplines was very much linked with the specialization of scientists having intellectual orientation to concentrate on a particular field of scientific study. Moving away from the earlier practices of encyclopedic orientations of the past with the demand for specialized knowledge disciplinary structures took concrete shape in institutions of higher education. But as science advanced disciplinary differentiation became more blurred and scientific research became more interdisciplinary in nature. Advanced scientific study integrated disciplines of mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, etc. to find solution to specific problems. Let us have a brief discussion on how major disciplines emerged in modern science.

Mathematics is considered the chief language of science which provides useful tools to use in analyzing data. Mathematical knowledge helps in explaining scientific ideas and data to discover general patterns and relationships. Greatest mathematical discoveries in the form of geometry, algebra and calculus helped in solving many physical problems. Mathematics is a tool for understanding and communication and helps in solving complex and real problems. Abstract mathematical problems and technicalities are beyond the understanding of the common people but solutions developed by mathematicians in solving problems have impacted the lives of many. Mathematics gradually is seen as an indispensable way of understanding the operations of natural phenomena.

Physics as a discipline is focused on the study of inanimate matter. In the 18th century physics continued to be called natural philosophy but with the spread of mechanical and experimental philosophies in European higher education institutions the theoretical explanations of natural philosophy were accompanied by experiments. Application of mechanical and experimental philosophy provided more scientific basis to the discipline of physics. Writing on emergence of physics as a discipline Silliman said that 'At the end of the eighteenth century physics was still an immature, undisciplined pursuit with indefinite limits and little cohesiveness among its various concerns. The main source of disunity was the unequal development of its two chief divisions: general physics, equivalent to mechanics, and particular physics, embracing the study of heat, light, electricity, magnetism, and other special properties of matter. Whereas the former was a coherent, exacting, quantitative science, the latter, otherwise referred to as experimental physics, was essentially a miscellany of empirical findings joined to a loose array of speculative theories. Physics emerged as a discipline when these two components came into closer accord, facilitated by two significant developments within particular physics. First, there was a gain in methodological sophistication, entailing improved experimental design, wider, more intensive use of mathematics, and greater philosophical astuteness in matters of theory construction and verification. As a result, particular physics was lifted above the level of mere empiricism and was submitted to standards of rigor comparable to those of mechanics. The second development, not unrelated to the first, was the rise of the ideas of energy and energy conservation, which allowed the theories of particular physics to be related to one another and to the laws of mechanics. Through these and other developments the old disparities were sharply reduced, and physics coalesced into a mature, unified science.' (**Source:** Robert H. Silliman, 'Fresnel and the Emergence of Physics as a Discipline', in *Historical Studies in the Physical Sciences* , 1974, Vol. 4 (1974), pp. 138-39.)

It is believed that the history of civilization is the history of Chemistry — the study of matter and its properties. Chemistry as a discipline is involved in the study of chemical structures and chemical reactions. Many believe that chemistry became a proper science in the eighteenth century. Investigation of air by Antoine Lavoisier, discovery of oxygen, carbon monoxide by Joseph Priestley played significant part in the development of chemistry as a scientific discipline. The development of Chemistry as a discipline is closely related to the changing roles of chemists through analysis of the function and nature of the chemical properties. Modern Chemistry succeeded in establishing strict interrelationship between observed facts and theory. By establishing relationship between observation and theoretical elaboration modern chemistry succeeded in abandoning earlier assumptions based on religious belief and mythology. Robert Boyle (1627-1691) is regarded by many had initiated modern chemistry. In his book *The Sceptical Chymist,* published in 1661 he criticized earlier theories explaining the properties of substances by Aristotle and others.

Biology is the most diverse amongst every discipline having different ways to study living organisms. Biology deals with the structure, function, growth, origin and evolution of living things. It developed as a distinct branch of science in the 19th century. Biologists believe that an organism share fundamental characteristics and changes and develops through evolution. Charles Darwin developed evolutionary theory of species and theorized that species and breeds developed through the process of natural selection as well as by artificial selection. Earlier study of living things was restricted to Botany and Zoology. But with the passage of time new branches and new technologies developed to study other areas like chemical substances in living cells, ecosystems and environmental changes. Advances in biological sciences helped in developing effective medicines to treat diseases and better understanding of environments affecting plants and animals.

Thus the rise of modern science and the contributions made by scientists in developing distinct disciplinary areas helped greatly in discovering the natural world, the nature of matter, living organs and the material world. Developments in modern science completely changed our knowledge about the natural world compared to earlier beliefs. Many scientific discoveries which are considered revolutionary in nature established the importance of observation and experiment in developing scientific spirit. All these developments transformed the society's views about nature. Modern science helped by providing theories for better understanding of the world around us.

Many scientific societies sprang up in Europe since 17th century offering places to share ideas and enrich knowledge through peer review. Important scientific societies established to promote scientific research in Europe were the Royal Society of London (1662), the Paris Academie royale des Sciences (1666), the Berlin Akademie der Wissenschaften (1700), the Academia Scientiarum Imperialis (1724) in St. Petersburg, Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences (1739), etc. These scientific societies were engaged in promoting research, experimentation, collaborative projects, and publication of research papers to encourage scientific ideas. With the development of distinct disciplines in science gradually discipline based science societies across the countries became more prominent. Science societies played important role providing platform to exchange ideas and publishing research works for exchange of ideas to wider audience. Over a period of time universities became important centres for exchange of scientific ideas and training of young minds in the fields of scientific research.

18.4 IMPLICATIONS OF MODERN SCIENCE ON SOCIETY

Modern science played a major role in developing rational thought and scientific spirit overthrowing the primacy of religious belief and traditional authority guiding human life. The rise of modern science laid the foundations for the Age of Enlightenment in which reason became the primary source of authority and legitimacy. Enlightenment thinkers valued empiricism and rational thought. (You have read about impact of enlightenment on ideas in Unit 2 in this course.) The impact of modern science on society is wide ranging influencing various aspects of our lives. Scientific discoveries encouraged cultural development, helped in developing new scientific ideas and improved standards of living. Modern science encouraged the spirit of enquiry leading to new ideas affecting society. Intellectually science changed the way people used to think. Impact of science on society is visible through the changes in material conditions of life and world of work. Let us first discus about how science influenced changes in intellectual life.

Influence on intellectual life

Scientific discoveries and importance given to facts, observation and experiments to draw conclusion had positive impact on thoughts and attitudes of people. The spread of the spirit of science inspired to search for new ideas influencing man's outlook approach towards life. The way the world looked at, analyzed and tested, many questions related to the universe dramatically changed with the rise of modern science. Modern science changed the idea of the relationship between nature and men. The scientific method followed by the scientists encouraged thinkers to develop rational thoughts challenging many accepted values of society. Rene Descartes, a mathematician, in his book *Discours de la méthode pour bien conduire sa raison et chercher la vérité dans les sciences* (1637, Discourse on Method), proposed deductive methodical approach to acquire knowledge. He argued that whatever is accepted as true may be false. To reach true conclusions he advocated for reason and the ability of mind. He established a method of enquiry based on systemic approach. He believed that enquiring systematically and stringently it is possible to make objective and true statements about everything existing. The new attitudes towards nature and the definition of a new scientific methodology advocated by scientists shaped the intellectual life of modern times. The relevance of science and scientific enquiry gradually influenced people to discard beliefs in magic, witchcraft and orthodoxy of the Church. Galileo, Kepler, Descartes, Boyle, Newton and many others who through their ideas created modern science helped in popularizing the empirical method of science for the acquisition of true knowledge. They are not credited merely because of their ideas but their illustrious struggles against superstition, injustice and orthodoxy of the Church provided courage to promote reason and enlightenment. Scientific ideas transformed society and encouraged search for new knowledge in terms of observation and experiments rather than Biblical tenets. This marked the beginning of the Age of Reason, when scholars adopted empiricism and advocated that theories should be based upon human observations and experience. New scientific ideas created a sense of optimism that human beings can change the world. There was new belief that knowledge serves humanity, not religion. Ideas dominated by custom and tradition were replaced by reason and scientific endeavour. This gave primacy to individualism and exploration. Modern science became the dominant force in the modern world.

Social thinkers began to reappraise how society and politics could be redefined. Moving away from centuries of political tyranny new thoughts centred round individual freedom and happiness became major concern of political philosophers. John Locke in his *Two Treatises of Government* advocated for separation of church and state and an obligation on governments to recognize the innate rights of the people. Discarding the view that human knowledge was mystical and predetermined Locke argued that reason and human consciousness would ensure human contentment and liberty. Equally influential was the works of Thomas Hobbes who advocated new social contracts between state and civil society to achieve personal happiness for all. Denis Diderot linked reason with the attainment of virtue. Jean Jacques Rousseau argued that man was born free and rational and true political sovereignty always remained in the hands of the people. These revolutionary ideas had direct influence on later political developments in European countries, notably the French Revolution and the American Revolution and other revolutionary movements. Most European nations witnessed movements for political reform in the late 18th and early 19th century demanding freedom from tyranny and absolutism. Secular science and invention inspired the spirit of enquiry and discovery became the characteristic of modern society. Individualism advocated by political philosophers encouraged the 19th century notions of independence and liberalism giving new identity to modern society.

Influence on material life

Modern science and its applications in various fields have significant contribution in our day to day life. Our material life has improved with the development of electrical and mechanical sciences, developments in agricultural sciences have helped in solving problem of availability of food, similarly medical sciences improved quality of life. Innovations in communication technology have brought the world closer. Inventions and discoveries in diverse areas have close connection with our day to day living. Science and technology have penetrated every aspect of our lives, changing the way we live, we work, we learn. Every aspect of daily living is now dependent on science and technology. With the application of science and help of technology it has become possible to make new devices and new discoveries. Science and technology has given new direction to development. Developed countries in the world are more advanced primarily because of using advanced technology. It is science and technology which have made possible for man to reach space. Scientific discovery, application of scientific knowledge propelled by societal needs helped in developing solutions to meet various challenges of society. Constructive use of science and technology have brought meaningful benefits, but at the same time use of scientific knowledge for making atomic bomb or chemical weapons can be proved disastrous for humanity. Use of science for development, protection of environment and removing hunger should be the aim to develop better world. Let me refer here what Venki Ramakrishnan, President UK Royal Society, said in an essay for the BBC about how science has transformed the world in 100 years.

'Much of what we take for granted today is a result of interplay of fundamental science and technology, with each driving the other forward…

Almost every modern invention has one or often many fundamental discoveries that make it possible. Sometimes, these fundamental discoveries were hundreds of years old. Neither jet engines nor rockets would be possible without knowledge of Newton's laws of motion.

There are big moments in science, like the discovery of the structure of DNA that shift our perspectives. But even that discovery was a milestone that built on work by Darwin and Mendel and presaged today's biotechnology where the entire DNA of a human being — the human genome — has been sequenced…

Science is the pursuit of knowledge about ourselves and the world around us. That pursuit of knowledge has also shaped the way we view the world, as has the application of the knowledge. It has transformed our lives, generally for the better.

We live nearly twice as long today as our ancestors did in 1900 and the quality of our lives is far better than it was then.

But the uses of science and technology are not shaped by science and scientists alone. They depend on interplay of cultural, economic and political factors.

Science is a triumph of human knowledge and we can all share in its excitement. At the same time, understanding its many uses can help us be engaged in decisions that affect us all.' (Venki Ramakrishnan, 'How Science transformed the world in 100 years', **Source.** www.bbc.com).

18.5 SUMMARY

We have discussed in this Unit, historical context in which you have to discuss the emergence of modern science. It is important to remember that rise of modern science is the result of exchange of ideas globally over a long period of time. Scientific ideas of Greek civilization, Indian civilization, Chinese civilization and civilization of the Arab world played significant role in shaping modern science in the western world. Economic, political and cultural developments in late 16th and early 17th century Europe contributed largely in the progress of Modern science. Great scientists like Bacon, Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler, Newton and others played important role in fomenting scientific knowledge and shaping modern scientific research. Based on new scientific researches different disciplines like mathematics, astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology, etc. developed in science to make further progress in specific areas of knowledge. With the passage of time new scientific ideas helped in developing objectivity and rationality which influenced intellectual life. Many social and political philosophers being influenced by scientific ideas challenged the prevailing orthodoxy of religious ideas and gave birth to the spirit of enlightenment and the Age of Reason. Beyond intellectual life science and technology became essential tools for bringing change in our material life. Every aspect of modern life is connected to modern science. Science has helped to expand continually our knowledge of the phenomena of nature providing useful insights to understand the complex interrelations of the natural world. Modern science is the most remarkable inventions of humankind which is a catalyst for social change and economic growth.

18.6 EXERCISES

1) Explain the historical context of the rise of modern science.
2) Discuss the contributions of scientists in shaping modern science.
3) Analyze the impact of science on society.

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UNIT 19 KNOWLEDGE REVOLUTION: PRINTING AND INFORMATICS

Structure

19.1 Introduction

19.2 Education

  19.2.1 Background: 17th - 18th Century Europe

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19.1 INTRODUCTION

The modern world has experienced broadly speaking, two kinds of revolutions. There are sudden convulsions that change the course of history irreversibly: political revolutions like the French and the Russian are instances of this. There are also slower, seismic shifts that underpin social change, which, when comprehended over the course of a century or two, present an undeniable picture of revolutionary transformation. The revolution in knowledge and social communication that this Unit will consider contains, at different junctures and with different intensities, both these forms of revolution.

We know much more about the world than our predecessors two or three centuries ago. This is undeniable. The question is, how did this change in the extent of general human knowledge come about? There are many possible answers to this. One could cite the list of major technological changes and scientific discoveries in the last few centuries. (The following Unit on technological revolutions will discuss some of these aspects). One could look at the growth of new fields of knowledge, the 'disciplines', as they're known, and notice nothing short of a revolution in fields like medicine, the physical and social sciences, and technical and technological knowledge. These would be relevant ways of approaching the knowledge revolution. This Unit will examine certain key processes that have revolutionized knowledge and expanded the possibilities of social communication.

- First, the protracted spread of systems of education and the achievement of literacy in various parts of the world, which constitutes a necessary basis for the absorption of knowledge.
- Second, the various ways in which the printed word has been revolutionized since the fifteenth century: the growth of modem printing, the book publishing industry, changes in ways people read, and the growth of newspapers producing regular information about the world.
- Third, the growth of audiovisual broadcasting in the twentieth century: radio and television and fourth the contemporary rise of the Internet.

19.2 EDUCATION

One of the central transformations of the modern era has concerned the organization of the ways in which knowledge is transmitted, and also the ways in which people's capacities to receive this knowledge have been shaped. For this reason, a study of the development of modern systems of education is essential for an understanding of the 'knowledge revolution'.

19.2.1 Background: 17th -18th Century Europe

As European Absolutism developed over the course of the 17th and 18th centuries, the state in countries like Prussia, France, and Russia began to perceive the importance of intervening actively in educational matters, often in competition with the Church and other religious bodies, which had hitherto dominated pedagogy. The spread of elementary education across society, and especially into the burgeoning middle classes, was often seen as an efficient way of breeding loyal and obedient citizen- subjects.

Certain major changes began to take place in educational practice and ideology in this period. First, Latin, which had been the medium for instruction, came to be rivalled and slowly displaced by teaching in the mother languages of different states. This heralded a move towards the identification of the kind of education one received with the cultural and political identity one bore. Second, spurred by the ideas of thinkers like Francis Bacon in England, there was a growing emphasis on training in the exact sciences, which slowly began to rival the Renaissance-inherited focus on logic and rhetoric as subjects fit for school curricula. This new emphasis can be seen as a way of trying to keep education abreast of the accretions of scientific knowledge that characterized European life from the 16th century onward.

The eighteenth-century Enlightenment produced different schools of thought around the question of education. The empiricist philosopher John Locke argued that human minds were formed by lived experience and not abstract reason: thus, children should be given thoroughgoing instruction in proper modes of conduct prior to 'studies'. On a different track, the Italian philosopher Giambattista Vico stressed the role of imagination in the creation of human personality. On the basis of this, he argued for the nourishment of the minds of children through the study of languages, poetry, history and oratory. Some German ideologies argued on the other hand for a severely regimented education for children, which would break their urge to disobey and sin by carefully disciplining both body and spirit. In different ways, then, some of the major thinkers and intellectual currents of the time tried to come to grips with the question of how knowledge was to be imparted through education, and what kinds of knowledge were most fit for transmission.

In the late eighteenth century, elementary education spread in absolute terms. The school system was by now a major concern of the state in all the major European countries, and the ideal — if not the reality — of universal compulsory schooling was established. Running hand in hand with the extension of state control over education was the process of *nationalization:* the systems of education that were now established were harnessed to the structures and needs of the nation-state as never before. In Prussia, Frederick II issued general school regulations across the country in 1763, establishing compulsory schooling for children between five and 13 or 14 years of age. In 1787, school administration was centralized under a national board of education. In Russia in the early eighteenth century, Peter the Great tried to organize an educational system squarely harnessed to the needs of the state: religious and classical learning were eschewed, and replaced by training in mathematics, navigation, artillery and engineering. Later, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, Tsar Alexander! tried to extend these principles of utility: rural education involved instruction to the peasantry in elements of agriculture as well as basic literacy; urban schooling, on the other hand, was focused on education fit for civil servants-in law, political economy, technology, and commerce. The transmission of knowledge through education, in these cases, was organized not as an end in itself, but as a means by which properly educated and trained subjects could serve the State. The administrative structure of education, and the subjects considered relevant for the curriculum, were dictated in large part by the interests of the State.

19.2.2 Education in the 19th Century

Major structural changes in the economy and society underpinned the enormous expansion of education in the nineteenth century. European expansion overseas brought new wealth into the European economy, and sustained the rise of business groups and the middle class. The growth of industrialization, initially in Britain and later across the continent, involved the development of mass labour, concentrated in industrial cities. The spread of elementary education to the industrial proletariat became a concern of state and public, and was fuelled also by the demands of democratic and radical agitators and intellectuals, who raised questions about the welfare of the 'common man', attacked privileges, and emphasized the creation of citizens who could, through education, fulfil their entitlement to personal growth.

The first half of the nineteenth century saw significant growth in pedagogical thought. Three figures stand out in this respect. The Swiss reformer Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi, at the beginning of this period, propounded the idea that the 'innate character' of the child, rather than the external structures of the arts and the sciences, should be the basis of a comprehensive intellectual, moral and physical educational programme. Working as he did with the children of the poor, he emphasized the importance of education within the home. Another major educational reformer was the German Froebel, who in 1837 began the kindergarten movement, which was characterized by an accent on the importance of play in child education. Games, according to Froebel, could tap the innate capacities of children. The kindergartens that spread across Europe in the second half of the twentieth century marked a new departure: earlier, institutions for small children (nursery and day-care centres) had merely been spaces where they could be kept while their parents were at work; with the new system, however, children could be, in Froebel's words, subjects for 'psychological training... by means of play and occupations.' Johann Friedrich Herbart, a contemporary of Froebel's who achieved immense posthumous fame, was among the founders of fully developed theoretical pedagogy, a system he developed by injecting metaphysics and psychology into the study of learning processes.

Over the course of the nineteenth century, national schooling systems came to be fully articulated in many countries. External processes were an impetus to this: the consolidation of national states wedded education to the building of 'national character' and enabled the administration of education by the State; the spread of modem technology fuelled the growth of new 'modern schools' that taught modern languages and exact sciences. There was an immense growth of vocational schools in this time, and the increasing pace of secularization in Europe was marked by the decline of the church (relative to the state) in educational matters. There was another factor: the growth of democratic movements across large parts of Europe, which demanded universal male adult franchise. For the state in England, France and Germany —

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the three European countries we shall consider at length, and also the three that witnessed major and sustained democratic agitations in the nineteenth century-education was a means of mobilizing populations, but also, equally, a concession to popular democratic demands.

Germany

Germany witnessed the fastest development of the structures of national education in this time. Compulsory school attendance was established by the second half of the eighteenth century, and in1794 a law declaring state supremacy over education was passed. In 1807, following the defeat of the Prussian army at the hands of Napoleon at Jena (1806), there was a new emphasis on cultivating nationalism through strictly state controlled education of the young and the remnants of ecclesiastical education were snuffed out. Wilhelm van Humboldt, at the head of a special section of the Ministry of the Interior that controlled education, established in 1810 the first comprehensive system for the state examination of teachers. The classical system of schooling (the nine-year *Gymnasium* with its accent on Latin and Greek training) persisted along time, though, and it was not till well after German unification and the establishment of the German Empire (1871) that 'modem' schooling, with its emphasis on the sciences and the mother tongue, came to enjoy similar privileges.

The real supremacy of the German educational system was in the field of higher education, which was centred around the universities of Berlin, Breslau, Bonn and Munich, institutions that drew in students from all around the world. The major universities in nineteenth-century Germany, far in advance of their counterparts in higher education elsewhere, integrated education with the steady accumulation of scientific knowledge that was proceeding across Europe by introducing scientific training at an advanced level into the curriculum. Even more significantly, these were the first modern educational institutions to combine teaching and research, integrating two radical principles — the elective freedom of the student (to choose his own programme of study) and the freedom of the professor to engage in research and develop his subject.

France

In France, the universal right to education was proclaimed as a revolutionary principle in 1791, in the middle of the French Revolution. However, when educational structures — formerly dominated by the Jesuits and other teaching orders — came to be displaced by a new centralizing state apparatus under Napoleon in the early nineteenth century, the revolutionary egalitarianism of the 1789-1793 period had largely been eschewed, and Napoleon devised his elaborate system of educational training mainly for the children of the upper classes and rising professional bourgeoisie. A detailed system of degrees and certificates for various levels of study was established, and requisite grades of proficiency were earmarked for entry into law, medicine, teaching and other professions. In 1854, France was divided into sixteen administrative districts *(academies)* for educational purposes; these, however, had little autonomy and functioned as arms of the national state apparatus of education. It was in the 1880s that the major changes in the educational system came to be legally defined: universally free and compulsory education was established, and religious teaching was abolished in public schools.

England

England followed a slightly different trajectory. The ideological hegemony of the doctrine of *laissez-faire* limited, for a long time, the drive towards state control of, and responsibility for, education. At the turn of the nineteenth century, education was considered the preserve of private enterprise, and much unstructured and unsystematic philanthropy was involved in the development of elementary education. Voluntary schools were set up all over the country — among the earliest were the Sunday schools from the 1780s, which mainly dealt in Bible reading — and were accompanied by philanthropic educational organisations such as the Society for Bettering the Conditions of the Poor, which was set up in 1796. Organizations financed voluntarily, however, could not cope with the task of providing comprehensive elementary education. It was in 1870 that, partly spurred on by the reproaches of Matthew Arnold (who served as inspector of elementary schools between 1851 and 1866), Parliament passed an Elementary Education Act. In 1880, elementary education, administered by local educational authorities or 'school boards', was made compulsory throughout England and Wales, and in 1891 fees were abolished in almost all elementary schools. Secondary education, however, continued to be left to voluntary and private enterprise, and the 'public school' system (which was highly expensive and anything but public, despite the name) continued to be thoroughly elitist in its nature and values.

Outside Europe, too, tumultuous changes in educational systems were beginning to be articulated. In the United States, in the second quarter of the nineteenth century — again, significantly, index-linked to the growth of radical democratic sentiment and the celebration of the 'common man' — the common school was established, as an educational structure run on public funds, and open to every child. This was, given the federal structure of the United States, not established at one go, but gradually, in state after state, beginning with Massachusetts in 1837. Before long, some common schools, acceding to demands for advanced public education, introduced courses beyond the elementary level, and the 'high school' thus came to be established. In the course of the nineteenth century, higher education in the United States was also reshaped, as colleges surged in number, lost their formerly religious character and became graduate schools of research.

19.2.3 Education in the 20th Century

Through the course of the twentieth century, education retained and intensified its role as a catalyst of social change, as a marker of inequalities and differentials, as a benchmark of state policy and accomplishments, and as a facilitator of the circulation of various kinds of knowledge. Structural processes and dramatic events in the twentieth century, as in its predecessors, shaped the trajectory of educational institutions and practices, and moulded the nature of their impact.

There was, first of all, the dislocation caused by the two world wars. To consider the relationship between war and education, however, one must probe slightly deeper. Through the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, European armies stood armed against one another, in a tense and unstable standoff, as rivalries — largely fuelled by competing colonial ambitions — escalated between different states. Policies of conscription were introduced, and there was a marked militarization of society. This was, ironically perhaps, one of the engines that drove the escalation and spread of-education. In societies continually preparing for war, the state had to be ready to invest in military and technical training, and this invariably involved a certain degree of education.

The world wars also, in the long run, weakened the power of the large European powers. The major consequence of this, of course, was the staggering rise of the United States and the Soviet Union as superpowers. However, another consequence

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of this, as processes of decolonization escalated after 1945, was that education as a nationalist agenda took on a new meaning in the context of newly liberated countries, trying to establish enduring and stable political and economic structures. Education in the Third World came to be seen as an instrument of national regeneration.

Industrial and scientific development in the West called into being new kinds of training in new kinds of technical knowledge. Old skills rapidly became obsolete as scientific technology consistently revolutionized itself, and new systems of knowledge were created, which necessitated education. Researchers, skilled workers, and high-level professionals were — and continue to be — constantly produced by this kind of education.

The same is true of academic knowledge. It was in the twentieth century that the university emerged as a major centre of both knowledge production and consumption, in various parts of the world. Mass universities and open universities pioneered the concept of adult education, which is something that has expanded greatly in the postwar world. Economic prosperity of the kind large parts of North America and Europe enjoyed after the Second World War brought about a tremendous demand for secondary and higher education, and also produced the means to fulfil this demand.

Between 1950 and 1970 — a period often termed the 'Golden Age' of western capitalism — the number of universities in many countries doubled or trebled, and education, both mass and specialized, was enabled on a much larger scale. In the Third World, too, universities catered to larger and larger numbers of students. Structures of mass education were established at higher as well as primary levels.

If we look briefly at the experience of revolutionary Communist rule in the twentieth century, the scale of transformation in the field of education becomes a bit clearer. Western capitalist countries had more or less achieved mass literacy — and in many cases near-universal literacy — by the twentieth century. The same was not true of Russia, under Tsarist despotism, and China, which suffered from the combination of a decaying monarchy, Western imperialist designs, and immense political turbulence in the first half of the twentieth century. Both countries were stabilized, and brought into line with technological and educational developments in the rest of the world, under Communist rule which in both cases began by stirring genuine hopes for expanded popular sovereignty and social egalitarianism, and ended up as revolutionary despotisms. The Russian Empire experienced its revolution between 1917 and 1923, and China came under Communist rule in 1949. Both revolutionary governments launched massive programmes of social reconstruction, and education was at the heart of this. Manual labour and productive work were emphasized in the educational systems of both States, and there was tremendous emphasis on basic literacy skills and primary education. Enormous advances were made in both these fields in very short time. The logic of revolutionary dictatorship seemed to demand this. On the one hand, there was the need to keep citizens from questioning the regime that ruled them, and to this end education deployed sophisticated propaganda machines (as, it has to be said, did many educational systems in many democratic countries). On the other hand, there was a constant pressure to give citizens access to good — sometimes excellent — standards of basic education, which was considered vital to socialist construction.

In essence, Russia, China (and, interestingly, virtually all the left-wing dictatorships of the twentieth century) achieved in the course of a period of decades in the twentieth century what the West had achieved a few generations previously: a population with extremely widespread literacy and basic education, free and compulsory for all. The achievements in this regard were remarkable: to this day, primary education in most surviving socialist regimes is administered with care and efficiency.

Theories of education in the twentieth century have taken many forms, increasingly informed by a reliance on the findings and methods of other disciplines, such as the social sciences, and, more directly, psychology. The progressive education movement of the early twentieth century, pioneered by the educational reformer John Dewey, was based largely in experimental American schools, and tried to break down the traditional stiffness of school structures and allow the child to explore her latent possibilities. Imaginative writing and reading classes, community-linked projects, dramatics and informal activities, and self-assessment systems were some of the innovations of the progressive movement that have lasted. Another pedagogic movement of the early twentieth century was characterized by the child-centred approach, which argued that the school should be fitted to the needs of the child and not vice versa. Maria Montessori, one of the early twentieth-century exponents of this approach, viewed educational reform as a means of countering the suppression of children's personalities by adults.

19.3 REVOLUTION AND THE WORD: PRINTING, PUBLISHING, READING

To comprehend the nature of the transformation brought in the modern world by the linked practices of printing, publishing, and reading, we need to imagine a world without newspapers, books and bookstores, publishing houses and printing presses. We would be imagining a world, in other words, without the foundations of modem communications, which till the twentieth century were entirely dominated by the printed word. When studying the successive revolutions in the world of the 'print media' in modem times, it is necessary to consider not only the technical transformations in the field, which made the circulation of knowledge and entertainment of various kinds possible, but also the *reception* of such media, in the form of *reading.* Keeping this in mind, we can briefly survey the radical changes in the world of the printed word in the last few centuries.

The details of the purely technical aspects of the printing revolutions since the fifteenth century need not occupy us. It is generally held that Johannes Gutenburg invented the first modern printing press, sometime between 1440 and 1450. Block printing had already been practised in Europe since the beginning of the fifteenth century, but Gutenburg introduced an entirely new *craft* of printing, involving movable metal type, ink, paper and press. By the end of the century, this new innovation had been carried through large parts of Europe, largely by German printers. Texts could now circulate on a scale hitherto unimaginable: earlier, copying a manuscript had been the only way to reproduce a text. Printing reduced the cost per copy of a book drastically, and greatly shortened the time needed to produce a book. The logical corollary of this was the production of books in larger numbers. Each book could now reach greater numbers of readers than before.

There were significant improvements in printing technology in the following centuries. Notable among these are the construction of the first all-metal press in England in 1795, the application of steam power to the printing process in the early nineteenth century (which joined together the various operations of the process of printing in a single cycle), the development of mechanical typecasting and typesetting, greater sophistication in the reproduction of illustrations through the nineteenth century, and the perfection of colour printing in the twentieth century. These and other inventions constituted a cluster that we can characterize as the *industrialization* of printing.

Through the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, after Gutenburg's invention, printing presses spread all across Europe, and printing was at the heart of some of the bitterest political struggles and most dramatic social transformations of the time. The church, the state, universities, and religious radicals all deployed printing technology as a means of social communication and propaganda during the religious ferment of the Reformation in Europe. There were several sustained attempts to regulate and censor the spread of printed material and the activity of presses on the part of church and state, and, on the other side, the use of cheaply printed literature to spread radical ideas. In the mid-seventeenth century, the heyday of cheap print, the English Revolution, which produced the only republican experiment in British history, witnessed the dissemination of radical tracts by religious and social reformers: printing, here, was in the eye of the storm of a revolutionary period. This was a pattern that to replicate itself later as well: during both the French and the Russian Revolutions. Print became, over the course of time, a potent political weapon.

Between the 15th and the 18th century, many of the characteristics of modern publishing practice and book circulation came to be established. Despite attempts at censorship, sometimes successful, by virtually all the European nation-states, the book trade flourished in these centuries. Books were distributed along trade routes, and at trade fairs such as that at Frankfurt in Germany. Frankfurt became the centre of much European publishing, and a kind of clearing-house for new publications: a state of affairs that lasted till 1759, when imperial interference caused the centre of the trade to shift to Leipzig. Over the course of these three centuries, the functions of publisher, bookseller, and printer gradually came to be separated from one another. By the nineteenth century, the publisher's dominance in the process of book production and distribution was established.

The industrialization of printing in the nineteenth century radically reduced publishing costs. Paper, which had formed more than 20 per cent of the cost of a book till 1740, dropped in value till it constituted only 7 per cent in 1910. Cloth cases began to replace leather bindings after 1820. Across Europe and America in this period, the book trade expanded in tandem with the rise in population and the growth of an educated public. The number of new books expanded enormously.

In the 20th century, book publishing became a large industry, embracing a number of large concerns, some of which employed staffs of 1000 and more. Specialization became a marked feature of publishing houses, especially in the field of educational books, which commanded an enormous market with the increase in literacy rates and the rise of higher education. Companies like Macmillan in Britain and America, and Methuen in London, began with specifically educational needs in mind. Parts of the colonized world also slowly emerged as markets with a secure readership: India, for instance, witnessed not only the mass entry of titles published in England, but also the setting upof branches of British publishing houses, and the development of a diversified indigenous publishing world.

In the postwar period, publishing expanded rapidly again, and book circulation found new means of intensification, such as the rapid growth of translations. The paperback revolution continued, creating millions of new readers across the world, dominated by the Penguin Publishing House. Paperbacks were — and continue to be — sold in not only bookshops, but also newsstands, drugstores, and railway stations. Academic publications — editions of works of scholarship in various disciplines, for the benefit of the growing numbers of university students across the world— also began to be published, initially in the United States in the 1950s, and then in various other parts of the world with large student populations. This was publishing's response to the growth of knowledge in various fields in the arts and the sciences through the twentieth century, and the emergence of the student and scholarly community as a fertile market for books to do with their subjects. University presses also grew in the postwar period, as a means of disseminating knowledge and research findings in various specialized fields without being too tied down to the more acute demands of profit expansion.

To understand the implications of the revolution in printing and publishing, one must consider the equally revolutionary ways in which readerships and reading practices were transformed from the eighteenth century onwards. Prior to the eighteenth century, the book in Europe had generally been seen as a form of social discipline, imposed by the Church. Now, as new kinds of printed matter — most dramatically perhaps the novel — penetrated the subjective lives of people, the book acquired an emancipatory function, and came to be seen as a vehicle for individual intellectual growth and social opportunity.The mechanically reproduced text could be read far more easily than any manuscript: the imagined life and world of the book, therefore, could draw in readers far more effectively. And most importantly, of course, the expanded number of books meant that readers could be drawn into the book in large numbers: individual works, then, could exercise a significant social impact. Lending libraries and reading societies grew: a new world of social intercourse thus developed around the practice of reading.

Through the eighteenth century, regular reading remained limited to a small section of the European population, mainly sections of the rising bourgeoisie. In the nineteenth century, however, as the reading public of the Western world achieved literacy on a mass scale, an enormous and inchoate world of new readers emerged. Women, children and industrial workers constituted the bulk of the reading population that emerged in this time, and books were written and circulated keeping their tastes-real or supposed — in mind. Cookery manuals, magazines, and a large number of cheap novels were published keeping women specifically in mind. Novels were considered suitable for women partly because, unlike the male world of the newspaper, they dealt with a world of the private sphere, inner life and personal relationships – a realm considered fit for the feminine character, with its supposed thralldom to imagination and fancy. Female readership came to constitute a distinct market by the late nineteenth century. The Bible, novels like *Robinson Crusoe,* and increasing numbers of fairy tales and fantasies were considered suitable reading matter for children. Middle-class reformers laid much stress on the literary education of working-class men, who were afforded greater opportunities for reading than before by the reduction of the working day. Classical and educational literature was considered suitable and edifying for the literate proletariat. However, the presence of radical and socialist literature on the shelves of workers' libraries suggests that there existed moves towards an independent working-class literary culture.

In the twentieth century, readership expanded further, with the advance of literacy in various parts of the world. Reading has come to be supplanted, however, by other kinds of leisure: cinema, rather than the book, is perhaps the definitive cultural form of the century. This does not mean a death to reading, but it does perhaps signal a slow decline. Potentially new forms of reading have developed with the growth of electronic texts in recent times, which are substantially different from the printed book. It is yet to be seen if this will herald another revolution in reading.

The Advent of Modern Newspapers

Few histories can give us a srich a sense of the texture of the 'knowledge revolution' as the history of the modern newspaper. Contemporary life in the literate world without access to news is unthinkable. We are so accustomed to being, in lesser or greater degree, familiar with some manner of information from different parts of the world that we tend to forget that this is a relatively recent development, and is closely linked to changes in the nature of international, national and regional communication. Through the twentieth century, vast numbers of people have been accustomed to getting the news 'as it happens' through the media of radio, television and more recently the Internet. However, the initial transformation in the nature of information generation and the creation of 'news' happened through the newspaper.

The emergence of news, as a given quantity of information that large numbers of people have regular access to through determinate media, is perhaps the most important dimension of the knowledge revolution in modern times. And newspapers stood, for many generations, in the centre of this momentous change. Consider some of the aspects of a news-producing and consuming world. Such a world is, in an obvious sense, integrated as never before. This was a process that naturally took time, but the trajectory was consistent: from the time newspapers and news production became a major industry, increasing numbers of people had access to information about parts of the world they would never see in their lifetime, and many parts of the world they may not even have heard of. In our own time, we are used to frequently articulated worries about the future of the world, about nuclear holocaust and environmental degradation, about political rivalries that threaten human existence. Would these anxieties be conceivable in a world without widespread access to *news* from vastly different regions and contexts?

The spread of news, then, created conditions for expanded awareness about the world outside regional and national boundaries for vast numbers of people. At the same time, it also created conditions for extremely — sometimes explosively — sharpened awareness of 'national' questions and issues, as well as of national identity. The assumption that people need to know first of all what is happening inside their own nation is an assumption that helps in constructing that nation within popular imagination. The fact that we as Indian citizens are likelier to know about a minor corruption scandal in Indian political life than about a flood in Bangladesh or an African famine is not 'natural', it is part of a reality *constructed* for us by the priorities that our sources of information set for themselves. A national newspaper has determined coordinates: it is going to be distributed among people within a given geographical territory, and it is usually going to treat events that happen within the space of the nation-state with much greater care and attention than it will events outside it, even if sufficient information is available about the latter. The rise of national consciousness across the world has been historically paralleled by the rise of newspapers as vast profitable concerns.

Till the turn of the nineteenth century and the advent of the Industrial Revolution, news coverage was sporadic. The first rudimentary newsletters, passing information between traders, had emerged in the Middle Ages. The seventeenth century saw the growth of the first semi-independent newspapers in Britain, America, and on the European continent, though these were frequently subject to enormous censorship.

This in itself demonstrates that, even at an early stage of growth, the power of 'news' to shape public opinion was recognized by the powers-that-be. In North America in the late eighteenth century, the press became a powerful social force, being the chief propagandist of the new republic of the United States after the Revolution of 1776. Clandestinely published newssheets were an agent in the creation of public opinion and political conflict across large parts of Europe and North America in this period.

By 1800, educated citizens in the United States and most of Europe could expect a certain degree of access to independent news coverage — a revolutionary breakthrough in itself, in the ways in which people related to the world around them. The era of the Industrial Revolution, however, produced conditions that supported an unimaginable expansion of the scope of news dissemination. Part of this had to do with the revolution in printing techniques and developments in transport and communications. Till well into the nineteenth century, news had to largely spread by road, or — in the case of international news — by sea, and the transmission of information was slow. The speeding up of communication in the nineteenth century, through the invention of the telephone or the telegraph, made it possible for news to be gathered instantaneously. In 1815, an event in Brussels took four days to report in London. Within a few decades, things had changed so much that it could be reported immediately.

In 1851, one of the legendary accomplishments in the history of news occurred, when Paul Julius Reuter began using the telegraph to supply foreign news to national presses through telegrams, and thereby created the modem news agency. Newspaper correspondents also had transformed responsibilities and powers in the era of instant communication. Journalism — in the form of on-the-spot newsgathering — became a major, and increasingly valued, full-time occupation. The structures of modem journalism and the organization of the modern press were thus being set into shape.

But what of the next stage in the production of 'news' — the conversion of this information to readable matter, available to thousands of readers? In the late nineteenth century, this too was revolutionized. The invention of the Lino-type machine — which began to be used in 1886 — cut down radically on the time taken to produce the newspaper. This machine was at the centre of a cluster of technological innovations, which also involved the application of electricity to the printing industry, and the creation of machines that could print and also cut, fold and bind newspapers of any size together. As we can see, the late-nineteenth century newspaper partook of the most dramatic and exciting scientific and technological advances of the time, and deployed them in its service.

As railways, steamships and telegraphs slashed distances between and within nations in the late nineteenth century, mass-produced newspapers became available to all literate or even semi-literate sections of society: industrial workers, for instance, rapidly became the major consumers of the daily paper. By the end of the century, the circulation figures of some popular newspapers had touched the million mark, which indicates the intensity and scale of news consumption.

In the late nineteenth century, then, newspapers across the world had become an industry with a mass market. Their earlier identification with a narrowly literary world was now snapped, and they entered the realm, and — in multiple ways — the logic of big business. As the press came to require more and more sustained investment, advertising revenue became increasingly important in the composition of newspaper finances. By the 1890s, the ‘press baron’, a businessman (not infrequently a multi-millionaire) who owned chains of newspapers, had become a pivotal figure in the world of news.

The logic of mass news production that had fuelled the rise of newspapers as big business remained, but the ownership pattern itself gradually changed, in both America and Europe. The older press baron had combined the functions of editor and management executive. Over the course of the twentieth century, the latter came to predominate over the former. The world of the newspaper in the twentieth century has also been shaped by the fierce competition that defines the corporate world as a whole. The newspaper industry has been characterized by fierce struggles for greater circulation, one concern trying to top another’s share in the news market. In this context, takeovers of smaller concerns by larger news enterprises have been frequent. A contemporary example of this is the vast international media empire built up by the Australian entrepreneur Richard Murdoch.

19.4 RADIO AND TELEVISION BROADCASTING

Newspapers have retained, by and large, their mass circulation and reach, their social force and relevance. However, over the course of the twentieth century they were gradually supplanted as the most advanced disseminators of knowledge and information by what we call the *audio-visual media:* radio and television. If economic forces, transport and communication welded the world together by creating new connections between different regions, radio and television played an equally revolutionary role. By making it possible to transmit events *as they happened* to various parts of the world, broadcasting dissolved distances of space and time, creating a *virtual* space — the radio set or the television screen — where events could be *simultaneously* reported in various comers of the globe. In a very real sense, the world shrank through the intervention of the mass media, both printed and audio-visual, but especially the latter.

The first known radio programme was broadcast in Massachusetts in the U.S.A on Christmas Eve, 1906. It was after the Second World War, however, that radio broadcasting really took off, as a form of news transmission and — perhaps even more vitally in the long run — as a source of popular entertainment, through the airing of music, drama, and soon. David Sarnoff, later of the Radio Corporation of America and the National Broadcasting Corporation, was the first to suggest the possibility of a radio receiver in every home, in 1916. This alerted experimenters in radio to the commercial possibilities of the form. The manufacture and sale of radio receiving equipment offered great possibilities for profit making, and radio – like the newspaper before it and television after-entered into a symbiotic relationship with advertising, which began to provide a substantial portion of its revenues, and in return used airtime on radio stations as an advertising medium. In the early 1920s, the business of constructing and selling radio receivers boomed, and concomitantly so did the business of radio broadcast, as more and more broadcasting stations were set up. Initially pioneered in England and the United States, radio spread extremely rapidly. By the end of 1923, there were radio stations established in Canada, France, the Soviet Union, Belgium, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Spain, Denmark and Australia. Shortly afterwards, Asian countries began to join the world of radio ommunication. Organized radio broadcasting began in Japan in 1925, and the Indian Broadcasting Company had stations in Bombay and Calcutta in 1927.

Initially developed for its commercial possibilities, radio also offered immense scope for public educational and awareness programmes. National governments, alerted to this, encouraged the growth of what came to be known as public-service broadcasting. The prototype for this was — and remains — the British Broadcasting Corporation, set up as a public corporation in 1927. The BBC was made answerable to Parliament, but day-to-day control was left in the hands of the Board of Governors. This was a model that influenced many other countries.

Politicians soon realized the enormous potential of radio to shape public opinion and deployed this in qualitatively new kinds of political campaigns, where the radio played an increasingly important role. In the 1920s, the Republican Party in the United States spent over 20 per cent of its campaign funds on radio broadcasting. The 1932 presidential contest between Herbert Hoover and Franklin D. Roosevelt saw an unprecedented deployment of radio propaganda on both sides. Citizens were made more aware of their relationship to their national government through radio broadcasting in both wartime and peace- time; simultaneously, radio was used-as print had been — to mould particular kinds of citizens, obedient and loyal to the State. The requisite degree of pliancy, however, was not easy to achieve, for the expansion of news networks — and the increasing access many radio listeners had to overseas networks as the century advanced — made it possible for radio to generate very different kinds of responses to government policy. One way or another, though, political consciousness and awareness was intensified in the era of broadcasting, as nation-states were knitted into coherent political units much more effectively than before.

Socially, broadcasting in the West responded to some major changes in the relationship between the private space of the family or individual home, and the world outside, changes implicit in the development of industrial capitalism that fructified in the early twentieth century. Relative improvement in wages and working conditions, changes in the length of the working day, and the limited expansion of leisure time, combined to produce an emphasis on the improvement of the small family home. At the same time, to maintain the self-sufficiency of the home, it was important to have access to regular and quick access to news from the 'outside' world - about employment, prices, weather, and wars, to take random examples. The development of popular aesthetic tastes and interests also led to a desire for entertainment that could be accessed at home. The development of sound broadcasting in the 1920s served exactly this purpose, making news and entertainment accessible within the home.

Television broadcasting, which became a technical feasibility from the early 1930s, drew upon the early experience of radio transmission, and also upon other techno-cultural innovations of the nineteenth and twentieth century. These included the use of electricity, the development of telegraphy, photography, and the early growth of cinema, with its invention of techniques of filming and projection that allowed images to be captured and transmitted in motion, rather than photographic stillness. Television created a unified virtual space, where people sitting in their homes could watch images collated and produced from all over the world. As television developed, and on-the-spot news broadcasting and reportage grew, it became possible for the circulation of information to take on a radically new form. For the first time, news was tangible, if only in virtual terms: the TV screen relayed images of actual events, attaching faces and forms (as the radio had attached voices and sounds) to persons, events, and processes that people had really only been able to imagine earlier. The live telecasting of sport is a prime instance of this development, for it fuses together the history of information and entertainment. For most people, TV and radio —

but especially TV — finally provided a substitute for the live sports events that most of them would never have a chance of watching in the flesh.

Early television broadcasting was pioneered in Britain, the United States being slower off the mark. The BBC in London began its television service in 1936, and the NBC in New York began telecasting in 1939. This pattern of established radio networks entering the field of television broadcasting, was taken up by many other companies, especially in the United States. In the 1950s, radio was rapidly overtaken by television in popular appeal.

Radio and television broadcasting, over the decades, have in many ways brought revolutionary transformations in the circulation and consumption of both news and entertainment. The volume of information available to the viewer of TV or to the radio listener is immeasurably greater than earlier recipients of news. Potentially, TV and radio also democratize knowledge. The literacy required to access a newspaper is not needed to listen to the radio or to watch TV. In third world countries, in particular, high rates of illiteracy have meant a great reliance on broadcasting (especially radio, TV being a more expensive medium) for information.

Broadcasting has been, from the outset, intricately linked with big business, but many programmes on: both TV and radio have also been noted for their aesthetic value. The performance of drama and comedy on radio and TV channels, the production of documentaries for both media, and the making of films for television, are instances of this. Some television comedies in particular- thelate-1960s British series *Monty Pythons Flying Circus,* for instance — have been important statements of twentieth century culture in their own right. The screening of films on TV, which has gone hand in hand with the international decline in cinema hall audiences, has linked cinema and television together closely, since the former is now often viewed through the medium of the latter, and the latter borrows many of its forms and much of its aesthetic from the former.

With all of this, the dimensions of personal leisure have changed dramatically, for people across the world. Very often, radio and television are referred to as belonging to the world of 'mass communication'. In purely quantitative terms, this is true — these are forms of communication that reach much larger numbers of people than any other. But the term is also misleading, for radio and television do not reach people *as* masses, but as atomized consumers, individuals and families. The image of a person sitting in front of a TV set for hours on end points to this cultural dimension of broadcasting — huge numbers of people are targeted by radio and television, but they receive programmes as private viewers. In this respect, television is the polar opposite of the cinema hall, which thrives on collectivity. Of course, there are frequently occasions when people crowd around a radio set or a TV placed in a public place and watch or listen as a congregation — during cricket matches broadcast live in India, for instance. Be that as it may, the most important social consequences of broadcasting are probably to be found in the ways in which it has influenced family and personal life, the ways in which watching a film, for instance, can be integrated with eating, or cooking, or washing clothes, or even fitted in between naps. Technological innovation in the field of broadcasting has been geared towards the privatization and personalization of reception. The rapid development of the pocket radio after World War II is an instance of this. Portable radios had been in vogue for a while before this, but this new innovation made it possible to listen to the radio entirely on one's own, to make it part of one's personal space, as it were.

19.5 THE INTERNET

The last of the major revolutions in the dissemination of knowledge and social communication up till the present day is the Internet. The full implications of Internet technology will probably take a while to realize. There are many imponderables in its growth. While Internet enthusiasts claim an immediately revolutionary status for this form of communication — and there are good reasons for this, since cyberspace has opened up previously unimaginable possibilities — there are also grounds for some skepticism. Operating the Internet involves both general and computer literacy, which means that the web-linked community remains numerically somewhat limited in comparison to, say, radio listeners in the middle of the century. One thing can be said with reasonable certainty, though: the full extent of the Internet's impact upon knowledge production and circulation will take a while to manifest itself. At present, we can only grasp some of its dimensions.

For a form of communication that has had such significance for radical left-wing movements in recent times, the origins of the Internet are strange and surprising. In the 1960s, the RAND Corporation, the most important strategic think-tank in America during the Cold War, trying to find a way of making communications among U.S. authorities secure, even in the eventuality of a nuclear war, hit upon an interesting idea. This built upon the growing importance of computers for purposes of information storage. One of RAND's engineers imagined a decentralized computer network, which could run because of a kind of internal anarchy: the absence of a central controlling mechanism meant that the relevant information could be simultaneously stored in several interlinked computers. Computer resources, then, could be shared. The idea that was to become today's Internet, then, arose within the parameters of U.S. defence thinking.

If the creation of the basic idea of the Internet was the consequence of the search for secure military command, its transformation into a 'free' community of users came from a diametrically opposite impulse: an insurgent student politics that, closely connected to anti-war agitation, also demanded the free sharing and dissemination of knowledge. In 1979, some American university graduate students developed some programmes by which computers using a particular operating system (Unix) could call one another and exchange files. Communication between people through the computer became possible (e-mail) as well as postings of information on a network that could be viewed simultaneously on different computers. This elaboration of the Internet principle proved genuinely revolutionary. Within a few years, this students' insurgent computer network connected thousands of 'websites' where information was posted. In 1988, there were over 11,000 sites, and over 1,800 articles of various kinds were being posted daily. The creation of the World Wide Web in 1990 signalled the further development of the world of networked computers and the dissemination of information.

In some ways, with the Internet, we have come full circle in the history of the knowledge revolution. When print exploded upon the European scene in the fifteenth and sixteenth century, reactions must in some ways have been similar. Apparently uncontrollable new material — information, news, propaganda, entertainment — circulated with remarkable and unprecedented freedom, and proved immensely difficult to manage and regulate. The opportunities this provided for business and profit making were soon realized, and large capital soon entered the printing industry and turned it into big business. However, the unmanageable and even radical edge of the print media could never be fully diluted, as knowledge, opinions, and arguments poured out of the presses and hugely expanded the quantity of recorded thought in the world. It could be that similar processes are in store today, with the rise of a radically new medium of communication.

19.6 SUMMARY

This Unit and the one that follows has tried to demonstrate two important features of the modern world. One, the various technological inventions have brought about fundamental and irreversible changes in the world. As a result, in the last three centuries, the pace of change has accelerated to such an extent that the world today appears to be unrecognizably different from what it was, say in the 17th century. At the same time, the world has also become, and is increasingly becoming, more and more comprehensible to more and more people. This has happened with the expansion of education, the discovery of the print, the newspaper revolution, the radio and television networks, and finally the Internet. This Unit has examined these aspects in detail, their role in the making of the modern world and their significance for the world today. The next Unit will take up some of the major technological breakthroughs that contributed to the same process.

19.7 EXERCISES

1) Briefly discuss the development in education in Europe.
2) How did printing and publishing contribute towards knowledge revolution?
3) Explain the development in media communication bringing significant change in knowledge system.

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UNIT 20 TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION: COMMUNICATIONS AND MEDICAL

Structure

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20.1 INTRODUCTION

The term 'Industrial Revolution' does not imply a singular transformation from a pre- to a post-industrial society. Industrial and technological changes had been proceeding for several centuries prior to the 18th. There was, however, a faster tempo in the rate of growth and a markedly global character to the Industrial Revolution, which, although it occurred first in Britain, spread to continental Europe and North America and radically altered the socio-economic life of the colonized world as well. Technological development during the European Middle Ages had been slow. In the succeeding period change was associated with profound social and institutional upheavals. The emergence of the nation-state, the Protestant Reformation, the Renaissance and its accompanying scientific revolution, and the expansion of European colonialism were all linked to developing technology. Thus, imperial expansion was made possible by advances in seafaring, navigational technology and new firepower. The new printing presses of the Reformation helped disseminate all points of view, its intellectual ferment stimulated scientific and technological innovation. Many of the inventors and scientists of the period were Protestants.

This Unit will examine some of the major technological innovations that happened during the course of the last three centuries. In particular it would focus on technological discoveries made in the fields of electricity, communications and medical sciences. Since the pace of changes accelerated tremendously in the 20th century, the changes in the last century will be discussed separately. Apart from discussing the technological changes, the Unit would also examine the factors that motivated and propelled these changes and their profound influences on human life.

20.2 POWER TECHNOLOGY AND STEAM

An outstanding feature of the Industrial Revolution was the advance in power technology. At the beginning of this period, the major sources of power available were animate energy and the power of wind and water, the only exception being the atmospheric steam engines that had been installed for pumping purposes, mainly in coal mines. The use of steam power was exceptional and remained so for most industrial purposes until well into the 19th century. Steam did not simply replace other sources of power: it transformed them. The same sort of scientific enquiry that led to the development of the steam engine was also applied to the traditional sources of inanimate energy, with the result that both waterwheels and wind mills were improved in design and efficiency. Numerous engineers contributed to the refinement of waterwheel construction, and by the middle of the 19th century new designs increased the speed of the waterwheel and prepared the way for the emergence of the water turbine.

The revolution in communications had a great deal to do with the development of steam-driven power and locomotion. Scientists, such as Robert Boyle of England (who worked on atmospheric pressure), Otto von Guericke (the vacuum), and Denis Papin (pressure vessels), developed the science of steam power. Technologists Thomas Savery and Thomas Newcomen were pioneers of steam engines. Savery's apparatus condensed steam in a vessel, to create a partial vacuum. The first commercially successful steam engine, was invented by Newcomen. Newcomen's engines were heavy fuel consumers, useful mainly in the British coalfields where they kept deep mines clear of water and fulfilled a pressing need of 18th century British industry. Water power and wind power would now gradually be replaced by a mechanism with tremendous potential. Its most important application, the steam railway engine, would (in tandem with modern metallurgy) transform the basis of transport and communications the world over.

Steam became the characteristic power source of the British Industrial Revolution. Little development took place in the Newcomen atmospheric engine until James Watt patented a separate condenser in 1769, but from that point onward the steam engine underwent continuous improvements. Watt's condenser separated the two actions of heating the cylinder with hot steam and cooling it to condense the steam for every stroke of the engine. By keeping the cylinder permanently hot and the condenser permanently cold, a great economy could be effected. The Birmingham industrialist Matthew Boulton, helped convert the idea into a commercial success. Between 1775 and 1800, the Boulton and Watt partnership produced some 500 engines, which despite their high cost were eagerly acquired by the tin-mining industrialists of Cornwall and other power users who needed a reliable source of energy. Boulton and Watt introduced many important refinements, by converting the engine from a single-acting into a double-acting machine that could be applied to rotary motion. The rotary action engine was adopted by British textile manufacturer Sir Richard Arkwright for use in a cotton mill, many other industries followed in exploring the possibilities of steam power, and it soon became widely used.

The Cornish engineer Richard Trevithick introduced higher steam pressures in 1802 and American engineer Oliver Evans built the first high-pressure steam engine in the United States at the same time. High-pressure steam engines became popular in America. Trevithick made the first successful steam locomotive for a tram in South Wales in 1804. (The age of the railways had to wait for the permanent way and locomotives). Another consequence of high-pressure steam was the practice of compounding, of using the steam twice or more at descending pressures before it was finally condensed or exhausted. The technique was first applied by Arthur Woolf, a Cornish mining engineer.

A demand for power to generate electricity stimulated new thinking about the steam engine in the 1880s. The problem was that of achieving a sufficiently high rotational speed for the dynamos. Full success in achieving a high-speed engine depended on the steam turbine, a major technological innovation invented by Sir Charles Parsons in 1884. By passing steam through the blades of a series of rotors of gradually increasing size (to allow for the expansion of the steam) the energy of the steam was converted to very rapid circular motion, which was ideal for generating electricity. This method still provides a major source of electric power. Even the most modem nuclear power plants use steam turbines because technology has not yet solved the problem of transforming nuclear energy directly into electricity. In marine propulsion, too, the steam turbine remains an important source of power despite competition from the internal-combustion engine.

20.3 COMMUNICATIONS: TRANSPORT

The sea was the greatest commercial highway, stimulating technological changes in sailing ships. These came in various forms, Elizabethan galleons with maneuverability and firepower, Dutch fishing vessels with spacious hulls and shallow draft, and the fast clippers of the East India companies. Reliable navigation demanded better instruments. The quadrant was improved upon by the octant, which then developed into the modem sextant. The construction of clocks that could keep accurate time helped sailors determine how far east or west of Greenwich the ship lay (longitude). The British Board of Longitude awarded a prize in 1763 to John Harrison for a chronometer that fulfilled all the requirements. Transport provides an example of a revolution within the Industrial Revolution, so complete were the changes in the period 1750-1900. The first improvements in Britain came in roads and canals in the second half of the 18th century. A network of hard-surfaced roads was built in France in the 17th and early 18th centuries and copied in Germany. Piem Treesaguet of France improved road construction in the late 18th century by separating the hard-stone wearing surface from the rubble substrata and providing ample drainage. By the beginning of the 19th century, British engineers were innovating inroad and canal-building techniques, with J.L. McAdam’s inexpensive and long-wearing road surface of compacted stones and Thomas Telford’s canals. The outstanding innovation in transport, however, was the application of steam power.

20.3.1 Steam Locomotives

First was the evolution of the railroad: the combination of the steam locomotive and a permanent travel way of metal rails. Experiments in the first quarter of the 19th century culminated in the Stockton & Darlington Railway, opened in 1825. The Liverpool and Manchester Railway opened in 1830, and was the first railway service with freight and passenger traffic relying entirely on the steam locomotive. It was designed by George Stephenson, and its locomotives the work of Stephenson and his son Robert. The first locomotive was called the Rocket. The opening of the Liverpool- Manchester line was the inauguration of the Railway Era, which continued until World War I. During this time railways were built across all countries and continents, opening up vast areas to the markets of industrial society. Locomotives increased rapidly in size and power, but the essential principles remained those established by the Stephensons: horizontal cylinders mounted beneath a multi-tubular boiler with a firebox at the rear and a tender carrying supplies of water and fuel. Meanwhile, the construction of the permanent way underwent an improvement — borrowed from preceding tramroads: wrought-iron, and eventually steel rails replaced the cast-iron rails. Very soon, a well-aligned track with easy gradients and substantial supporting civil-engineering works became a common place.

20.3.2 Steam Shipping

The other major application transformed marine transport. The initial attempts to use a steam engine to power a boat were made on the Seine River in France in 1775, and experimental steamships were built by William Symington in Britain at the turn of the 19th century. The first commercial success in steam propulsion for a ship, was that of the American Robert Fulton, whose paddle steamer the "North River Steamboat," commonly known as the Clermont after its first overnight port, plied between New York and Albany in 1807, equipped with a Boulton and Watt engine. A similar engine was installed in the Glasgow-built Comet, put in service on the Clyde in 1812 and which was the first successful steamship in Europe.

All early steamships were paddle-driven, and all were small vessels suitable only for ferry and packet duties because it was long thought that the large fuel requirements of a steamship would preclude long-distance cargo carrying. The further development of the steamship was thus delayed until the 1830s, when I.K. Brunel began work on the problems of steamship construction. His three great steamships each marked a leap forward in technique. The Great Western (launched 1837), was the first steamship built specifically for oceanic service in the North steamship Atlantic, and demonstrated that the proportion of space required for fuel decreased as the total volume of the ship increased. The Great Britain (launched 1843) was the first large iron ship in the world and the first to be screw-propelled; and was in service until as late as 1970. The Great Eastern (launched 1858), with a displacement of 18,918 tons, was the largest ship built in the 19th century. By the end of the century, steamships were well on the way to displacing the sailing ship on all the main trade routes of the world.

20.4 ELECTRICITY

The pioneering work in the development of electricity as a source of power had been done by an international collection of scientists including Benjamin Franklin of Pennsylvania, Alessandro Volta of the University of Pavia, Italy, and Michael Faraday of Britain. The latter demonstrated the nature of the relationship between electricity and magnetism in 1831, and his experiments provided the point of departure for the mechanical generation of electric current, previously available only from chemical reactions and the utilization of such current in electric motors. Both the mechanical generator and the motor depend on the rotation of a continuous coil of conducting wire between the poles of a strong magnet. Both generators and motors underwent substantial development in the middle decades of the 19th century. In particular, French, German, Belgian, and Swiss engineers evolved the most satisfactory forms of armature (the coil of wire) and produced the dynamo, which made the large-scale generation of electricity commercially feasible.

Continental Europe and North America rapidly developed markets for electricity. In the United States Thomas Edison invented the carbon-filament lamp for domestic illumination. The success of the carbon-filament lamp did not mean the supersession of gas lighting. Coal gas had been used for lighting in Cornwall, in 1792, and in Birmingham in 1798. Gas lighting was adopted by firms and towns all over Britain in the first half of the 19th century. Under competition from electric lighting the quality of gas lighting was improved, and remained popular until the middle of the 20th century. Lighting alone could not provide an economical market for electricity because century. Lighting alone could not provide an economical market for electricity because its use was confined to the hours of darkness. The popularity of urban electric tramways and the adoption of electric traction on subway systems such as the London Underground coincided with the widespread construction of generating equipment in the late 1880s and 1890s. The subsequent spread of this form of energy is one of the most remarkable technological success stories of the 20th century, but most of the basic techniques of generation, distribution, and utilization had been mastered by the end of the 19th century.

20.5 COMMUNICATIONS: IDEAS, WORDS, IMAGES

Communications were equally transformed in the 19th century. The steam engine helped to mechanize and thus to speed up the processes of paper making and printing. In the latter case the acceleration was achieved by the introduction of the high-speed rotary press and the Linotype machine for casting type and setting it in justified lines (i.e., with even right-hand margins). Printing had to undergo a technological revolution comparable to the 15th century invention of movable type to be able to supply the greatly increasing market for the printed word. Another important process that was to make a vital contribution to modem printing was discovered in the 19th century: photography. The first photograph was taken in 1826 or 1827 by the French physicist J.N. Niepce, using a pewter plate coated with bitumen. Daguerre and Fox Talbot adopted silver compounds to give light sensitivity. By the 1890s George Eastman in the United States was manufacturing cameras and celluloid photographic film and the first experiments with the cinema were beginning to attract attention.

Telegraphs and Telephones

The great innovations in communications technology, however, derived from electricity, and were propelled rapidly into usage by a combination of business and military motivations. The first was the electric telegraph, invented or at least made into a practical proposition for use on the developing British railway system by two British inventors, Sir William Cooke and Sir Charles Wheatstone, who collaborated on the work and took out a joint patent in 1837. The same year, the American inventor Samuel F.B. Morse patented and devised the signalling code that bore his name and was subsequently adopted all over the world. Tue first public telegraph line opened from Baltimore to Washington in 1844. Within a decade, telegraph lines had sprung up in the USA and Europe, and in 1848, Julius Reuter partnered Bernhard Wolff to · open the first news agency in Germany. By the 1860 the continents of the world were linked telegraphically by transoceanic cables, and the main political and commercial centres were brought into instantaneous communication. Rapid communication eroded parochial and national barriers, telegraph treaties and unions

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were formed, and the International Telegraph Union (formed in 1865) in Paris, soon grew into the International Bureau of Telegraph Communication — the world's first permanent international organization, established in Vienna, in 1868.

To be truly effective internationally however, telegraph cables needed insulation in order to cross the seas and oceans. One of the most successful inventors of insulation was an English doctor in the East India Company's Bengal Army, and chemistry professor at the Calcutta Medical College. In 1838 he suspended 22 kilometres of wire on bamboo poles, with the last 3 kilometres under the surface of the Hoogly river. This was the first underwater circuit, but went unnoticed in Europe. However, experimentation was taking place elsewhere, with the rapid spread of the telegraph. France and Britain were linked in 1850, and lines across the Mediterranean laid, with partial success through the next two decades. (France was particularly interested in establishing stable links with its Algerian colony in North Africa). The Crimean War, wherein France and Britain were pitted against Tsarist Russia, was the first one conducted with long-distance contact between armies and command headquarters. This could prove to be a mixed blessing for local commanders who could be subjected to long-distance meddling by political leaders as well. In India, the recently installed telegraph played a major role in colonial-imperial communications in the Revolt of 1857.

The telegraph system also played an important part in the opening up of the American West by providing rapid aid in the maintenance of law and order. The telegraph was followed by the telephone, invented by Alexander Graham Bell in 1876 and adopted quickly for short-range oral communication in American cities and at a slower pace in Europe. Meanwhile theoretical work on the electromagnetic properties of light and other radiation was beginning to produce experimental results, and the possibilities of wireless telegraphy began to be explored. By the end of the nineteenth century, Guglielmo Marconi had transmitted long-distance messages over many miles and was preparing the apparatus with which he made the first transatlantic radio communication on December 1901. The world was being drawn inexorably into a closer community.

20.6 DEVELOPMENTS IN MODERN MEDICINES

The development and use of the compound microscope (invented slightly earlier, in Holland) was the work of Galileo (1564-1642). He was the first to insist upon the value of measurement in science and in medicine, replacing guesswork with accuracy. **The view of the French philosopher Renee Descartes (1596-1650) that the human body is a machine and that it functions mechanically had its repercussions in medical thought.** One group adopting this explanation viewed life as a series of chemical processes, and were called iatrochemists. Santorio Santorio working at Padua, was an exponent of this view and a pioneer investigator of metabolism. Another Italian, who developed the idea was Giovanni Borelli, a mathematics professor at Pisa University, who gave his attention to the mechanics of the human body and the laws that govern its movements. The discovery of the circulation of the blood based on precise observation and scrupulous reasoning was a landmark of medical progress. In 1628 William Harvey, who studied at Cambridge University and then at Padua, published his classic book *Concerning the Motion of the Heart and Blood.* Following the method described by the philosopher Francis Bacon, he drew the truth from experience and not from authority. Meanwhile, in the 18th century, medical education grew, and prominent schools functioned at Leiden (Holland), Padua (Italy), and Edinburgh (Scotland). In 18th century London, Scottish doctors were the leaders in surgery and obstetrics. William Smellie's *Treatise on the Theory and Practice of Midwifery,* published in 1752-64, placed midwifery on a sound scientific footing and helped to establish obstetrics as a recognized medical discipline. It contained the first systematic discussion on the safe use of obstetrical forceps, which have saved countless lives. The science of modem pathology also had its beginnings in this century. Giovanni Morgagni, of Padua, in 1761 published his massive work *The Seats and Causes of Diseases Investigated by Anatomy,* based on 700 postmortem examinations.

A highly significant medical advance was vaccination. The often fatal disease smallpox, was widely prevalent. Inoculation, which had been practiced in the East, was popularized in England in1721-22 by Lady Mary Montagu, who had seen it practised in Turkey. In 1796 Edward Jenner, a country practitioner began inoculations with cowpox (the bovine form of the disease).This procedure-vaccination-has been responsible for eradicating the disease. Public health received more attention during the 18th century, with population statistics, health legislation and hospitals. In Paris, Philippe Pinel initiated reforms in the care of the mentally ill, discarding the notion that insanity was caused by demon possession. Conditions improved for sailors and soldiers. James Lind, a British naval surgeon from Edinburgh, recommended citrus juices to prevent scurvy. In 1752 the Scotsman John Pringle, published his *Observations on the Diseases of the Army.* His suggestion in 1743 that military hospitals be regarded as sanctuaries eventually led to the establishment of the Red Cross organization in 1864.

By the beginning of the 19th century, the structure of the human body was almost fully known, due to new methods of microscopy and of injections. The understanding of physiological processes was rapidly elucidated, especially in Germany, where physiology became established as a distinct science under the guidance of Johannes Muuller, a professor at the University of Berlin. France's brilliant physiologist Claude Bernard, made important discoveries based on carefully planned experiments. He clarified the role of the pancreas, revealed the presence of glycogen in the liver, and explained the functioning of the blood vessels. His work, *An Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine* (1865) is still studied.

The great medical advance of the 19th century was the demonstration that certain diseases and surgical infections were caused by minute living organisms. This discovery changed the face of pathology and the practice of surgery. A pioneer in the parasitic theory of infection was Agostino Bassi of Italy, who showed that a disease of silk worms was caused by a fungus that could be destroyed by chemical agents. The main credit for establishing bacteriology goes to the French chemist Louis Pasteur (1822-95), who proved that the fermentation of wine and the souring of milk are caused by living microorganisms. His work led to the pasteurization of milk and solved problems of animal and human diseases. He employed inoculations to prevent anthrax in sheep and cattle, chicken cholera in fowl, and finally rabies in humans and dogs. From Pasteur were derived concepts that led to the antiseptic principle in surgery. In 1865 Lister, a surgeon at Glasgow University, began using carbolic acid as a disinfectant. His pioneering work led to more refined techniques of sterilizing the surgical environment. An important development in tropical medicine (and of great consequence to colonial projects of conquest) was the extraction of quinine from the cinchona bark by the French chemists Pierre Peletier and Joseph Caventou in 1820. This made it possible to treat the malaria, one of the most dreaded of all diseases especially in the 'Orient'. It was only in 1897 that the anopheles mosquito was identified as the vector of malaria.

The most famous contribution by the United States to medical progress at this period was the introduction of general anesthesia, a procedure that not only liberated the patient from pain and enabled the surgeon to perform more extensive operations. There were many claimants for priority, some used nitrous oxide gas, and others ether. But it was William Morton who, on October 16, 1846, in Boston, first demonstrated the use of ether as a general anesthetic. General anesthesia soon became prevalent in surgery. In November 1847 chloroform was tried with complete success, and soon it was preferred to ether and became the anesthetic of choice.

Preventive medicine was considered as important as the cure of disease. The 20th century witnessed the evolution of national health services. Spectacular advances in diagnosis and treatment followed the discovery of X rays by Wilhelm Roentgen, in 1895, and of radium by Pierre and Marie Curie in 1898. Before the turn of the century, too, the new field of psychiatry had been opened up by Sigmund Freud. The increase in scientific knowledge during the 19th century radically altered and expanded medical practice, and led to the establishment of public and professional bodies to govern the standards for medical training and practice.

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20.7 TECHNOLOGY IN THE 20TH CENTURY

Recent history of technology is notoriously difficult to write, because of the mass of material and the problem of distinguishing the significant from the insignificant among events that have virtually the power of contemporary experience. In respect to the recent history of technology, however, one fact stands out clearly: despite the immense achievements of technology by 1900, the following decades witnessed more advance over a wide range of activities than the whole of previously recorded history. The airplane, the rocket and interplanetary probes, electronics, atomic power, antibiotics, insecticides, and a host of new materials have all been invented and developed to create an unparalleled social situation, full of possibilities and dangers, which would have been virtually unimaginable before the present century.

In venturing to interpret the events of the 20th century it will be convenient to separate the years before 1945 from those that followed. The years 1900 to 1945 were dominated by the two world wars, while those since 1945 have been preoccupied by the need to avoid another major war. The dividing point is one of outstanding social and technological significance: the detonation of the first atomic bomb at Alamogordo, N.M., in July 1945.

There have been profound political changes in the 20th century related to technological capacity and leadership. It may be an exaggeration to regard the 20th century as "the American century," but the rise of the United States as a super state has been sufficiently rapid and dramatic to excuse the hyperbole. It has been a rise based upon tremendous natural resources exploited to secure increased productivity through widespread industrialization, and the success of the United States in achieving this objective has been tested and demonstrated in the two world wars. Technological leadership passed from Britain and the European nations to the United States in the course of these wars. This is not to say that the springs of innovation went dry in Europe: many important inventions of the 20th century originated there. But it has been the United States that has had the capacity to assimilate innovations and to take full advantage from them at times when other nations have been deficient in one or other of the vital social resources without which a brilliant invention cannot be converted into a commercial success. **As with Britain in the Industrial Revolution, the technological vitality of the United States in the 20th century has been demonstrated less by any particular innovations than by its ability to adopt new ideas from whatever source they come.**

The two world wars were themselves the most important instruments of technological as well as political change in the 20th century. The rapid evolution of the airplane is a striking illustration of this process, while the appearance of the tank in the first conflict and of the atomic bomb in the second show the same signs of response to an urgent military stimulus. It has been said that World War I was a chemists' war, on the basis of the immense importance of high explosives and poison gas. In other respects the two wars hastened the development of technology by extending the institutional apparatus for the encouragement of innovation by both the state and private industry. This process went further in some countries than in others, but no major belligerent nation could resist entirely the need to support and coordinate its scientific-technological effort. **The wars were thus responsible for speeding the transformation from "little science," with research still largely restricted to small-scale efforts by a few isolated scientists, to "big science," with the emphasis on large research teams sponsored by governments and corporations, working collectively on the development and application of new techniques.** While the extent of this transformation must not be overstated, and recent research has tended to stress the continuing need for the independent inventor at least in the stimulation of innovation, there can be little doubt that the change in the scale of technological enterprises has had far-reaching consequences. It has been one of the most momentous transformations of the 20th century, for it has altered the quality of industrial and social organization. In the process it has assured technology, for the first time in its long history, a position of importance and even honour in social esteem.

20.7.1 Industry and Innovations

There have been technological innovations of great significance in many aspects of industrial production during the 20th century. It is worth observing, in the first place, that the basic matter of industrial organization has become one of self-conscious innovation, with organizations setting out to increase their productivity by improved techniques. Methods of work study, first systematically examined in the United States at the end of the 19th century, were widely applied in U. S. and European industrial organizations in the first half of the 20th century. These evolved rapidly into scientific management and the modern studies of industrial administration, organization and method, and particular managerial techniques. The object of these exercises has been to make industry more efficient and thus to increase productivity and profits, and there can be no doubt that they have been remarkably successful. Without this superior industrial organization it would not have been possible to convert the comparatively small workshops of the 19th century into the giant engineering establishments of the 20th with their mass-production and assembly-line techniques. The rationalization of production, so characteristic of industry in the 20th century, may thus be legitimately regarded as the result of the application of new techniques that form part of the history of technology since 1900.

20.7.2 Improvements in Iron and Steel

Another field of industrial innovation in the 20th century has been the production of new materials. As far as volume of consumption goes, man still lives in the Iron Age, with the utilization of iron exceeding that of any other material. But this dominance of iron has been modified in three ways:

- by the skill of metallurgists in alloying iron with other metals;
- by the spread of materials such as glass and concrete in building; and
- by the appearance and widespread use of entirely new materials, particularly plastics.

Alloys had already begun to become important in the iron and steel industry in the 19th century (apart from steel itself, which is an alloy of iron and carbon); self-hardening tungsten steel had been first produced in 1868, and manganese steel, possessing toughness rather than hardness, in 1887. Manganese steel is also nonmagnetic; this fact suggests great possibilities for this steel in the electric-power industry. In the 20th century steel alloys multiplied. Silicon steel was found to be useful because, in contrast to manganese steel, it is highly magnetic. In 1913 the first stainless steels were made in England by alloying steel with chromium, and the Krupp works in Germany produced stainless steel in 1914. The importance of a nickel-chromium alloy in the development of the gas-turbine engine in the 1930s has already been noted. Many other alloys also came into widespread use for specialized purposes.

20.7.3 Modern Medicine and Pharmaceuticals

An even more dramatic result of the growth in chemical knowledge has been the expansion of the modern pharmaceutical industry. The science of pharmacy emerged slowly from the traditional empiricism of the herbalist, but by the end of the 19th century there had been some solid achievements in the analysis of existing drugs and in the preparation of new ones. The discovery in 1856 of the first aniline dye had been occasioned by a vain attempt to synthesize quinine from coal-tar derivatives. Greater success came in the following decades with the production of the first synthetic anti-fever drugs and pain-killing compounds, culminating in 1899 in the conversion of salicylic acid into acetylsalicylic acid (aspirin), which is still the most widely used drug. Progress was being made simultaneously with sulfonal hypnotics and barbiturate drugs, and early in the 20th century Paul Ehrlich of Germany successfully developed an organic compound containing arsenic which was effective against syphilis. This discovery, made in 1910, was the first to overwhelm an invading microorganism without offending the host. In 1935 the discovery that Prontosil, a red dye developed by the German synthetic-dyestuff industry, was an effective drug against streptococcal infections (leading to blood poisoning) introduced the important sulfa drugs. Alexander Fleming's discovery of penicillin in 1928 was not immediately followed up, because it proved very difficult to isolate the drug in a stable form. But World War II gave a fresh urgency to research in this field, and commercial production of penicillin, the first of the antibiotics, began in 1941. These drugs prevented the growth of pathogenic organisms. All these pharmaceutical advances demonstrate an intimate relationship with chemical technology.

In 1901, for the United Kingdom the expectation of life at birth was 48 years for males and 51.6 years for females. By the 1980s life expectancy had reached 71.4

years for males and 77.2 years for females. With the exception of diseases such as cancer and AIDS, attention has become focused on morbidity rather than mortality, and the emphasis has changed from keeping people alive to keeping them fit. The rapid progress of medicine was reinforced by improvements in communication between scientists. And although specialization increased, teamwork became the norm. In the first half of the century, the emphasis was on combating infection, but landmarks were also attained in endocrinology and nutrition. Following World War II, new discoveries in biochemistry and physiology led to more precise diagnostic tests and therapies; and spectacular advances in biomedical engineering enabled the physician and surgeon to probe into the structures and functions of the body by noninvasive imaging techniques like ultrasound (sonar), computerized axial tomography (CAT), and nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR). With each new scientific development, medical practices of just a few years earlier became obsolete.

20.7.4 The Human Genome Project

This scientific effort to analyze the DNA of human beings and of several lower types of organisms began in the United States in 1990 under the sponsorship of the U.S. Department of Energy and the National Institutes of Health and was completed in 2003. Related programmes were begun in several other countries in coordination with the American programme. Every cell of an organism has a set of chromosomes containing the heritable genetic material that directs its development — i.e., its genome. The genetic material of chromosomes is DNA. Project goals were to identify all the approximately 30,000 genes in human DNA, determine the sequences of the three billion chemical base pairs that make up human DNA, store this information in databases, improve tools fordata analysis, transfer related technologies to the private sector, and address the ethical, legal, and social issues that may arise.

Human genome projects undertaken concurrently in Japan, the United Kingdom, Italy, France, and Russia are coordinated with the American effort through the Human Genome Organization, whose members include scientists from throughout the world. The potential utility of the Human Genome Project is immense. The information gathered will serve as the basic reference for research inhuman biology and medicine and will provide fundamental insights into the genetic basis of human disease. The new technologies developed in the course of the project will be applicable innumerous other fields of biomedical endeavour. Though the HGP is finished, analyses of the data will continue for many years.

20.7.5 Twentieth Century Communications

The spectacular transport revolution of the 20th century has been accompanied by a communications revolution quite as dramatic, although technologically springing from different roots. In part, well-established media of communication like printing have participated in this revolution, although most of the significant changes — such as the typewriter, the Linotype, and the high-speed power-driven rotary press — were achievements of the 19th century. Photography was also a proved and familiar technique by the end of the 19th century, but cinematography was new and did not become generally available until after World War I, when it became enormously popular.

The real novelties in communications in the 20th century came in electronics. The scientific examination of the relationship between light waves and electromagnetic waves had already revealed the possibility of transmitting electromagnetic signals between widely separated points, and on December 12, 1901, Guglielmo Marconi succeeded in transmitting the first wireless message across the Atlantic. Early equipment was crude, but within a few years striking progress was made in improving the means of transmitting and receiving coded messages. This was essentially a development from the carbon-filament electric light bulb. In 1883 Edison had found that in these lamps a current flowed between the filament and a nearby test electrode, called the plate, if the electric potential of the plate was positive with respect to the filament. This current, called the Edison effect, was later identified as a stream of electrons radiated by the hot filament. In 1904, Sir John Ambrose Fleming of Britain discovered that by placing a metal cylinder around the filament in the bulb and by connecting the cylinder (the plate) to a third terminal, a current could be rectified so that it could be detected by a telephone receiver. Fleming's device was known as the diode, and two years later, in 1906, Lee De Forest of the United States made the significant improvement that became known as the triode by introducing a third electrode (the grid) between the filament and the plate. The outstanding feature of this refinement was its ability to amplify a signal. Its application made possible by the 1920s the widespread introduction of live-voice broadcasting in Europe and America, with a consequent boom in the production of radio receivers and other equipment.

This, however, was only one of the results derived from the application of the thermionic valve. The idea of harnessing the flow of electrons was applied in the electron microscope, radar (a detection device depending on the capacity of some radio waves to be reflected by solid objects), the electronic computer, and in the cathode-ray tube of the television set. The first experiments in the transmission of pictures had been greeted with ridicule. Working on his own in Britain, John Logie Baird in the 1920s demonstrated a mechanical scanner able to convert an image into a series of electronic impulses that could then be reassembled on a viewing screen as a pattern of light and shade. Baird's system, however, was rejected in favour of electronic scanning, developed in the United States by Philo Farnsworth and Vladimir Zworykin with the powerful backing of the Radio Corporation of America. Their equipment operated much more rapidly and gave a more satisfactory image. By the outbreak of World War II, television services were being introduced in several nations, although the war suspended their extension for a decade. The emergence of television as a universal medium of mass communication is therefore a phenomenon of the postwar years. But already by 1945 the cinema and the radio had demonstrated their power in communicating news, propaganda, commercial advertisements, and entertainment.

The dominant lines of development continue to be those that were established before or during World War II. In particular, the rapid growth of television services, with their immense influence as media of mass communication, has been built on foundations laid in the 1920s and 1930s, while the universal adoption of radar on ships and airplanes has followed the invention of a device to give early warning of aerial attack. But the development of communications age has produced important innovations. The transistor, so significant for computers and control engineering, has also made a large contribution to communications technology. The establishment of space satellites, considered to be a remote theoretical possibility in the 1940s, had become part of the accepted technological scene in the 1960s, and had played a dramatic part in telephone and television communication as well as in relaying meteorological pictures and data. The development of magnetic tape as a means of recording sound and, more recently, vision, has provided a highly flexible and useful mode of communication. New printing techniques such as photo-typesetting and xerography, have increased the speed of publication. New optical devices such as zoom lenses have increased the power of cameras and prompted corresponding improvements in the quality of film available to the cinema and television. Physical techniques such as the laser (light amplification by stimulated emission of radiation) are making available an immensely powerful means of communication over long distances. The laser also has acquired significance as an important addition to surgical techniques and an instrument of space weaponry. The final communications innovation is the use of electromagnetic waves other than light to explore the structure of the universe by means of the radio telescope and its derivative, the X-ray telescope. This technique was pioneered after World War II and has since become a vital instrument of satellite control and space research. Radio telescopes have also been directed toward the Sun's closest neighbours in space in the hope of detecting electromagnetic signals from other intelligent species in the universe.

20.8 SUMMARY

The story of technological revolutions is, in many ways, a continuing story. New innovations feed on the old ones and make them obsolete. This Unit has traced the story of a whole range of technological breakthroughs — cumulatively called technological revolution — in the field of electricity, communications, and medical sciences. Although technological changes had occurred prior to 18th century, their pace accelerated dramatically after the industrial revolution and they also increasingly acquired a global reach. In the 20th century, acquired a global reach. In the 20th century, however, a few decades were able to achieve levels of technological developments unmatched in the preceding centuries. This technological advance has brought about enormous changes in the socio-economic life of mankind across the globe, and continues to govern and shape human life in a variety of ways.

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20.9 EXERCISES

1) Discuss the major technological developments in communications.

2) Write a note on the developments in modern medicines.

3) Examine some of the major technological innovations made in the 20th century.

UNIT 21 MODERN WARFARE

Structure

21.1 Introduction
21.2 Conceptualizing Modern War
21.3 Mobilizing Military Manpower
21.4 The Marriage between Technology and War
21.5 Modern War in the Colonies
21.6 Weaknesses of Modern Warfare
21.7 Summary
21.7 Exercises

21.1 INTRODUCTION

War is the father of all things.

Heraklitos

The clash between Napoleon's infantry armed with muskets and the Mamelukes on horses in the sandy plain of Egypt was a classic case of modernity confronting tradition. Mobile artillery of Napoleon blasted the sabre wielding Mamelukes in the backdrop of the Sphinx. Firepower, an adjunct of modernity resulted in victory over muscle power, the hallmark of traditional warfare. War has always been a catalyst of great change. Modern War not only initiated but also resulted from complex changes in metallurgy, chemistry, ballistics, politics and economics. Continuous encroachment of the military in the non-military sphere is termed as militarization. The emergence of Modern Warfare resulted in military spillover into political, economic, social and cultural spheres. This Unit attempts to explain the origin, forms and legacies of Modern War.

21.2 CONCEPTUALIZING MODERN WAR

Karl Von Clausewitz (1780-1831) was an untypical Prussian military officer because he was a scholar in uniform. He proved to be a philosopher in his own right. Modern scholars have placed him on the same pedestal as Karl Marx, Adam Smith etc. Clausewitz fought against Napoleonic France and then distilled his experience in writing. His philosophical treatise titled *Vom Kriege* (*On War*) was published in 1832 by his widow Maria Von Clausewitz. Clausewitz's analysis of warfare turned out to be one of the best if not the best ever produced in history. For Clausewitz, war is organized violence unleashed by the state. He divided war into Limited War and Real or Absolute War. For him, eighteenth century European warfare as practised by Louis XIV and Frederick the Great represented Limited War. In contrast, Napoleon Bonaparte, whom he admiringly called the 'God of War', tried to break out of the paradigm of Limited Warfare. For Clausewitz, Napoleonic Warfare exhibited seeds of Absolute War that would reach fruition in near future. Clausewitz's prophecy proved true but he did not live to witness Absolute Wars of 1914-18 and 1939-45.

So, what we mean by Modern War is Clausewitz's early forms of Real or Absolute War. Thus, Modern War is the stage between Limited War of the eighteenth century and Total War of the twentieth century. Limited War is also referred to as Dynastic War because the various monarchies fought against each other for making limited gains along the frontiers at the expense of other dynasties. Louis XIV fought for extending the French frontier on the left bank of Rhine. In contrast, Absolute War in Clausewitz's paradigm means war untrammeled by any obstruction. The objective is to unleash organized violence wholeheartedly for absolute destruction of the enemy. This in turn required mobilization of all available resources of the state for total defeat of the enemy. The aim in such conflict is to annihilate the enemy's *schwerpunkt* (centre of gravity). For Clausewitz, *schwerpunkt* referred to the enemy's army which could only be destroyed by *Kesselschlact* (big bloody battles).

The French Revolution ushered in the idea of destruction of the enemy's government. Hence, the beginning of French Revolution i.e. 1789 could be taken as the beginning of Modern War. This process reached its logical culmination under Adolf Hitler's *der totale krieg* (Total War) when the objective was complete destruction of enemy's society by wholesale mobilization of the *volk* (common people).

21.3 MOBILIZING MILITARY MANPOWER

From this moment until our enemies shall have been driven from the territory of the Republic, all Frenchmen are permanently requisitioned for the service of the armies. Young men shall go to battle; married men shall forge arms and transport provisions; women shall make tents and clothing and serve in hospitals.

Decree of the French National Convention authorizing *levee en masse*, 23 August 1793

God is on the side of heavier battalions.

Napoleon Bonaparte

Increasing size of the armies was a characteristic of Modern War. Between Napoleon Bonaparte and General Schlieffen, the size of the armies registered a linear growth. Under Louis XIV (1643-1715), the French Army numbered 200,000. The opposing British Army under Marlborough comprised about 100,000 personnel. In 1786, when Frederick died, the size of the Prussian Army was 160,000 men. Since the objectives of Dynastic Warfare were limited, small armies were adequate. Alternately, small size of the forces under their disposal also prevented the monarchs from conducting lengthy war for unlimited gains. Actually, the monarchs were afraid of arming the landless peasants and the urban proletariat. The monarchical courts feared that mass arming of the lower order might result in revolution against the *ancien regime* (the old French regime before the revolution in 1789). Hence, the core of the armies was composed of nobility who constituted the officer corps and their armed retainers functioning as soldiers. During emergencies extra men were hired as mercenaries. They were of various nationalities who preferred the trade of soldiering due to pecuniary motives. Most of these soldiers were unenthusiastic to die for the monarchs' ambitions. However, the French Revolution changed the 'face of war'.

The French Revolution with its cry of *la patrie en danger* and the consequent *levy en masse* in 1793 cleared the path for larger armies. The National Convention decided to conscript all single Frenchmen aged between 18 and 25. This also enabled the Napoleonic government to mobilize manpower on a hitherto unimaginable scale.

In 1812, when Napoleon invaded Russia with 600,000 men, his *Grande Armee* numbered one million soldiers. However, for total mobilization of both the males and the females, the West had to wait till the Third Reich's clash with USSR during 1941-45.

Modernization of organized violence resulted in the rise in scope, intensity and lethality of warfare. Dynastic conflicts occurred within a confined geographical space. But, under Napoleon, thanks to greater number of soldiers available, war acquired a continental character. The theatre of Napoleonic warfare embraced whole Europe: from Moscow in the east upto Lisbon in the west; and from Denmark in the north till Sicily in the south. Thus, in terms of geographical spread, Napoleonic Warfare was the prelude to Total War of 1939-45 which occurred on a truly global scale.

Increasing sizes of the armies and their deployment on a continental scale also resulted in the battles becoming more bloody and lengthier. Battles in the age of Limited War lasted for a maximum of about twelve hours. Combat in case of Dynastic War stopped during night and campaigning ceased during winter. But, under Napoleon, fighting continued throughout the year. In 1813, the Battle of Leipzig was fought between Napoleonic France versus Russia, Prussia and Austria-Hungary. The fighting lasted for three days. Battling continued even during the night. In this single battle, Napoleon deployed 190,000 soldiers while the anti-Napoleon block responded with 300,000 men. The point to be noted is that the strength of the army deployed for a single battle during the age of Modern War was bigger than the total size of the army maintained by a country during the age of Limited War. One consequence of the rising size of the armies was increasing casualties. In 1809, at the Battle of Wagram against Austria-Hungary, Napoleon concentrated 160,000 soldiers. Though victorious, Napoleon suffered 40,000 casualties. Due to Napoleon's policy of sacrificing 30,000 men every month, France between 1789 and 1815 lost 1.7 million men. During the American Civil War, the Confederates mobilized half a million warriors. About 622,000 soldiers died during the American Civil War. Since, the 'Butcher's Bill' continued to increase with the passage of time, the percentage of national population dying in war went up. In France during the eighteenth century, 27 people out of 1000 died due to warfare. The number for nineteenth century was 30.

Ironically, militarization of the society also accelerated democratization. Frederick the Great of Prussia even conscripted enemy prisoners for meeting manpower shortage in the army. In the pre-modern era, the armies were cosmopolitan organizations. Changing sides did not offend national identities. National identities, however, became rigid in the nineteenth century, during the course of the Modern Wars. The causative factor behind nationalization of war was conscription of the nation's males, as it was necessary for mass mobilization. Thus, national armies replaced mercenary militias. The notion of 'every citizen a soldier' was first introduced in the 1790s by the revolutionary dictatorship of France. In continuation of this policy, during 1883, the German military theorist Colmar Von der Goltz coined the term '*Das Volk in Waffen*' (nation in arms). While the French Revolution resorted to mobilization on a large scale for meeting the rising demand of Modern Warfare, this process also increased the political consciousness of the common mass. Thus the slogans of 'Liberty, Fraternity and Equality', not only generated the cannon fodder for mass warfare but also created '*homo politicus*'. When the states conscripted citizens, they were told to fight in order to maintain the sovereignty of their fatherland cum motherland. While citizens were under the obligation to give their lives for the state, the citizen soldiers in return also demanded political rights. For survival, Napoleonic France's opponents were forced to increase their armies by recruiting serfs who were given civic rights. Thus, the nineteenth century witnessed continuous expansion of adult franchise in West Europe. However, the West had to wait for the two World Wars for total franchise.

Mass mobilization also opened the gates to talents. Modern War witnessed the replacement of the landed gentry with the educated middle class in the officer cadre. Till 1798, entry into the officer corps was a birthright for the younger sons of the declining landed gentry. They used to purchase the officers' commissions from the monarchs. However, the French Revolution opened the officer cadre to merit. In Napoleon's Army, even common soldiers with exceptional talents were promoted to officer ranks. Many Marshals of Napoleon were of common origin. Marshal Ney and Murat were sons of barrel maker and innkeeper respectively. Hence, the cliché, that in Napoleon's Army every common soldier carried a Marshal's baton in his knapsack. The possibility of upward mobility motivated the French soldiers to fight better. In response, the opponents of Napoleon like the Prussians, Austrians and the Russians were forced to plebianize their officer cadre. By 1910, about 40 per cent of the officers below the rank of Colonel in the Russian Army were drawn from the peasantry and lower middle class. A contradiction developed between these non-noble modernizers who wanted a high tech army and the traditional aristocratic elements who emphasized the role of cavalry. However, history put its weight behind the modernizers. Waging Modern War required increasing technical knowledge. Engineering techniques, bridge construction and scientific knowledge for gun laying, etc forced the Western armies to enlist University educated sons of the urban bourgeoisie in place of the polo playing aristocratic scions in the officer corps. Militarism could be categorized as excessive veneration for the army among the middle class. Officers' commissions became the badges of most prestigious occupation in nineteenth century Europe.

21.4 THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN TECHNOLOGY AND WAR

One aspect of modernization of war was also industrialization of war. A dialectical relationship existed between the growth of modern war and industrialization of West Europe. Modern warfare in a way meant more killing in a shorter time. This in turn necessitated newer technology especially by the bourgeois officer corps. Continuous technological advancements made the acquisition of a lethal arsenal possible. This in turn facilitated Modern War. The history of Krupps (a German military firm) exhibited that innovation in technology was accelerated due to the soldiers' demands for more guns of better quality. And these big firms invested lot of human resources and capital for research and development. The complex credit network emerging in the West aided these firms. Besides Krupp, the Remington Gun Factory in New York also made possible production of weapons in mass for arming large armies. Remington developed assembly line techniques of production based on the principle of interchangeable parts introduced early in the century by Eli Whitney. This marked the beginning of the military-industrial complex.

The 19th century witnessed continuous improvement in weapons of mass murder. Matchlocks were fired with the aid of lighted matches. Hence, they could not be fired during rainfall. The use of flints removed this defect. However, flintlocks used to misfire at every seventh shot. The introduction of percussion caps reduced misfires to fewer than one in two hundred rounds. Again, the introduction of the cylindro-conoidal bullet made practicable the replacement of the inaccurate short-ranged smoothbore musket carried by Napoleonic infantry by the highly accurate longer-ranged rifle. This transition occurred between 1850 and 1860. The grooved barrel of the rifle imparted a spin to the bullet which enabled the latter to achieve accuracy, range and penetrative power greater than the ball fired from a smoothbore musket. The rifle first emerged among the huntsmen of Rhineland. From there it spread among the huntsmen of North America. The rifle could hit target even at 1000 yards and it remained the basic infantry weapon till World War I. Then the smokeless powder of the 1860s allowed clear vision for repeated firing.

While cavalry was the decisive arm in pre-modern warfare, artillery became the definitive arm in Napoleonic warfare. Napoleon concentrated his guns in *grande batterie* in order to blast a hole among the line of his opponent. Explosive ammunition (shrapnel and high explosive shell) replaced solid iron balls, which made artillery more lethal. They accounted for 50 per cent of the casualties inflicted on the opponents. This trend continued in the post-Napoleonic Europe. During 1871, the Prussians used rifled steel ordnance like Big Bertha. Such monsters were able to reduce a city like Metz into rubble within a few hours.

Steel cannons became common with the advent of Bessemer process. After 1881, Siemens Martin Open Hearth process raised steel production. Between 1856 to 1870, the price of steel dropped by 50 per cent. In 1863, the first steel ship and locomotive came into existence. Mass production of steel weapons required a huge industrial infrastructure. Military prowess became dependent on economic muscle. This was reflected in the victory of the industrialized north over the agrarian south in the American Civil War. US steel output in 1900 was 10 million tonnes and that of Germany about 8 million. In the same year, British production of steel was only 4.9 million. This reflected British military power falling behind.

The state took up the responsibility of clothing, feeding and arming the citizens. This was the beginning of Hobbes' *Leviathan*. For supplying 750,000 soldiers, revolutionary France had introduced price and wage control as well as press censorship all over the country. Compared to the scope of this scheme, Sultan Alauddin Khalji's attempt in medieval India to regulate market price of Delhi for paying his 120,000 troopers was paltry indeed. *Generalfeldmarschal* Helmuth Von Moltke of Prussia, the winner of Austro-Prussian and Franco-Prussian Wars introduced the General Staff system. The General Staff became the nervous system for conducting conflicts. While the Minister of War presented the budget in the Parliament, planning and execution including operational control of war devolved on the General Staff. Instead of the monarch or the Prime Minister, the Chief of the General Staff assisted by staff officers controlled forces in the field. Introduction of electronic communications in the form of telegraph replaced horses as means of command and control. Such advances in long-range communications enabled the Chief of the General Staff in the capital to retain close contact with the distant field commanders. It was a step in the emergence of the centralizing polities.

Special institutions like *Ecole Normale* in France and *Kriegsakademie* in Berlin, were set up for training the staff officers. The officers were bound by a code of conduct. In case of any breach of this code, the military personnel unlike the civilians were judged by special military courts. In return the state offered the officers a structured career with requisite pay and privileges. Specialized theoretical knowledge was imparted to them in order to make the officer cadre professional. Officers devoted their lives for understanding and conducting warfare. They became 'specialists of violence'. The staff officers were specially trained in survey and cartography which in turn were necessary for building roads and railways. Railways were especially required for deployment of mass armies quickly and cheaply. In 1871 extensive railroads enabled Prussia to concentrate more soldiers than France at a quicker notice thus enabling her to defeat Napoleon III.

Modern War in the sea witnessed the replacement of the wooden ships with ironclads. Short recoil carriage and high explosive shell became the chief component of naval artillery. The first clash between the ironclads occurred at Lissa in the Adriatic on 20 July 1866 between the Austrian and the Italian fleets. By 1840s the Western navies experimented with steam propulsion which gradually replaced sail driven wooden ships. Steam power enabled the ships to become heavier. Hence, for protection against enemy naval gunnery broadsides, it was possible to cover the body of the ships with armour plates. Britain the biggest colonial power first produced the iron hulled warship with watertight compartments and boilers. Then a Swedish engineer named John Erickson of the US Navy came up with revolving armoured turrets and air ventilation below the decks. This supremacy in ships enabled the Western powers to project power over long distance and to acquire colonies.

21.5 MODERN WAR IN THE COLONIES

Whatever happens we have got the Maxim gun and they have not.

Hilaire Belloc

Some techniques of Modern Warfare were imported in the non-European World by the colonizing powers. The indigenous polities when faced with modern military techniques of the colonial powers were forced to transform their own states and societies. Thus an action-reaction dialectic set in resulting in spiralling cost and increasing scale of warfare. Britain possessed the largest colonial empire. The British used to remark arrogantly that the sun never set in their empire. And within it, India was the 'jewel in the crown'. For policing the sub-continent and to defend India from a probable Russian invasion, the British raised a 158,000 strong army from the Indians. Before the advent of the British no other power maintained such a huge standing army in the sub-continent. For instance, Ranjit Singh, the ruler of Punjab perceived threat from the British Indian Army. So, in the 1830s, he attempted to replace the cavalry raised by the *jagirdars* with a Western modelled infantry force with the help of French military officers. The Khalsa Army was composed of 35,000 permanent soldiers. And the permanent contingent of the Mughal Empire known as the *ahadis* numbered only10, 000.

The British officered Indian Army also known as the Sepoy Army was not unique to colonial India. For Congo, the Belgian Government maintained *Force Publique* of 20,000 men. The Army of Netherlands' East Indies numbered 25,000 men. The functions of the colonial armies were internal security, guarding the frontiers of the colonies and also to acquire new colonies. All the colonial powers used indigenous military manpower because each 'native' soldier was four times cheaper than a white soldier. In the tropical climate, a European fell sick quickly due to heat and sun. During emergencies importing white soldiers from the metrople (mother country) to the colonies was not only costly but also time consuming. Also, the local soldiers were more adaptable to the terrain for deployment. The Dutch found out that the European soldiers were unable to adapt successfully for jungle warfare in the Indonesian archipelago. Finally, the policy of integrating some colonial manpower in the colonial military machines, argued the imperialist administrators, also prevented the locally ambitious elements from rebelling against the colonial administration.

Besides the maintenance of a permanent army, another characteristic of Modern Warfare was rising cost of warfare. The Khalsa Kingdom extracted 50 per cent of the gross produce from the agriculturists. And 80 per cent of the *durbar's* income was used for maintaining the Westernized Sikh Army. The principal expenditure of the British Government in India was maintenance of the army. About 42 per cent of the government's income was spent on the army. Again, increasing interaction between warfare and society was a cardinal feature of Modern Warfare. The Sepoy Army was composed of long service Indian volunteers. Every year about 15000 Indian peasants were recruited in this force. Thus, the Sepoy Army constituted the biggest government employer in colonial India. In independent India, railways have overtaken the army as the biggest government employer.

Recruitment of the sepoys (infantry) and sowars (cavalry) had massive impact on the fabric of colonial society. From the Classical antiquity, European political and military thinkers like Vegetius, Niccolao Machiavelli believed that farmers were the best soldiering material. And in nineteenth century Europe, the modernizing regimes depended on the semi-literate peasants for filling the vacancies in the armies. This was because the farmers compared to the urban under employed and the unemployed were regarded as 'sterile' and 'docile'. This stream of thought also influenced the British in India. However, the British refused to recruit landless labourers, sharecroppers, etc. This was because being malnourished they possessed inferior physique. Moreover, the army officers assumed that it was better to collaborate with men of property who would have a stake in the continuation of the colonial regime unlike the property less persons. However, the rich farmers were not eager to join the army as they earned more from farming compared to the soldiers' pay. But, military service became very popular with the small farmers. Especially younger sons of farmers with about 60 acres of land and four bullocks preferred to join the army. Their military income supplemented the ancestral income from the land. Moreover during litigations, the families of the soldiers got extra protection from the *sarkar*. For popularizing military service further, the army introduced the system of *furlough* (paid leave). During harvest time, when extra hands were required in the family farms, the soldiers were granted *furlough* in order to help out their families. Similarly in Indonesia, those groups who were unable to engage in sugarcane and rice cultivation used to join the Dutch colonial forces.

In order to differentiate the colonial collaborators from the colonial society, the imperial powers granted those joining the colonial armies special favours. Both in Africa and in Asia, the soldiers before the advent of the colonial powers were paid either in kind (a share of the crops) or with land grants. The European maritime powers for the first time introduced the scheme of regular pay in cash, gratuity and pension facilities. All these attracted the 'natives' towards their white employers. The communities joining the colonial armies were given the status of 'martial race'. The Dutch colonial authorities marked the Ambonese, a group of Indonesia as a martial race because they were loyal to the House of Orange and had also accepted Christianity. They were granted extra pay, more pensions and better food. Gradually generation after generation, the Ambonese used to join the Dutch colonial army and developed a self-image of being a warrior community. In India, the British ascribed the status of martial race to the Gurkhas and the Sikhs. Over development of Punjab was the byproduct of British dependence on the Sikhs from 1880 onwards. In order to pamper the Sikh farmers of central Punjab, the Raj pumped money to construct canals and railways in Punjab. And these two boons of modern civilization not only enabled Punjab to become the breadbasket of India but also enabled the Sikh farmers to sell their grain to the world market. Grain was transported by rail cars from Punjab to Karachi and Bombay. From these two ports, the grain was taken to Europe in cargo ships. Both in the Sepoy Army and in the British officered Kings African Rifles, for ensuring loyalty of the martial races, their sons were also provided jobs of soldiers, drummers etc. Just like the French Revolution where the army was made a platform for upward mobility, service in the Sepoy Army also offered vertical mobility to selected Indian communities. Military service in colonial India not only resulted in pecuniary advantages but also rise in ritual status. The Bhumihars of Bihar by serving in the Sepoy Army got the status of Brahmins. The Dalits of Maharashtra continuously petitioned the British Government in India to allow them to join the Sepoy Army.

In order to prevent any mutiny among the martial races, the imperial powers followed the policy of *divide et impera* (divide and rule). Segregation of the various martial groups was a cardinal aspect of divide and rule policy. In India, the British planned to use the Gurkha regiments in case of any uprising among the Sikhs and vice versa. In a similar vein the US Army recruited various groups in the Philippines and encouraged their distinctive language and customs to prevent any homogeneity among the military personnel. The most favoured martial races were generally illiterate peasants because of the imperial belief that literacy might encourage rebellious tendencies. Further, to prevent the 'natives' from gaining any know how about the higher management of Modern Warfare, the officer corps of all the colonial armies were reserved for white males.

Most of the medical innovations in the nineteenth century were activated by the need to ensure the health of the European soldiers in the extra-European theatre. Compared to the Russians, cholera caused eight times more casualties among the French soldiers during the Crimean War. Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, more than 30 per cent of the European soldiers in India were hospitalized at any given moment due to sexually transmitted diseases like syphilis, gonorrhoea, etc. Besides venereal diseases, drunkenness was another vice of the European soldiery in the colonies. Intense boredom forced the white troops to take recourse to drink. The country spirits like arrack available in the Indian *bazars* were especially ruinous to the health of the white troops. In India, the army's medical corps carried out a campaign against cholera, the biggest killer of European soldiery. Invention of quinine gave victory to the white military manpower against the ravages caused by malaria.

During campaigns the African and Asian soldiers of the colonial armies moved with their wives and children. Women were tolerated because they provided essential logistical backups in the colonial theatres. In the cantonments they looked after the plantations and the gardens which provided vegetables for the soldiers. Again such females also functioned as unpaid nurses. In India, the Madrassi and the Gurkha soldiers were allowed to keep wives because the soldiers' families were imperial hostages that guaranteed good behaviour on part of the soldiers. The British officers also encouraged the sepoys to bring their families within the lines because it enabled the military to ensure complete isolation of their personnel from disruptive influences of the society. The British officers commanding both African and Indian soldiers found out that soldiers behaved well in presence of their wives. Lashing was common for indiscipline. And the soldiers hated being lashed in front of their women. Again, presence of the families not only kept the soldiers sober but also reduced any risk of desertion. The Western maritime powers realized that if the soldiers' families were infected with diseases then sooner or later it would also adversely affect the military personnel. To retain their military manpower in good shape, the imperialists were forced to introduce modern medical measures in the colonies. So, the soldiers' families in the cantonments received free medical care especially against colds, chicken pox, etc. Both the African and Indian women residing within the lines were regularly treated for venereal diseases. Further, the soldiers and their family members were given instructions in personal hygiene.

From the 1880s, the colonial armies acquired firepower superiority in their struggles against the Afro-Asians. This was because the former were equipped with three elements of Modern War: rifled steel artillery, breech loading rifles and machine guns. Repeating rifles certainly aided British expansion in Africa. During 1874, General Garnet Wolseley defeated the Ashanti tribe, thanks to the firepower generated by the Snider rifles and 7 pounder guns. However, the techniques of Modern War were not omnipotent against all colonial opponents.

21.6 WEAKNESSES OF MODERN WARFARE

Afghanistan was a classic case that proved the limitations of Modern War in the non-European world. Afghanistan was not a nation state with a capital but a decentralized tribal structure. Hence, the Clausewitzian notion of victory- capturing the enemy's capital after the destruction of the enemy's army in a pitched battle was inapplicable. In Afghan society due to the prevalence of the blood price for murder and the operation of the *Pukhtunwali* code, every male was armed and a potential soldier. In late nineteenth century, the Pathans could mobilize 400,000 males armed with 230,000 rifles along the northwest frontier of British India. Instead of offering a set-piece battle, the Afghans carried out a grulling guerrilla war. Due to the road less mountainous terrain, heavy artillery could not accompany the British Indian military columns. The Afghan sharpshooters with their *jezails* (long range home made rifles) perched on the *sangars* (stone fortifications) at the mountain tops and taking every advantage of the ground, inflicted horrible casualties on the imperial columns. Again, in terms of cross-country mobility, the Pathan *lashkars* (war bands) were more mobile than the Raj's soldiers. Similarly in 1904, the Nama people in Southwest Africa conducted guerrilla war against the Germans. Since the Namas were widely dispersed, the German commander Von Trotha was unable to carry out concentric operations and decision by battle. In a way, frontier commitments hampered the colonial armies because of their very modernization. Due to lack of forage for the horses and bullocks, horse artillery and field guns could not be used in Afghanistan and in the jungle clad swampy interiors of Africa. Then mortars did not have much lethal effect against the stone fortifications. Heavy howitzers (used for high angled fire in order to destroy the personnel inside the fortifications) could not be hauled over the ravines and mountain crevices. Rapid deployment of lightly armed mobile units was the only solution. This resulted in close quarter combat with small arms resulting in very heavy human casualties, a fact which the British Empire found costly.

Elimination of the distinction between the combatants and the non-combatants was a feature of Modern War. This was also evident in the pacification operations conducted by the colonizers against the colonized. Both in Africa and Asia, the imperial military formations deliberately destroyed the livestock, grain and villages in order to destroy the colonized's 'will to resist'. In East and Southwest Africa, the Germans deliberately starved rebel groups for pacifying them. Von Trotha's *Schutztruppe* (German colonial force) carried out scorched earth policy. It was the prelude to what the Nazis would do in Russia between 1943-45. For pacifying Philippines, the US Army not only relocated entire communities but also put them in concentration camps. It was an indication of genocide that in the near future became a crucial component of *der totale krieg*.

21.7 SUMMARY

Lazare Carnot's (Minister of Revolutionary France) *guerre a outrance* signalled the beginning of Modern War. While the French Revolution initiated Modern Warfare, the Industrial Revolution sustained it. And Modern War albeit in a limited way exhibited several characteristics of Total War like inclusion of the non-combatants as legitimate targets of war, extermination of entire communities, etc. Increasing scope of Modern Wars and management of its rising complexities in turn generated a Managerial Revolution: the emergence of the General Staff System. All these resulted in bureaucratization of violence by the centralizing nation states. Some of the features of modern conflicts like centralizing polities and the General Staff continue in the post-modern age. Again the notion that posts should be filled with men of talent and merit instead of those with wealth and high birth, when first emerged in the last decade of the eighteenth century appeared revolutionary. Today, such idea has become common place. Then, the British construction of martial races with its emphasis on the social and cultural peculiarities of the various groups aided the emergence of sub nationalism among the various ethnic communities in South Asia. Even today the Indian Army like the Sepoy Army remained over dependent on the martial races like the Sikhs and the Gurkhas. Further, the army's care for the soldiers' families marked the beginning of a welfare state which probably reached its zenith in the post-Second World War era. Here in lies the legacy of Modern War.

21.8 EXERCISES

1) How did technology bring change in modern warfare?
2) Define the distinctive features of the modern armies in the colonies.
3) Discuss the impact of modern warfare.

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UNIT 22 THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION

Structure

22.1 Introduction
22.2 Economic Crisis
22.3 Political and Administrative Problems
22.4 Question of Nationalities
22.5 Gorbachev's Reforms
22.6 Disintegration of the Soviet Union
22.7 Summary
22.8 Exercises

22.1 INTRODUCTION

The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 succeeded in overthrowing the Empire in Russia, Russia witnessed a series of civil wars and then Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was formed in 1922. Russia was one of the 15 Republics and other republics were Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. Initially Soviet Union in 1922 had six member states — Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia and by 1941 numbers of member states increased to 15 expanding influence into Central Asia and Balkan states. Following its victory in the Second World War USSR emerged as a strong global power till the mid 1980s. About 70 years the Soviet Union dominated the world and under Stalin its supremacy in the world stage was very much visible and had the recognition of one of the superpowers. However, for various reasons the collapse of the Soviet Union started in the late 1980s and the disintegration completed on December 25, 1991 when the country broke up into 15 independent states. This signaled the end of the Cold War between the United States representing the capitalists and the Soviet Union representing the communists. In this Unit, you will be introduced to the various factors that historians have analyzed as the possible reasons for the collapse of the Soviet Union. The collapse was not due to a single factor but there were multiple factors which brought the end of the Soviet Union. Here we will focus on economic crisis, political and administrative problems faced by the USSR, rise of national identities, impact of reforms introduced by Gorbachev which are considered key factors precipitating the disintegration. This will help you to understand how world politics took a new turn with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.

22.2 ECONOMIC CRISIS

Economic history of the Soviet Union is explained in terms of four broad stages. First stage covering 1917 and 1928 is described as primitive socialism when New Economic Policy (NEP) was introduced. Second stage began with the death of Lenin and coming of Joseph Stalin in power and continued till Stalin's death in 1953. This was the period when five-year planning of national economy proved to be

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ineffective and the country incurred huge expenses due to the Second World War. The period from 1953 to 1985 is considered as de-Stalinization which was marked by de-centralization of economic decision making and deep economic stagnation. Last stage from 1985-1991 corresponds to 'Perestroika' under Gorbachev introducing liberalized economic reforms. Economic factors played important role in the collapse of the Soviet Union. Due to flawed policy of economic centralization in the agricultural and industrial sectors the USSR economy failed to bring expected prosperity. Forceful collectivization of agriculture had antagonized farmers and the Kulaks who resisted were persecuted. This forceful collectivization gave rise to peasant hatred against the government and many peasants were forced to leave country-side. In the industrial sector because of centralization it was the government who controlled the sources of supply and market resulting in the disappearance of demand and supply mechanism. Centralized economy in the long run proved not beneficial for the country's economic growth. Let us now see how different scholars have tried to explain the economic crisis faced by the USSR.

Writing on the economic crisis faced by the Soviet Union Alec Nove cited the following quotation for understanding economic problems:

'The economy ... approaches the borderline, beyond which one can speak not of economic crisis but of catastrophe. The sharp fall in output which is occurring in most state enterprises is accompanied by a growth of inflationary processes. The factory management is concerned not with the development of production, but with how to find a means to pay wages at the level demanded by the employees and how to supply the food and consumers' goods to spend these wages on. These problems, as well as that of material-technical supply, are increasingly being resolved by the archaic methods of barter. But barter is in its nature inefficient, it cannot ensure the needed supplies, so economic links are disrupted and production is halted...The degree of uncontrollability (neupravlyamosti) of the economy has reached catastrophic dimensions. The planning institutions are demoralized by the uncertainty of their situation today and particularly tomorrow. Reliable information from the grass-roots is lacking. All union, republican and regional orders contradict each other, which adds to the social and political tensions.' (This is a quotation from the preamble to a reform proposal drawn up for the Russian republic which appeared in Komsomolskaya Pravda on 23 April, 1991. **Source:** Alec Nove, 'The Soviet Economic Crisis' in ***National Institute Economic Review*** , November 1991, No. 138, November 1991, pp. 84-91). There are differences of opinions among scholars on the nature of economic crisis and its complexity but there is agreement on the fact that the Soviet economy since 1970s was passing through crisis. It is argued that centrally-planned economic system had problems in resource distribution and lack of motivation for improvement due to the absence of competition. Integrating growth with social justice did not produce desired result. Before 1970 the Soviet economy was successful in the world in terms of per capita GDP as the measure of performance. However, many scholars do not share the view of success of the Soviet economy because of political repression and famine mortality following the collectivization of agriculture, negligible growth in consumption and compared to the West standard of living was poor. Explaining economic slowdown since 1970s Robert C. Allen referred to wrong investment decisions and the end of surplus labour. Lack of investment was due to conflicts between the military and civilian economies, priority was given to military production. Investment was not available for civilian industrial production. Technological failure due to lack of incentives and motivation slowed down economic growth. Preferential investment in the military caused technological stagnation of the civilian machinery sector. Diversion of funds from research and development to military had adverse impact on Soviet economic growth. (See Robert C. Allen, 'The Rise and Decline of the Soviet Economy' in ***The Canadian Journal of Economics***, Vol.34, No. 4, Nov.2001, pp. 859-881) It is argued that the Soviet economic system was characterized by centralized planning which failed to address the demands of modern economy more governed by the market. 'Victor Kuznetsov's essay "The Economic Factors of the USSRs Disintegration" frames the cause of collapse in terms of the short-term economic dynamic. Kuznetsov concedes that the socialist economy had several systemic inefficiencies, including: low productivity of labour (due to lack of competition), slow progress of science and technology (due to over-centralization), and an excessive military expenditure. However, he claims that the Soviet economy, though somewhat wasteful, could still have provided for the reproduction of the socialist system, even if it would have fallen behind the capitalist one. After all, even according to Western estimates, growth in pre-perestroika USSR was still moderate by world standards. The more important cause, rather, was circumstantial – arising from the unconsidered and hap-hazard reforms of the economy during perestroika. This included the "laws on socialist enterprises, on partial abolition of the foreign trade monopoly,... limited liberation of the price formation and wages, and [greater freedoms] to directors of public enterprises". These ultimately clashed with the socialist system of central planning and created economic chaos.' (**Source:** Antony Kalashnikov, Differing Interpretations: Causes of the Collapse of the Soviet Union, in ***Constellations*****,** 5, no. 1 (2011). 75-86.). Majority scholars agree that over centralization of economy was the major reason for economic crisis in the later years although centralized economy was aimed at creation of an egalitarian society. Main economic problems faced by the country were identified as lack of labour discipline, poor productivity, inefficiency, slow growth in living standards, inadequate quantity and quality of consumer goods and services particularly food, housing and health care. Added to this was the failure of using modern technology. The Soviet Union's costly and long war in Afghanistan since 1979 had worse effect on the Soviet economy. Whatever economic and political gains were expected ultimately the Soviet Union had to pay huge cost of the war. Writing on economic problems faced by the USSR David R. Marples has observed that 'The economy was in deep crisis, its problems exacerbated for a number reasons including a costly and unsuccessful war in Afghanistan that ended 1988-1989, the enormous expenses of dealing with the 1986 Chernobyl disaster and its aftermath, an earthquake that devastated Armenia in 1988, decentralization of the Union leading to shortages of funds in the central budget, economic experiments that were essentially half-hearted and incomplete — starting with anti-alcohol campaign in 1985 that depleted state revenues while rendering government unpopular, and the undermined authority of the Communist party, later the KGB, thereby removing not only the structure of power but also the and/or usage of force in times of perceived crisis.' (**Source:** David R. Marples, 'Revisiting the Collapse of the USSR', in ***Canadian Slavonic Papers / Revue Canadienne des Slavistes***, Vol. 53, No. 2/4 (June-Sept.-Dec. 2011), pp. 461-473). Reforming and modernizing the centralized planning system and use of market mechanism believed to be the way to keep pace with the development in modern economy. Gorbachev after coming to power in 1985 introduced number of reforms to address the economic crisis faced by the Soviet Union. This however failed to save the country from its disintegration. We will discuss in a separate section Gorbachev's reforms and its consequences.

22.3 POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS

From the beginning the Soviet Union was expected to provide better alternative to capitalism through socialism. But from the days of Stalin itself ideological legitimacy of socialism began to be questioned because of Stalin's dictatorship. In its formative phase itself leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) such as Lenin, Trotsky, Bukharin and Stalin had differences on how to attain social and economic wellbeing. Following Lenin's death Stalin established his complete control over the Soviet Union by putting Trotsky into exile and isolating others from the party. Stalin became the face of the communist ideology and by introducing the doctrine of 'Socialism in One Country' he drove the Soviet Union away from Marxist Communist internationalism. Scholars like Richard Sakwa saw in it the genesis of drifting away from communist ideology advocated by Karl Marx. Having complete control of the state by the party, the party elite headed by Stalin decided the goals of the state in which people in general lost their voices. Stalin believed in 'revolution from above' and tried to establish socialism by means of forced collectivization and industrialization. His policy caused tremendous human suffering and loss of life. Stalin wanted complete control of the Party and state and unleashed the police terror on dissenting voices. Through censorship creative efforts of intelligentsia were silenced and non-Russian nationalities faced forced deportation to Siberia because Stalin had suspicion of their loyalty. By mid 1930s he became the unquestionable leader of both the Party and the state by removing political challengers to his leadership within the Party. He ruled the Soviet Union throughout as absolute dictator till his death in 1953. There is thinking that future political crisis faced by the Soviet Union and deviation from Marxist-Leninist philosophy had its origin in Stalinism.

After the death of Stalin, Khrushchev became the first secretary of the Party eliminating his rivals. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union met in Moscow in 1956, first time after Stalin. In this meeting in his speech as the First Secretary of the Party Khrushchev denounced Stalin, the personality cult that he developed and the crimes that Stalin perpetrated. It was shocking to many Party members who were admirers of Stalin but his speech deflected blame from the Party by putting on Stalin's shoulders. He asked for measures for removing individual cult which is not part of Marxist-Leninist ideology from the Party and governmental activities. Khrushchev speech in the Party meeting marked the beginning of a campaign of 'de-Stalinization' allowing greater freedom in cultural and intellectual life. But through his policies he alienated a section of the Party members and the Soviet elite. He was forced to resign by his opponents led by Brezhnev within the Party. Many feel that Khrushchev was a poor judge of political environment in which he worked. In 1964 end of Khrushchev rule came when the collective leadership of the Party forced him to resign.

Brezhnev remained in power from 1964 till his death in 1982. He was conservative in approach and wanted to undo those reforms initiated by Khrushchev. Political and cultural freedom was curtailed and repressive tactics against dissident voices were used to silence criticism. Marxist ideology was followed to strengthen the authority of the political regime rather than allowing any revolutionary ideas. Soviet dissidents were influenced by human rights ideas and political rights which activists around the world were advocating. But through intimidation, arrest and exile dissident voices were silenced. Policy of strict centralization and the Party control of administrative machinery resulted in inefficiency in administration and people's apathy towards the government. Gorbachev's reforms which will be discussed separately were a response to address the popular concerns but the bastions of the Soviet power structure — the Party, the police and the bureaucracy remained untouched. Added to this was the role of corruption at various levels which caused further hardship to common people. It is argued that the 1960s and the 1970s saw rapid increase in the wealth and power of the Party elite. Ideological stagnation, factionalism within the Party, over-centralization, dictatorship and gradual shift from Marxist-Leninist philosophy not only alienated people from the Party but weakened the very foundation of governance. In the early 1980s the US President Ronald Reagan's anti-Soviet rhetoric and building an anti-ballistic missile system, known as Star Wars, forced Brezhnev to invest more in defense further depriving common people of state revenues for better livelihood. In the last years of Brezhnev's rule due to his poor health the Party and the state was controlled by a coterie within the Party resulting more general apathy towards the government. The end of Brezhnev era witnessed many economic, social, political and ideological problems. The CPSU had two factions representing diverse views — one group represented proletarian and petty bourgeois and the other democratic bureaucratic. In the post Brezhnev era with the coming of Gorbachev initiatives towards reforms marked the beginning of liberalization democratization but also the process of disintegration of the Soviet Union began during this period.

Summing up the above discussion on political crisis we may say that there was overlap between the Party and the government. It is said that CPSU in fact was shadowing the government departments and created a permanent crisis of governance. There were overlapping jurisdictions and rigidity of the Party leadership blocked the attempts to reform. Government failed to respond to social changes and meet people's expectations. In the absence of political pluralism, separation of powers, democratic space for reform and change was limited. Reform efforts also clashed with vested bureaucratic interests and therefore faced opposition from the ruling elite. People got exhausted with the communist ideology and also lost hope in the ideal of building communism. There are also scholars who believe that lack of democracy and over-centralization of administration weakened the Soviet government. Historians are divided on the nature of political crisis and to what extent it caused the debacle. But the fact remains that from the beginning there were two distinct groups within the Party and the tendency towards totalitarian state did not evoke popular support.

22.4 QUESTION OF NATIONALITIES

The collapse of the Soviet Union may not be solely due to assertion for independence by different nationalities but the role of ethnic movements was definitely important. Integration of divergent ethnic, linguistic and religious identities in the Soviet Union was a complex process and the possibilities of dissension were inherent in the processes of integration. Ethnic Russians consisted of only 50% of the nation, there were over one hundred distinct national ethnicities and over two hundred different languages and dialects. Russian was not even the official language until 1990. All the republics having distinct nationalities were united together by a political-economic experiment with the hope of establishing socialist ideology. Socialism was seen by many as the better alternative than Capitalism. Through the harmonizing ideology of socialism and its main instrument the Communist Party Soviet patriotism, a sense of new nationhood was promoted centred on the Soviet Union. But this attempt could not completely erase from people's memories their distinct historical past. (For detailed discussion on the processes of formation of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union you may read (Address of the Sectional President, MADHAVAN K. PALAT, 'FORMS OF UNION RUSSIAN EMPIRES AND THE SOVIET UNION' in ***Proceedings of the Indian History Congress***, 1991, Vol. 52 (1991), pp. 831-887). In the present context, we have to understand the reasons behind the sudden rise of nationalist movements in the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

The Bolshevik communists proclaimed the equality of all nations and the support to minority nationalism against the dominant Russian nationalism. The Soviet Union tried to create an ethnic federation where all constituent nations will have equal rights. Allowing cultural autonomy of constituent nations the Communist Party provided opportunity for future resurgence of exclusive ethnic identities. In a situation when the central authority became weak, the nations at periphery raised voices for autonomy. Different ethnic groups were opposed to Russification and asserted for political and economic autonomy and ethnic cultural revival. Stalin's nationality policy and intensive Russification succeeded in curbing the authority of local elites. In the garb of internationalism Russians were in majority in institutions of power and non-Russians were made to adopt Russified cultural practices. They were compelled to adapt to the political and social dominance of Moscow. But after Stalin, 'trust to local elites' policy pursued by the Soviet rulers allowed regional cultural autonomy to grow helping cultural nationalism to consolidate. Under Khrushchev and Brezhnev local national elites, particularly in Central Asia and Transcaucasia, became more powerful and with the help of party elites ran the republics as fiefdoms. It is argued that the policy of giving more autonomy to local elites gave birth to political nationalism in the late 1980s. After Gorbachev announced broad political reforms in late 1980s, political balance between Moscow and the regions radically changed. Nationalists came to power after the elections of 1990 in almost all ethnic republics. Local elites within various republics became stronger and they tried to take over local political control in their hands. Taking the advantage of dire socio-economic situation the republics made attempts to break away from the Soviet Union. Explaining the correlation between nationalism and the collapse of the Soviet Union Mark R. Beissinger wrote:

'After the Nineteenth Party Conference in June 1988, attempts to challenge the Soviet regime proliferated with great rapidity, diffusing across multiple groups. At this very time challenging groups engaged in a widespread sharing of information, pamphlets, expertise, modes of challenge and mobilization frames. By June 1988 representatives of Ukrainian, Armenian, Georgian, Latvian, Lithuanian and Estonian dissident nationalist movements had initiated contact with one another and established a coordinating committee among themselves. Indeed, in summer and autumn 1988 popular fronts created along the lines of the Baltic model sprang up throughout most of the Soviet Union. Representatives of these groups met frequently, shared documents and ideas, and occasionally aided each other by providing material support or organizing demonstrations in solidarity with each other s demands. The tide of nationalism thus assumed concrete form during the collapse of communism in the ways in which nationalist paradigms were consciously exported and borrowed, organizational resources were shared and challenging groups sought inspiration from one another. (**Source:** Mark R. Beissinger, 'Nationalism and the Collapse of Soviet Communism' in ***Contemporary European History***, Vol. 18, No. 3, Revisiting 1989: Causes, Course and Consequences (Aug., 2009), pp. 331-347)

Edward Walker in his book ***Dissolution: Sovereignty and the Breakup of the Soviet Union*** claims that dissolution was the result of 'the structure of the Soviet ethno-federal system and the legitimizing myths of the Soviet nationality policy.' Accepting the role of economic crisis and policies of the central political leadership in the breakup of the Soviet Union he argues that the Soviet policy of voluntary union of republics and endorsement of national pride and self-determination worked against the interest of the Soviet Union. The breakup of the Soviet Union was further precipitated by federative structures and policies. It is believed that there was latent struggle between the Russian centre and the nationalities on the periphery. Taking advantage of the crisis at the centre caused by other factors the nationalities announced their autonomy. Nationalism was harnessed by local political elites in order to capture power and leave the Union. In 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Eastern Bloc, the Baltic States declared to break away from the Soviet Union. Thereafter, Armenia, Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia joined the independence movement. Boris Yeltsin, the leader of the Russian Soviet Republic, leaving the Communist Party declared Russian sovereignty.

22.5 GORBACHEV'S REFORMS

In sections 24.2, 24.3 and 24.4, we have discussed economic, political crisis and also the problems faced by the Soviet Union on the question of nationalities. In this discussion, we have referred that Gorbachev's reform initiatives in the mid 1980s brought see change in the administration of the Soviet Union and ultimately led to the disintegration of the Soviet Republics. In this section, our focus will be on Gorbachev's reform initiatives and to see how his reforms failed to hold the Soviet Republics together. Gorbachev came to power in 1985 and he is remembered for his two sweeping policies of reform, Perestroika and Glasnost, which completely changed the course of Soviet history. After Stalin, Gorbachev was the youngest Soviet leader whom the Communist Party appointed as the head of the state. Majority of the Soviet people welcomed this decision because his two predecessors — Andropov and Chernenko were of an old age and did not connect with the people in general. Gorbachev denounced corruption, centralization of power and advocated for peaceful coexistence based on equality and self-determination. He also wanted to end the arms race. When he came to power economy of the country was in deep crisis caused by a series of events like unsuccessful war in Afghanistan, enormous expenses of dealing with the 1986 Chernobyl disaster — a nuclear accident, shortage of funds in the central budget, etc. Gorbachev's appointment aroused hope among people that he would address the concerns of the common people but they could not think that the series of radical reforms introduced by him would lead to the breakup of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev was instrumental in transition from orthodox communism to a different kind of political system. During his rule East–West relations were transformed and communist hegemony came to an end in Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union was traditionally totalitarian in nature having highly centralized political system. It was the politburo who had all decision making authority and all others within and outside the Party were expected to follow the decisions taken by the Party. There were dissident voices within the Soviet Union before the Gorbachev era but the dissent was crushed by the government machinery. Dissents were seen as works of enemies to undermine the Soviet political and social order. Dissidents were sent to either in exile or in labour camp or mental asylum. Dissidents in fact failed to get much support from common people and that made the task easier to crush dissidence. Propaganda by the government portraying dissidents working as agents of foreign government also weakened the dissident voices. Political, economic reforms endorsed by Gorbachev marked the beginning of a remarkably liberal politician who reached the top position within the party through the ranks of the Soviet Communist Party bureaucracy. Drifting away from dogmatic Marxist-Leninist ideology he took more radical position within the Party and changed the balance of power within the Soviet leadership. Political organizations and movements outside the Communist Party acquired more autonomy. He introduced many characteristics of political pluralism.

After assuming power Gorbachev showed eagerness to listen opinions of others which created displeasure among many conservative leaders of the Party. His policy of Glasnost or openness was to bring more transparency in internal and external policies. Censorship was relaxed and the Press got freedom to criticize the Party policies. Even matters pertaining to the United States and Western countries were reported in friendlier manner. Media started exposing inefficiency, corruption within the government and became critical of officials. Rights to people to express their viewpoints freely resulted in open criticism of weaknesses within the government. There was also feeling that for the last seven decades people were aspiring to achieve the communist ideal which in turn failed to make their life comfortable. In short, Gorbachev's glasnost policies aimed at bringing greater transparency in the functioning of the government and providing the Soviet people much needed freedom to express their voice. People no longer had to worry about arrest and exile for dissent against the state. People were allowed to voice opinions on governmental policies and received news not pre-approved by the government. He decided to democratize the soviets, or councils, at all levels; and expand the rights and authorities of the regions, territories, and republics. Writing on Gorbachev regime Archie Brown has made the following observation:

'It does indeed make no sense to speak of *reform communism*. But that does not mean that a Communist system could not and did not become something different in kind — i.e. cease to be Communist in any meaningful sense of the term — while being led by a Communist reformer who became in due course a systemic transformer. Nor does it mean that reformers within a Communist system may not set in motion processes that lead to the replacement of that system by another. Evolutionary change is often in the long run more far-reaching in its effects than revolutionary upheaval, and the Gorbachev era was one of profound and — in a comparative context — surprisingly fast political evolution.

The Soviet Union, between the spring of 1989 and the summer of 1991, was in the throes of systemic transformation, and Gorbachev, as the leader of the country throughout a period of historic change, used a vocabulary which was a mixture of the old and the new. But in each year from 1985 to 1991 the proportion of new concepts to old in his political lexicon significantly increased. During that time he continued to refer to himself as a Communist (in public at least) and, with greater conviction, as a socialist.' (**Source:** Archie Brown, *The Gorbachev Factor*, pp. 8-10).

Gorbachev's policies of reform clearly show departure from Communism in any meaningful sense of the term. Gorbachev's policy of Perestroika was to restructure the country's economy which was suffering under the inefficiencies of a planned economy. On the occasion of celebration of the seventieth anniversary of the October Revolution in November 1987 Gorbachev said in his speech that 'Two key problems of the development of society determine the fate of perestroika. These are the democratization of all social life and a radical economic reform…The purpose of the radical economic reform begun in the country is to assure, over the next two or three years, a transition from an overly centralized command system of management to a democratic system based mainly on economic methods and on an optimal combination of centralism and self-management…' (Cited in Richard Sakwa, ***The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union, 1917-1991***, p.422) Explaining the need of

Perestroika Gorbachev wrote in his book, **Perestroika: New Thinking for our Country and the World,**

"Perestroika is an urgent necessity arising from the profound processes of development in our socialist society…At some stage – this became particularly clear in the latter half of the seventies – something happened that was at first sight inexplicable. The country began to lose momentum. Economic failures became more frequent. Difficulties began to accumulate and deteriorate, and unresolved problems to multiply. Elements of what we call stagnation and other phenomena alien to socialism began to appear in the life of society. A kind of 'braking mechanism' affecting social and economic development formed. And all this happened at a time when scientific and technological revolution opened up new prospects for economic and social progress."

Gorbachev felt the urgent need of restructuring of economy, otherwise there was possibility of serious social, economic and political crises. The command economy under the Soviet regime worked under the control of the Party and its machinery determining from above goods to be produced and pattern of economic growth. However, due to weakness in the central command production fell and hoarding increased affecting common people. Gorbachev realized the importance to move to a system in which market would determine the economy curtailing the power of the Communist Party to control economy. He decided to create necessary economic conditions for the financial self-sufficiency and self-financing of enterprises without state subsidies. The Soviet Union adopted a mixed communist-capitalist economic system allowing free-market forces to determine what would be produced. He was aware of the fact that economic management was concentrated in the hands of the Party-political leadership who determined what would be and what not would be. The Party bodies were unable to pressure from departmental interests. Excessive governmental control of public life harmed the society. Highhanded administration distanced people from participatory role. Over centralization had given rise to inefficiency and inability to meet expectations of common people. In the domain of economic reform he took away the supervisory role of the Party in economic activity, brought changes in property relations and provided concessions to the market. Glasnost was seen as means to put pressure on the institutions opposed to economic change.

But the process of Perestroika or economic restructuring initiated by Gorbachev failed to address systematic economic problems of the Soviet Union. Problems were of complex nature and lack of experience of economists in managing economic systems other than centrally planned market economy further added to the problems. Soviet people started expressing their discontent publicly about economic problems such as shortages of food and other products in shops and various other social problems. There were in one side abundance of unnecessary products and on the other side shortage of products that were needed for certain areas. There were long lines for products outside stores due to rationing of commodities. In the year 1990 there was good harvest, still there was a bread shortage. This was attributed to lack of co-operation by the government and local officials, with the local Party officials in particular having not the slightest desire to help Gorbachev. This led to public outcry and intellectuals also joined the demonstration. His anti-alcohol policy prompted by the logic to preserve social health caused loss of revenue and encouraged home-made brews for which no tax was paid. Public revenues declined by more than 37,000 million roubles due to reduced sale of alcoholic beverages. In agricultural sector Gorbachev legalized individual farming allowing leasing of the state land to farmers in order to enhance agricultural production. But due to his reluctance to fully privatize land many farmers were not eager in developing farms which the state can take back any time. Agrarian reform failed to yield desired result. Explaining the problems as a result of Gorbachev's initiatives for economic reforms Archie Brown wrote,

'The Soviet Union's deteriorating economic plight by 1990 owed much to the fact that, without the fear and coercion the old order had instilled (which under Brezhnev were already in decline and which virtually disappeared under Gorbachev), the traditional instruments of economic power were working worse than ever, the system was somehow in limbo — neither a functioning command economy nor yet a market economy. Concrete economic outcomes were the result of the struggle for power and resources among the major economic interests, and the entire battleground was supervised by a ministerial system with no interest in facilitating a move to a market economy and by a Chairman of the Council of Ministers in principle committed to such a transition but who wished to take his time about getting there. By 1990 the party and governmental apparatus were in widespread covert — and often open — revolt against Gorbachev.'(**Source:** Archie Brown, ***The Gorbachev Factor***, p.150)

Gorbachev's efforts to create a market-oriented economy had inherent problems in execution of reforms leading to gap between supply and demand. Food shortage and inflation caused mass disillusionment in his capacity to lead the economy towards better condition. His reform initiatives proved counterproductive. Beneficiaries of economic reforms, Party oligarchy and bureaucracy, taking advantage of liberalization became rich and more powerful but did not support Gorbachev when it is required. Gorbachev failed to garner support within the Party to push his economic reform agenda rather faced criticism within the Party for not improving people's standard of living. While a section within the Party wanted complete market economy, the conservatives felt that he had moved away from Marxist-Leninist philosophy. Gorbachev faced major threat to his reform initiatives. Evaluating Gorbachev's qualities as a leader it has been observed that 'He was certainly a 'magnificent failure', but he was also a 'tragic success'. His unstable mix of reform communism and communism of reform failed to achieve the aspirations of either, while his statecraft was unable to keep the country together; but he presided over the internal transcendence of the Bolshevik system that avoided civil war, oversaw the disintegration of the country without inter-state war, and achieved the end of the Cold War without international conflict.' (**Source :** Richard Sakwa, 'The Soviet Collapse: Contradictions and Neo-modernization' in ***Journal of Eurasian Studies***, Vol.4, Issue-1, January 2013, p.67). In the following section, we will discuss the consequences of reforms initiated by Gorbachev and the process of the fall of the Soviet Union.

22.6 DISINTEGRATION OF THE SOVIET UNION

Gorbachev's failure to reform communism ultimately caused disintegration of the USSR by the end of 1991. Disappointment with his reforms led critics to air their voices openly. Politicians taking advantage of Gorbachev's policy of openness aired their grievances publicly which encouraged miners in 1989 to go on strike. Workers, peasants and others organized themselves in groups to fight for their respective interests. Society in general was in a grip of crisis. Encouraged by their new powers to organize and speak out against the government Soviet people began to demand the end of Soviet rule. Gorbachev was caught in a political struggle in the process of reforming the political system which ultimately sealed the fate of the Soviet Union.

The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe just before the dissolution of the Soviet Union had significant impact on the developments in the USSR. East European nations such as Poland, East Germany, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, the Baltic

States, Hungary and Finland all after the Second World War following the defeat of Fascism came under the control of the Soviet Communists. In most of the East European countries the form of communism practiced was an imposed Soviet variety. But with the passage of time the experience with Soviet ideology and economy helped the nationalist forces in these East European countries to mobilize themselves against the Soviet communism. With economic failure and disillusionment with the communist ideology nationalist ideology gained strong ground in these countries. Contrast between East and West Germany in terms of quality of life was so much visible that there was growing feeling among people that Berlin Wall is preventing people to improve their life. Eastern countries had to depend on the Western powers because of their increasing economic weakness. The failure of the Soviet style economic system had become very apparent. It was not only economic failure but the suppressed nationalist sentiment being influenced by national memories and traditions also played important role in overthrowing the Soviet sponsored governments. The people of Eastern Europe in general were opposed to the idea of Soviet interference in government affairs and to the huge military presence of the Red Army on their territory. The countries which were under control of the Soviet Union during the Cold War taking advantage of the process of democratization under Gorbachev became emboldened to assert their nationalist voice. Nationalist voices within East European countries strongly demanded the end of the communist rule. U. S. President Ronald Reagan in 1980s adopted anti-communist Reagan Doctrine which weakened Soviet influence in Eastern Europe and helped in breaking the Berlin Wall dividing East and West Germans. By 1990 Germany was fully united signaling the end of communism in Eastern Europe. In the case of Poland in the early 1980s there were a number of popular outbursts against shortage of consumer goods, food and other household items. They established Trade Union Solidarity which demanded greater Polish control over polish affairs. The Solidarity came in power in 1989 and committed to make Poland free from the Soviet rule. Other East European nations like Hungary, Romania and Czechoslovakia also witnessed anti-soviet popular movements. In fact the fall of the Berlin signaled the effective end of the Cold War and Soviet influence in the East European countries. Revival of nationalist sentiment, failure of Soviet economic planning to provide better livelihood along with the failure of the soviet communism caused the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe.

Gorbachev's Glasnost and attempt for democratization of the political system encouraged leaders in various republics to claim freedom from the Soviet control. Through his political reforms he wanted to encourage local groups to take initiative on their own and to find solution to the problems faced by their region. But Gorbachev never anticipated that this could lead to independence movements. Adding to this was Gorbachev's failed economic reforms which failed to improve living standards. Individual republics got the feeling that their salvation lies in independence. It is believed that Gorbachev's decisional errors paved the ground for independence movements in the republics. Nationalist feelings in the republics following the fall of communism in the East European countries were intensified. Nationalist sentiment became strong in the Baltic States and in Georgia, Armenia and Ukraine. Popular movements in some states got majorities in election in 1990. Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Moldova, Armenia and Georgia all effectively declared themselves independence as the Communist Party lost out to national parties in all six republics. Before the August coup Lithuania was officially independent and others followed the same path after the coup.

Emergence of Yeltsin of Democratic Russia as a very able politician who could mobilize masses became a major concern for Gorbachev's future. After elected as Chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet in 1990 Yeltsin soon made Gorbachev's position untenable. Apprehending possible threat coming from Yeltsin Gorbachev decided to oust Yeltsin from Supreme Soviet but Yeltsin with his supporters succeeded in defeating Gorbachev's plan. In mid 1991 Yeltsin advocated for political and economic sovereignty of the Russian republic. Democratic Russia under Yeltsin got involved in political confrontation with the CPSU conservatives. Being aware of Yeltsin's power Gorbachev supported Yeltsin's proposal for the Union Treaty. This treaty proposed a 'Union of Soviet Sovereign Republic' wherein membership was voluntary and republican sovereignty was allowed. The USSR Supreme Soviet was disbanded and this weakened the position of the conservatives within the Party. This prompted the hardliners within the Party who considered Gorbachev weak and powerless to stop the collapse of the Soviet Union to stage a coup to bring back the lost control of the Party. But this coup failed and provided more support towards Yeltsin and his plan for total independence. Leaders of three most powerful Soviet republics signed the Belovezha Accords which nullified the existence of the Soviet Union.

Yeltsin emerged as strong democratic ruler after the failure of the coup. The failure of the coup was the final blow towards dissolution of the USSR which came to its knees following Gorbachev's reform initiatives. Although Gorbachev was released but he lost his control in the political showdown that ensued. Gorbachev was forced to seek support from the reformist faction within the Party which eventually helped Yeltsin and his pro-democracy movement. The Soviet Empire could not be saved. Taking opportunity of the coup Yeltsin issued a decree on economic sovereignty of the Russian Federation. Soon the Ukranian Supreme Soviet declared Ukraine an independent state and all fifteen republics followed the same path. Scholars like Brown and Cohen are of the opinion that Gorbachev would have succeeded in pursuing his reform agenda to establish a new political equilibrium if Yeltsin was not there. But others suggest that Gorbachev's reforms had inherent problem and were expected to fail which the Russian leadership under Yeltsin realized and that was the reason for Yeltsin's success. Yeltsin understood that the Soviet national project had lost its relevance. Gorbachev announced the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the world's largest communist state broke into 15 independent republics. This brought an end to the Cold War causing profound changes in global political and economic affairs.

22.7 SUMMARY

It is clear from the above that no single condition can be identified in precipitating the collapse of the Soviet Union. Different factors came together in creating a storm that swept the Soviet Union away. We have analyzed economic crisis, political problems, rise of nationalists, impact of reforms introduced by Gorbachev and finally how with the end of communism in East European countries, republics within the Soviet Union declared themselves independent from the Soviet Union. The collapse of the Soviet Union caused significant changes in global political and economic affairs, impacting the lives of hundreds of millions of people.

22.8 EXERCISES

1) Analyze economic crisis faced by the Soviet Union.
2) Explain the reasons for failure of political reforms in the USSR.
3) Critically analyze the impact of Gorbachev's reforms.
4) Why did Communism fail in the Soviet Union?

UNIT 23 DEMOGRAPHY

Structure

23.1 Introduction
23.2 Theories of Demographic Change
    23.2.1 Malthusian Theory of Demographic Change
    23.2.2 Demographic Transition Theory
    23.2.3 Marx's Understanding of Demographic Change
23.3 Demographic Change: Different Trajectories
    23.3.1 Europe
    23.3.2 China
    23.3.3 India
23.4 Demography: Society Linkages
23.5 Summary
23.6 Exercises

23.1 INTRODUCTION

From the middle of the eighteenth century Western Europe witnessed a historically unprecedented decrease in mortality, followed by a period of rising fertility and then a secular decline in fertility. It was roughly while the western world was in the process of this momentous transformation that population became a subject of intense debate. Economists and statesmen have at different times in different places been extremely anxious about the consequences of contemporary demographic developments.

These anxieties were largely associated with the internal contradictions of the capitalist expansion. The dilemmas of development, then can for the purposes of this Unit be schematically classified into three broad groups: Overpopulation, immigration and the demographic deformations associated with the continuing hold of older attitudes towards marriage, health and son-preference in a context of modern capitalist growth. Finally, though less closely related to the dynamics of capitalist growth, we have imagined demographic imbalances being attributed to certain ethnic and religious groups for reasons of ideology and political power.

Population has frequently been invoked to explain a variety of social processes-population growth as a check on economic growth, as a stimulant of economic growth, as a cause for poverty, as an outcome of poverty and so on. There clearly seems to be a lack of certainty regarding whether population is the explanatory or dependent variable.

To clarify some of these issues relating to demographic change, it would be necessary to have some rudimentary understanding of the larger processes on which these are premised. First, it becomes necessary to understand the demographic determinants of population change. Next, these determinants or the most significant of these determinants need to be studied in association with the larger dynamics of economic and social change in region or country being studied. When discussing these changes at the global level, in the modern period, these could be reduced to three large processes that have characterized world history: the rise of capitalism beginning

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first in north-western Europe, the increasing economic disparities between the West and the poorer countries of the world with capitalist growth and imperialist expansion and finally the rapidity of economic change in the developing world without commensurate changes in social attitudes.

Population change can be explained in demographic terms by a simple equation, which demographers call the Balancing Equation:

$P_t=P_0+B-D+I-E$

Where P_0 is the initial size of the population

P_t is the terminal size of the population

B, D, I and E denote the number of births, deaths and in-migrants (immigrants) and out-migrants (emigrants) between the two dates.

In other words, population change is the result of three variables- fertility, mortality and migration. At different times in history, in particular regions, one or the other of these variables assumed greater significance than the others. Fertility, mortality and migration in turn, are determined by pure demographic factors and a larger set of social and economic variables.


Population Change
Fertility
Mortality
Migration
Demographic Factors
Proximate (Nuptiality, Natural Fertility, Abortion, Contraception)
Non-demographic Factors
Institutions, Income, Class, Social Practices, Religion, Politics

23.2 THEORIES OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE

To understand and place in perspective the discussions on the demographic variable in modern history, we need to look at the two guiding theories of the discipline of demography— the corpus of Malthus' writings on demographic dynamics and the sustained hold of the "demographic transition theory" since the Second World War. The third view, though equally relevant but not part of mainstream demographic discussions, is that put forward by Karl Marx in response to Malthus' speculations.

23.2.1 Malthusian Theory of Demographic Change

The Reverend Thomas Robert Malthus (1766-1834) is popularly considered to be the founding father of modern demography. His 1798 work, *An Essay on the Principle of Population,* which went through six editions, still provides the main theoretical frame for modern demographic research.

Malthus' main contribution was to enunciate a homeostatic, cyclical view of population movements. The high level of human fecundity made it possible for fertility to outstrip food production bringing about starvation and enhanced mortality in its wake. This crisis ensured the return of equilibrium and the beginning of a new cycle. This vicious cycle was usually prevented by the operation of preventive and positive checks. The "preventive" check in the form of postponed or averted marriages in the "civilized" European part of the world usually allowed these regions to escape crisis. The other route to equilibrium, usually found outside Christian Europe was the so-called "positive" check that took the form of war, disease, sterility from sexually transmitted diseases, polygamy and vices including infanticide, abortion and contraception. Though this was the main demographic content of the original Malthusian model, it also contained a very significant element of ruling class anxiety about the debilitating influence that the rapidly proliferating poor would have on society. The general Malthusian model of homeostatic population-economy equilibrium through the operation of preventive and positive was to have universal applicability. But it was the class component of the model that made it politically significant. Malthus believed that mortality had been unchanging for centuries, but in class societies, the poor experienced higher mortality and were the first casualty of a subsistence crisis. This ignorant and wretched section of society did not respect preventive checks as they went ahead and had children despite minimal subsistence. Within the logic of this model the Elizabethan Poor Laws then by transferring part of the social surplus to this improvident class encouraged their reckless multiplication. This, in turn, increased the demand for food and raised the price of food for the middle class, thereby raising their mortality. Thus the Poor Laws instead of bettering the condition of the wretched merely increased their population and spread death to the more industrious and worthier sections of society. One direct policy outcome of this line of reasoning was the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834 where outdoor relief was substituted by urban workhouses.

While Adam Smith's thesis of free trade appealed to the natural man, Malthus saw an unambiguously Divine design behind the forces responsible for equilibrium. For Malthus, contraception was vile and unchristian — a view shared by most Englishmen of the day. In the absence of contraception the only respectable way to control was the preventive check.

Despite being widely held as the progenitor of demography, Malthus was neither the first to postulate a potential strain between population growth and food resources nor was he responsible in any way for the development of the technical tools of demography. What then were the reasons for his popularity?

Though this question can never be answered in full, one major reason is that Malthus was the first to clearly and comprehensively enunciate the fears and anxieties of English intelligentsia of social revolution and assert a civilizational gap between the peoples of the metropolis and the colonies in clearly demographic terms. Further, in the middle of the nineteenth century it carefully saw contraception as vile and clearly accepted a divine design. Being written in the most general terms, Malthusian concepts could be used to understand demographic phenomena in widely different contexts — from Poor Laws in England, to population growth in the New World and to famines in India.

Malthus progressively became more concerned with the absence on the preventive check in the uncivilized world. However, anticipating latter day diffusionists he did hope that the "diffusion of education and knowledge" in the future would bring these people to delay marriage.

23.2.2 Demographic Transition Theory

This brings us to the second enduring shibboleth of demography- the so-called "demographic transition theory". In the post-War period, eugenics and the earlier politics of status quo took a severe beating. The resurgence of the Left, the horrors of Nazi race politics and advances in scientific theory were responsible for the quick demise of pre-War eugenicist arguments. The new governments now emphasized welfare. After the War, demography was taken very seriously by government policy makers. In France the INED was created to collect data and analyse population trends. In Germany, however, after the terrible excesses of the Nazis, the state decided to remain neutral in matters of population and family.

Early American demographic anxieties concerned immigration and immigrants. According to Notestein this work was "mainly descriptive and of little long-run significance." Most of the academics associated with demography in the U.S. were part-time demographers drawn largely from the disciplines of sociology and statistics.

The so-called transition theory that has had such an enduring hold over generations of demographers was first presented in 1929 by Warren S.Thompson, one of America's leading demographers. However, this prototype failed to recruit many followers. Towards the end of the Second World War in 1944, the "demographic transition theory" was published separately by Frank W. Notestein and Kingsley Davis to become the guiding "theory" of demographic change.

Classical "transition theory" as it was first formulated rested on a tripartite division of human demographic experience. In the first phase both mortality and fertility were high resulting in little or no population growth. In the second phase mortality fell sharply while fertility continued to remain high, leading to a sharp increase in population. In the third and final phase, fertility falls sharply and population goes into secular decline as fertility falls faster than mortality.

This model of demographic change was clearly evolutionary and functionalist in nature. Fertility decline was seen to be necessarily consequent upon industrialization and modernization. Transition theory was invested with applicability independent of place and time. Unlike its subsequent reincarnation in the 1950s, the transition theory of 1944 vintage clearly saw demographic change as a dependent variable with social, economic and cultural developments as the main explanatory factors. Unlike the early theoreticians of demographic change, Notestein saw all nations in the world capable of development. Predatory colonialism was seen as the culprit for delayed transition in countries such as India. The context was clearly held to be significant. Demographic change was seen to be a cumulative result of social and cultural and institutional change. The dissemination of contraceptive techniques was recognized as important in controlling fertility. However, its effectiveness was always dependant on "the social setting; hence new patterns of behaviour are to be established principally by the alteration of that setting."

Within a space of just about half a decade, Notestein and subsequently Davis, the twin popular progenitors of the transition theory revised their recently pronounced model of demographic change very significantly. In a report in 1949 he wrote, "…Fertility control is not a substitute for other ameliorative effort; instead, it is a means that will assist in making ameliorative effort successful — indeed it may turn out to be a necessary condition for such a success."

The "transition theory" in its original form saw falling fertility as a consequence of industrialization. The greater the level of fertility, the quicker was the required pace of industrialization. The Soviet model, based on "totalitarian methods" was thought to be better at attaining higher rates of capital formation and thus potentially more attractive to newly independent Third World countries. Slower industrialization held the risk of increased poverty leading to Communism. The immediate goal of American demographers was to convince Third World leadership that population control was both possible and necessary.

The subject area of American demography now shifted to the Third World and so did the emphasis from academic demography to population studies focussed on family planning. Fertility control in the Third World now became one of those rare fields with a multiplicity of willing and rich sponsors. This singular emphasis on fertility control as the panacea for the ills of the Third World was soon questioned in terms of its motives and politics. Development as a vital necessary condition for population control was stressed and by the 1970s "revisionists" started questioning the inverse relationship between population growth and development. Today in the United States there is no one overwhelming issue comparable to the old enthusiasm over Third World fertility control. The questions asked are much more diverse in nature.

The transition theory based largely on Parsonian functional structuralism and its subsequent sociological paradigms of "Westernisation" and "modernization" has continued to be single most important theory for demographers. Sociologists and anthropologists have long stopped taking Westernization and modernization seriously. Historical demography has clearly contradicted the empirical basis of the transition schema. First we find that in nineteenth century France, fertility began on its course of secular decline much before industrialization or any major phase of economic development. This should have been evident to the formulators of the theory of demographic transition as this phenomenon was well documented. The large scale Princeton based European Fertility Project, designed specifically to test the theory, was unequivocal in their finding that economic growth showed no clear relationship with falling fertility. Despite being at variance with the historical record, classical transitional theory maintained that fertility would decline only as a consequence of the cumulative interaction of lowered mortality, growing individualism, socially mobile urban groups, the decline of family and fatalism. These preferred conditions could only result from wide-ranging industrialization and modernization. The demographic transition it was believed had universal applicability. Any historical period or geographical point could be placed and situated on this demographic-economic scale. Dudley Kirk, who was involved with the elaboration of the transition theory at Princeton commented, "In regard to demographic matters the different countries of the world may be considered as on single continuum of development…" This implied that historical specificities and contextual differences had no bearing on the working out of demographic transition.

Though a historical and confident in its universal applicability and relevance, the classical version of the transition theory did however privilege the social, cultural and economic over the demographic. Demographic change was clearly a dependent variable in this equation, with modernization as the sole explanation. Demography was seen as firmly embedded in society. This reminds one of Malthusian thinking on the subject as well as Marx's view that every mode of production had its special laws of population. In clear opposition to Malthus and Marx, the transition theory omitted class differences and regional specificities. To plot demographic transition or the later concept of fertility transition one has to have a base period and society to begin with and a different one at the end of that process. The moment one leaves the neat periodization and certain correlations of the demographic transition theory, and takes note of historical contingencies and complexities, it becomes clear that there is no one homogenous starting specimen that can be designated as "traditional" and its replacement by a "modern" society. Further, since the demographic transition theory is based on partial description and not any abstract analytical construct, any empirical observation that runs contrary to the stated trajectory becomes proof of significant weakness. Further, when the authors of the "theory" themselves mutate it out of recognition, any remaining confidence evaporates rapidly. Finally, in its mutated second birth the theory lacks causal direction. Other than the necessity to contracept, the demographic transition helps us very little in characterizing demographic regimes, fixing determinants or predicting change.

Despite the theory not receiving a formal burial from demographers, it has been noted that the term demographic transition theory has increasingly been replaced by "fertility transition" which however is plagued by the same theoretical and methodological weaknesses as the original term.

Since these two guiding "theories" — Malthusianism and "demographic transition" have clearly been indicted for failing to correspond with known history and analytical rigour, alternative ways of conceptualizing demographic change have became an urgent need.

23.2.3 Marx's Understanding of Demographic Change

Karl Marx's views on the subject of demography — economy linkages assume significance here. With tremendous perspicacity, Karl Marx in his discussion of the development of capital, noted that "The law of capitalist production, that is at the bottom of the pretended "natural law of population," reduces itself simply to this: The correlation between accumulation of capital and rate of wages is nothing else than the correlation between the unpaid labour transformed into capital, and the additional paid labour necessary for the setting in motion of this additional capital. It is therefore in no way a relation between two magnitudes, on the one hand, the magnitude of the capital; on the other, the number of the labouring population; it is rather, at bottom, only the relation between the unpaid and the paid labour of the same labouring population. If the quantity of unpaid labour supplied by the working-class, and accumulated by the capitalist class, increases so rapidly that its conversion into capital requires an extraordinary addition of paid labour, then wages rise, and, all other circumstances remaining equal, the unpaid labour diminishes in proportion. But as soon as this diminution touches the point at which the surplus-labour that nourishes capital is no longer supplied in normal quantity, a reaction sets in: a smaller part of revenue is capitalized' accumulation lags, and the movement of rise in wages receives a check. The rise of wages therefore is confined within limits that not only leave intact the foundations of the capitalistic system, but also secure its reproduction on a progressive scale. The law of capitalistic accumulation, metamorphosed by economists into pretended law of Nature, in reality merely states that the very nature of accumulation excludes every diminution in the degree of exploitation of labour, and every rise in the price of labour, which could seriously imperil the continual reproduction, on an ever-enlarging scale, of the capitalistic relation." (Marx, Capital Volume I, Chapter 25, Section I).

Marx then went on to note that, "The labouring population therefore produces, along with the accumulation of capital produced by it, the means by which it itself is made relatively superfluous, is turned into a relative surplus-population; and it does this to an always increasing extent. This is a law of population peculiar to the capitalist mode of production; and in fact every special historic mode of production has its own special laws of population, historically valid within its limits and only in so far as man has not interfered with them." (Marx, Capital Volume I, Chapter 25, Section 3)

Thus it is in *Capital* that we first find the argument that socially acceptable levels of population are not independent of the capitalist production process, but are in fact, a function of the latter. Marx, however, attached a rider to this formulation — that this dynamic or "law" of population was peculiar to the capitalist system and that other modes of production had their own laws of population.

23.3 DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE: DIFFERENT TRAJECTORIES

While certain common trends can be discerned in the very long term across national and regional population histories, these commonalities disappear when we begin to look demographic developments in the medium and short term. Consequently what we then have is not one single universal story of world population history but a variety of different trajectories with different determinants of demographic change. Western Europe, East Asia and the Indian subcontinent may be taken as representative of various different trends to understand demographic change in the modern world.

23.3.1 Europe

The historical demography of Europe is important to any discussion of the demographic variable in the world context, as it was here in the eighteenth century that population first showed rapid increase followed by a sustained decline.

The population of north-west Europe increased from between 60 to 64 million in 1750 to about 116 million in 1850 growing at an annual compound rate of around 0.6 per cent. Between the French Revolution and the First World War, mortality sharply declined with the availability of new resources and favourable epidemiological changes, creating conditions where population could possibly increase. The introduction of new crops such as potato and maize, greatly contributed to limiting subsistence crises and permitting population increase. Further, during the eighteenth century plague and associated epidemics such as typhus, smallpox, malaria, venereal diseases lost much of their lethal efficacy. Population increased sharply at first but was then limited by nuptiality checks. Next, it resulted in large overseas migration and a sustained decline in fertility. It led to the massive movement of Europeans overseas and also to the demographic transition. This demographic transformation is one of the most significant transformations that Europe witnessed in the last millennium.

In twentieth century Western Europe devastating wars further exacerbated the effects of fertility decline, finally resulting in an ageing age structure and growth rates that will turn negative in the future.

23.3.2 China

Western observers, including Malthus, saw China as a country that was hopelessly caught in the trap of overpopulation and poverty. High population densities, low per capita consumption of food and energy and consequently low anthropometrical indices characterized China in the eighteenth century.

Describing the economic context of demographic change in China, Malthus wrote, “In some countries, population appears to have been forced; that is, the people have been habituated by degrees to live on the smallest possible quantity of food. There must have been periods in such countries when population increased permanently, without an increase in the means of substance. China seems to answer to this description. If the accounts we have of it are to be trusted, the lower classes of Chinese people are accustomed to living on the smallest possible quantity of food and are glad to consume putrid offals that European labourers would rather starve than eat.”

Despite this low level of living standards, Malthusian positive checks did not prevent an increase in Chinese population. China’s population grew virtually exponentially between 1700 and 1800 increasing from 175 million to 400 million in the same period. Between 1800 and 1950 the population increased more slowly to nearly 600 million. This was followed by a sharp acceleration to over 1.2 billion at present. Studies of Chinese historical demography using new sources such as imperial genealogies have now conclusively shown that mortality in the eighteenth century was similar to and even lower than Western Europe. Despite a sharp increase in population in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, mortality levels decreased, in a rather unMalthusian fashion. Public health measures have been credited for this increase in life expectancy. This is not to say that there were sharp peaks marked by crisis mortality. These famines were few and not severe enough to arrest population growth in the long-term. Famine mortality, including the severe 1958-61 famine, was more the product of administrative and political mishandling than of population size.

From the middle of the twentieth century China’s mortality started falling at a rate unknown in world history. Infant mortality registered a fall of 300 per cent between 1950 and the present. Male life expectancy similarly increased rapidly from 42.2 years in 1953-54 to 61.6 years in the period 1964-82. Once again increased state intervention, in the form of larger investments in public health, was responsible for this marked fall in mortality. Thus China with its low standard of living instead of proving the Malthusian positive check clearly shows that the Malthusian economy-mortality relationship did not have a universal applicability. It must also be noted here China has also exhibited very high levels of female infanticide and very high levels of sex-selective mortality both amongst the nobility and commoners.

This brings us to fertility. Once again, recent research into Chinese historical demography has shown that fertility in traditional China was quite moderate despite an absence of contraception. Nuptiality, one of the most important proximate determinants of fertility, was very different from marriage patterns elsewhere in Asia and in Europe. While there was early and universal female marriage in China, this was not the case with males. Males married much later and across a longer age span. Richer males married earlier than poorer men across social groups. This social differential in the pattern of marriage observed since the eighteenth century has persisted to the present day. The recent economic reforms and attendant increases in inequity have further raised the proportion of poor single men up to the age of thirty to 30 per cent from 25 per cent in the 1980s.

Other than this check on nuptiality, three mechanisms of fertility control – late beginning, birth spacing and early stopping – effectively controlled Chinese marital fertility.

23.3.3 India

The population of India grew slowly from 1871 to 1921 largely because of the mortality check despite high fertility. In the post 1921 years up to the 1980s fertility remained high but mortality declined leading to rapid population growth and resulting in a very young age population. Women fared badly in terms of mortality relative to men throughout our period. The sex ratio at birth usually falls between 1040 to 1070, internationally. In other words 104 to 107 male babies are born for every 100 female babies. On the other hand male mortality is also generally higher than female mortality in the older age groups. Despite this, India has exhibited a continuous decrease in the proportion of women. This is explained by lower life expectancy at birth for females. This all-India trend however does not hold good for many parts of India, as we shall see in our discussion of regional trends.

India's age distribution has remained remarkably stable with a large and virtually constant proportion of young people. In a closed population such as that of India's, the large proportion of children points to high levels of fertility. The age distribution also suggests a high dependency ratio. Further, the youthfulness of the population also ensured a continued population momentum that would last beyond the onset of fertility decline.

23.4 DEMOGRAPHY: SOCIETY LINKAGES

In this section, we try to understand some of the relationships between demographic and social and economic change.

In the Malthusian scheme of things, unregulated demographic growth was certain to result in crisis and a return to equilibrium between food supply and demand. For Malthus this vicious cycle of rapid procreation and resulting death could only be prevented by the preventive check or the safety valve of migration.

This part of Malthus' formulation provided a basis to a large number of writers in the post-War period who feared an imminent population explosion resulting in widespread scarcity. The United Nations in its publication entitled, *The Determinants and Consequences of Population Growth* (1953) observed, "Especially during the last decade a number of authors have recalled the Malthusian principle of population and expressed the fear that the present population of the earth is drawing near the maximum that its resources can support." Demographers, economists and statesmen took this warning seriously.

Coale and Hoover in their work on India saw rapid population growth as the cause for the country's poverty. Population increase resulted in a progressively larger share of the production being used for consumption, leading to a fall in savings and investment. The government of India appears to have taken the thesis of overpopulation as being an obstacle to development seriously. India was the first country to begin a comprehensive programme of family limitation in 1950s.

However, there were dissenting voices. Simon Kuznets' large-scale study found no association empirically between population growth and development. Around the same time, Boserup provided theoretical arguments and empirical proof to argue that critical level of population pressure was necessary for technological development to take place in agriculture. Others saw population pressure as forcing the development of new institutions that were essential for economic growth.

Recent research now clearly tells us that the Malthusian specter of population outstripping resources is not true historically at the global level. According to Angus Maddison, between 1500 and 1820 while the world's population grew at an annual rate of 0.29 per cent, the gross domestic product increased by 0.33 per cent.

Malthus hypothesized the operation of the preventive check as the preferred route to equilibrium. However, history once again tells us that the Malthusian preventive check was in operation in a wide range of societies and not limited to "civilized" Western Europe. Again, we find that other mechanisms such as widowhood, infanticide, abortion and a number of measures were resorted to in regions where the nuptiality check was absent to regulate population. There is also no evidence to suggest that the preventive check was a conscious decision to limit fertility and population growth. Thus, what we do find is that a range of societies characterized by varying levels of economic development resorted to some form or the other of fertility regulation.

High mortality and especially infant mortality was clearly inversely correlated with fertility through "replacement" and "hoarding". In a demographic regime marked by high and volatile levels of mortality, parents or the society would tend to replace dead children and produce more than the desired family size given the high incidence of mortality. Unless mortality levels were so high as to depress fecundity, high mortality regimes were also characterized by high fertility, though not necessarily population increase.

While the interrelations between the proximate determinants of population growth are fairly well understood, the population-economy relationship continues to pose an enduring conundrum. Malthus saw the overpopulation resulting in poverty and famines. On the other hand according to the theory of demographic transition, modernization resulted in first lowered mortality and rapid population growth followed by sustained fertility decline and slowing down of population growth.

While development or modern economic growth resulting in mortality and then fertility decline over the long run appears logical, this has not always been borne out by available historical evidence. France experienced low fertility levels well before the beginnings of modern economic growth. The Princeton based European Fertility Survey that was designed to test this assertion of the "transition theory" once again failed to find any statistically significant relationship between economic development and fertility decline.

However, the failure to find such a relationship may be related to the choice of economic indices that were available to the Princeton researchers. At a more global scale, taking more sensitive indices of economic development such as the Human Development Index rather than aggregated measures such as per capita income or GDP, recent research finds that fertility transition occurred only in countries with a HDI of 0.6 or more.

Mortality decline is a necessary condition for sustained fertility decline. Thus it is not surprising that only when the population as a whole is freed from the threat of mortality hikes will it exercise the option of family limitation.

The uneven nature of fertility decline between the developed and developing countries has created another contradiction. With the West having experienced fertility decline for more than a century now, its population is rapidly ageing and the proportion of men and women in the working ages is getting smaller. What this implies in economic terms is that these countries now have to import labour. As North-South disparities have sharply increased in the recent past, employment and wages have decreased in the developing world. This has resulted in the West facing a virtual tide of job seeking immigrants trying to enter these richer countries. The cruel contradiction of globalization has been that while the West wants all factor markets to be liberalized, it fights shy of opening up to labour.

A related dilemma of development that has a bearing on migration is the nature of economic development in the globalized world. The recessionary trends that have marked corporate globalization have greatly increased both unemployment as well as underemployment. Work is also rapidly shifting from the organized to the unorganized sector accompanied by the attendant evils of poor working conditions and low wages especially in Asia. All this further increases North –South disparities and sets up conditions encouraging a poor workforce to move in search of better employment opportunities, which then attracts severe restrictions.

Demographic changes are path-dependent. We find that regions and countries that underwent the mortality transition early also began on their course of sustained fertility decline much before traditionally high mortality regions. The path-dependence also extends to other features of demographic change. Patriarchal China and the northern Indian sub-continent have traditionally been characterized by pronounced son-preference. With the beginning of fertility decline and the reduction in the desired family size, we find new technologies, such as pre-natal diagnostic testing being employed to destroy female foetuses resulting in alarmingly skewed sex ratios.

Finally, in many of the countries of the developing world, in a context of increasing social disparities, demographic arguments are erroneously marshalled to hold certain communities responsible for the ills of society. Attempts have been made to biologically reduce their reproduction or more brutally by outright physical extermination — Nazi Germany being the most revolting, but by no means the only case in point.

23.5 SUMMARY

Demographic change is thus one of the most pressing problems facing the modern world today. The problems are different, specific to societies and countries and are closely related to wider economic and social changes. Attempt to understand demographic change without reference to time and region- specific context has failed.

The relationship between development and demographic problems is so closely intermeshed, that both in the past and in today's world, population being more visible and easily quantifiable than the underlying processes of global economic, political and social change, is held culpable for a range of problems.

23.6 EXERCISES

1) What is the importance of demographic change in understanding of world history?
2) Discuss Malthusian theory of demographic change. Can it be applied universally?
3) What are different historical contexts which have led to different demographic patterns in areas like Europe, India and Asia?

UNIT 24 ECOLOGY

Structure

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24.2 How Europe Perceived the New Lands

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24.1 INTRODUCTION

The Industrial Revolution changed the lives of people in Europe in a most dramatic way. It brought them from the countryside to the city in search of jobs; it changed their life patterns, created new tastes and recreations. Most significantly, it saw the organization of production of goods on a scale never known before. Factories required fuel and raw material. As new industrial townships came up there was a huge demand for construction material like bricks, in the manufacture of which large quantities of wood were required. There was also a growing need for food grain to feed the growing urban population.

How did all this impact on nature? In a very big way because it was Mother Nature alone that could provide all the materials required for this major change. The most noticeable change was the conversion of wooded or forest lands to cultivable tracts. Millions of hectares of land were brought under cultivation. The well-known historian E.J. Hobsbawm, in his book *Age of Capital 1848-1875*, tells us that Sweden more than doubled its crop area between 1840 and 1880, Italy and Denmark expanded it by more than half, Germany and Hungary by about a third. In southern Italy and its islands, about 600,000 hectares of trees disappeared between 1860 and 1911. Forests and grasslands, which were teeming with biodiversity, were made to give way to the simplifications of commercial agriculture. This brought major ecological changes, which we will discuss later in this Unit.

New industrial cities brought unhealthy living and pollution in its wake. In England and later in Europe, writers, poets and painters recoiled at the ugliness of the new urban centres. Some writers like Charles Dickens and Elizabeth Gaskell described the squalor in their novels. Here is an account of an English industrial town in Elizabeth Gaskell's novel, *North and South*:

> For several miles before they reached Milton, they saw a deep lead-coloured cloud hanging over the horizon in the direction in which it lay…Nearer to the town, the air had a faint taste and smell of smoke; perhaps, after all, more a loss of the fragrance of grass and herbage than any positive taste or smell. Quick they were whirled over long, straight, helpless streets of regularly-built houses, all small and of brick. Here and there a great oblong many-windowed factory stood up, like a hen among her chickens, puffing out black 'unparliamentary' smoke, and sufficiently accounting for the cloud which Margaret had taken to foretell rain.

The Romantic poets and painters turned their faces away from the squalor and desperately sought to return to nature. They believed that outside the city survived a lost innocence, which they respected and venerated. Their passion moved the general public. From 1865 onwards numerous societies like the Commons Preservation Society, the Lake District Defence Society and others, which we will refer to later, emerged. But there was no setting the clock back. Capitalism had come to stay and it was like a hungry giant, whose appetite for raw material and markets was insatiable. This hunger could only be fed by exploiting the colonies of Asia, Africa and the Americas, which were very rapidly coming under European control.

This was one of the dilemmas of development. On the one hand there was progress. The nineteenth and twentieth centuries were the centuries of major developments in science and technology. While one branch of science concentrated on uncovering the laws of nature, another was committed to harnessing nature to the needs of capitalist development. The lives of men and women were being transformed as never before. There were new conveniences to be enjoyed but there were, at the same time, new health hazards and new natural disasters to contend with. The negative consequences of the new developments were recognized rather early in the day – in fact in the nineteenth century itself. The problem of nature was understood to be a serious one and policy makers had to strike a balance between maintaining the existing natural order and disturbing it. At the same time development could not be compromised, especially at a time when each nation was involved in the race to surpass the other.

What made the whole issue more complex was Imperialism. Since this was the era of imperialist expansion and colonial exploitation, the dilemmas of development would involve not just Europe but Asia, Africa, the Americas and Australia as well. Given the equation between the imperialist powers and their colonies, it was only to be expected that the ecological changes would be on a much larger scale in the colonies.

24.2 HOW EUROPE PERCEIVED THE NEW LANDS

In fact, these changes had begun even prior to the Industrial Revolution. Even as the Europeans moved out of their homelands, fired by a new spirit of adventure or because of a sudden population increase, as occurred around the 1750s, or because of religious persecution at home or in order to make profit through trade, they triggered off many ecological changes in the new lands they entered. Their attitudes towards the new regions they inhabited were varied. Some saw the lush green tropical areas as the lost Eden. The French navigator, Louise Antoine de Bougainville arrived in Tahiti in the South Pacific in 1768 and thought that he had been transported into the Garden of Eden. The natural abundance of the tropics seemed to contrast with the frugality of nature in Europe. Another type of reaction, at the other extreme, was of hostility towards the existing flora and fauna. The marshes and swamps were seen as breeding grounds of disease and must be cleared. A third type of reaction was of interest in the exploitability of these natural resources and their commercial value. Here, nature was seen as inexhaustible and waiting to be put to "productive" use. If, in the process of tapping natural resources, much of the existing natural vegetation and animals were destroyed, that could not be helped. The superior forces of Europe were merely prevailing over the inferiorities of the rest of the world. It was an assertion of Darwin's theory of the survival of the fittest.

24.3 THE IMPORTING OF NEW PLANT AND ANIMAL SPECIES

When the settlers came to the New World, (North and South America), Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and other lesser-known parts of the world, they brought with them the plants and animals they were familiar with. These plants and animals formed an important part of their diet. For instance, the Europeans brought in the pig to many colonies, because it was a rich and convenient source of food.

But soon the species multiplied so rapidly that it became a menace, competing with human beings for the land and its resources. The new animals also needed certain kinds of fodders and grasses for their sustenance. These grasses were often imported from the home countries and would spread like wild fire. Existing grasses and weeds were wiped out as a result. Alfred Crosby in his *Ecological Imperialism: The Biological Expansion of Europe, 900-1900,* explains how, along with other regular plants, a large variety of weeds also found their way across the seas into the new lands. In the case of Australia, the onslaught of European plants and weeds began in 1778 when the first expedition sailed from Britain to Botany Bay. Most of the northern parts of Australia as well as its interior were too hot and dry for European seeds and grasses. So it was in the southern coasts and Tasmania that Europe's flora took root. They wiped out other indigenous plants in this region.

Like the weeds and the pigs, rabbits could also be uncontrollable. In 1859 some rabbit species were released in southeast Australia. They multiplied in such alarming numbers that they began competing with the sheep for grasses and herbs. It was much the same story in New Zealand, which had been annexed by the British in 1840. Here, since there were no large native predators, all the Old World livestock that had been introduced – i.e. horses, goats, pigs and sheep – multiplied very rapidly and soon outstripped the human population. What made the New Zealand story even more distressing was the fact that the flora and fauna here was extremely unique, since they had evolved in isolation for some 80 million years.

Sir Cecil Rhodes, the British colonialist who made a fortune mining diamonds, introduced the Himalayan Tahr, a long-haired mountain goat to South Africa in the 1920s. It was considered an exotic specie and some three or four specimens were brought for a zoo at the base of the Table Mountains. The goats, however, escaped from the zoo and multiplied. Soon they had established a colony and began to run riot, threatening the natural habitat of the region. These goats are now considered such a menace that the South African National Parks authority has taken a decision to eliminate these animals. But that decision has triggered a controversy and a group of animal lovers in Cape Town have now formed a support group called Friends of the Tahr (FOTT) to rehabilitate this near-extinct species.

So there were two types of ecological changes: the intended and the unintended. Both had very far-reaching consequences and usually upset the ecological balance of the

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regions where they appeared. As we have seen above, even the intended changes ended up having unintentional repercussions. And these repercussions could affect not only plant and animal species but also entire races of humans, as will be seen below. And this in turn could have important political consequences.

24.4 THE WIPING OUT OF THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES

Just as the introduction of new animal and plant species sometimes resulted in the wiping out of the indigenous species, so too the coming of Europeans to the New World could mean the extermination of large sections of the existing population in that region. In Central and South America, for instance, the Aztecs and the Incas were suddenly exposed to the smallpox virus when the Spaniards arrived in the second decade of the sixteenth century. Since they had no immunity to this disease, it spread rapidly and caused huge loss of lives. This led to political collapse and demoralization, as a result of which it became possible for a few hundred Spanish adventurers led by Hernan Cortes, to defeat the 5-million strong empire of Montezuma in the Mexico region. As for the Incas of Peru, the reigning Inca as well as his son and heir fell victim to smallpox and since there was no clear successor, the Spanish conqueror Francisco Pizarro was able to exploit the ensuing disunity to conquer the area with ease.

24.5 WERE HUMAN BEINGS DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE OR ONLY INDIRECTLY?

The larger question that is raised by writings like those of Alfred Crosby is the extent to which human beings can be held responsible for ecological disasters. The title of Crosby's book — *Ecological Imperialism – The Biological Expansion of Europe* is significant. It seems to suggest that the ecological impact of imperialism was not man-made but due to the biological changes that occurred when men and women moved into the new areas. Diseases like smallpox, measles, typhus and influenza were of common occurrence in Europe in any case and they only found a more congenial environment in the new areas that the Europeans travelled to. Critics of the Crosby type of explanation such as David Arnold in his book *The Problem of Nature,* say that it underplays the destructive aspect of human actions. Arnold argues that in the case of the Aztecs and the Incas, the other policies of the Spaniards i.e. of massacres, of forced labour in mines and plantations and the destruction of indigenous agriculture were also contributory to a significant population decline even before the arrival of smallpox in 1519.

The European conquerors also weakened the native population by appropriating their food reserves. Since most of these areas had a subsistence economy, i.e. the people produced just enough to meet their own immediate food requirements, their precarious nutritional balance broke down. They now became more susceptible to illnesses and subsequent death.

There is no doubt that major ecological changes were being triggered off in the areas occupied by the imperialists. Even if they were unintended, they suited imperial interests. The wiping out of indigenous plant and animal species and the killing off of native populations all fitted into a pattern and rendered easier the tasks of accommodating the surplus population of Europe and of creating a subsistence base for them.

24.6 THE IMPACT ON EXISTING ECOSYSTEMS

Since most of the colonies had been acquired to fulfil the needs of industrialization, especially the growing demand for raw materials, the ecosystems of these areas were bound to be affected. All parts of the earth have their own natural ecosystems. These could be very small, like a simple pond, or an entire rain forest or a desert – it could even be the whole earth. Ecosystems have been compared to machines that run on and on automatically, checking themselves when they get too hot, speeding up when they get too slow and so on. However, when outside forces disturb these ecosystems, the equilibrium is affected and the entire system could collapse.

Environmental historians like Donald Worster, in *The Ends of the Earth,* tell us that for a long time the most dramatic environmental alterations came from the massive conversion of natural ecosystems into croplands. As mentioned before, immense tracts of forests and grasslands were cleared and brought under cultivation. The bio-complexity of these regions was lost. Species of plants and animals began to disappear at an alarming rate. As Worster puts it: "First it was one species every year, then one every day, soon it will be one every hour, one every half hour, one every 15 minutes." There were plants on which man had depended for food, for medicines, for building materials and so much else for centuries. They now disappeared without a trace. Not only was the natural process of evolution suspended, it was even reversed.

Let us take up some examples of the effects of modern capitalist development on the colonies.

24.7 COAL MINING

During the period of the industrial revolution coal was the major source of energy. As the industrial revolution gathered momentum, the demand for coal went up dramatically. Where was this coal to be obtained from? There were parts of Europe, which were rich in coal like Poland and southern Russia, and mining was carried out here. But another major source of coal was the Appalachian mountains of the United States. Here, the method of strip mining was used to extract coal. Vegetation was obviously removed to enable the mining to take place and once that happened, there were major landslides. These landslides destroyed neighbouring farmlands and even roads. River systems were also affected as sedimentation increased and the flowing capacity of streams and rivers was reduced. Apart from all these was the pollution – sulphuric wastes were generated and these entered the water system. It is estimated that in the Appalachian region, the waste from the mines polluted some 16,000 kilometres of waterways.

These were the effects of coal mining on the regions from which it was extracted. What about the places where coal was being used as a source of fuel? The burning of coal releases carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, which seriously affects the ozone layer. As is well known, it is the ozone layer that protects the earth from the harmful ultraviolet rays of the sun. When the ozone layer gets depleted it can cause a variety of health problems.

24.8 CHANGING THE FACE OF NATURE: THE NEW ENGLAND EXAMPLE

New England was that part of North-Eastern America around present-day Massachusetts, which was colonized by Britain in the seventeenth century. The impetus for this colonization came from the Puritan movement for religious reform in England. In the first quarter of the seventeenth century the Puritans faced discrimination from the local Anglican Church in England. Some of their leaders felt that the Puritan salvation lay in America, where they could set up a model church and state. Since 3,000 miles of ocean separated them from England, they would be free to govern this new land as they wished, with no interference from the home church. This was how the English settlement of New England came into being. By the early 1640s more than 20,000 Englishmen had made the pilgrimage to New England. The rates of population growth were also rather high.

This region had several kinds of furred animals, which were not known in Europe. There was the ocelot – a medium-sized cat with a striped deep yellow or orange coat; the coyote – a wolf-like wild dog and the bobcat – a small cat with a spotted reddish-brown coat. The skins of these animals began to become popular for fur coats in Europe and as they entered the European fur market, the large-scale destruction of these animals began. It is estimated that beaver skins comprised over half of England's total fur imports between 1700 and 1775. Soon, beavers vanished from New England, their original habitat. Beavers are also builders of natural dams, and when the beavers disappeared, other species such as otters and muskrats were either flooded or frozen out. Many varieties of ducks and other birds that used to breed in beaver ponds also became extinct. The ponds themselves shrank into marshes and finally became meadows. Even larger animals like the moose (a large-antlered deer found in North America) and other varieties of deer were affected by the disappearance of beaver ponds because they used to escape from flies by standing in the cool water. Tree stumps that were cut down by beavers for building ponds used to sprout tender stalks and leaves on which deer, rabbits and hare fed.

By 1800 most game animals had dwindled in the New England area and by the mid-nineteenth century they had vanished. These included the white-tailed deer and the buffalo. The moose and the caribou disappeared a little later – i.e. by the beginning of the twentieth century.

But the Puritan settlers welcomed all this and rejoiced when the shrieks of the wild panther were replaced by the sound of Sunday church hymns and the busy hums of machines.

24.9 TURNING FORESTS INTO CULTIVABLE LAND – THE CASE OF NORTHERN INDIA

Most colonial states derived a large amount of their revenue from agriculture. Hence it was in the State's interests to expand the area of cultivation. For this it was necessary to clear forestlands. In British India an 1894 document, which codified Governmental land use policy, clearly stated that there should be no hesitation in sacrificing forests where the demand for arable land could only be fulfilled in this way. Ironically, at the same time, Wilhelm Schlich, who was the Head of the Indian Forest Department, was waxing eloquent on how forests reduced the temperature of air and soil, regulated climate, increased rainfall, helped reduce violent floods and prevented occurrence of land slips, avalanches and siltation of rivers. He went on to add – all this in his *Manual of Forestry* — that forests also assisted in the production of oxygen and ozone and thus helped to improve the health of the country.

Let us get back to story of the Ganga Jamuna Doab. This region, in present day Uttar Pradesh, is the area lying between the Ganga and the Yamuna rivers. From the foothills of the Himalayas the two rivers flow parallel to each other for about 500 kms, separated by 80-120 kms of land. As they move eastwards the two rivers run closer to each other until they finally merge at Allahabad. The Doab region was one of the most fertile regions of Northern India

The English East India Company acquired control over this region in 1801 and what followed thereafter was a series of blows to the sensitive ecological system of the Doab. There was a thick forest belt between Bulandshahr and Kanpur, incorporating the districts of Aligarh, Etah, Mainpuri and Kanpur, at the beginning of the 19th century. The predominant tree species of this region was the *dhak – butea monosperma,* — more popularly known as the Flame of the Forest. Since the soil here was rather saline, the only vegetation that could survive and thrive was the dhak tree. But the new conquerors decided to bring these areas under cash crop cultivation – indigo, cotton and sugarcane. Besides the revenue incentive for bringing the land under the plough, an additional argument advanced was that the clearing of the forests would help to control crime. In this part of northern India there were several bands of dacoits who were believed to be seeking refuge in these jungles. By the 1840s, a substantial portion of the *dhak* jungle had disappeared and by the 1880s there were hardly any trees left outside the properties of the large landlord.

What happened to this region when these forests were cut down? Climatic changes began to occur. By the 1840s there was a visible rise in temperature and the intensity of the loo or hot wind that blew in the summers increased. It loosened the surface of the now unprotected soil which was then washed away in the monsoon rains. The subsoil lost its water retaining capacity and ponds and lakes began to dry up. All this led to the severe drought of 1837-38, which came as the climax of a succession of dry years. The number of cases of malaria increased dramatically due to the stagnant water in dried out riverbeds and lakes.

With the disappearance of the *dhak* tree, the soil also became more saline and in due course of time, the fields became less and less productive. By the 1820s, this process had gone so far that entire villages had to be abandoned. Moreover, due to intensive cultivation, which left little time for fallow periods, the productive capacity of the soil was also greatly reduced.

The Doab story, thus, is one of causing ecological damage to fulfil the needs of development. But very soon, development was itself the victim of this assault on nature and agricultural productivity, which far from being increased, was actually reduced. As a result the whole policy for this region had to be reviewed.

24.10 THE COMING OF THE RAILWAYS

The modern world is generally associated with faster and more efficient means of transport like steam navigation and the railways. From the 1840s an ever-expanding network of railway lines began to criss-cross the European continent and shortly thereafter spread to those parts of Asia, Africa and Latin America, which were in the hands of the imperialist powers. In India it has been estimated that the total length of rail track increased from about 5,000 kilometers in 1870 to 20,000 kilometers in 1890 and thereafter, in every decade, about 10,000 kilometers of rail track were being laid. Railways were an extremely effective means of maintaining administrative control over far-flung and hitherto inaccessible areas. They also helped to transport raw materials and finished products from the rural hinterlands to the ports with greater ease.

The sight of a steam engine hurtling down the countryside was awe-inspiring and magnificent. It came to be associated with the might of empire and technological advancement. But what implications did the coming of the railways have for the natural environment? Railway tracks are usually laid on beams of wood, which are called sleepers. In recent times metal sleepers have replaced wooden sleepers but throughout the nineteenth century, when the railway network was expanding rapidly, wooden sleepers were in use. It is estimated that each mile of newly laid track required 1760 sleepers. The *sal* and *deodar* trees of northern India and the teak of southern India were found to provide ideal wood for the sleepers since they were strong enough and resistant to termites and fungal decay. An average tree could provide between five to ten sleepers. This meant that thousands of trees would be cut down for railway construction and sometimes whole forests would be devastated. In some cases more trees would be cut than could be easily transported out of the forest by unscrupulous contractors. These would be left to rot in the forests and contribute to forest fires and further destruction.

In the early years of railway construction forests were ransacked indiscriminately. But very soon the colonial state realized that such methods would be disastrous in the long run and so it began enacting legislation which would enable them to manage forests in such a way that they were assured of long-term supplies of wood. Forests began to be reserved but this meant that even people who had been using the forests for centuries for firewood, fodder, honey, fruits, roots and numerous other produces, were now prohibited from entering these forests.

24.11 THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN ECOLOGICAL AWARENESS

Man knew the disadvantages and hazards of overexploiting nature from early times. In Ancient Greece, where large areas of countryside were turned into a barren waste during the Peloponnesian War (431-421 BC), Theophrastus of Erasia, who was Aristotle's biographer and botanical gardener, developed a theory in which he linked deforestation with the decline of rainfall in Greece. Coming to more recent times, in Germany, there was a shortage of wood after the Seven Years War of 1756-63. The government of the time realized that the woodlands would have to be preserved and hence decided to exercise state control over the forests. But here there was a twist to the tale. The forest was now to serve the needs of the national economy – especially its industrial needs. The larger, national interest was projected as being more important than local, regional needs. In the process the idea developed that forests had to be preserved from man, i.e., there was an attempt to restrict the rights of traditional forest users. This caused resentment among the local people and there were many protests over access to forest resources. Thus, just as traditional artisans were protesting against the displacement caused by industrialization, so too the forest dwellers felt threatened by the new forest laws and state takeover of forests in the countries of Europe and later other parts of the world. This tussle continues even today.

State takeover of forests and the harnessing of forest resources for industrial development had its effect on the nature of the forest. Often, mixed forests had to give way to monoculture stands of species like pines, which were more suitable for construction and industrial needs. Not only were the requirements of the local inhabitants overlooked but the very health of the forest was compromised in the process. The natural biodiversity that existed until then was destroyed.

Thus we can say that though the importance of the forest was realized it was still regarded as an exploitable resource, to be modified and distorted to serve the interests of the "nation". Who constituted the "nation"? The powerful classes that were emerging and consolidating themselves at this time. The less powerful, traditional groups were being steadily marginalized by the industrial development of the period.

But these other groups did not remain silent, as Ramchandra Guha tells us in his book *Environmentalism: A Global History.* In the United Kingdom a large number of public associations emerged in the latter half of the nineteenth century. The Scottish Rights of Way Society, formed in 1843, intended to protect walking areas around the city of Edinburgh. The Commons Preservation Society, begun in 1865, wanted to prevent the encroachment of cities on woodland and heath. For the protection of rare birds, beautiful plants and threatened landscapes, there was the Selbourne League, formed in 1885 and named after Gilbert White of Selbourne, a famous eighteenth century naturalist. There was also the Coal Smoke Abatement Society, started in 1898 as an independent pressure group to make the government enforce pollution control laws on erring factories. Largely because of all these efforts, Guha tells us, it has been possible to save "at least some parts of England from the contaminating effects of urban-industrial civilization." But the colonial state in India was not fettered by such pressure groups and attempts at conservation could only emerge from within the state apparatus itself.

This is not to say that Indians did not realize the ill effects of industrialization. Even though the Industrial Revolution had largely left India untouched in the colonial period, and there were nationalists who saw industrial development as the need of the hour, Mahatma Gandhi was opposed to such a path of development. In his *Hind Swaraj,* published in 1909, he saw industrialization as being destructive of nature. Some twenty years later he wrote:

> God forbid that India should ever take to industrialization after the manner of the West. The economic imperialism of a single tiny island kingdom is today keeping the world in chains. If an entire nation of 300 million took to similar economic exploitation, it would strip the world bare like locusts.

Some of his followers like Mira Ben and Sarla Behn were very active in the environment protection campaign. Mira Ben's Pashulok Ashram, situated between Hardwar and Rishikesh, was witness to some of the most devastating floods from the upper reaches of the Ganga which not only swept away bushes and trees but also cattle and human beings along with their dwellings. She realized that this fury of nature had its origin in the wanton destruction of forests in the mountains. She also realized that the solution to the problem lay not in the planting of trees like the pine, but in more ecologically appropriate trees like the oak. The Himalayas had also become ecologically unstable because of the replacement of mixed forests by monoculture. As more and more women and men came to be influenced by her ideas as well as those of Sarla Behn, who had set up an ashram for educating hill women in Kausani, Almora district, the powerful Chipko movement took root.

24.12 SUMMARY

The dilemma of whether to preserve the environment or exploit it for development, which revealed itself in a strikingly sharp manner in the nineteenth century, continues to be an important issue for policy makers and the people even today. The Industrial Revolution and the growth of empire changed the face of nature irrevocably in almost all parts of the world and we are now left with its lasting impact. But with the growth of democratic institutions, public awareness and political accountability, it is no longer possible for governments to ignore the voices of protest that are emerging from various quarters. But often it is a bitter tussle. The controversial Sardar Sarovar Dam and the Narmada Bachao Andolan illustrates this clearly. Which is more important? The benefits that this ambitious project will bring to some parts of the country or the ecological damage and the displacement of large numbers of people living in the areas which will be submerged?

24.13 EXERCISES

1) Briefly discuss the linkage between the process of industrialization and ecological damage.
2) How did European colonization lead to the environmental losses?
3) Explain the growing awareness towards ecological issues giving specific instances.

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UNIT 25 CONSUMERISM

Structure

25.1 Introduction

25.2 The Character of Commercialization and "Consumption" under Industrial Capitalism

25.2.1 Early Days

25.2.2 The Late 19th Century and After

25.3 Representations of "Consumption"

25.4 Material Culture

25.5 The Rise of the Consumer Movement and Material Politics

25.6 Summary

25.7 Exercises

25.1 INTRODUCTION

In modern times, the term "consumerism" has been associated with a preoccupation with the acquisition of goods and commodities. Traditionally, it has been used with negative connotations – as a "problem" that indicates a lack of discretion among "buyers" and "consumers" regarding what goods to buy and why to buy them in an increasingly commercialized environment. Among Marxist thinkers especially, what happened has been linked to exploitation under industrial capitalism.

"Consumerism" has been associated with the growth of industrial capitalism in Europe from the 18th century and its global spread thereafter – a development that was accompanied by economies of scale and increases in production and productivity. Improvements in technology and extensive use of the division of labour enabled manufacturers to produce on a large scale for "wants", "needs" and "fashions". Commercialization of leisure and the penetration by innovative manufacturers, of religious practices, public health, and education reinforced the habits of acquisition and increasing "consumption". In European society, in these circumstances, availability of goods ceased to be a substantial problem. Rather, more important were means to ensure that they were in demand and "consumed". If this was not achieved, "gluts" and economic depressions would take place, affecting employer and employee alike.

On the other hand, the regular use of commercial methods to make goods desirable, some argued, encouraged an obsession with purchase and consumption – often distorting habits of discretion and a sense of proportion. The consequence would be "consumerism" (i.e. defined as the near-compulsive concern with consumption) – which might be economically profitable, but would lead to distorted social perspectives. The manufacturer's concern with mass consumption, it was argued, led to a decline in interest in quality, ensuring that "consumerism" bred so-called "mass culture" (i.e. culture that catered to the lowest common denominator in society) as a common social reference point. "Consumerism" as defined above could also lead to poor management of household budgets and impoverishment.

Such a perspective encouraged a critical approach on the character of consumption under industrial capitalism – and the attempt to avoid indiscriminate consumption under

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socialist industrialization. The critical vision stirred a concern with the rights of the consumer. And this in turn made questions of consumption a matter for politics – as it was anyway at another level, given that in societies where needs and wants were continuously the object of discussion and representation, public figures were concerned about the symbolism that advertisers and manufacturers toyed with and what goods they projected. Consumption came, consequently, to be associated with citizenship, since it was connected with social status and politics.

Duly, the critique of consumerism has been met with perspectives that sharply differ with it – perspectives that argue the benefits of variety in the market for the consumer and the necessity of regular consumption for economic and social stability. The popularity of the critique has consequently varied considerably.

Most recently, writing on consumption, "material culture" (the attitude of consumers, producers and society in general to the world of manufactured "things") and "material politics" has firmly established that whatever the value of the critical appraisal of consumerism, manufacturers' practice and consumer experience cannot be easily straitjacketed. This is all the more true in regions of the world where consumer societies of a sort have existed in the past (India, China, Africa) and which came to industrial capitalism late and in unusual circumstances.

25.2 THE CHARACTER OF COMMERCIALIZATION AND "CONSUMPTION" UNDER INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM

This Unit deals with two major aspects of the problems presented by consumption and the various definitions of "consumerism" in modern Europe. Firstly, what were the major features of the context in which these problems came to be posed? Secondly, how have these problems been treated at different times?

25.2.1 Early Days

Production and consumption of a variety of goods of everyday use was well established in Europe and other consumer societies in Asia and Africa by the mid 18th century. In addition, in Europe, a variety of exotic goods – often brought from China (mainly porcelain) and India (spices, and cotton goods) — were luxury products in high demand among the aristocracy.

Various historians have indicated that during the 18th and 19th centuries, manufacturers, endowed with sophisticated industrial technology, used the great renown of luxury goods among classes outside the aristocracy, and rushed to meet local demand with large scale production of goods on the foreign pattern that were produced locally. Such devices, together with close attention to machine production of basic metal goods (buttons, cutlery etc.) appealed to middle classes and stimulated their inclination to buy.

Industrial Capitalism brought significant changes in consumption for the "revolution" in economic life in Europe during the 18th and 19th centuries but economic changes varied substantially from country to country. If "home demand" was important in the way textiles, and iron and steel played the role of "leading sectors" in the Industrial Revolution in Britain, low levels of income and social differences made "demand" less important as a motor of change in France, Germany and Russia. Here, concentrations of capital (in investment banks) and the initiatives of the state played a major role in what transpired, with the state often acting as the prime consumer (as in the case of Tsarist and Soviet Russia). However, once initial changes had occurred in the character of the regional economy, exploitation of "demand" and "consumption" in everyday life became essential to the further development of European societies.

The process came slowly, and in fits and starts. In Britain, from the mid 18th century, as indicated by the instances of Manchester textile manufacturers, in the enterprises of Matthew Boulton (associated with metal goods) and Josiah Wedgewood (associated with the pottery manufacture) sustained and careful surveys of markets were normal and production for them by small manufactories working on strict principles of the division of labour, was the rule. Hence, one description of the Boulton business would stress regular travel by its owners to establish the contours of the market. And it would also stress various initiatives taken to establish the reputation of the firm's products:

> Scarcely a day passed but Boulton received letters of introduction of merchants and gentlemen from every quarter and as their house was only emerging from obscurity, Boulton was desirous of promoting its reputation with all in his power and therefore paid a particular attention to all their customers both foreign or domestick and to all their connections whatsoever in so much that his house at Soho for many years seemed like an inn for the entertainment of strangers.

The description would present further details of how Boulton invited powerful members of the European courts to his manufactory (the Duke and Duchess of Villaformosa, Count Orlov, Catherine the Great's favourite, Prince Poniatowski of Poland etc.). Well aware that such notables would be emulated by the gentry and middle classes of their societies, the Boultons attempted to present their goods to various markets through this route to establish a taste for such products.

Elsewhere in Britain, in order to extend the range of such products, crafts were fitted into a putting out system that gave the trader or merchant preference – allowing them to understand patterns of demand and taking initiatives to use prevailing patterns of consumption to greatest effect.

Meanwhile, in almost all major states of modern Europe, the period upto1870s was dominated by small-scale producers who gradually moved away from a position as craftsmen dealing in quality goods. In France and Germany, following the economic expansion of the 1850s and 1860s, craftsmen targeted a large market. As Shulamit Volkov has pointed out, carpenters restricted their range of products, in order to produce more that had a regular demand. The same came to be true of shoemakers. Technology was applied to achieve economies of scale. Only in food processing was this transformation not to be noticed until the 1890s – when refrigeration gradually came to permit the same in this quarter.

The increased output (often according to a set pattern) was presented to the buyer through a range of routes. In Britain, potential consumers were targeted by manufacturers, but they were normally approached by the itinerant trader, who provided the less well endowed buyer with credit (payment was made on an "instalment plan"). These drapers worked together in societies and associations in order to protect their interests against defaulters: the Highland Society of London (formed 1778), and English Guardian societies such as the London Society of Guardians for the Protection of trade against Swindlers and Sharpers (formed in 1776).

Among labouring classes, minimum levels of consumption were ensured by associative action among certain trades to ensure that sickness and unemployment could be tided over. This was especially so among various unions and societies — the Boilermakers, the Amalgamated Engineers and the London Compositors for instance. Among these and others, Friendly Collecting Societies existed, as did Industrial Assurance Companies. All of them were protected by law and took subscriptions to provide assistance to their members in times of distress. The big unions (e.g. Amalgamated Engineers) provided pensions to members by the beginning of the 20th century. Such institutions and initiatives clearly improved the spending capacity of the working class, while, elsewhere at this level, the usual run of Christmas Clubs, Goose Clubs etc. encouraged saving for the great extravagance on a special occasion. Building Societies and Freehold Societies enabled the household with the small income to plan the purchase of land or a home.

The mid 19th century in France and Germany also witnessed the "democratization" of demand on the British pattern. This followed from the high agricultural prices of the time and the overall increase in employment. In Germany, the trend persisted well after 1871, sponsored by the high levels of public and municipal activity paid for by French reparations after the war of 1870. Craft enterprises became focused and streamlined to take advantage of this phenomenon.

The change in employment and settlement patterns already indicated in the Units on demographic trends and industrial capitalism made the distribution of consumer goods easier. The concentration of populations in cities and small towns (in the Midlands and North of England, the Paris Basin in France, and the Rhine country in Germany) provided more ready and regular demand for manufactured goods than dispersed communities of the countryside.

25.2.2 The Late 19th Century and After

The late nineteenth century saw the persistence of many of these institutions and habits. In Britain, for instance, itinerant traders continued to be of importance well into the 20th century. Known numbers increased from 9459 in 1831 to 69, 347 in 1911. From the 1850s, however, three major changes are noticeable in this pattern. Firstly, consumption was not strictly the preserve of firms and individuals. Local government and the state also became regular consumers. This developed an old habit – purchase for the administrative and military establishment. Municipal construction and the development of amenities (gas distribution, parks and gardens, bridges, institutions to provide medical treatment and education) became significantly marked.

Equally, though, capacities for individual consumption received a boost. Initiatives were taken to provide opportunities to subjects/citizens for savings, and important variations were noticeable in trading practice to tempt the consumer with small income. In Britain, savings schemes included the Post Office Trustee Savings Banks, with their "Home Safes", and a range of other Savings Banks. By the time of the inter-war period, mortgage banks (such as the Abbey Road) had also made their mark.

At another level, the urban environment became the target of a new system of trading and distribution – through the "department store". The best example of this was Fortnum and Mason's of London and the Bon Marche in Paris. These department stores, in some cases, began to form branches in various towns, and "chains" of stores emerged in the commercial network. The shops run by Jesse Boot that dealt in pharmaceutical products were an example in Britain. This "chain" began in the pre-1914 period and persists to the present day. Woolworth is another such chain which exists in the US and Britain. In post-1945 France, the Monoprix and Uniprix chains are the equivalent. The significance of these shops was that they displayed a large range of goods (while the standard store specialized in two or three major types of goods) – encouraging a general redefinition of needs and wants among those who passed through them. The store also paid attention to attractive presentation. This had already been achieved through advertisement and discussions in newspapers and through the small billboard. But the large space given over to specific ranges of products in department stores increased the impact of the profile. Association of quality with the name of the store also drew in customers who were also otherwise bewildered by the variety of the market and the problem of shoddy produce.

The desire of the state to take advantage of the interest in consumer products for its own purposes also led to investments in specific goods in France under the Third Republic and Germany under National Socialism. From the 1920s, the radio and, from the 1950s, the television both added a new dimension to such activities and to the advertising of products.

25.3 REPRESENTATIONS OF "CONSUMPTION"

The availability of a vast number of goods and commodities in the market place was often celebrated. Manufacturers not only pointed to the merits of their products, but also to the remarkable system of production that went into those products – a system of production that not only made them fashionable but miracles of modern science. Boultons and Wedgewoods consistently laboured this aspect of their output.

Other views of consumption developed from perspectives associated with the idea – widespread among intellectuals at this time – that industrial capitalism broke down "communities", and created individuals who faced the world alone, or as members of "society". In such "society", individuals were more open to the suggestions of the market than was the case when they were members of "communities" where they followed "traditions" and "rituals", and where individuals were less self-conscious. Large or medium-sized towns saw the breakdown of communities and the creation of a world of individuals whom the market manipulated to think of needs and wants that they had hitherto never conceived. Advertisement by producers and traders were designed to tempt individuals into a preoccupation with buying and consumption.

Some of this may have been admitted by many who approved of the changes of the time, but they did not see it with foreboding or worry. In the early days of industrial capitalism, optimistic as ever, Adam Smith argued:

> "Consumption is the sole end and purpose of all production and the interest of the producer ought to be attended to only so far as may be necessary for that of the consumer".

He also noted, though, as David Miller has pointed out, that 'the human propensity to consume was the consequence of a fascination for "baubles and trinkets", a passion for accumulating objects of "frivolous utility" and "a vehicle for deception with false promises that wealth will bring happiness". Smith called for caution and discretion:

> "Money will at best "keep off the summer shower", "but not the winter storm", leaving humans more exposed than before to anxiety, fear and sorrow, disease, danger and death".

The new atmosphere of acquisition and consumption attracted disapproval and warnings elsewhere. In the 18th century itself, condemnation of exotic luxury items was often evident. Adam Anderson, in his *Historical and Chronological Deduction of the Origin of Commerce,* in the 1760s, decried goods that were not clearly "useful and excellent for the Ease, Conveniency or Elegance of Life". Luxury, consumption and acquisitiveness were condemned by Wesleyans, Quakers and other Non-Conformist Protestants in England, who considered such behaviour sinful. Critics associated with the Romantic Movement – including major figures such as William Ruskin – argued that the obsession with the market worked against what was "natural". The German poet Schiller expressed similar sentiments when he called for the recognition by man of what was ideal in him rather than be diverted by the superficial demands and standards of society. Early socialists of the 19th century expressed similar sentiments: in France (Prudhon and Fourier) and in Britain figures such as William Morris, who stressed the virtues of individual creativity and expression, and made craft industry a fashion, repudiated the virtues of machine-made goods.

More fundamentally, Karl Marx, making the distinction between "use value" and "market value", argued that consumption merely refined the process of exploitation through which manufacturers extracted surplus from the working class. Looking closely at the world of acquisition and consumption in Europe and the United States, Thorstein Veblen, the American essayist, spoke of the appearance of a wealthy leisured class that indulged in conspicuous consumption, and also of an acquisitive society where consumption was not moulded by requirements but by somewhat witless emulation and imitation. Veblen disapprovingly argued that consumption was the product of the wish to impress and to improve social status.

Many came to argue at the end of the twentieth century that rampant consumption motivated by such inclinations rather than discretion, bred a respect for goods and occupations that smacked of a lack of serious thought and refinement. This was the hallmark of what was called "mass culture", which was considered (by figures as different in their opinions as Adorno, one of the principal philosophers of Frankfurt School and F.R. Leavis an important English literary critic) to have had a disastrous impact on society.

On the other hand, following Smith's more optimistic assessments of consumption and its character in the 19th century, followers of the "marginal utility" school of economic thought were worried that people would not consume enough to ensure economic and social stability. This was a notion that was echoed in the work of J.M. Keynes in the period between 1918 and 1939. Commentators such as Simmel argued that fashion was not, contrary to Veblen, merely the consequence of the desire to establish status as much as a means of establishing one's own identity in a world in which individuals did not wish to wholly set themselves apart from others. In his somewhat difficult language, he would term it as a phenomenon that:

> "represents nothing more than one of the many forms of life by the aid of which we seek to combine in uniform spheres of activity the tendency towards social equalization with the desire for individual differentiation and change".

Most recently, French philosopher Jean Baudrillard has taken issue with the perspectives of Marxists and others who have stressed the distinctions between "use value" and the value created by the market – stating that "use" is seldom free of a market culture of sorts. They also have pointed to how consumers often deal independently and as groups with the products that are recommended to them – transforming them, and finding a value for them that is wholly outside the value that advertisement suggests. Baudrillard still warns though, of problems, given the way commerce has come to surround the consumer through media blitz and social manipulation. As David Miller has pointed out, he is better known today:

> 'for his argument that the massive spread of consumer goods as acts of symbolism has reached such a level that where goods once stood for persons and relationships, they now come to replace them. Such is the power of commerce to produce social maps based on distinctions between goods that actual consumers are now relegated to the role of merely fitting themselves into such maps by buying the appropriate signs of their 'lifestyles'.

25.4 MATERIAL CULTURE

Whatever the merits of these points of view, in recent comment and research, a number of writers concerned with "material culture", "material politics" and "consumption" have pointed out that the experience of consumer society in modern times has been varied and cannot easily be straitjacketed into the framework of the opinions covered by these debates. The approach of producers and buyers to manufactured items took on different shapes over time.

True, the subjection of crafts to the putting out system placed the focus of the production system squarely on the trader who had an interest in the product primarily from the point of view of salebility. Hence what was considered exotic or unusual (as in the case of Chinese/Indian imports) decisively influenced patterns of production. Meanwhile, inventive producers – St. Gobain the glass makers, Boultons, the metal workers, and Wedgewoods of the ceramics' industry – followed the market also, but they also tried to create a demand for specific products that they understood they could make.

The critics of the consumption that was bred under the circumstances point out that buyers were influenced by the utility of goods, but also by the status they conferred. In the 20th century, advertisement made the associations of a product still more important than before. And what transpired became a problem of some size and scale. Consumers came to be faced with a bewildering choice of goods not only when it came to everyday needs and requirements but also when they dealt with occasions such as birth, marriage and death (christening robes, bridal wear, coffins) and the way they took their leisure (sportsgear, theatre equipment etc.)

But the authority of the manufacturer/trader should not be overstressed. As the strength of itinerant trades in Britain and France indicate, persuasion that took into account personal taste still continued to be very important. Studies of 18th century France at the time of the Ancien Regime and the Revolution also indicate the impediments consumers encountered, as politics often sought to direct and regulate the presence of manufactured items.

25.5 THE RISE OF THE CONSUMER MOVEMENT AND MATERIAL POLITICS

In fact, those who were worried about the way manufacturers and the market could draw the consumer into a net that ensnared him in different ways – both making him buy goods he did not really "want" and also providing him with shoddy goods – quickly sought to set up bodies that would prevent this. In the 19th century itself, in France, shoddy goods led to recourse to law, and also to judgments that were hostile to manufacturers. In Britain, the period from the mid-19th century witnessed a rash of legislation to prevent deception of the buyer: the Sale of Food and Drugs Act (1875), the Sale of Goods Act (1893), a series of Weights and Measures Acts (1878-1936), and, dealing with purchase on the basis of part payment, the Hire and Purchase Act (1938).

Movements at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries to protect consumers have been identified with various personalities: Percy Redfern and Beatrice Webb in Britain, Charles Gide and Jean Prudhommeaux in France, Louis de Brouchere in Belgium. And Percy Redfern's sense of things is common to most of these activists in one way or another:

> "We the mass of common men and women in all countries also compose the world's market. To sell to us is the ultimate aim of the world's business. Hence, it is ourselves as consumers who stand in central relation to all the economics of the world, like a king in his kingdom. As producers, we go each unto a particular factory, farm or mine, but as consumers we are set by nature then to give leadership, aim and purpose to the whole economic world. That we are not kings but serfs in the mass is due to our failure to think and act together as consumers and realize our true position and power."

The work of these activists and their latter-day followers, coping with the aid of TV, has led to a fresh wave of consumer-protection legislation in Britain. This followed the formation of the Molony Committee on Consumer Protection in 1962, which led in 1963 to the formation of the Consumer Council. The legislation that followed intensified consumer protection in the market place: the Trades Description Act (1968), the Fair Trading Act (1973), the Restrictive Trades Practices Act (1977) and the Consumer Safety Act (1978). Similar activities and legislation has figured in France and Germany around groups that came together around the Council of Consumer Groups (Germany) and the National Consumption Institute (France).

25.6 SUMMARY

As Elizabeth Cohen has pointed out, the moves to strengthen the consumer's status, however far it has developed, still remains, though, a matter of shopping and controls on it in Modern Europe and the United States. The grand vision that inspired Redfern – that the consumer should be given a dignity in social awareness is in all likelihood still an ideal that few are concerned with. Given the differing approaches to consumption over time, and changes in the way the production system operates, it is probably also uncertain that anything can be done for the consumer on these lines. Contributing to this is the lack of self-awareness among consumers as consumers primarily.

As the spread of industrial capitalism in the world indicates, moreover, patterns of consumption vary widely from society to society. Before the onset of industrial capitalism, consumption in India and China, for instance, had followed specific patterns associated with gift and exchange unlike the patterns followed in Europe. Even if modern times create a uniform pattern of consumption at certain level the world over, the specific pattern is often moulded by the existing paths that have been followed. Habits of emulation and imitation also vary.

In the circumstances, the fears that were often expressed of the consequences of consumerism may be valid at some levels, but they are far from applicable as a rule.

Not only in Modern Europe, but also in the Modern World, the story of consumption has been too different to justify a single perspective.

25.7 EXERCISES

1) Discuss the meaning of consumerism.
2) How did industrial capitalism lead to the coming of modernization of 'Consumerism'?
3) Critiques of consumerism have also led to consumer rights movement. What are its different aspects?

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UNIT 26 GLOBALIZATION

Structure

26.1 Introduction

26.2 Understanding Globalization

26.3 Political Perspective

26.4 Economic Perspective

26.5 Cultural Perspective

26.6 Summary

26.7 Exercises

26.1 INTRODUCTION

Globalization is not completely a new phenomenon in world history. The concept is used to explain interdependence of the world's economies, cultures following cross-border trade in goods and services, technology and movements of people from one country to other countries. It implies a process of increasing interconnectedness between societies. Industrialization and technological revolution have brought in new relationships between countries and changed substantially political, economic and cultural space globally. The old power-politics have given way to a new genre of international relations and the very identity of the state as powerful actor is very much questionable as a result of globalization. The world economy is more interdependent than ever. With the revolution in electronics communication we are now living in a world where developments in any part of the world are felt in other parts immediately. Much of the urban world is sharing common culture. In a way globalization has brought the countries closer to each other. Globalization has been defined by the Committee for Development Policy (a subsidiary body of the United Nations) in the following way:

> "… the increasing interdependence of world economies as a result of the growing scale of cross-border trade of commodities and services, the flow of international capital and the wide and rapid spread of technologies. It reflects the continuing expansion and mutual integration of market frontiers."

The term globalization has got new impetus since 1980s reflecting changes in economic interdependence and technological advances which have significant impact on polity and culture of various countries. In this Unit, we will first explain the meaning and scope of globalization and how different scholars have interpreted the phenomenon of globalization. Then we will discuss political, economic and cultural aspects of globalization. Hope this will help you to learn that how globalization as a phenomenon since 1980s has influenced world history.

26.2 UNDERSTANDING GLOBALIZATION

Globalization is explained as process of interdependence of nations following the end of the Cold War and the emergence of the new economic order. This process is facilitated by an international policy of openness, mutual cooperation and free trade agreements. It is a fundamental mistake to see globalization only in economic terms, it has important political and social implications also. Globalization has given important space to various multinational organizations who have gained greater power in deciding various policies compared to sovereign governments. In the domain of culture global media networks, social media, internet and other communication tools have brought changes in cultural traditions. We may refer here the definition of globalization given by Anthony Giddens, well known sociologist. In his paper "The Consequences of Modernity", he used the following definition: "the globalization can be defined as the intensification of social relations throughout the world, linking distant localities in such a way that local happenings are formed as a result of events that occur many miles away and vice versa. (Giddens, Anthony, (1991) **The Consequences of Modernity** p. 64.). We would like to discuss here that how globalization needs to be seen in broader historical perspective and not simply as the outcome of the Western supremacy.

Many scholars are of the view that globalization is not a phenomenon that emerged since 1980s. Rather it is seen as a process that can be traced from the beginning of civilization. It is linked with the maritime exploration and adventures, slave trade, colonization, exchange of labour and capital inputs followed by industrialization and technological revolution. Since ancient times humans moved to settle in different places and trading activity was very much part of human civilization and progress. Following centuries of European colonization and trade activity there was increasing economic cooperation among countries. Industrialization in European countries since the beginning of mid 18th century followed by agricultural and technological revolution greatly contributed to increasing economic cooperation among countries all over the world. The catastrophe of World War I, post war protectionism, the Great Depression and World War II affected the globalization progress. Later on the efforts made by the United States to revive international trade, role played by non-governmental organization advocating for economic cooperation and free trade brought momentum in globalization. Since 1980s globalization trend had picked up, technological revolution and the collapse of the Soviet Union further influenced liberal economic regime. Advocates of globalization argue that "Markets promotes efficiency through competition and the division of labour-the specialization that allows people and economies to focus on what they do best. Global markets offer greater opportunity for people to tap into more and larger markets around the world. It means that they can have access to more capital flows, technology, cheaper imports, and larger export markets. But markets do not necessarily ensure that the benefits of increased efficiency are shared by all." (**Source:** www.imf.org). Beyond economics there are broader political and cultural dimensions of globalization. Globalization needs to be understood from various perspectives.

In the context of understanding globalization it is important to refer here the views of Amartya Sen, eminent economist, who wrote 'How to Judge Globalism'. Sen does not agree with the view that globalization is a gift from the West to the world civilization. Looking from a broader historical perspective he argues that globalization has historical roots and people all over the world were connected through trade, migration and exchange of ideas. He writes,

"Over thousands of years, globalization has contributed to the progress of the world through travel, trade, migration, spread of cultural influences, and dissemination of knowledge and understanding (including that of science and technology). These global interrelations have often been very productive in the advancement of different countries. They have not necessarily taken the form of increased Western influence. Indeed, the active agents of globalization have often been located far from the West. To illustrate, consider the world at the beginning of the last millennium rather than at its end. Around 1000 ad, global reach of science, technology, and mathematics was changing the nature of the old world, but the dissemination then was, to a great extent, in the opposite direction of what we see today. The high technology in the world of 1000 ad included paper, the printing press, the crossbow, gunpowder, the iron-chain suspension bridge, the kite, the magnetic compass, the wheelbarrow, and the rotary fan. A millennium ago, these items were used extensively in China – and were practically unknown elsewhere. Globalization spread them across the world, including Europe. A similar movement occurred in the Eastern influence on Western mathematics. The decimal system emerged and became well developed in India between the second and sixth centuries; it was used by Arab mathematicians soon thereafter. These mathematical innovations reached Europe mainly in the last quarter of the tenth century and began having an impact in the early years of the last millennium, playing an important part in the scientific revolution that helped to transform Europe. The agents of globalization are neither European nor exclusively Western, nor are they necessarily linked to Western dominance. Indeed, Europe would have been a lot poorer – economically, culturally, and scientifically – had it resisted the globalization of mathematics, science, and technology at that time. And today, the same principle applies, though in the reverse direction (from West to East). To reject the globalization of science and technology because it represents Western influence and imperialism would not only amount to overlooking global contributions – drawn from many different parts of the world – that lie solidly behind so-called Western science and technology, but would also be quite a daft practical decision, given the extent to which the whole world can benefit from the process...To see globalization as merely Western imperialism of ideas and beliefs (as the rhetoric often suggests) would be a serious and costly error, in the same way that any European resistance to Eastern influence would have been at the beginning of the last millennium." (Amartya Sen, 'How to Judge Globalism' in **The Globalization Reader,** Fifth Edition, Edited by Frank J. Lechner and John Boli, 2015, pp. 19-21).

The point that emerges from Amartya Sen's argument is that globalization should not be seen as contemporary phenomenon. Trade, exchange of ideas and cultural contact was very much part of progress of human civilization. Globalization should not be seen as an extension of Western imperialism or dominance of Western ideas. In the past scientific and technological ideas from China, India and the Arab world very much contributed to the development of western scientific knowledge. Mutual appreciation of each other's ideas was the spirit behind the progress of the world civilization. Global economy and global exchange of knowledge have benefitted many nations. However, the question of gains and losses from globalization is debatable. Globalization has entered new phase since 1980s which we would look into this Unit.

Frank J. Lechner and John Boli in introduction to their edited volume on Globalization have given two definitions to globalization. First one is, "globalization is the set of processes by which more people become connected in more and different ways across ever-greater distances." This is termed as a generic definition and the more specific second definition "identifies globalization with the process by which capitalism expands across the globe as powerful economic actors seek profit in global markets and impose their rules everywhere, a process often labeled "neoliberalism"". (**The Globalization Reader,** Fifth Edition Edited by Frank J. Lechner and John Boli, 2015, p.5) Globalization can simply be explained as growing exchange between countries of goods, services, capital, ideas, information and people which resulted in cross border integration of a number of economic, political and cultural activities. Understanding globalization, its complexity and consequences pose challenges and scholars are divided in their assessment of globalization. While a section of scholars believe that globalization has created wealth and strengthened democratic politics and individual rights, others argue that globalization has created a world governed by profit-seeking global organizations and by allowing the triumph of market values has reduced the power of individual states and undermined public morality. It is seen as threat to cultural integrity and exploitative undermining the interests of poorer states. Globalization is also seen as the reason for integration and polarization. One the one hand it encourages movements for protecting human rights, on the other it has also promoted racism, ethnic divisions and fundamentalism. With the end of Cold War and triumphant of capitalism globalization has become a reality for people living in all parts of the world. We may sum up our discusstion on understanding globalization by stating that it is truly a multifaceted phenomenon having implications not just on economy but on political, social and cultural life also. Globalization has made different countries dependent on each other because of trade, investment, migration and cultural exchanges. In the subsequent sections, we will discuss the impact of globalization from political, economic and cultural perspectives.

26.3 POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE

In this section, we will discuss the political implications of globalization. Many scholars are of the view that globalization undermines the autonomy of the nation-states. A state is a sovereign authority within its territorial boundary having jurisdiction over its citizens and has the exclusive right to maintain internal order and to defend its territory against aggression. A sovereign nation-state is not subjected to any outside authority in policy making and governing the state. With the rapid de-colonization and the end of the Soviet Union in early 1990s, the world today is composed mostly of sovereign nation-states. The question then comes that what are the political implications of globalization. One way of looking at political implication of globalization is that the principle of state sovereignty is a common feature of global society and the sovereign state is considered as the most accepted form of government. Sovereign states have adopted certain common principles in terms of structures, programmes, goals and operations of governance. Most of the states have adopted democratic form of government in which citizens have equal right to vote in elections to choose particular political party to govern them. Another significant outcome of political globalization is the rise of intergovernmental organizations to deal with problems faced by different states. United Nations and its associated agencies like World Health Organization, International Labour Organization, etc., the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, etc. are important international bodies having great influence in decision making of the nation-states to manage internal problems faced by the states. The existence of the great powers and power blocs has also curbed a state's authority. The existence of NATO and the Warsaw pact directly undermines independent decision making powers of states on matters related to military and foreign policy. A command structure above the states has been created for joint use of armed forces by states and individual states have little control over it. This is viewed by many scholars as curbing the authority of the nation-state following the impact of globalization. It is argued the globalization has resulted in declining state effectiveness. Thus globalization has weakened the centrality of the nation-state. The idea that globalization undermines the autonomy of the nation-states is strongly advocated by many scholars.

It is argued by a group of scholars that because of restricted power in decision making on economic and social policies as a result of globalization the nation-state has lost its independent authority. International economic policy has larger control in shaping domestic economic policies of a country at the cost of the authority of the nation-state. The World Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Trade Organization (WTO) hold more power and control over financial and trade policies under globalization than the authority of the state. The nation-states have limited powers to challenge the hegemonic power of institutions like IMF, WB, WTO, etc. Under globalization power steadily shifted to the most powerful financial institutions. Therefore, tension definitely arises between the notion of a sovereign nation-state who controls domestic affairs of the state and the existence of international bodies who can interfere in the management of a country's internal affairs. Example of European Union is given to explain this point. European Union can punish, make law, regulate and implement policy, has common currency. European states have voluntarily accepted its authority at the cost of their sovereign power. It is also said that "Political activity can also transcend national borders through global movements and NGOs. Civil society organizations act globally by forming alliances with organizations in other countries, using global communications systems, and lobbying international organizations and other actors directly, instead of working through their national governments." (Global Policy Forum, 2005) Following globalization politics is now essentially market driven. Whatever sovereignty national governments could obtain in developing countries after decolonization has drastically taken away by the supranational organizations. Neoliberalism has taken over the nation-states' models of development. Many also believe that globalization has adversely affected the notion of welfare state. Concern for inflation and budgetary deficits pushed states to cut in social welfare expenditure which resulted in undermining the principle of welfare state. Other important point is that with the coming of various international laws states can no longer treat their citizens as they wish. International laws governing crimes, environmental issues, human rights, etc. have made major inroads into state sovereignty. States are expected to adhere to basic standard of living, to respect human rights and to protect environment as per the international understanding.

Contrary to the concerns about the loss of sovereignty, there are scholars who believe that the nation-state still remains strong. The state still holds authority to take independent decisions on matters pertaining to domestic and international. The many "challenges that we confront today are beyond the reach of any state to meet on its own. At the national level we must govern better, at the international level we must learn to govern better together. Effective States are essential for both tasks, and their capacity for both needs strengthening." (UN 2000, Millennium Report) It is not curbing the power of nation-state but for new challenges at international level there is need to have certain common principles of governance for protection of common interest. Nation-states are still ensuring internal and external security, political structures within the state to ensure popular representation and providing basic framework for economic and social policies. Globalization has not reduced the role of state in managing its basic functions. The notion of a border-less world in which nation-state has no role to play is not true and nation-states are still playing effective role in addressing its social, political and economic roles. States at local level protect the general interest and enter into agreement with other states for the benefit of its citizens. Many of the problems the world facing today like poverty, environmental issues, terrorism, economic crisis, etc. are of international nature and need collaborative efforts through state to state negotiations. This makes it necessary to have multilayered system of governance. Thus the assumption that state has lost its relevance under globalization is not correct. But definitely under globalization functions and role of states have substantially changed because of the complexity involved in the process of globalization. With globalization the role of the state has been redefined and important reforms need to be introduced in the way government institutions function. Globalization does not simply mean to leave everything to market forces. State still has larger role to play to ensure people's participation at all levels of governance and to build collaboration between the state, civil society and the private sector for development. State has a major role in capacity building in terms of institutions, human resources, innovation and information technology to capitalize the opportunities of globalization. Thus one can say that globalization has curtailed certain authority of the states but the states have not lost its complete sovereign power to decide to be part of the globalization process. There are concerns to make globalization a positive force and to ensure equitable distribution of its benefits. Concern for equitable distribution of benefits of globalization is expressed in the following words in the UN Millennium Declaration.

'We recognize that developing countries and countries with economies in transition face special difficulties in responding to this central challenge. Thus, only through broad and sustained efforts to diversity, can globalization be made fully inclusive and equitable. These efforts must include policies and measures, at the global level, which correspond to the needs of developing countries and economies in transition and are formulated and implemented with their effective participation.' (United Nations (2000), United Nations Millennium Declaration)

Having gone through the two sides of argument about the relationship between globalization and nation-state we may conclude by saying that globalization has profound influence on the functioning of nation-state. With the emergence of different multinational organizations, new challenges in the form of human rights, environmental issues, violence, trade relations, etc. the functioning of nation-states has changed. International summits of bodies like the United Nations, IMF, WTO, the European Union, the Group of Seven, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Bloc, Association of South-East Asian nations, etc. deal with global, regional and multilayered system of governance which have direct influence on the functioning of the nation-states. But the nation-state has not lost its sovereign power completely. Globalization has brought both challenges and opportunities to grow. Nation-state has the choice to decide its course of action in the changed international scenario. Boundaries between domestic and global affairs have to a great extent become blurred. Although politics is no longer confined within the boundary of the nation-state but that does not mean the end of the nation-state.

26.4 ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE

When we talk of globalization first thing comes to our mind is economic globalization. To understand economic globalization we have to see how globalization has impacted trade, finance and production. Equally important is the question of distribution of economic benefits of globalization across the nations. Post Second World War economic globalization is very much on the path of visible growth. The value of world trade has grown considerably compared to the overall economy. Foreign direct investment has increased substantially and most parts of the world are now geared up towards a single world economy. Economic globalization has led to growing interdependence of world economies as a result of cross-border trade of commodities and services, flow of international capital and spread of advanced technologies. Market oriented reform in different countries is the major driving force of economic globalization. Transition from the former centralized planned economies to market economies has integrated the world economy into a whole. With the dismantling of trade barriers global market is open for many goods and services. Economic globalization is characterized by flows of goods and services cutting across state borders, foreign capital flows, reduction in tariffs and trade barriers, immigration, spread of technology and knowledge. Multinational corporations have played significant role towards economic globalization. The following observation of IMF on globalization sums up the idea behind economic globalization.

'The IMF believes that economic growth is the only way to improve living standards in developing countries, and that this is best achieved through globalization. It is doing its utmost, within the mandate given to it by its members, to safeguard the international financial system, and help its members take advantage of the opportunities offered by integration into the world economy, while minimizing the associated risks. However, it also recognizes that, while much progress has been made in making globalization work better, much work still lies ahead.' (www.imf.org).

The signatories to the agreement in 1944 Bretton Woods conference desired not to face financial crisis caused by the Great Depression of the 1930s again and to facilitate smooth functioning of the international capitalist system. Since 1945 large number of countries embraced capitalism and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990s further strengthened capitalist ideology and domination of market economy. IMF and the World Bank, created in 1944 following Bretton Woods conference, have an important role in promoting globalization. In spite of having different mandates both the institutions were tasked to promote international economic cooperation. While primary focus of IMF is to monitor international monetary system to ensure sustained economic growth, the World Bank focuses on long-term investment projects, institution building and issues related to poverty, environment, etc. After joining IMF countries become eligible to join the World Bank and near about 190 countries are members of these organizations. The other important international organization promoting international economic cooperation is the World Trade Organization (WTO), established in 1995. Before the creation of WTO there was the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which was set up in 1947 with the understanding to liberalize international trade. But by late 1980s there was felt need for a stronger multilateral organization to monitor trade and thus the WTO came in. It is the only global international organization dealing with the rules of trade between nations. Its objective is to ensure hinder less flow of global trade. 'The WTO has many roles: it operates a global system of trade rules, it acts as a forum for negotiating trade agreements, it settles trade disputes between its members and it supports the needs of developing countries.' (www.wto.org).

Taking advantage of global economy developing countries like Brazil, China, Costa Rica, the Philippines and Mexico had increased their share in world trade and succeeded in raising per capita incomes. But many countries failed to benefit from globalization, particularly sub-Saharan Africa which resulted in economic inequality and increasing incidence of poverty. IMF and World Bank have major responsibility in removing economic inequality and helping individual countries to take advantage of global economy. Ensuring flow of capital, job creation and productivity IMF has important role to sustain economic growth. Globalization has made it difficult to keep economic activity insulated from global competition. Production process can now be located in different countries. Number of Multinational Corporation has increased which led to the increasing transnational production, sell of goods and services. But with the creation of global markets national regulatory framework has not completely lost its relevance, rather nation-state tries to protect domestic trade. The global finance is equally important in globalization. Foreign direct investment and foreign exchange market have seen significant increase. This has also created more risk for countries due to uncertainty and volatility of global market. In the given financial integration through globalization adverse economic situation in any country can impact the rest of the world. This was demonstrated in the global economic crisis that badly affected the world economy since 2007. Financial crisis faced by the US in 2008 due to various factors sent shock waves to world economy as financial institutions faced severe liquidity crunch. Countries like Britain, China, France, Germany, India and many others tried to bail out banks by cutting interest rates and injecting fresh capital to capital markets in order to stimulate economy and to deal with rising unemployment. Economic integration is an integral part of globalization. This has on the one hand showed positive sign of economic development but at the same time one cannot close eyes to the vulnerability associated with economic globalization. Many scholars are of opinion that economic globalization is undemocratic and disadvantageous for developing nations, developed countries have larger role in policy making compared to developing nations. Capital liberalization has increased undue volatility and due to trade liberalization large groups of workers are at risk. At the same time it is believed that reversing the process of globalization may not remove inequality and solve the problem of poverty. Rather there is need to seriously find out ways to exploit the benefits of globalization and its potential for improving human welfare. A common political understanding among countries leadership is very much needed to maximize the benefits and minimize the risks.

26.5 CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE

With globalization and development in technology, media and communication people are now more exposed to others cultures compared to the past. Cultural globalization is caused by exchange of ideas, meanings, values, cultural products and foods across national borders. Tourism, education, social media and movements of people from one part to other part of world have influenced cultural globalization. Transnational marketing of multination brands of various products and transcending local cultural traditions people are now more accustomed to lifestyles of the place where they live in the world. In an increasingly borderless world created by globalization the preservation of cultural diversities is a major concern for many. Many scholars perceive that due to the trend of global homogenization of culture and the dominance of world culture it would be difficult to preserve distinctive traditional cultures. While others argue that globalization brings into focus cultural convergence as well as cultural differentiation. Homogenization of culture cannot wipe out cultural heterogeneity. Advanced technology, communication, social media, etc. have the potential to impact cultures of other nations but it is difficult to accept that distinct cultures of various nations will lose its value and importance. We will come to the question of erosion of traditional culture and creation of a global culture later. Let us first have idea about how globalization impacted culture.

Globalization today is reality and one of the various areas in which globalization have significant impact is culture. Culture is not rigid, rather it evolves through interaction. People living in a particular place are grown up with certain social and cultural codes and ethics that distinguish them from other cultures. Culture identifies a group of individuals and differentiates from others based on cultural practices. How individuals express their cultural identities depends much on the context of social interaction. With globalization migration of people due to various reasons has contributed towards multiculturalism. When people move they take their culture with them which is reflected in their food habits and celebration of their distinct cultural activities. Today in the age of advanced communication through electronic media and internet people are exposed to new ideas, values and cultures which they never had in the past. English language being one of the dominant languages in the world has facilitated exchange of ideas and cultures promoting cultural globalization. In the age of globalization multinational corporations are manufacturing products in different parts of the world and selling to consumers around the world. Capital, technology and raw materials are moving across national borders. With the movement of technology, products and finances, ideas and cultures are also exchanged freely at the global level. Materialistic and consumer cultures have given primacy through the mass media to the people. Consumerist ways of life and system of values have taken precedence and people are more used to common brands of various products in their daily life. Globalization in a way has encouraged unification and standardization of cultural patterns around the world. But this should not be construed as cultural imperialism and the hegemony of Western values. Globalization has exposed people to diverse cultures and values rather than forcing domination of any particular culture. There is debate among scholars on the issue that whether globalization has led to the erosion of traditional culture and strengthening of a global culture.

It is argued that globalization has an ideological foundation based on capitalist economic tradition and promotes a way of life having uniform cultural values throughout the world. Due to media, communication technologies, promotion of multinational products in life style and food habits there is a tendency towards the process of cultural homogenization. Traditional cultures practiced by different groups of people may not necessarily welcome cultural transformation but globalization definitely contributed towards acceptance of dominant cultures. People are now used to same type of entertainment programmes, have common global brand products and services which indicate the development of a global culture. Globalization produced a new identifiable class of people who represent global culture and are not confined within the boundary of local cultures. This is interpreted as indication of erosion of local cultural traditions and practices and consolidation of global cultural practices which are more influenced by Western cultural tradition. This is seen as a trend towards establishment of a homogenized world culture. However, scholars like Arjun Appadurai consider this as oversimplifying the process of cultural transformation among traditional cultures. Appadurai argues that local cultural traditions are so strong that foreign cultural practices cannot simply suppress local cultures. Local cultures are deep rooted and have the ability to resist foreign cultures. Global culture although had strong Western influence but it also borrowed from other cultural traditions. In place of homogenization globalization demonstrates heterogeneity of cultural practices. Local cultures did not remain unaffected due to global flows of cultural practices but local cultures still hold importance at the local level. There is more convergence of different cultures enriching each others rather than homogenization of the world. There is coexistence of distinct and disparate global and local cultures. Cultural differentiation is still strong despite global cultural influences. With growing exposure to different values and cultures people in general have become much more concerned about their cultural identity. They are very much fond of their cultural roots and also try to preserve them. Culture may no longer be traditional as it used to be in the past, but it is still different and plural. The sense of being a global citizen is not at all in conflict with diversity. Globalization is now an overwhelming dominant trend but it does not lead to homogenization of culture. Globalization in way facilitated more interaction with each other and helped to learn from diverse cultures. Preservation of respective cultural identity is one of the major concerns of each nation in contemporary world. Through cultural globalization the world has become more cosmopolitan accepting free exchange of ideas and values. True cosmopolitan culture demands equal respect to all cultures and sharing of a common sense of commitment about the world. Let us conclude this discussion on cultural globalization referring to the important observation made by Arjun Appadurai,

‘Thus the central feature of global culture today is the politics of the mutual effort of sameness and difference to cannibalize one another and thereby proclaim their successful hijacking of the twin Enlightenment ideas of the triumphantly universal and the resiliently particular. This mutual cannibalization shows its ugly face in riots, refugee flows, state-sponsored torture, and ethnocide (with or without state support). Its brighter side is in the expansion of many individual horizons of hope and fantasy, in the global spread of oral rehydration therapy and other low-tech instruments of well-being, in the susceptibility even of South Africa to the force of global opinion, in the inability of the Polish state to repress its own working classes, and in the growth of a wide range of progressive, transnational alliances. Examples of both sorts could be multiplied. The critical point is that both sides of the coin of global cultural process today are products of the infinitely varied mutual contest of sameness and difference on a stage characterized by radical disjunctures between different sorts of global flows and the uncertain landscapes created in and through these disjunctures.’ (Arjun Appadurai, ‘Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy’, in **The Globalization Reader,** Fifth Edition, Edited by Frank J. Lechner and John Boli, 2015, p. 103).

26.6 SUMMARY

In this Unit, we have introduced you to the understanding of globalization and its various dimensions. Global change since World War II is very striking and people have become more interdependent and developed contacts with others in different ways. Not just a world economy but a new global society has developed around us having complex relationships. People have become connected to others cutting across local or national boundaries. Diffusion of knowledge, ideas, cultures, economic and political interdependence have brought the world together. We have explained the meaning of globalization and how it has evolved historically gaining new momentum since 1980s. Impacts of globalization in political, economic and cultural fields have been discussed giving references to different interpretations. Due to various factors different countries are now interconnected, there is increasing integration of the world economy but the nation-state has not lost its sovereign authority and cultural identity. Benefits of globalization are not equally distributed and therefore concern is expressed that the principle of justice should be honoured and potential gains of globalization should be equally distributed. Real challenge is to reduce the gap between the rich and the poor and to resist global inequality and injustice. Expectation is for a new form of responsible capitalism that can earn profit but at the same time spread the benefits of globalization more equitably.

26.7 EXERCISES

1) Explain political implications of globalization.

2) In what ways globalization has changed economy.

3) Is it true to say that globalization has resulted in homogenization of culture?

SOME USEFUL BOOKS FOR THIS COURSE

J. R. Hale, *Renaissance Europe, 1480-1520*

Paul Hyland and others (Ed.), *The Enlightenment: A Source Book and Reader*

G. McLennan, D. Held and S. Hall, (eds.), *The Idea of the Modern State*

W. W. Rostow, *Theorists of Economic Growth from David Hume to the Present*

G. Balakrishnan (ed.), *Mapping the Nation*

Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*

Maurice Dobb, *Studies in the Development of Capitalism*

Paul Sweezy, *The Theory of Capitalist Development*

S. Pollard, *Peaceful Conquest: The Industrialization of Continental Europe, 1760-1970*

D. K. Fieldhouse, *Colonialism, 1870-1945, An Introduction*

B. J. Cohen, *The Question of Imperialism*

Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914-1991*

D. A. Low, *Eclipse of Empire*

R. Kagan, *The Rise and Fall of Great Powers*

Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations- The Struggle for Power and Peace*

C. A. Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914*

F. Furet, *Interpreting the French Revolution*

Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution, 1789-1848*

J. L.H. Keep, *The Russian Revolution: A Study in Mass Mobilization*

Peter browning, *The Changing Nature of Warfare: The Development of Land Warfare from 1792 to 1945*

Alfred Crosby, *Ecological Imperialism: The Biological Expansion of Europe, 900-1900*

David Arnold, *The Problem of Nature: Environment, Culture and European Expansion*

John Henry, *The Scientific Revolution and the Origins of Modern Science*

Archie Brown, *The Gorbachev Factor*,

Richard Sakwa, *The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union*

Frank J. Lechner and John Boli (eds.), *The Globalization Reader*

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